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Abstract
In 2007 Germany’s Left Party (DIE LINKE) won its first seats in the regional parliament 
of a western federal state, Bremen. This success contrasted with the failure of its 
predecessor, the PDS, to establish an electoral base beyond the eastern states. Today 
the Left Party is represented in eastern and western legislatures and challenges 
established coalition constellations both at federal and regional level. How can we 
understand the Left Party’s significant breakthrough in the West?
The existing literature has sought to analyse and interpret the Left Party’s origins, 
success and challenges, and has also emphasised the importance of the western 
states, both for the PDS and the Left Party. This thesis offers new insights by 
evaluating the respective strengths of two distinct theories, Cartel Theory and Social 
Cleavage Theory, as explanatory frameworks for the Left Party’s breakthrough. The 
theories are also appraised in a detailed case study of Bremen. The study examines 
whether the party displayed the organisational traits, parliamentary focus and electoral 
strategy identified in Cartel Theory. The investigation of Social Cleavage Theory 
explores the mobilisation and framing of class-based protest in the anti-Hartz 
demonstrations, and analyses election results for evidence of a realignment of class-
based support. The existing empirical data is supplemented by qualitative evidence 
obtained through questionnaire responses from Left Party members and sympathisers 
in Bremen. 
The final chapter considers the evidence as to whether Bremen is representative of 
other western states or an exceptional case. The overall findings suggest that 
indications of organisational features and the parliamentary focus associated with 
Cartel Theory did not explain the increase in Left Party support. Also, the redistributive 
character of the party’s programme countered, rather than converged with, the 
prevailing policy offer. However, WASG ties to organised labour and the SPD helped 
establish the Left Party in the tradition of social democracy and the political 
mainstream. Protest and the demand for social justice were indeed mobilised and 
framed in class terms and the Left Party attracted the votes of the unemployed and 
workers, as well as organised labour, with a partial realignment towards the Left Party, 
notably in SPD strongholds. The thesis concludes that class cleavage and class-based 
voting more strongly account for the Left Party’s electoral breakthrough. 
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The originality of the thesis lies in its approach of combining theoretical analysis with an 
in-depth local case study, supplemented by empirical evidence. The thesis also 
suggests avenues of future research that may validate or challenge the strength of the 
two explanatory frameworks over time.
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Introduction
In 2005 a new left-wing alliance entered the German national parliament (Bundestag). 
Formed from the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des demokratischen 
Sozialismus - PDS) and the recently emerged Electoral Alternative Work and Social 
Justice (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit - WASG), the alliance 
subsequently merged to constitute the Left Party (DIE LINKE). The new Left Party 
became Germany’s fifth main party at national level and is currently the largest 
opposition party in the Bundestag. It has also gained seats in a series of regional 
parliaments, including in Germany’s western federal states (Länder). 
The rise of the Left Party has important implications for German party politics. First, it 
challenges the established constellation of party coalitions. With the addition of a third 
left-of-centre party, the Social Democratic SPD, at best ambivalent about cooperation 
with the Left Party, has found it increasingly difficult to achieve a majority for its 
preferred coalition with the Greens, giving rise to more ‘Grand Coalitions’ and minority 
governments, a trend that looks set to continue . Secondly, there is now a party clearly 1
to the left of the SPD in the western states. Conversely, from the outset, the PDS 
adopted the strategy of ‘Westausdehnung’ (western expansion) but despite concerted 
and repeated efforts never succeeded in becoming established as a political force 
beyond the eastern states of the former GDR. 
The Left Party has also managed to bring together sections of the western German left, 
which had largely spurned the PDS during its fifteen-year existence. Furthermore, by 
attracting the support of the western and eastern electorates, the party constituted a 
new political force across both the eastern and western regions of the country . Most 2
recently, the party has gained its first ever premiership, leading a Left-SPD-Green 
coalition in the eastern state of Thuringia. While it is unlikely that the party will replicate 
this achievement in the West anytime soon, a number of regional elections are 
scheduled to take place from 2015 onwards, including in some key western Länder. It 
is currently unclear whether the Left Party will be returned to parliament or whether it 
can enter the three legislatures where the party has hitherto failed to gain 
 A Grand Coalition is formed from the two major mass parties, the SPD and the Christian 1
Democrats (CDU).
 The Left Party remains unrepresented in the parliaments of three western states: the two large 2
southern states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, as well as Rhineland Palatinate.
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representation. Furthermore, with the centre-left vote now split three ways, a further 
question concerns the potential for the first formal SPD-Green-Left coalition in the 
West. 
These developments and opportunities touch on some of the core political and 
strategic tensions that often caused conflict in the PDS and continue to spark debate in 
the Left Party today. At what price should the party cooperate with the SPD to bring 
about an overall change in political direction (Politikwechsel)? Should the party remain 
committed to a pathway of principled opposition? Is the party best described as an 
office-seeker or as the parliamentary arm of social movements? And how can the party 
be understood historically in relation to the German left?
Since the foundation of the PDS in 1989, the literature has offered a variety of insights 
into the party. The PDS has been explained in the context of unification and the fate of 
post-communist parties (Bayliss, 2008), and it was not unusual for the party to be 
portrayed as an outsider with extremist tendencies (Moreau, 1994). With an 
overwhelmingly eastern organisational and voter base, the PDS has been designated a 
‘milieu’ party, or the party of unification’s ‘losers’, with few prospects of becoming 
established in post-unification Germany (Gapper, 2003a). Furthermore, the literature 
displayed little optimism concerning the strategy of Westausdehnung. Despite a 
general consensus among the party and commentators that the western electorate was 
essential for the long-term survival of the PDS, the party’s ‘easternness’ and SED 
heritage were widely identified as barriers to establishing sustainable ties to existing 
western leftist and social movements and western voters (Olsen, 2002a). 
In light of the striking disparity between the party’s resilient eastern electorate and the 
bleak outlook in the West, debate increasingly centred on the notion that the PDS 
might abandon Westausdehnung altogether and instead consolidate its strength in the 
East (Patton, 2000) to become an eastern regional party (Hough, 2001). Regional 
aspects therefore became more prominent in the literature. Focusing on the East, 
analysis was primarily concerned with the PDS ‘toleration’ of SPD-led minority 
government, and later with power sharing as the junior partner in Germany’s first ‘Red-
Red’ coalition. PDS participation in regional governments became the fulcrum of 
internal conflict relating to the party’s understanding of socialism, political directions 
and goals (including parliamentary or extra-parliamentary orientation), the pathways of 
principled opposition, toleration or government (Behrend, 2006), as well as the 
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subsequent changing nature of internal party structures and sense of purpose (Gapper, 
2003b).
However, the PDS-West was not entirely overlooked. In fact the literature highlighted 
the dilemmas surrounding the achievement of the much-needed establishment in the 
western states: the party was evidently unable to attract disillusioned SPD or Green 
voters, while its attempts to unite a splintered extra-parliamentary left were both 
fruitless and unsustainable (Neu, 2000). Meanwhile, the party did gain seats on some 
western municipal councils, but a qualitative study of western PDS politicians at this 
level (Olsen, 2002b) explored the everyday hostility still encountered by elected PDS 
representatives, including endeavours by their counterparts in other parties to exclude 
them from participating in the democratic process. With the PDS failure to secure re-
election to the Bundestag in 2002, the literature was once again concerned with the 
party’s anticipated demise; the party’s lack of relevance in the West was attributed in 
part to weak performance at national and European level (Weiss, 2005), while the 
focus on the eastern core electorate was considered an alienating factor for western 
voters, and threatened the necessary breakthrough in the West (McKay, 2004). Later, a 
retrospective view of Westausdehnung carried out shortly before the PDS/WASG 
cooperation lamented the missed opportunities to build and develop a genuinely 
grassroots party with strong ties to unions and extra parliamentary movements, thus 
contributing to the rise of the (then) competitor, the WASG (Meuche-Mäker, 2005). 
The public response to the SPD government’s Agenda 2010 and specifically the Hartz 
reforms proved to be the turning point not only for the PDS but also for the German left. 
Naturally, the emergence of the WASG and the subsequent foundation of the new Left 
Party has been the subject of much analysis seeking to account for and explain the 
significance of the merger, as well as prognoses for the party’s long-term development. 
One such approach, the vacuum thesis, by which a party occupies a space on the 
political spectrum vacated by another (in this case the SPD) was able to offer a partial 
explanation, but did not account for the earlier failure of the PDS to occupy the space 
resulting from the SPD’s shift towards the ‘Neue Mitte’ (Olsen, 2007). Alternatively, the 
ability of the new left alliance to meet societal demand for social justice was elucidated 
in terms of a combination of opportunity structures that comprised actors, institutional 
factors and the framing of demands and protest (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007). Indeed, 
the demand for social justice was a recurring theme in the literature; rather than 
ideological extremism or economic pessimism, support for economic redistribution was 
identified as a common value among eastern and western voters (Bowyer and Vail,
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2011). The existence of social divisions was also explored in relation to voting 
behaviour, where analysis identified evidence of cleavage-based voting (Elff and 
Rossteutscher, 2011). Meanwhile, it has been argued that the continuing success of 
the Left Party, particularly in the western states, depends not only on the mobilisation of 
former SPD voters, but also on the ability of the party to mobilise non-voters into class-
based politics (Solty, 2007). Furthermore, the uneven development of the party and the 
federal nature of Germany’s political system mean that many of the dilemmas that 
faced the PDS remain unresolved in the Left Party; most notably the question of office-
seeking versus issue/vote-seeking goals, where divisions between the eastern and 
western party branches still persist (Green et al., 2007). Nonetheless, despite 
continuing challenges, the Left Party’s impact on German party politics and its 
significance for the German left emphasise the relevance of even this partial 
breakthrough in the western states.     
To sum up, the literature has set out analyses and interpretations of the Left Party’s 
origins, success and challenges. It has also emphasised the importance of the western 
states, both throughout the entire existence of the PDS, and for the Left Party today. 
On the other hand, the current literature has yet to combine theory and empirical 
evidence in a detailed exploration of the Left Party’s development and performance. 
Therefore, against the background of the PDS’s underachievement in the western 
states, the aim of this research is to appraise the ability of two very different 
explanatory frameworks, Cartel Theory and Social Cleavage Theory, to account for the 
far greater success of the Left Party. To do so, it examines the evolution of both parties 
and then undertakes a detailed analysis of Bremen, the western federal state in which 
the Left Party’s breakthrough occurred.       
The first chapter begins with an account of early PDS efforts to establish party 
organisations and a voter base in the West. It sets out the party’s three main policy 
areas: representation of eastern interests, social justice and antimilitarism. These 
themes have subsequently formed the cornerstones of Left Party policy today. Also 
explored in this chapter are the different political and strategic approaches that 
characterised the eastern and western PDS, particularly in relation to party 
organisation, (extra-)parliamentary orientation and office seeking. Once again, the 
same recurrent – or unresolved – issues are manifested in the Left Party. The chapter 
then provides an overview of the Agenda 2010 and Hartz ‘reforms’ and explains how 
the public response and the subsequent emergence of the WASG alliance created the 
conditions for the foundation of a new, all-German party to the left of the SPD. 
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Following an analysis of the often uneasy dynamic of the PDS-WASG merger, the 
chapter reflects on continuity and change in the three main policy areas.
The thesis then begins to consider explanations of the Left Party’s electoral 
breakthrough in the western states. Chapter Two introduces the first of the two 
theoretical approaches, Cartel Theory. This framework offers two interesting 
perspectives for the analysis of political parties. First, it suggests that a changing 
relationship to the state and a series of coordination dilemmas lead parties to adapt 
their internal structures and organisation. As a result, we can expect to see an 
increasingly top-down approach within the party (described as the ascendancy of the 
party in central office) and prioritisation of the parliamentary party over grassroots 
activism. The second perspective concerns electoral competition. According to Cartel 
Theory, parties seek to maximise their own security within the institutions of the state 
and minimise external threats from political challengers. To do so, they employ 
oligopoly-like behaviour and techniques such as the rhetoric of ‘no alternative’, thereby 
subduing and restricting the policy supply. Although Cartel Theory is usually concerned 
with parties and electoral competition at a national level, Germany’s federal structure 
means that the ’top down’ and oligopolistic effects could also refer to the party 
executive within an individual federal state. The thesis investigates the theory’s ability 
to explain the developments in the PDS/Left Party’s performance, both generally and in 
the specific context of Bremen.     
The second framework applied in this thesis is Social Cleavage Theory. Given the Left 
Party’s strong policy focus on social justice and economic democracy, Chapter Three 
specifically addresses the class cleavage in relation to the tension between capital and 
labour. Again, two key perspectives are explored in the chapter. The first concerns the 
enduring relevance of the class cleavage. The continuing salience of socio-economic 
class has been cast in doubt in light of the changing nature of economic activity and the 
shift from the industrial to post-industrial society. However, analysis of characteristics 
associated with modern patterns and types of employment, including the rise of the 
‘precariat’, in fact demonstrates the continuing importance of the capital-labour 
cleavage. Moreover, support for welfare has remained resilient in Germany, particularly 
among workers and the unemployed, and was exemplified in the protests against the 
Hartz employment market and welfare reforms. The second perspective is concerned 
with class-based voting. The thesis analyses voting patterns both for the Social 
Democrats (SPD) and the PDS/Left Party in eastern and western Germany and then in 
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the context of Bremen to determine whether a partial realignment of class voting has 
indeed occurred.  
In Chapter Four the main findings from both explanatory frameworks are carried 
forward and applied in a case study of the Left Party in the city-state of Bremen. 
Particularly acute social and economic challenges and the fact that Bremen offers a 
favourable environment for small parties identified the state as a seemingly obvious 
target for a PDS breakthrough. However, a succession of poor election performances 
proved the strategy unsuccessful. In the 2007 regional election, however, the new Left 
Party alliance entered Bremen’s parliament (the Bürgerschaft) and formed a full 
parliamentary group, the first in a series of electoral breakthroughs in western 
legislatures. 
The aim of the Case Study is to account for the Left Party’s groundbreaking 
achievement in Bremen, with specific reference to the two explanatory frameworks. As 
a context not only for understanding the historical circumstances of the Left Party’s 
success, but also for evaluating the respective strengths of the theories, the chapter 
begins with an overview of key socio-economic and political characteristics of Bremen, 
and considers the disappointing performance of the PDS in regional elections. 
The analysis of the explanatory frameworks begins with Cartel Theory. In its 
investigation of any tendency to adopt organisational features identified in the theory, 
the study focuses on the tensions between the two components of the Left Party 
alliance as well as between different strata within the party hierarchy, particularly 
concerning central party influence in local matters and prioritisation of parliamentary 
politics. Secondly, the study considers evidence relating to the 2007 election campaign 
to discover whether the Left Party consciously modified its policy offer in the interests 
of parliamentary politics and longer-term cooperation or office-seeking goals. 
The analysis of Social Cleavage Theory focuses on the anti-Hartz demonstrations to 
consider class-based mobilisation and in particular the changing actors and language 
of protest. The study then undertakes a detailed analysis of the 2007 Bürgerschaft 
election results, and includes factors such as locations of support, occupational group, 
unemployment and past electoral choices. The study investigates the extent of class-
based voting patterns and possible realignment from the Social Democrats to the Left 
Party. 
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The study draws on available data including official election results and locally based 
resources, such as collected press releases, articles, flyers and transcripts of 
speeches, as well as discussion forum contributions and PDS/Left Party publications. 
To further investigate the explanation of the Left Party’s electoral success in 2007, two 
questionnaires were distributed to Left Party members, voters and sympathisers in 
Bremen. The questionnaires tested the key themes identified in Cartel Theory and 
Social Cleavage theory in a series of both closed and open questions. Chapter Four’s 
introduction to the Case Study provides a full account of the research methodology, 
including some of the obstacles encountered. This qualitative, supplementary data 
obtained enriched the existing evidence and enhanced understanding of the Case 
Study’s key findings. 
An increasing parliamentary focus was discernible in Bremen’s Left Party. First, internal 
organisation saw resources and activities increasingly dedicated to supporting the 
future parliamentary party. Secondly, the scope of the campaign was concentrated on 
policies achievable within the competence of the regional parliament. In addition, 
instances of federal party involvement suggested the increasing ascendancy of the 
party in central office, as well as attempted restriction of policy. However, the campaign 
was premised on an oppositional role for the party; furthermore, the majority of the 
electorate as well as sections of the party deemed Left Party governmental cooperation 
either unlikely or undesirable. Analysis from the perspective of Social Cleavage 
confirmed class-based mobilisation over the Hartz reforms, and that the protest was 
increasingly framed in class terms as the influence of the WASG also grew. Second, in 
the 2007 election, the Left Party was most successful in attracting the votes of the 
unemployed, workers and trade union members. However, the party received its 
greatest voter share in specific Green strongholds, and therefore continued to build on 
the modest historical strength of the PDS in these areas. 
The chapter concludes that while key aspects of Cartel Theory were identifiable in the 
Left Party, these did not actually explain the increase in voter share, and as such 
cannot account for the party’s breakthrough electoral success in Bremen. 
Nevertheless, the WASG’s origins in Social Democracy and especially organised 
labour overcame (or at least alleviated) the fundamental weaknesses that had cast the 
PDS in the role of perennial ‘outsider’; furthermore, the WASG contributed to the 
framing of protests in class terms. With a clearly redistributive policy offer and 
established links to the ‘familiar’ social democratic tradition, the new Left Party was in a 
position to mobilise opposition to austerity, privatisation and cuts and to gain 
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substantial support among workers, the unemployed and trade union members. Even 
though the party’s best performance was in Green strongholds, SPD losses here and 
especially in many traditionally Social Democrat-voting districts indicated a partial 
realignment of these voter groups to the Left Party. These trends suggested the 
relevance of Social Cleavage Theory.
Chapter Five reflects on the Case Study findings and discusses whether Bremen, while 
undoubtedly significant for the Left Party, can be considered representative of other 
western states or an exceptional case. The Hartz reforms were implemented 
nationwide and their consequences felt in each federal state. Yet the Case Study 
demonstrates that Bremen suffered from particularly severe unemployment and 
poverty and was also experiencing the impact of the ‘restructuring’ programme of cuts 
and privatisation. In addition, Bremen is distinct from most other western states through 
its political traditions and status as city-state. The chapter therefore undertakes a 
comparison between Bremen and the western states of North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hessen and Hamburg. Although less detailed than the Bremen study, the analysis 
identifies similarities and differences relating to organisation, parliamentary focus and 
office-seeking goals as well as class-based support for the Left Party: 
• First, attempts were made by the central party to ensure conformity among 
candidates and campaigns. In some instances the intervention occurred because of 
organisational weakness at regional level; elsewhere the objective was clearly to 
modify policy in the interest of achieving parliamentary representation. 
• Second, policy goals closely reflected the national party programme and were 
mostly confined to the competence of the regional legislature. However, the 
election programmes’ emphasis on redistribution and the democratisation of the 
economy actually set the Left Party somewhat apart from the established 
parliamentary parties and therefore indicates that policy convergence did not 
account for the increase in the party’s support. 
• Third, some contrasts became evident in the approach to government cooperation, 
ranging from unequivocal rejection through to participation in preliminary talks with 
the SPD and Greens, thus highlighting the tension between office-seeking 
tendencies and principled opposition; nevertheless, in each state the party entered 
parliament in an oppositional role. 
• Finally, alongside traditionally SPD-voting areas, Green strongholds emerged as 
locations of Left Party voter share in Hamburg and Bremen, suggesting that 
antimilitarism might represent an additional important means of attracting support, 
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albeit one rather specific to the two city-states. Overall, though, in each state it was 
the same three voter groups – workers, the unemployed and trade union members 
– that constituted not only the greatest voter share, but also produced the most 
significant qualitative change in Left Party support. 
To sum up, Cartel Theory cannot satisfactorily explain the rise in Left Party support in 
the regional elections. The organisational traits and parliamentary focus identified in the 
theory and evident within the western party associations may have intensified in 
anticipation of the parliamentary success, but did not signify a substantial qualitative 
change at the time of the party’s electoral breakthrough. Furthermore, despite the 
parliamentary focus, the Left Party programme proposed a set of alternatives that 
countered the prevailing policy offer. Therefore, conscious policy convergence by the 
Left Party is also unlikely as an explanation of the party’s success. However, the 
WASG’s organisational and political origins were instrumental not only in facilitating ties 
to organised labour (therefore overcoming an inherent weaknesses within the western 
PDS), but also in establishing the Left Party within the Social Democratic tradition and 
therefore closer to the political mainstream. 
  
Social Cleavage Theory requires the presence of a clearly defined social group to 
mobilise around a particular tension. Opposition to the Agenda 2010/Hartz reforms and 
the continuing demand for social justice exemplified this mobilisation, which the WASG 
in particular succeeded in framing in class terms. In the regional elections the Left 
Party attracted the support of the unemployed and workers, as well as organised 
labour. Even though the SPD continued to benefit from a degree of loyalty among 
these voters, the evidence from this research indicated a partial realignment towards 
the Left Party, especially in working-class SPD strongholds. Furthermore, though an 
additional source of support was indicated in middle-class Green strongholds (at least 
in the city-states), it was the votes of the unemployed, workers and trade union 
members that represented the most significant qualitative change in Left Party support. 
The findings therefore endorse the thesis that the class cleavage and class-based 
voting most strongly account for the Left’s electoral breakthrough. 
The originality of the thesis lies in its approach of explaining the Left Party’s success 
through the consideration of two competing theories. In addition, the theoretical 
analysis is combined with a local case study of the Left Party, which is in turn 
supported by empirical evidence. The thesis also places the protests against the Hartz 
reforms in the context of social movements and organisational change. This 
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combination of approaches allows a more differentiated understanding of the Left 
Party’s breakthrough than might be gained from a historical perspective only. Finally, 
while both theories considered in this research contribute insights into the trajectory of 
the Left Party and its initial success in the West, the party’s continued presence in 
western legislatures is by no means assured, so it is perhaps too soon to reach longer-
term conclusions regarding the party’s performance. The thesis ends by suggesting 
avenues of future research that may validate or challenge the strength of the two 
explanatory frameworks.  
 
 10
Chapter One:
The PDS/Left Party and its 
Development in the West
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the Left Party and to set out the key 
developments that led to its founding in 2007. The story begins with the party’s 
predecessor, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Section One explains the 
emergence of the PDS in response to the citizens’ movement and change (Wende) in 
East Germany and the subsequent process of unification, and outlines the rationale for 
the party’s early attempts to establish a voter base in the western federal states.     
The PDS identified three major policy areas: the representation of eastern interests in 
unified Germany, social justice and antimilitarism. Section Two draws on PDS 
programmes and manifestos to explore the development of these policy areas — the 
core issues and themes which the party hoped would also mobilise leftist voters and 
activists in the western states. It soon becomes evident that contradictions emerged 
relating to these themes, and that these often resulted in a clash of interests that 
reflected the deeper tensions running through the party. The PDS never succeeded in 
becoming a truly national party and continued to attract the majority of its electoral 
support in the East, where it was far more established in the party political system as 
well as in positions of responsibility, both at local and regional (Land) level. However, 
the party’s pragmatic approach and parliamentary success in the eastern states were 
often at odds with the more ideologically based and extra-parliamentary approach in 
the West. Divisions ran particularly deep within the party over whether to seek a reform 
of capitalism or a socialist alternative, and whether to pursue office-seeking goals or 
principled opposition. Meanwhile, the issue of antimilitarism and peace brought to the 
fore the tension between the party leadership on the one hand and activists on the 
other.   
Against this background and in light of a stubbornly weak PDS presence in the West, 
Section Three reflects on the party’s strategic dilemmas. Throughout the party’s 
existence, sections of the party, mainly in the eastern states, urged the leadership to 
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abandon the strategy of western expansion. The existing tensions became even more 
acute when the party failed to constitute a parliamentary group at federal level; while 
the western electorate became even more strategically important, further doubt was 
cast on the party’s ability to become established as a fully nationwide party and a leftist 
force in both regions of Germany. 
 
Section Four turns to the foundation of the Left Party. The implementation of far-
reaching welfare and employment market reforms triggered protests among people 
affected by and opposed to the fundamental restructuring of work and the social state 
(referred to by Wiesendahl (2004, p.1) as the ‘Welfare Wende’). Members and 
supporters of the Social Democratic party also participated in the protests. The schism 
led to the emergence of a new alliance, the WASG, and a unique opportunity to 
establish a new left-wing movement to the left of the SPD. This section also focuses on 
the often uneasy relationship between the PDS and WASG, and the factors that 
compelled their cooperation and eventual merger to form the Left Party.  
The final section of the chapter returns once again to consider the themes of eastern 
interests, social justice and peace, all of which continued to form the political direction 
of the Left Party programme. It was with these policies that the Left Party gained 
sufficient electoral support not only to form a parliamentary group in the Bundestag, but 
also to enter the regional parliament in Bremen, followed by a succession of other 
western regional legislatures. 
By the end of the chapter, there will be an understanding of the catalysts for the 
formation of the PDS and the Left Party, the continuing strategic importance of the 
western states and an overview of the main policy areas. The chapter is the foundation 
for subsequent exploration of the two theoretical frameworks that seek to explain the 
Left Party’s eventual success in the western states. 
 12
1.1. Beyond the Wende: the Formation of the PDS
In 1989, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) experienced an autumn of political 
and social upheaval. This period became widely referred to as ‘Die Wende’, meaning 
‘change’ or ‘turn’. The country saw the proliferation of new opposition groups such as 
Neues Forum (New Forum), Demokratischer Aufbruch (Democratic Awakening) and 
Demokratie Jetzt (Democracy Now). None of these groups regarded themselves as 
parties (Neugebauer, 1995, p.39). But in October that year, the Social Democratic Party 
in the GDR (SDP ) declared itself a direct competitor to the Socialist Unity Party 3
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - SED), the governing or 'leading' party 
since the GDR's foundation in 1949. The SDP's stated intention of participating in 
elections thus effectively represented a challenge to the SED's monopoly on power 
(ibid.). At the same time, as a result of the autumn's burgeoning political unrest, the 
SED found itself confronted with a weakening of its political hegemony; this too spurred 
the processes of transformation within the bloc parties . These transformations took the 4
form of renewal drives among the old parties, the foundation of new parties and the 
formation of new alliances. In short, it became clear that the political 'unity' of the 
GDR's bloc parties would not survive (ibid.). Consequently, political parties in the 
western Federal Republic began to consider strategies for expansion in the East. The 
Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP) assimilated corresponding existing bloc 
parties (ibid., p.40); the CDU also adopted the more right-wing sections of the citizens' 
movement (Demokratischer Aufbruch and a breakaway section of Neues Forum) 
(Irving and Paterson, 1991, p.357). All the same, both Neues Forum and Demokratie 
Jetzt reaffirmed both their status as citizens' movements and their rejection of political 
parties (Neugebauer, 1995, p.40). 
Between 8 and 17 December 1989, the SED embarked on an extraordinary congress 
at which it declared its break with Stalinism and stated its commitment to democratic 
socialism (Behrend, 2006, p.26). The congress also resolved not to dissolve the SED in 
order to found a new party, but instead announced the existing party would be renamed 
the SED-PDS . Human rights lawyer Gregor Gysi was elected Chair of the 'new' party. 5
 In 1990 the SDP changed its same to the SPD, to align itself to the West German Social 3
Democrats. 
 A bloc of nominally independent anti-fascist parties that were effectively controlled by the SED.4
 To avoid confusing terms, the thesis refers to the party as the PDS for the period between 5
1989 and 2005 (the start of the PDS’s cooperation with the WASG).
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(At a further congress in February 1990 the party was renamed again, this time simply 
as the PDS.) The party's critics claimed this unwillingness to formally break with the 
past provided proof the party was nothing but an SED-Nachfolgepartei or even SED-
Fortsetzungspartei (successor or continuation party respectively), emphasising that the 
PDS would, for all intents and purposes, mean SED business as usual, albeit under a 
different name (Moreau, 1994, p.11). 
The Wende placed immense pressure on the PDS. On 1 December 1989, the GDR’s 
parliament (Volkskammer) revoked the SED's claim to leadership from the GDR 
constitution and therefore its status as party of state. The party had also been stripped 
of its organisational monopoly (Behrend, 2006, p.24). On the other hand, by choosing 
to rename rather than dissolve the SED, the PDS maintained its forerunner's logistical 
structures, members and, importantly, its informal network of contacts, without which it 
is doubtful the party could have survived (Neugebauer, 1995, p.41). However, it was 
also confronted with the threat of expropriation; SED cash and business and property 
were transferred to the state, so that by the end of 1990 the PDS was left with just five 
per cent of SED assets (Die Linke.PDS, 2007a). Furthermore, while SED membership 
had previously amounted to over two million people, numbers plummeted to 450,000 
by May 1990 and to just 200,000 by the end of the same year (Patton, 2011, p.36).  
In March 1990, a total of twenty-four different party groups, political parties and 
electoral alliances participated in the Volkskammer election. The election and the 
subsequent phase that led towards unification clearly demonstrated two related 
phenomena; first, that western parties had quickly established themselves as the 
dominant force in the East's political system; and, secondly, that it had become 
unfeasible for the bloc parties to survive without a western partner (Neugebauer, 1995, 
p.41). In the Bundestag election of December 1990, it was overwhelmingly the 
western-affiliated parties that would receive the majority share of the vote in the 
eastern Länder, while the PDS and Bündnis ’90  survived only because of an 6
exceptional ruling on the conditions of the election (ibid.)  
In General Elections (Bundestag elections) two votes are cast, with fifty per cent of 
parliamentary seats allocated according to the results of each respective vote. The first 
vote is given directly to a constituency candidate, a rule which is intended to maintain a 
personal, localised element to representation. The result of the first vote is calculated 
 Alliance '90: An electoral alliance including Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt, peace and human 6
rights activists and Greens. Bündnis '90 merged with the (western) Greens in 1993. The party is 
officially known as Bündnis '90/Die Grünen.
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by means of a simple majority and the winner in each constituency is elected to 
parliament via a direct mandate (Direktmandat) (Green et al., 2008, p.83). The second 
vote is for party lists put forward in the respective federal state and is of particular 
importance since this determines the balance of power within the Bundestag. The 
result of the second vote is calculated proportionately, and parties must normally 
achieve at least five per cent — the electoral threshold — in order to gain seats in 
parliament (ibid.). However, to minimise the disadvantage to small regional parties, 
including those representing national minorities with little chance of polling five per cent 
of the second vote, the direct mandate rule (Grundmandatsklausel) allows a party to 
enter parliament if it has won three direct mandate seats via the first vote (ibid., p.84). 
Since it was rare for small parties to win a constituency outright , for many years the 7
rule was of only minor significance. But in 1994 the PDS would go on to win three 
constituencies outright and therefore qualified to enter parliament under the 
Grundmandatklausel ruling, despite failing to clear the national electoral threshold. In 
the post-unification period, the direct mandate rule thus assumed a more prominent 
role, particularly in relation to PDS representation in the Bundestag. In August 1990 
both the Federal Republic's Bundestag and the GDR's Volkskammer agreed that the 
electoral threshold should apply to the whole of Germany as a single entity in the first 
all-German general election to be held in December (Irving and Paterson, 1991, p.372). 
To allow the small eastern parties a competitive chance, their larger, western 'sister' 
parties would open their lists to the eastern candidates. However, the PDS, which had 
no such western ally or natural partner, made a formal complaint to the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. On 29 September 1990 the complaint was upheld on 
the grounds that the electoral law passed by the two parliaments failed to ensure 
equality of opportunity for political parties (Die Linke.PDS, 2007a). Consequently, a 
revision to electoral law stipulated that for the December 1990 election only, the five 
per cent threshold must be cleared in either the western or eastern Länder. In short, 
although unification had already taken place just two days before, East and West were 
to be regarded as two separate electoral entities (Irving and Paterson, 1991, p.372).  
The revision threw a lifeline to the PDS. For although the party managed to win just 
0.3% of the western vote and 2.4% overall, its result in the eastern states (11.1%) was 
enough to ensure entry to the first all-German Bundestag, with seventeen seats 
(Hough et al., 2007, p.23). Figure 1.1(a) below shows the share of second votes 
 Notable exceptions:  Former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher won his constituency of 7
Halle for the FDP in 1990, while the Greens' Hans-Christian Ströbele won the Berlin 
constituency of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg in 2002 and 2005 (Green et al., 2008, p.84).
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(Zweitstimmen) gained by the PDS, and (from 2005 to 2009) the Left Party in federal 
elections since unification, while Figure 1.1(b) illustrates how these votes translated 
into parliamentary seats in the Bundestag. The data for the year 2002 highlights the 
disastrous consequences of failure to overcome the electoral threshold; after this 
election, the PDS was represented by just two members of parliament. 
Figure 1.1(a): PDS/Left Party percentage share of Bundestag votes
(DIE LINKE.PDS, 2007b)
Figure 1.1(b): PDS/Left Party Bundestag seats 
1990-2002: PDS; 2005: Left Party.PDS (with WASG); 2009: Left Party  
(DIE LINKE.PDS, 2007b)
Parties represented in the Bundestag aim to form a Fraktion (parliamentary group) . 8
The Fraktion consists of the party’s elected members but can also include members of 
other parties who share the same political goals and do not electorally compete against 
 Translation note: Fraktion is translated as ‘parliamentary group’ in official Bundestag 8
documents. However, the standard English translation of Gruppe is ‘group’, which may lead to 
confusion over which term is meant. For the purpose of clarity, this thesis applies the following 
translations throughout: Fraktion = ‘parliamentary group’; Gruppe = ‘group within the 
Bundestag’.
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the main party in any federal state. To qualify as a full parliamentary group, the party 
has to make up at least five per cent of the Bundestag members or, failing this, has to 
apply for recognition by the Bundestag as a whole (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013). 
Despite entering parliament through the special threshold ruling, the PDS failed to 
achieve the five per cent of the vote (thirty-four seats) normally required for 
parliamentary group status. The PDS and Bündnis '90/Greens delegations applied 
unsuccessfully for full recognition and both were subsequently assigned the status of 
Gruppe (group within the Bundestag), rather than that of full parliamentary group (ibid.). 
The Gruppe, which requires a minimum of five members or three direct mandates, 
does not receive the rights and privileges extended to the full Fraktion (ibid.) and as a 
result is subject to several restrictions placed on its political work (see Chapter Two). 
Gaining parliamentary group status is therefore extremely important, especially for 
smaller parties. Aside from the associated significant material resources, such as 
additional funding, staff and offices, it also entitles the party to a greater allocation of 
speaking time in parliamentary debates . Without these resources and rights, it is 9
difficult for a party — in particular a new or regionally based party — to maintain a 
visible presence at federal level. Consequently, the electoral system of the Federal 
Republic was an important factor driving PDS strategy for the western states. 
1.1.1. From Informal ‘Project’ to Establishment in the Western States
In the early part of 1990, a group consisting of the reform wing of the Deutsche 
Kommunistische Partei (DKP), Greens, Social Democrats, members of the 
Kommunistischer Bund (Communist Alliance) and others within the western 
independent left movement gathered in Hamburg as part of an initiative convened by 
Wolfgang Gehrcke (formerly chair of the DKP) and Christane Reymann of the PDS 
(Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.15). The aim of the meeting was to establish a common 
discourse concerning the Wende and its consequences. According to Gohde (1995, p.
70), only minor consideration was given to whether the PDS might need to find a 
western partner to participate in forthcoming Bundestag elections; at the time, the next 
general election was not anticipated before 1992; hence for the initiators of this 
gathering, the priority was not the founding of a new western party. Instead, they 
envisaged the instigation of a leftist 'Sammelbewegung' (collective movement) in which 
 This theme is explored in greater depth in the next chapter, which discusses the issue of state 9
resources and subsidies in the context of Cartel Theory. 
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the various left forces in the western states were able to find a way to overcome 
existing party and organisational borders, with the PDS as a common reference point. 
The atmosphere was therefore provisional and project-like (ibid.). 
Although the PDS already had a statute and manifesto, both had been rendered largely 
irrelevant, as they had been written within the specific context of the GDR. As a result, 
neither document was able to serve as the starting point for the building of a new party 
in the western states. However, by the middle of 1990 it became clear that elections to 
the Bundestag would actually take place as soon as December that same year. 
(Gohde, 1995, p.70). The PDS opted to contest the elections with the 'Left List', which 
involved the party opening up its list to members of other organisations and 
independent candidates, a strategy that enjoyed by no means unanimous support in 
the party. Relations between the PDS and DKP organisations had been growing closer 
and therefore a number of PDS members believed it made little sense to abandon ties 
to what seemed to be the only serious and relatively known western partner in favour of 
an assorted bag of ‘leftists' (ibid., p.71). As such, there was a degree of support for a 
concrete partnership with the DKP. Another stream of opinion preferred the rapid 
establishment of a new party organisation in the West, supported by a network of 
contact offices and PDS initiatives. Even so, the majority of the PDS leadership at the 
time favoured the idea of the Left List, although it was also open to the idea of 
establishing a new party organisation in the western states at some point in the future 
(ibid.). The first western Left List and PDS regional organisation was established in 
Baden-Württemberg, on 2 September 1990, with other western states following suit 
(Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.15).
The decision to pursue the Left List strategy also met with a strong reaction among the 
various leftist groups in the West — the same groups who had initially been courted by 
the PDS to form the collective movement 'project'. The eco-socialist wing of the 
Greens, who had broken away from their party because of what they perceived as 
'rampant red-green inebriation' , formed their own loose collective, opposing what it 10
saw as social-democratic and nationalistic tendencies within the PDS, and stood 
against the Left List in the election (Gohde, 1995, p.71). Meanwhile, a number of the 
reform orientated communists had fallen by the wayside at some point between their 
exit from the DKP at the end of 1989 and the formation of the Left List in the summer of 
1990; other DKP members who had thrown in their lot in with the PDS 'project' took a 
 A reference to the increasingly mooted notion of electoral cooperation between the social 10
democrats (SPD) and Greens.
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sceptical view of the electoral list, fearing a rapid de facto founding of a new party 
before they had a chance to fully consider the fate of their own. Although individuals 
without prior membership of any party also joined the PDS in the formative years, the 
majority of western PDS members already had some sort of political background (ibid.). 
A common expectation among former DKP members and those who had left the 
Greens or SPD was that the PDS/Left List should somehow manage to heal all their old 
wounds, regardless of whether these centred on a perceived lack of radicalism or too 
much conformity in the previous party organisations. In short, the PDS was to be the 
socialist party able to provide everything that had been impossible within the confines 
of the respective old parties. Yet for many among the western left, it became clear there 
was a considerable difference between the concept of the PDS in theory and the PDS 
in practice; although it presented itself as a combination of a party and 'movement', its 
activities and organisational structures failed to live up to this self-image and, therefore, 
several of the expectations placed upon it (ibid., p.74). Moreover, its own history as 
dominant state party meant that the PDS was regarded as authoritarian and anti-
parliamentarian, while its critical stance on the unification process earned it a 
reputation as an 'anti-western' party. Thus, unable to credibly change its (perceived) 
character overnight, the PDS failed to convince that it was a fully ‘gewendete' party at 
the beginning of the unification process. This wordplay, which alluded to the Wende, 
implied that the PDS had not only failed to undertake structural reforms, but was also 
regarded as out of step with the spirit of transformation and the unification. As a result, 
the stream of the West's most prolific left-wing activists into the PDS did not materialise 
to the extent that had been anticipated (Neugebauer, 1995, p.42).  
Nonetheless, even after the 'collective project' initiative was replaced by the election-
orientated Left List, followers of various leftist, autonomous and anarchist groups did 
continue to gravitate towards the western PDS. Members of these groups constantly 
sought to justify (to each other and perhaps also to themselves) their membership of 
the PDS, a party which they considered suffered from too much social democracy and 
too little radicalism; indeed, it was commonplace for these members to cite as their 
motive for joining the PDS their intention to prevent the party's drift to the centre ground 
(Gohde, 1995, p.76).
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1.1.2. Why Were the Western States so Important for the PDS? 
The early general election in December 1990 prompted the PDS to switch the nature of 
its cooperation with the western left from a loose, project-like approach towards the 
party-based electoral Left List. However, the December election also directly 
contributed to an important development element in PDS strategy concerning the 
western states specifically. As described above, the ruling that a party should clear the 
five per cent threshold in either eastern or western Germany allowed the PDS to gain 
representation in the Bundestag, thanks to its strong result in the East, and in spite of 
its poor (under five per cent) result nationwide. But it also rendered the Left List 
superfluous, at least in terms of helping the PDS over the electoral threshold (Meuche-
Mäker, 2005, p.16). 
The task was now to transform the various Left List groups into PDS regional party 
organisations (Landesverbände). Nonetheless, these organisations maintained ‘Left 
List’ as a suffix to the name and a number of western party associations continued to 
view themselves in terms of a cooperative, rather than as a party, even refusing to 
accept members on a formal basis. According to Gohde (1995, p.72), with hindsight, 
subsequent internal conflict within the PDS can be traced back to this serious ‘birth 
defect’.
There were also other, more far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, the 
decision to run the Left List did little to alleviate western scepticism about the extent of 
PDS willingness to participate in alliances without (again) assuming the leading role; on 
the other hand, experience of the early attempts to establish a presence in the West 
raised concerns within the PDS about the cooperation potential among much of the 
'organised orthodox or dogmatic left spectrum' of the Federal Republic (Neugebauer, 
1995, p.43). Gohde (1995, p.72) therefore claims that it was thanks to the internal 
dynamic of the existing cooperation, rather than any consciously political decision, that 
the PDS took the step of becoming a nationwide party. Neugebauer (1995, p.42) 
concurs with this view, stating that internal debates such as those concerning the past 
or the overall direction of the party played a less influential role in driving the PDS 
through the transformational period than did any reluctance of other parties such as the 
DKP to become associated with the PDS, whether for historical or ideological reasons.   
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Competing in the western states, the PDS was in a rather unique position. Unlike 
communist successor parties elsewhere in central and eastern Europe, the PDS did 
not benefit from any ‘fresh start’ and instead faced electoral competition from 
established and strong western parties in a political marketplace they had created. On 
the other hand, unlike established communist parties in western Europe, it had at that 
time no network of cooperation with other organisations and no experience of 
competing against capitalist parties (Hough, 2005, p.146). The longer-term prognosis 
for the PDS as a nation-wide party was far from optimistic:
The PDS is likely to retain a presence in the five new Länder, but at the 
next Federal election the 5% threshold will apply to the whole territory of 
Germany and it is very unlikely that it will secure representation. (Irving and 
Paterson, 1991, p.370)
In this quote, Irving and Paterson highlight the danger of failing to clear the electoral 
threshold that would be applied nationwide, rather than for separate regions, in 
subsequent Bundestag elections. The risk had to be minimised, but a strategy that 
depended on winning eastern direct mandates neither provided a reliable safety net nor 
secured a sustainable route to Bundestag representation and parliamentary group 
status. Support among the eastern population could by no means be taken for granted; 
it was likely that both the eastern socialist 'milieu' of former SED members and civil 
servants as well as the eastern protest vote would erode, initially due to migration to 
western states and, over the longer term, due to an ageing voter base. Furthermore, 
over 80% of the population resided in the western states, meaning that even a strong 
share of the vote in the East might not suffice to counter a weak performance in the 
West. Instead, a sustainable strategy of gaining representation and parliamentary 
group status in the Bundestag required the party to safely clear the electoral threshold 
nationwide, which in turn necessitated a substantial increase in the share of the 
western vote. This calculation continued to underpin PDS strategy right up until the 
party's cooperation and subsequent merger with the (western-based) WASG.
It is very unlikely to survive except possibly in a few parts of East Germany. 
Probably the majority of its supporters will gravitate to the SPD in due 
course. (Irving and Paterson, 1991, p.371)
Here, Irving and Paterson underline the conundrum facing the PDS. On the one hand, 
the party could not rely on its relative popularity among the eastern electorate to secure 
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its future as a parliamentary group in the national parliament. The party leadership was 
also ideologically committed to ‘establishing an all-German socialist alternative to the 
SPD’ (Patton, 2006, p.209) and the claim to be a modern socialist party rather than an 
eastern regional party would carry greater credibility if the persistently vast gap 
between its eastern and western voter share could be narrowed (McKay, 2004, p.53). 
Yet on the other hand, the prospects of establishing a solid voter base in the West were 
bleak for this decidedly eastern party. It was unclear as to why western voters should 
prefer the PDS to the well-established Social Democrats, and the experience of the 
Left List had already demonstrated the PDS’s limited appeal among the western left. 
Moreover, despite the imperative to secure a voter base in the western states, the 
eastern PDS forcefully asserted itself as the only 'indigenous' party able to articulate 
the eastern interests and dissatisfaction with the consequences of unification. (Olsen, 
2002a, p.198) This type of language clearly identified the PDS as a party very much at 
home in the East, rather than a party seeking to embrace the West. Olsen (ibid.) 
therefore considers it ‘no wonder then that there are some who view the PDS as having 
less in common with other communist successor parties than with "regional" parties" 
throughout western and eastern Europe’. 
The long-term pursuit of western expansion (Westausdehnung) therefore required the 
emphasis of socialist policies designed to appeal to the western left, despite the 
inherent risk of jeopardising shorter term electoral prospects and despite a conflict line 
between the aims of this strategy and the interests of the party's own eastern core 
(McKay, 2004, p.67). The following section focuses on the programmatic development 
of the PDS and introduces the key themes of eastern regionalism, anti-capitalism and 
antimilitarism.
 22
1.2. Key Policy Areas: The PDS
It makes sense to vote for more PDS in the Bundestag: as the party of 
social justice, as the party of peace and antimilitarism and as the party that 
sees a better future for eastern Germany.  (PDS, 2002)
The PDS provisional programme was adopted at conference in February 1990 and 
published under the heading ‘PDS — Progressiv — Produktiv — Pro-DDR’ just in time 
for the March Volkskammer elections (PDS, 1990). Due to the time pressure, there had 
been little opportunity for extensive policy debate; nonetheless, the programme had to 
fulfil a number of objectives and expectations. At the heart of the party’s programme 
was the need to achieve a ‘balancing act, portraying itself at once as new and 
progressive, while not alienating those who had worked in the GDR for the just 
socialism the SED claimed to be progressing towards’ (Hough, 2005, p.143).
By early 1990, with a haemorrhaging membership base (from just under 1.5 million 
members in December 1989 to ca. 650,000 members in February 1990) and further 
loss of material assets, the PDS was facing a decidedly uncertain future (Moreau, 
1994, p.15). Therefore, the immediate priority for the PDS was to hold its ground 
among what remained of its existing supporter base and, at the same time, to 
somehow present prospects that would attract new members (Neu, 2011, p.9). In 
essence, despite the stigma of representing a state that would cease to exist (Hough, 
2005, p.143), the party had to identify its own ‘continuity of purpose’ in a rapidly 
changing environment (Patton, 2011, p.39).
The party had already undergone structural and constitutional change. The Statute of 
December 1989 established congress as the highest organ in the party and guaranteed 
secret ballots held for the election of the party leadership as well as other officers and 
commissions. Regional party organisations were granted autonomy and freedom to 
form articles of association. Distancing the PDS from the SED’s ‘administrative-
bureaucratic-socialism’ (ibid.), the Statute set out the rights and responsibilities of 
individual members, including the freedom to organise themselves into regional and 
national groups (Zusammenschlüsse) that reflected particular social interests, political 
areas of activity or perspectives (PDS, 1991). These Interest Groups 
(Interessengemeinschaften - IGs) and Working Groups (Arbeitsgemeinschaften - AGs) 
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comprised a broad range of interests, such as those of young people and Christians, 
as well as a variety of specific policy themes, including education, ecology and peace. 
One of the most prominent and certainly most vocal streams within the party was the 
Communist Platform (KPF). Still active within the Left Party today, the KPF 
endeavoured to prevent a pull towards social democratisation of the PDS, and was 
concerned to preserve the central role of Marxism in the formation of party policy 
(Patton, 2011, p.39), despite demands from both inside and outside the PDS for the 
party to distance itself from orthodox positions (Hough, 2005, p.145). 
Although the Statute recognised and indeed promoted inner-party plurality, 
democratisation of internal structures also presented a challenge for the PDS. Not only 
did the party’s policy programme have to appeal to existing and potential voters, it also 
needed to embrace the respective interests and perspectives of the various interest 
and working groups. As such, the document — as well as subsequent PDS 
programmes — covered a broad range of themes, and identified an array of key 
underpinning values: individualism, solidarity, justice, meaningful work, freedom, 
democracy, human rights, peace and preservation of the natural environment (PDS, 
1990). Echoing the party's new commitment to plurality and democracy, the PDS also 
declared its pledge to the primacy of parliament, transparency, opposition to state 
repression, and a ‘constitutional ban on neofascism, racism, anti-Semitism, chauvinism 
and war propaganda’ (Moreau, 1994, p.69). By 1993, these policies were grouped 
together as peace, freedom, democracy and social justice.
The programme declared itself rooted in the German and international workers' 
movements, as well as in socialism, anti-fascism, pacifism and humanist and religious 
perspectives. In so doing, the programme tried to convince the electorate that the PDS 
was calling for a humane GDR (Moreau, 1994, p.69) characterised by peace, social 
justice and solidarity. The programme placed the party and its aims within the tradition 
of, among others, Marx, Engels, Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Liebknecht and 
Gramsci, which ‘resonated among party traditionalists who remained ideologically and 
emotionally attached’ to the ideas of these ‘intellectual founding fathers’ (Patton, 2011, 
p.39).
At the same time, even though written in the context of the Volkskammer elections, by 
identifying these aims, values and traditions, the programme could also be seen as a 
statement of intent regarding a unified Germany. The eclectic character of the 
programme's ‘communist, green, social democratic, feminist as well as radical and 
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grassroots democratic elements and demands’ illustrated the party's attempt to appeal 
to those among the western left who condemned the state socialism of the GDR, but 
who favoured a grassroots, extra-parliamentary approach to socialism (ibid., p.40). 
All in all, the 1990 programme was a hasty drawing together of a diverse array of 
themes and traditions, with the objective of satisfying the ‘eastern socialist milieu’ (ibid., 
p.39), whilst attracting a new voter base that was critical of state socialism and the 
SED; furthermore, with an eye on the future, it also had to appeal to the its potential 
electorate waiting in the West.
1.2.1. The Representation of Eastern Interests 
The PDS had opposed the GDR’s absorption into the existing jurisdiction of the Federal 
Republic and instead had called for a draft of a new constitution for a united Germany 
whose adoption would require the approval of the people via a referendum (Patton,
2000, p.154). However, it became clear that unification would take place in form of the 
West’s ‘annexation’ of the East. Party Chair Lothar Bisky described unification as a 
successful ‘change of elites’ which denied Eastern Germans the opportunity to 
genuinely influence policy making (ibid.).
The PDS declared itself a socialist party for the whole of Germany and set out its 
demands for the unification process in its 1990 programme, published ahead of the 
final Volkskammer elections in the GDR. Reflecting the changes and uncertainty of the 
time, the Wende, the fate of the East and the question of unification were predictably 
important themes of the programme. Ultimately, to achieve the genuine unification of 
two equal states, rather than a wholesale annexation, the PDS insisted it was 
necessary for both states — not just the GDR — to undergo transformation. Although 
the party acknowledged and accepted in principle the Social Market Economy of the 
Federal Republic, it nevertheless expected the Federal Republic to reciprocate by 
recognising and striving towards core values that characterised the GDR. The party 
described democratic socialism as an ‘integral part of human progress’ (PDS, 1990) 
and drew attention to several achievements and values of the GDR that should be 
preserved in a future unified Germany, such as anti-fascism, comprehensive social 
security, the right to work and state childcare. The party also warned that these 
principles, as well eastern interests in general, would be afforded no protection under 
the existing laws in the Federal Republic, and that it was therefore imperative for the 
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GDR to enter unification negotiations not as a subordinate but as an equal and 
sovereign actor (Patton, 2011, p.40).
In the wake of unification, much of the initial optimism had waned, giving way to 
disillusionment and so-called Ostalgie, or sentimental longing and nostalgia for the 
GDR. The PDS too had had to adapt to the context and realities of unified Germany, 
and continued to pursue its strategy of building up an organisational and electoral basis 
in the West where for the small but growing western membership the PDS was no 
longer merely a 'project'. 
Nonetheless, in its 1993 programme and beyond, the PDS continued to strongly 
emphasise its identification with eastern Germans, their social and economic plight and 
specifically what it saw as the discrimination against people from, or still living in, the 
former GDR. For instance, the party condemned the expropriation of eastern property, 
the disparity between eastern and western pensions and the fact that certain eastern 
qualifications and accreditations were not recognised in unified Germany (Patton, 
2000, p.151). Therefore, in the section ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’ it claimed 
that, as a result of government policy,
Widespread regions in the eastern German Bundesländer have been de-
industrialised; agriculture has been largely destroyed. Social and human 
poverty have reached shocking proportions. The scientific, economic and 
cultural potential of the GDR has been dismantled (...). The policies of the 
established parties mean that the former citizens of the GDR will be people 
whose basic rights are restricted for years, if not for decades. (PDS, 1993)
Further evidence of the party’s distinct position on eastern interests could be found in a 
section of the programme calling for an end to the 'cold war in Germany’. To remedy 
the exclusion of eastern Germans, the PDS called for the establishment of an elected 
eastern German chamber, independent of the Bundestag or Bundesrat (PDS, 1993), 
charged with the specific task of representing the interests of eastern Germans, 
including pensions, property and access to services, and defending these against 
erosion as a consequence of the unification treaty. With this demand, the PDS again 
brought to the fore its solidarity with the citizens of eastern Germany. Yet in an 
endeavour to emphasise the nationwide rather than purely eastern engagement and 
focus of the PDS, it also extended the scope of its message to the western states by 
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warning that the implications for the German social state would be felt across the whole 
of the republic:
The exceptional crisis in eastern Germany is thus intensified and serves the 
ruling elite as a lever with which to dismantle democracy and social welfare 
throughout Germany. (PDS, 1993)
Nonetheless, despite the party’s declared ambition to ‘contribute to the dialogue and 
cooperation of the left in the Federal Republic of Germany’ and beyond, as well as its 
desire to ‘campaign for the emergence of broad, leftist movements’ (PDS, 1993), 
Meucher-Mächer (2005, p.21) claims that the 1993 programme essentially confirmed 
the PDS in its role of communicator of primarily eastern interests.
After the 1994 European election, the PDS was also represented in the European 
Parliament. The party became a member of the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL) confederate group within the Parliament. Although critical of the EU 
and its institutions, which the group considered ‘elitist, bureaucratic and intrinsically 
linked to corporate capitalism’ (Hough, 2005, p.154), the PDS deputies used their 
mandates to represent eastern German interests at European level, for instance by 
arguing the case for EU structural funds to be allocated to areas of eastern Germany. 
Both in terms of policy and language, the PDS was clearly orientated to representing 
eastern interests. In the East the PDS had, from the outset, assumed the role of the 
‘caring party’ (Kümmererpartei); a substantial contributory factor of PDS success in the 
East was the ability to represent and articulate interests not just in parliament and in 
manifestos but also in very practical and tangible ways. The local party organisations 
provided services to citizens, for example in the form of advice concerning the laws and 
regulations of the Federal Republic, assistance with welfare and pensions and finding 
accommodation. In fact, the party was uniquely equipped to offer this kind of support; it 
was represented in nearly every locality in the eastern states and many of its members 
were retired civil servants and administrators able to donate time as well as expertise 
(McKay, 2004, p.57). Conversely, it could be argued that the motivation was less about 
supporting citizens in need of help per se, and more about demonstrably helping 
eastern citizens specifically, in order to exploit a territorial-cultural cleavage (ibid., p.51). 
This was, after all, fertile electoral ground for the PDS.
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Meanwhile, a gathering of eastern PDS mayors resolved to concentrate on ‘real 
politics’, claiming the reason they had been elected was not anything to do with the 
class struggle or democratic socialism, but because they were engaged with the 
everyday concerns of the people. Yet it was precisely this regional focus on ‘real 
politics’ in the eastern states that would emphasis the tension between representing the 
interests of eastern core voter and the strategy of establishing the party in the western 
states.  
This conflict line was exemplified in what became known as 'The Letter from Saxony'. 
In 1996, Christine Ostrowski (MdB from Saxony) and Ronald Weckesser (leader of the 
PDS group on Dresden city council) published a document that argued for an 
abandonment of the party's westward expansion strategy, which, despite heavy 
investment of material and personal resources, had so far failed to yield promising 
results. The document argued that the PDS should instead promote itself as an eastern 
German catch-all party (Volkspartei); individual PDS sympathisers in the West were 
urged to cooperate with the party at federal level, rather than seek to establish formal 
regional PDS organisations in the western Länder (Hough, 2001, p.35). The 
document’s authors believed the official policy of westward expansion represented an 
obstacle to what they saw as the overarching objective of the PDS, namely 
consolidation as an eastern people's party (McKay, 2006, p.53).
In its vision for the PDS as a catch-all party, the document also proposed a more 
pragmatic approach to policy. Above all, it claimed, modern socialism should be defined 
by the everyday experience of people in the East. This concept of modern socialism 
shared common ground with the Social Market Economy that had become established 
in the Federal Republic. Furthermore, alongside recognition of the crucial role of small 
and medium size enterprises in rebuilding the eastern economy (Aufbau Ost) was the 
demand for a halt on immigration and the 'normalisation' of the property question, in 
other words an acceptance of privatisation and private wealth and property (Behrend,
2006, p.68). Defending the document, Ostrowski claimed that people did not want to be 
'fobbed off’ with party manifestos and oft-repeated critiques of capitalism. People, she 
stated, were neither left nor right but simply wanted practical answers — answers 
which many in the PDS were not prepared to give due to what Ostrowski described as 
their elitist arrogance towards the people (Hartung, 1997).
According to the document, the main drivers of policy should be the experience of local 
politicians, as it was this group of people that had contributed significantly to the 
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transformation of the PDS from 'herrschsüchtige Staatspartei' (power-addicted state 
party) to 'dienstbereite Bürgerpartei' (citizens' party ready to serve). The trusted and 
elected mayors should therefore not be obliged to justify themselves along the lines of 
ideology (Behrend, 2006, p.68). Harald Buttler, PDS mayor of Berlin-Marzahn, had 
been sharply criticised within the party for accepting proposed spending cuts instead of 
mobilising a campaign to protest the measures. According to Buttler, the opportunity to 
influence policy was more important than party propaganda and the risk of a spending 
cap and while he considered the PDS to be left of the SPD, he insisted that he was 
simply concerned with local politics (ibid.). The document’s authors argued that the 
priority was not positioning the PDS to the left of the SPD; it simply needed to be 
distinct as a party of the middle ground. They thus concluded the future lay not in class 
struggle or a radical rejection of capitalism, but on a path along which landlords and 
tenants as well as new eastern enterprises and their employees could find common 
cause (ibid.). Ultimately, Ostrowski and Weckesser envisaged the PDS fulfilling a role 
in the East similar to that of the CSU in Bavaria, but on the left, rather than on the right; 
as a strong, regional party it could hope to exert greater influence over national 
government (Hough, 2001, p.35). A follow-up document urged the party leadership to 
recognise that although the PDS wanted western votes, western voters obviously did 
not want the PDS (McKay, 2006, p.53).
Both documents met with criticism from individuals in the PDS leadership, including 
Wolfgang Gehrcke (who said they had 'nothing to do with socialism') and Andre Brie 
(who had challenged the stance on western expansion strategy), as well as the 
Communist Platform and western party members (Behrend, 2006, p.69). However, the 
eastern PDS went on to consolidate its position in the six eastern states and by 1994 
was no longer an opposition party. 
First, in 1994, the SPD's Reinhard Höppner was elected Ministerpräsident (Prime 
Minister) of Saxony-Anhalt. The SPD formed a minority government with the Greens 
that depended on the votes of PDS deputies to pass legislation. This agreement 
marked the beginning of PDS 'toleration' of SPD-led government. In 1998 the PDS 
formed the first full ‘Red-Red’ coalition as a junior partner with the SPD in Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania (and was re-elected in 2002). Meanwhile, in the city-state of Berlin, 
the PDS regional party organisation had also long since set its sights on the 
opportunity to enter into government responsibility.  At the launch of the 2001 election 
manifesto, the leader of the PDS-Berlin promised less talk of political dogma, fewer 
‘wish lists and castles in the air’, and more focus on concrete and above all 
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‘responsible’ reforms (Liebich, 2001). With a strong result in the election, the PDS 
entered a coalition in the SPD-led Berlin regional government.
In the early 1990s, the PDS had been written off as a party likely to die out ‘on the 
fringes of political life’ (Hough, 2005, p.143) but just over a decade after unification, the 
party had established a broad electoral base in the East and was directly involved in 
policy-making in half of the eastern states. Yet the policies often advocated and 
practised by the eastern party organisations were hardly typical of the policies one 
might expect of a party that identified itself as socialist. The tension between the ‘real 
politics’ of the PDS-East and the drive to establish the party in the western states 
became an enduring one that split opinion within the party. Although the socialist 
ideology of the GDR had been described as a ‘cultural marker of the east that contrasts 
with the prevailing political culture of western Germany (Patton, 2000, p.155), it was in 
fact a perceived abandonment of socialism by the PDS-East that prompted the most 
vociferous criticism from party counterparts and activists in the West.
1.2.2. Socialism and Social Justice 
In its 1990 programme the PDS identified itself as a socialist party open to all people 
and movements who strived for a society characterised by social justice and solidarity. 
Although this statement did not establish the PDS as an unequivocally class-based 
party, the programme went on to emphasise the ‘interests of all workers’ as a core 
principle (Höpcke, 2005, p.247). This principle featured in subsequent programmes too, 
but from 1993 was supplemented by the additional assertion that the PDS offered a 
political home to those who wanted to ‘resist capitalist society’ and who ‘fundamentally 
rejected’ the prevailing conditions, as well as to those whose resistance was combined 
with efforts to positively transform and gradually overcome such conditions (PDS, 
1993). It was this very issue — whether to strive to overcome capitalism or seek its 
reform — that formed the crux of an enduring tension within the party.    
The 1990 programme acknowledged the economic efficiency of capitalism and praised 
its capacity for technological and scientific progress. Other notable accomplishments 
achieved under capitalism included representative democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and civil society (Patton, 2011, p.40). According to the programme, a Social 
Market Economy that was genuinely orientated towards the greater good as well as for 
the benefit of the individual was not in fact a contradiction of socialist values (Höpcke, 
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2005, p.249). For Neu (2011, p.10), the aspiration to a market economy and a 
meritocracy in which each person is able to determine their professional and social role 
according to their individual talents and abilities belied a somewhat liberal approach, 
rather than a distinctly socialist agenda. 
However, the PDS presented a stark critique of capitalism’s inherent inability to create 
social justice. The party took an interventionist approach to the economy, and set out to 
achieve its key goal of social justice through state regulation and redistribution (Land 
and Possekel, 1995, p.113). For example, the programme stated the objective of a 
constitutional right to work (PDS, 1990). Public ownership of the key means of 
production was also emphasised, although the programme simultaneously recognised 
the value of competition arising from various forms of ownership, so long as these 
served the goal of social justice (Höpcke, 2005, p.93). Alongside labour, nature too was 
to be understood as a source of social wealth; consequently, an ecological 
restructuring of society was required in order to break from the one-sided exploitation 
of nature and essential natural resources (Patton, 2011, p.40). The pathway towards 
achieving a market economy determined by social justice and ecological sustainability 
would be one of grassroots activism, rather than of the violent overthrow of existing 
capitalism (ibid.).
Moreau (1994, p.70) identifies this combination of recognition and criticism of 
capitalism as indicative of the self-contradictory character of the programme, However, 
the programme was very much a product of the prevailing and dominant ideas, as well 
as hurriedly drafted ahead of the first all-German election (Behrend, 2006, p.49) and in 
this respect the 1990 programme should be understood within the context of the 
Wende. Against the background of the previous autumn’s mass protests and with 
unification impending, perceived failure to recognise democracy, human rights and the 
achievements of the Federal Republic’s Social Market Economy would have risked the 
PDS appearing significantly out of touch with the political mood of the time. Secondly, 
to have any chance of surviving in a unified Germany, the PDS needed to appeal to 
leftist voters in the West too, particularly those sceptical of unification. A reformist 
approach to achieving social justice, an economic policy based on ecological 
sustainability and an emphasis on grassroots activism and democracy could be 
reassuring and palatable to social democrats and the environmental movement in the 
western states. However, no less essential was reassuring voters in the PDS core 
constituency in the East, many of whom were concerned about their future in the 
Federal Republic.
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Defending the values that formed the very essence of socialism, the PDS warned that 
despite the impending demise of the GDR and the apparent victory of capitalism, these 
values — and therefore socialism itself — would not be swept aside:  
Socialism as an expression of age-old human ideals — social justice, 
solidarity, freedom for the oppressed, help for the weak — is immortal, even 
if its opponents declare it dead one hundred times. (PDS, 1990, cited in 
Patton, 2011, p.40)
The themes of socialism and (eastern) identity were similarly intertwined in the 1993 
programme. Here, the PDS insisted ‘no apology’ was required for the post-war attempt 
by millions of people to build a better society, and defined its understanding of 
socialism as: 
(...) a movement against the exploitation of humans by humans, against 
patriarchal repression, against the plundering of nature, for the preservation 
and development of human culture, for the assertion of human rights, for a 
society in which citizens can conduct their affairs democratically and 
rationally.  Socialism is (...) a system of values, in which freedom, equality 
and solidarity, human emancipation, social justice, preservation of nature 
and peace are inexorably connected. (PDS, 1993) 
The programme also stressed that the responsibility for the waste, destruction and 
discrimination in the eastern Länder lay not just with the terms and conditions of the 
Federal Republic's 'Anschluss' (annexation) of the GDR, but above all with the very 
nature of capitalist society itself. The chapter 'The Contemporary World' held the 
capitalist production and political system responsible for preventing the realisation of 
the citizens' movements' democratic and socialist ideals, and went on to identify 
overcoming the capitalist models of production, distribution and consumption as the 
greatest challenge facing the modern world. Once again, such statements fuelled the 
party's opponents' view that it was ‘rückwartsgewandt’ (retrospective and backward-
looking).
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Every economic conflict, inevitable even in a free and democratic society, is 
re-interpreted as a class conflict. The PDS manifests itself therefore as a 
party that seeks to extend an ideology that worldwide had failed by 
1989-1990 at the latest. (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, 
1995, cited in Patton, 2008, p.2) 
Criticism from within the PDS left wing, especially the Communist Platform, centred on 
the programme's ‘incurably social-democratic character’ and related in particular to 
paragraphs declaring the PDS's openness towards ‘broad leftist movements’ and a 
‘renewal of socialist politics’ (Behrend, 2006, p.52ff). However, Behrend (ibid., p.53) 
points out that although social-democratic and reformist traits are undoubtedly evident 
in the programme, the predominant accents remained unmistakably anti-capitalist and 
socialist, while Neu (2011, p.12) notes that overtly anti-capitalist rhetoric featured more 
heavily than it had in the 1990 programme. Furthermore, the Communist Platform itself, 
despite its attempts to block conference's adoption of the programme, would go on in 
subsequent policy discussions to defend the solid, socialist and anti-capitalist basis of 
the 1993 programme. In fact, Hough et al. (2007, p.25) even assert that many aspects 
of the 1993 programme ‘represented a step backwards, illustrating how the KPF and 
other left-wing orthodox forces were still able to influence party policy’ and cite as 
evidence the programme's extensive defence of the GDR's real-existing socialism as a 
justifiable endeavour in the construction of a new type of society, as well as the 
ongoing commitment to socialism as a ‘legitimate aim in itself and how a state built on 
socialist principles would solve many of the ills of the (capitalist) world’ (ibid.).  
  
This extensive critique did not fully develop into a comprehensive set of concrete 
policies, though. Hough et al. (2007, p.25) observe that firstly, when drafting the 1993 
programme, the party was far more concerned with its own political survival than what 
it would set out to do in office — which at the time was a far-fetched notion to say the 
least. Secondly, the party lacked the ‘time and expertise’ needed to formulate thorough 
policies. Meanwhile, Olsen notes that the 1993 programme, like its predecessor, 
combined orthodox Marxism, social-democratic reformism and New Left ideas. The 
glue holding together ‘these disparate versions of socialism’ was the ‘nationalistic/
regionalistic/GDR nostalgic tenor of the entire document’ (Olsen, 2002a, p.209). A 
similar thread ran through the 1994 Bundestag general election campaign, which 
blamed dominant capitalism for the premature curtailment of the citizens' movements of 
1989, thus preventing the fruition of their ideas of democracy and freedom. Capitalism 
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was also held responsible for ecological destruction, militarisation and the 
impoverishment of the developing world.
However, despite the PDS’s sometimes strident criticism of capitalism, a shift in the 
party’s strategic goals was also taking shape. In February 1994 Gysi presented his 
'Ingolstadt Manifesto', in which he declared that the PDS had 'arrived' as a party, also 
in the West (Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.23). The claim triggered further inner-party debate 
that once again focused on the PDS's role (if any) in the western Länder, but also 
speculated whether 'arrived' (angekommen) might also be an indication that the party 
was finding its place in the political mainstream at the expense of socialism and 
principled opposition. For it was at this time that the PDS began its transformation from 
a party of opposition to a party of government responsibility in the eastern states. 
Electoral success had begun at local level in June, when Horst-Dieter Brähmig became 
the PDS mayor in the town of Hoyerswerda. In keeping with the ‘real’ politics approach, 
Brähmig would go on to justify privatisation, the sinking of wage costs and cuts in local 
services in order to defend ‘Standort Deutschland’ (Germany as a business location) 
(Behrend, 2006, p.66). The real watershed, though, was the PDS agreement to 
‘tolerate’ the Red-Green government in Saxony-Anhalt. The party’s office-seeking goals 
were then realised with the formation of the first full Red-Red coalition in 1998 and then 
again in Berlin 2001.
The PDS controlled three ministries in the Berlin coalition government. Seen from the 
perspective of ‘real politics’, their role could be seen as providing the ‘last line of 
defence’ against the very worst aspects of a series of harsh but necessary measures. 
Berlin's annual tax revenue amounted to some €8 billion, but its debt was a massive 
€53 billion — an unwelcome reality which, insisted supporters of the Red-Red 
coalition, simply could not be ignored. Under the previous coalition of SPD and CDU, 
the city had also experienced a serious and ruinous banking scandal, and corruption in 
the construction sector was rife. Through its subsidy of public sector housing, state 
funding had flowed into the pockets of shareholders and investors, rather than assisted 
poor tenants rent homes at socially sustainable prices. The PDS-Berlin cited the 
urgency of this problem, as well as progress made in reducing construction sector 
sleaze, in defence of the government's decision to reduce funding and privatise a share 
of the state's public housing stock. However, other measures implemented by the Red-
Red government also included the privatisation of selected state enterprises, a rise in 
the price of water, cuts in various public facilities and services, and reduced budgets for 
culture and education (Hough et al., 2007, p.106ff.). 
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Resisting earlier attempts to recast the PDS as an eastern catch-all party, a group of 
members, several of whom were based in the West, published a statement in Neues 
Deutschland newspaper under the heading 'In großer Sorge' (with great concern) . 11
The statement accused the PDS leadership of serious misdeeds, including pursuing a 
headlong course towards social democracy and a 'reformists versus Stalinists' vendetta 
among the party membership. Three specific points were highlighted: first, a deviation 
from the role of principled opposition; second, an abandonment of the class struggle 
and the sidelining of the property question in favour of a new social contract; and third, 
a restriction of inner-party pluralism (ibid.). The thirty-eight signatories and their 
supporters went on to form the Marxist Forum within the PDS, citing their concern over 
the future of the party's oppositional role, (versus government participation), the 
unresolved property question and class conflict in contemporary society . 12
The political course of the Berlin coalition also attracted a great deal of criticism, the 
main source of which was once again the left wing of the party and the western 
regional organisations. One of the key concerns raised was the apparent lack of 
serious discussion at federal level of whether toleration or coalition actually contributed 
to achieving the party’s stated objective of social justice. Furthermore, it was necessary 
to evaluate the relationship between negotiated compromise — the PDS as the ‘lesser 
evil’ — and dwindling credibility as a socialist party (Wagenknecht, 2001, p.12). 
Nevertheless, the commitment to office-seeking goals was confirmed in the 2003 
Chemnitz programme. After a warning from Gysi that the ‘dogmatic left’ had to 
recognise that they were out of step with the new programme (ibid.), the PDS stated 
the intention to build a centre-left alliance working towards ‘forward-looking, 
democratic, social and ecological alternatives’ and to ‘overcome the intellectual and 
political hegemony of neoliberal ideology and politics’ in Germany and the EU (PDS, 
2003). The PDS argued that socialist politics needed to take account of the prevailing 
conditions, so that protest and resistance were combined with engagement in tangible 
reform measures. The immediate priority was to improve standards of living and to take 
steps towards greater social justice and democracy; only then would it be realistic to 
aim for a more fundamental and comprehensive restructuring of wealth and power to 
break the dominance of profit over society (ibid., p.13).  
 Reprinted in Beinert, H. (ed.) (2005): Die PDS - Phönix oder Asche?, p.227.11
 The Marxist Forum remained a grouping within the Left Party, although it has not been 12
recognised as a federal alliance. The MF set out to promote the anti-capitalist character of the 
party through discussion, seminars and theory papers, as well as to develop strategies for 
overcoming capitalism.
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Drafts of the programme as well as the final version adopted at the Chemnitz 
Conference prompted a critical response centring primarily on the nature of socialism 
and the feasibility of capitalism’s reform. During the discussion, a subtle but important 
reformist shift in core values was also detected in some of the terminology. For 
example, the term ‘Freiheitsgüter’ (literally ‘freedom goods’) was frequently mentioned 
in the programme to describe the ability to develop according to capacity and needs, 
and to develop productive forces and moral standards — this ability determined 
whether people were free. Criticism centred not only on the use of rather vague 
concepts, but also the use of the word ‘goods’ (Güter), which was interpreted to mean 
something which can be bought, sold, given or received and therefore considered 
insufficient to describe a right that involved struggle, conflict or achievement (Höpcke, 
2001, p.250). In addition, a draft of the programme emphasised ‘access’ (Zugang) to 
these ‘goods’. Once again, the wording was problematic: socialism was not merely 
about ‘access to’ or ‘use of’ common goods; it was about influence over their 
production by those who produced them. As such, the term was perceived to neglect a 
fundamental principle of socialism, as ‘access’ suggested the equal opportunity of use, 
but said nothing about participation or influence (Wawzyniak, 2001, p.39) . A further 13
dispute over wording concerned the concept of freedom. The PDS had consistently 
acknowledged that freedom, along with equality and solidarity, formed the very 
foundations of socialism. The 2003 programme added that equality without freedom 
was repression; the critical response observed the failure to state that freedom without 
equality was likewise repression. This was considered a grave omission given the 
widespread lack of freedom caused by inequality driven by capital and militarism 
(Höpcke, 2001, p.250). 
In the Chemnitz programme, the PDS acknowledged that economic growth under 
capitalism had resulted in environmental degradation and ‘deformed’ consumption. The 
party was committed to increasing domestic demand and among the concrete 
proposals designed to achieve this aim was a plan to return to full employment. This 
was to be accomplished through a fairer distribution of work that would first limit the 
working week to forty hours and then introduce a reduced working week of thirty-five 
hours and, eventually, thirty hours. The party rejected any decrease in wages or social 
transfer payments as not only economically damaging but also socially ruinous. 
 The principle of ‘access’ (Zugang) would later feature in the SPD welfare reform, which was 13
based on equality of access (to the labour market) rather than equality of outcome (see Chapter 
Three).  
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Another demand was a minimum wage and PDS support of trade union engagement 
for higher pay (PDS, 2003).         
Although the party claimed that the dominance of profit was incompatible with social 
justice, entrepreneurship and the interests of profit were cited as important 
prerequisites of innovation and efficiency (ibid.). However, Wagenknecht argued that 
the goal of ‘a market economy but not a market society’ was rather too close for 
comfort to the ‘Third Way/Neue Mitte’ position advocated by Schröder and Blair . 14
Moreover, by promoting the interests of profit, the party had surrendered not only its 
goal of overcoming capitalism but had also squandered the opportunity to even rein in 
capitalism (Wagenknecht, 2001, p.13). Another criticism was that in its praise for 
entrepreneurship and profit, the programme had failed to mention the associated 
exploitation of workers (Höpcke, 2001, p.31). 
Whenever a political party drafts and debates a new programme it is of course 
commonplace for members and activists to engage in an (often forensic) analysis of 
the proposals, and for objections and amendments to be put forward. However, the 
criticisms and arguments cited in this section go some way to indicate the depth of the 
unresolved tension within the PDS over its core socialist values and orientation; in fact, 
the Chemnitz programme itself admitted that the socialist profile of the PDS was the 
subject of ongoing development and debate. Yet it also stated in very clear terms that a 
priority was parliamentary strength and that the party’s track record of toleration and 
coalition in eastern states was proof of PDS ‘Politikfähigkeit’ in a set of difficult 
conditions (PDS, 2003). 
1.2.3. Antimilitarism and Peace 
The third key theme reviewed in this chapter is antimilitarism and peace. The PDS 
adopted a clear position on this issue in its 1990 programme, as the process of 
unification was still taking shape. The party considered it imperative that unification 
should unfold gradually and, moreover, within the context of wider European 
disarmament. The programme aspired to a demilitarised Europe of social, cultural and 
regional diversity; it also called for recognition of the Soviet Union's decisive role in the 
development of the GDR and its achievements, as well as its contribution to European 
stability in what was then a phase of change and upheaval (Moreau, 1994, p.69). The 
 See page 52 for an explanation of the Third Way/Neue Mitte.14
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party later argued that in retrospect the sovereignty Germany regained as a result of 
the Two plus Four Treaty of 1990  had been used to ‘normalise’ German foreign and 15
military policy, to justify Germany’s dominant role in the EU and to provide a rationale 
for war (PDS, 2003).   
Throughout its existence, the PDS was consistent in its demand for the dissolution of 
NATO, and advocated Germany’s unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty as a first step. 
The party argued for a comprehensive ban on the development, production and the 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and also opposed the development of any new types of 
weapon. In addition, there was to be blanket ban on weapons exports — a policy that if 
realised would have far-reaching consequences for Germany’s economically important 
weapons manufacturing and export industry (PDS, 1993).
A further demand was the immediate cessation of all German military assistance and, 
crucially, the ban on German military participation beyond the borders of the Republic 
or involvement in domestic conflict. Critical of capitalism’s failure to secure peace, the 
party rejected military action to end conflict and instead called for efforts to tackle social 
causes. Over the longer term the PDS envisaged the complete demilitarisation of 
Germany and Europe — and did not seek to establish Europe as a military force to rival 
the USA (ibid.). Already perceived as a political ‘outsider’, the PDS also found itself 
increasingly at odds with the position of other political parties over the issue of peace 
and antimilitarism, as Germany’s own foreign policy and military role became the 
subject of growing scrutiny and debate against the context of conflict and challenges at 
the turn of the century.
In 1998, the freshly elected SPD-Green federal government coalition took the step of 
aggressively deploying German military forces for the first time since the founding of 
the Republic. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Green) had urged that at the close of 
the twentieth century Germany's responsibility was not to pacifism (‘no more war’), but 
to humanitarianism (‘no more genocide’). In fact, this paradigm shift, the most 
vociferous supporters of which were the Greens, saw it as Germany's special duty to 
prevent holocausts from ever occurring again (Solty, 2007, p.5). Fischer argued that 
Serbia was intending to commit genocide against Kosovo Albanians, but the claim of a 
 The Two Plus Four Treaty — the ‘Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany’ — 15
resolved the international dimension of unification (including the question of whether and under 
which conditions the Federal Republic’s NATO membership could include the East). The USA, 
the Soviet Union, Britain and France terminated their rights and responsibilities with respect to 
Germany, giving the united country full sovereignty (Auswärtiges Amt, 1990).
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threatened holocaust also raised the question of whether first steps were about to be 
taken towards a return of German military interventionism (ibid.). The PDS opposed 
military action, questioning the legitimacy of the NATO resolution (acting without the 
explicit approval of the UN Security Council), the credibility of the humanitarian 
objectives (since humanitarian agencies would have to withdraw in the event of military 
intervention) and warning against escalating violence that would lead to militarism 
becoming the sole means of influence (Gysi, 1998).
Gradually, the PDS also faced internal challenges to its previously unambiguous 
position. At the party’s Münster conference in 2000, a debate took place in response to 
UN military intervention in East Timor. A leadership motion proposed the party assess 
on a case-by-case basis whether to support military interventions sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council, rather than reject these outright as a matter of principal. Although 
Gysi insisted that the motion did not pave the way for future participation of Germany’s 
army (the Bundeswehr) in such interventions, conference instead backed an opposing 
motion which bound the PDS to reject, without exception, UN-mandated military 
deployments (PDS, 2000). 
As a result of the defeat, both Gysi and Lothar Bisky resigned from the party 
leadership. Explaining his decision to stand down, Gysi later reflected that this had 
been the first time the overwhelming majority of conference had voted against a 
leadership proposal; furthermore, he was also concerned that sections of the party 
portrayed the rejection of the proposal as a 'victory' over the leadership  (Gysi, 2001, p.
293).
In the wake of the 2001 terror attacks in New York, Germany declared unequivocal 
solidarity with the USA and also agreed to deploy its troops in Afghanistan. Military 
intervention and aggression contravened the constitution (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012, 
(Article 26)), and also challenged beliefs held deeply by many Germans that the 
Bundeswehr should be engaged for defensive purposes only. Yet the SPD-Green 
government's 'proactive and interventionist' foreign and security policy, according to 
defence minister Peter Struck, considered that German interests could also be 
defended on distant foreign territory (Green et al., 2008). Foreign Minister Fischer also 
supported the stationing of German troops in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Bundestag 
debate on Afghanistan was combined with a confidence vote for the government; the 
PDS was the only parliamentary group to vote unanimously against military action. The 
head of the parliamentary group, Roland Claus, said the PDS would not give in to the 
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Chancellor’s ‘coercion of parliament’ and remained opposed to war as a means of 
fighting terrorism’ (Claus, 2001). The antimilitarist position of the PDS was endorsed by 
its partners at European level. The GUE/NGL group in the European Parliament shared 
the principle of the ‘unambiguous rejection of the military adventures of NATO and the 
United States’, and sought to bring about an end to militarisation of the European 
Union as well as the production of weapons that support the militarisation of others 
(Hough, 2005, p.154). The affiliated Party of the European Left, too, echoed the aim of 
the PDS to form alliances to oppose war, capitalism and globalisation (ibid.). 
Despite the opposition among the population and indeed much of the PDS to military 
aggression, some leading figures in the PDS took a more supportive approach to what 
was described as 'humanitarian' intervention in certain circumstances. Following the 
NATO military action in Afghanistan, PDS Chair Gabi Zimmer did not unequivocally rule 
out PDS support of German participation in a subsequent six-month United Nations 
ISAF mission in the country . For Zimmer, the decisive factor was whether the 16
mission’s objective would be solely peacekeeping, or whether German troops would 
become involved in ‘picking up the pieces’ in the aftermath of military action — deemed 
a step too far towards participation in the logistics of war (Spiegel Online, 2001). This 
echoed concerns within the party that in US-led NATO military action, the chief role 
assigned to the Bundeswehr would be clearing up the land mines and unexploded 
bombs left behind by US air strikes (Heltzelt, 2002). Eventually, the PDS parliamentary 
group opposed German participation. 
In 2003, the new programme adopted at Chemnitz retained the commitment to the 
dissolution of NATO but also lifted the earlier clause passed at the Münster conference 
that had rejected, as a matter of principle, any UN military intervention. The PDS 
recognised that the UN Security Council would as a last resort need to sanction military 
action for the purpose of ‘averting threats to world peace’ but insisted that this right 
should not be misused as a result of pressure from or in the interests of powerful 
nations (PDS, 2003). Yet the acceptance of UN-mandated military intervention was 
perceived as a weakening of the PDS’s commitment to social rather than military 
solutions to conflict, and met with opposition, particularly from the left within the party, 
who argued that international law was frequently undermined and that UN resolutions 
were conveniently used or simply ignored to serve prevailing interests (Hetzelt, 2002). 
The programme itself also acknowledged that violations of international law, together 
 International Security Assistance Force: The mission was to support the Afghan government 16
in the rebuilding of the country and to stabilise its security.
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with the ‘war on terror’ and the resulting ‘preventive wars’ had enabled the USA to 
achieve hegemony over the world by military means (PDS, 2003).
In May 2002, US President Bush addressed the Bundestag on the subject of foreign 
policy. As he was about to begin, three members of the PDS parliamentary group 
unfurled and displayed a large banner bearing the words ‘Mr. Bush + Mr. Schröder stop 
your wars’. The banner was quickly bundled away by Bundestag officials and after 
some momentary unrest and shouts of disapproval at the protest from other deputies, 
President Bush continued his speech. But in a move that both shocked and infuriated 
many in the party, the head of the PDS parliamentary group, Roland Claus — who had 
earlier voiced the party’s opposition to war in the Afghanistan debate — issued an 
apology to President Bush on behalf of the PDS members (Spiegel Online, 2002). 
Although a single incident, the Bundestag protest and subsequent apology symbolised 
several of the contradictions and conflicts within the PDS. First, although the party 
defined itself as the party of peace and non-violence, its parliamentary leader had 
apologised to a US President who was widely regarded within the party (and beyond) 
as a warmonger (Hough et al., 2007, p.40). Winfried Wolf, one of the deputies who 
protested in the Bundestag, later warned that the PDS position as the ‘consistently anti-
war party’ (PDS, 2003) had crumbled wherever it became an obstacle to power. 
Indeed, ahead of Bush's visit, the SPD-PDS Berlin regional government had prohibited 
members of the Senate from participating in any of the street protests organised for the 
event, an order with which the PDS deputies dutifully complied (Wolf, 2004), even 
though the PDS-Berlin party had cited the commitment to antimilitarism as a key factor 
in its electoral success that year (Alexander, 2002). This in turn highlighted the distance 
between the PDS's rhetoric and its actions, particularly when in a position of 
responsibility — Thomas Flierl, a PDS member of the Berlin Senate, said that he 
‘recognised the difference between government and party’ (ibid.) — and intensified the 
party's growing credibility gap. 
Furthermore, the controversy reinforced the entrenchment of the various factions within 
the party. Peace was to be a core issue in the PDS in the 2002 Bundestag federal 
election, but was in danger of being undermined by the acquiescence of the Berlin 
regional party. Furthermore, the deputy Prime Minister in the SPD-PDS coalition in 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania argued that should the PDS ever be in a position to form 
a federal coalition with the SPD, it should consider accepting a compromise in its 
foreign policy. In other words, a party that unequivocally rejected military deployment 
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was not fit for governmental responsibility at national level — the PDS policy of peace 
was therefore seen as an obstacle in the way of governing with the SPD (Hetzelt, 
2002). However, Zimmer had declared that an alliance with the SPD at federal level 
would be ‘simply wrong’ (ibid.).
In its initial efforts to establish a base of supporters, activists and voters in the western 
states, the PDS had sought ties with the peace movement. Despite the ambivalence of 
western extra-parliamentary groups towards the PDS, the party’s rejection of German 
involvement in military action would actually create a clear distinction between the PDS 
and all the other parties represented in the Bundestag, including the Greens. The 
party’s antimilitarism was therefore an important political basis from which to build and 
strengthen links to peace campaigners and voters, especially in the West. According to 
a peace activist in the western state of Bremen, the PDS was ‘a federal partner for the 
peace movement. It was the only party in the Bundestag that was solid in its opposition 
to military intervention of the Bundeswehr’ (Bremer Friedensforum, 2003, p.11). Peace 
and antimilitarism represented a further line of tension within the PDS: the pragmatic, 
office-seeking wing of the party feared that principled opposition to military intervention 
was an obstacle preventing a future (federal) coalition with the SPD; conversely, any 
perceived weakening of this position raised doubts about credibility. Moreover, 
ambiguity concerning the commitment to antimilitarism threatened to further hinder the 
PDS’s long and onerous efforts to present itself as a reliable partner for social 
movements in the western states. 
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1.3 PDS Strategy and the Western States
 
In 2002, the PDS published a paper that reflected on the respective achievements and 
mistakes of the party and its leadership since its (re)foundation in 1989 (Brie et al., 
2002, p.1). Throughout that period, the PDS had continued to pursue its strategy of 
establishing a political and electoral base in the western states. However, some basic 
figures reveal the extent of the party’s persistent organisational weakness in the region. 
The combined western party organisations consisted of just 4,000 members and 
accounted for three per cent of the entire membership (Olsen, 2002b, p.148). As a 
result, the income from subscriptions collected from members was minimal, leaving the 
party unable to fund the establishment of party offices. Party meetings had to be held in 
local pubs and activists could afford only the barest resources for campaign work. With 
so few members, local parties were not able to fill officer posts at all, let alone with 
competent people. Consequently, neighbouring local associations often had to combine 
forces to form more feasible organisations, the downside of which was that it was 
difficult to mobilise members over a wide geographical area (ibid.). Furthermore, the 
party suffered from a high turnover of members, which in turn also contributed to the 
problem of finding engaged and competent activists to lead the campaign in the 
western states. In 1993, western party organisations had demanded the establishment 
of a western umbrella organisation (Regionalverband West) and a special conference 
of western regional organisations to address the specific set of problems the party was 
facing. Neither the regional association nor the conference materialised. This section of 
the chapter sets out the underlying causes of the PDS’s organisational and electoral 
weakness in the West, focusing specifically on the party’s ‘easternness’, its uneasy 
relationship with other political and social movements in the region and the role of the 
national leadership.    
The 2002 paper found that by 1993 the leadership had managed to execute the 
transition from state party to democratic, leftist party formally, structurally and 
programmatically (Brie et al. 2002, p.3). Yet it also recognised as a serious flaw the 
failure to immediately distance the party from the resources and the legacy of the SED. 
Merely renaming the party had cast doubt on the authenticity of the PDS’s democratic 
credentials. Furthermore, by maintaining structures associated with a crumbling regime 
and a state that would soon cease to exist, the party had also alienated younger 
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members, which in turn jeopardised its future sustainable growth and renewal (ibid.). In 
fact, writing for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Spehr (2002) went so far as to argue 
that what had previously been the main strength of the PDS — its ties to the GDR and 
distinctly eastern identity — could even become a liability for the party, in that it 
overlooked the opportunity to relate to a new generation of younger voters who had 
grown up in the unified Federal Republic. 
Brie et al. also identified a departure from the informal ‘project-like’ atmosphere that 
had characterised the party early on in the western states. In its place was increasing 
emphasis on parliamentary and administrative processes and a centralisation of 
decision-making (Brie et al., 2002, p.3). In addition, the tighter administrative and policy 
control by the federal party diminished the influence of the volunteer and activist-based 
IGs and AGs. Although a compromise was reached which created a space for the 
orthodox left (including the Communist Platform) within the party, the national 
leadership continued to pursue its goal of Handlungsfähigkeit , particularly within the 17
eastern states. This shift contributed to the divide between the eastern core 
membership who prioritised office-seeking goals within the region and the more loosely 
organised western left. According to the paper, this was a barrier which had never been 
overcome (ibid.). 
    
Also illustrative of the concentration of decision-making was the national leadership’s 
strategy to contest the 1994 ‘super election year’  with a PDS ‘Open List’. The 18
rationale for this election strategy was that particularly in the western states the PDS 
was not strong enough to challenge the conservative forces within the country, either 
on its own or within an alliance of smaller socialist/communist orientated groups. The 
party therefore needed to attract high-profile independent candidates noted for their 
commitment to principles and objectives compatible with those of the PDS, namely a 
socially just, peaceful and democratic Germany. However, candidates would also need 
to articulate the interests of citizens in the East, thus appealing beyond the traditional 
socialist-communist voter group (Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.65). But opening the list to 
independent — and potentially non-socialist — candidates met with controversy among 
western members, who feared they would be manoeuvred from the list.     
 Capacity to act — here meaning the capacity to form a functioning coalition government with 17
the SPD at Land level.
 'Super election year' — in addition to the general (Bundestag) election, there were also 18
European and a number of regional (Land) elections.
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In the 1994 Bundestag election, the party was able to increase its support and enter 
parliament for the second time. Nationwide, it only achieved 4.4% of the votes, thus 
falling short at the five per cent threshold required to enter parliament, but through 
securing four direct mandates (including a Berlin seat won by the list candidate, author 
Stefan Heym), the party gained thirty seats, proportionate to its share of the vote, with 
twenty-six of its representatives coming from the open party lists. In the run-up to the 
election, the PDS had been all but written off as an ‘Auslaufmodell’ (obsolete model), 
an eastern protest party whose voter base would crumble with signs of economic 
improvement. Earlier success at local level and now an increased parliamentary 
presence at federal level appeared to contradict this analysis. However, success was 
still very much restricted to the eastern Länder, where it achieved almost 20% of the 
vote, compared to just 1% in the West (Olsen, 2002a, p.200).
Intent on westward expansion, the national leadership keenly focused its attention on 
regional elections in the western states. Hopes were particularly pinned on Bremen, 
Germany’s smallest state, where the ruling ‘traffic light’ coalition of SPD, FDP and 
Greens had collapsed, bringing forward the Bürgerschaft election to May 1995. 
Campaigning under the slogan, ‘Left after the traffic light!’ (‘Nach der Ampel Links!’), the 
PDS believed Bremen would provide the party with its most promising opportunity to 
date to finally establish an electoral foothold in a western state, make the transition to 
parliamentary practice and demonstrate the party's political competence in the West 
(Probst et al., 2008, p.3). The city-state was struggling with long-term unemployment 
problems and public spending cuts, but also had a high proportion of young voters, 
especially students and Green voters. However, neither the campaign nor the crises 
facing the state convinced voters to support the PDS. Instead, a new citizens' group 
called Arbeit für Bremen (Jobs for Bremen) provided voters dissatisfied with the main 
parties' approach with a local, fresh, untainted but right-wing alternative to tackling 
unemployment and the budgetary problems. Meanwhile, the younger voters appeared 
to remain loyal to the Greens. Despite the resources and hopes invested in the 
campaign, the PDS achieved only 2.4% of the Bremen vote and failed to enter 
parliament. Bremen delivered a serious blow to the federal leadership, which was left 
with no other realistic prospects for entry into a western state (Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.
62). Moreover, the disappointing result in the target state only cemented the already 
entrenched image of the PDS as an eastern interest party.
 
A chronic problem facing the party was the failure to become firmly anchored in social 
movements in the western states and moreover, the lack of important close ties with 
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the trade unions. In an interview with Neues Deutschland, Bodo Ramelow (campaign 
manager for the 2005 elections, and later responsible for steering the fusion process 
between the PDS and WASG) acknowledged that the PDS was not the natural partner 
for the unions, adding that even the DGB leadership appeared to shun the PDS, a 
large party with an eastern tradition (Neues Deutschland, 2005). Much of the western 
left had developed a critical stance towards the GDR and although the PDS had 
broadened its appeal to extend beyond former functionaries and eastern Germans 
dissatisfied with unification, the party remained distinctly ‘eastern’, both in terms of its 
programme and its language. In addition, the PDS sought to preserve and promote 
what it saw as the positive values and achievements of the GDR, but the western 
image of the PDS remained one of SED successor party — in short, the embodiment of 
a GDR legacy with deeply negative associations in the western states. Furthermore, in 
the context of the West’s prevailing anti-communism, which was evident not only 
among conservative elements but also among the social democratic left as well as 
trade unions, the PDS was frequently labelled ‘extremist’ and found itself in the sights 
of the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) . All in 19
all, as the trade unions and other movements in the West remained largely unaware of 
the party’s political work or for what it stood, and the existing prejudices or perceptions 
remained unchallenged and were even reinforced (ibid.).
Parties emerge from conflicts within society and articulate these tensions. The SPD 
grew from the workers' movement, as an expression of the tension between capital and 
labour, while the Greens formed from the ecology, anti-nuclear and peace movements, 
and are most closely associated with the cleavage of post-materialism that emerged in 
the West. Yet the PDS, as an eastern party — and the successor to the SED — did not 
emerge from the workers' movement in western Germany.  Trade unions and the SPD 
regarded the party as too extreme, but for the more radical western left the PDS was 
too moderate, having set its course on a parliamentary route of capitalism’s reform, 
with only a long-term goal of socialism. As the successor to the GDR’s ruling state 
party, the PDS appeared too traditional and rigid for the informal extra-parliamentary 
social movements. Brie acknowledged that the PDS had been rooted in a party that 
was clearly anti-emancipatory, riddled with dogmatism and favoured repression of, 
rather than engagement with, social tensions and movements. Given this heritage, it 
was expecting a lot of the western left to accept that the PDS could ever genuinely 
stand for something new (Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.74). When the WASG emerged, 
 The monitoring of selected Left Party organisations and individual members continues today.19
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primarily from the unions and left wing of the SPD based and largely in the West, here 
too, the relationship with the PDS was an uneasy one.
Behrend (2006, p.65) argues that although the former GDR had been largely 
restructured according to the positions and practices of the 'victor' (the Federal 
Republic), a large number of easterners held onto the principles of egalitarianism and 
solidarity. Many of these people joined and voted for the PDS, a left-wing party. In 
contrast, these positions and values were less prominent in the West where, according 
to Behrend, prior to the Wende, the left was commonly portrayed as work-shy and 
politically naïve (unbedarft). Events in central and eastern Europe and especially in the 
GDR had impacted heavily on the left in West Germany, which had already been 
grappling with dilemmas and challenges of its own . The scope and pace of change 20
robbed the left of any opportunity to consider at length its own response: ‘The Third of 
October as date of accession and the all-German elections in December 1990 could be 
not be delayed, let alone prevented, by the political left’ (Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.11). 
Furthermore, some elements in the western left considered they had 'won' over the 
East; a position that stood in the way of developing closer relationships with the PDS or 
with its eastern members (Behrend, 2006, p.65). In short, the movements and activists 
with whom the PDS sought to build alliances were themselves already divided, with 
little clear direction.
In addition to the PDS’s very limited appeal to western left-wing social democrats and 
trade unionists, a further obstacle was the modest reward that could be expected of 
relationships developed with other left-wing groups in the western states, such as the 
DKP. For example, even though the DKP was quite solidly established, it provided little 
in the way of members or indeed votes, as it was ‘electorally marginal’ (Olsen, 2002b, 
p.149). Before the PDS banned dual membership there was a brief flurry of activity as 
experienced and well-organised supporters or members of other leftist organisations 
joined the party (ibid.). The problem was that the continuation of factional conflict 
spilled over into the PDS, adding to the sense of disorientation within the western party 
organisations.  
At federal level, too, the PDS continued to be divided over its political and strategic 
direction. In 2002, the PDS suffered a disastrous defeat in the Bundestag election, 
failing to either clear the five per cent hurdle or gain three direct mandates. 
 For example, Meucher-Mäker (2005, p.11) describes the dwindling of the western leftist 20
intellectual movement, the crisis of Euro-communism and a long-term decline in the trade union 
movement, brought about by conservative and neo-liberal policies.
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Consequently, the party failed to qualify for status as parliamentary group or even as a 
group in the Bundestag. The sole and rather isolated PDS representatives throughout 
the legislative period were Gesine Lötzsch and Petra Pau, both of whom had been 
elected directly by their constituencies in eastern Berlin. The party was therefore 
stripped of the important financial and material resources as well as debating time 
entitlements reserved for the parliamentary group. A particularly painful example of the 
PDS’s curtailed influence was the debate on the Agenda 2010 proposals. When the 
government’s proposals for sweeping employment market and welfare reforms were 
debated in the Bundestag, the PDS, no longer a parliamentary group, was not entitled 
to refer the Hartz recommendations, a central and highly controversial component of 
Agenda 2010, to the Constitutional Court for judicial review and was therefore unable 
to effectively oppose the reforms as it would have wished. The party struggled to 
maintain its visibility and relevance at national level, which cast even further doubt on 
the PDS's credibility as anything other than an eastern regional party.
Following the decision of Gysi and Bisky not to seek re-election (in the wake of the 
Münster conference defeat) the PDS was led by Gabriele (Gabi) Zimmer, until then the 
chair of the Thuringia regional organisation. Zimmer was supported by three deputies: 
Peter Porsch (leader of the PDS Saxony), Petra Pau (Bundestag member and head of 
the Berlin party) and, more surprisingly, Diether Dehm, who had until just a few months 
before been a longstanding member of the SPD, based in the western state of Lower 
Saxony (Hough et al., 2007, p.38). A characteristic of Zimmer's leadership was that the 
central party executed only minimal coordination of the regional party organisations. 
Due to Germany’s federal system, the regional organisations in the Länder play an 
influential role within political parties. A significant part of the problem was that the party 
executive itself represented a diverse range of sometimes opposing positions, 
particularly concerning the ever-controversial issue of government participation. Among 
the executive were eastern members with tried and tested experience of ‘real politics’ 
and government at Land level (e.g. Helmut Holter and Petra Sitte ), members of the 21
generally pragmatic reform wing of the party, as well as members who wished to see a 
more socialist and opposition-orientated PDS (such as Rouzbeh Taheri and Sahra 
  Helmut Holter - leader of the PDS in Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania and the first ‘Red-21
Red’ coalition. A firm believer in the necessity of governmental responsibility in order to bring 
about real change, Holter was described as a ‘social democrat through and through’ by his SPD 
counterpart in the coalition, Harald Ringstorff. (Uhlmann, 2011). Petra Sitte was one of the 
architects of the ‘toleration’ model in Saxony. Also a proponent of governmental responsibility, 
Sitte said she sometimes wished that the ‘bold class warriors’ in the party were forced to hold 
office, even for just half a year, to see how difficult it really was. (Zöller, 2004).
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Wagenknecht ) (Hough et al., 2007, p.39). Even the three deputies each stood for a 22
different political direction of the party. Although the composition of the executive might 
have raised the profile of inner-party plurality, the following examples illustrate that the 
resulting tension and inconsistency did not provide the ideal conditions in which to 
steer the party towards a coherent political and strategic direction.
Firstly, the existing PDS programme dated back to 1993. Since then, the party had 
gained experience of government at Land level in the East; Germany itself had also 
changed, not least in its role in military action. But the process of drafting and debating 
a new programme in time for the 2002 election was a fraught and arduous one; the 
new programme was not adopted until 2003, by which time the PDS no longer 
constituted a parliamentary group at federal level. Secondly, despite (and because of) 
the party’s experience of governmental responsibility in the East, Zimmer's deputy, 
Diether Dehm, strongly advocated an oppositional role for the PDS, and actively sought 
to strengthen the party’s alignment to extra-parliamentary movements, particularly in 
the West (Hough et al., 2007, p.40). This 'Uneindeutigkeit' (ambiguity) in the vertical 
structure — from the federal leadership to the regional organisations in the Länder — 
gave rise to an environment of 'lose verkoppelte Anarchie' (loosely coupled anarchy) 
that took root on the horizontal dimension, in other words, among the PDS's various 
Land organisations (Hough and Koß, 2008). This in turn created space for conflicts 
surrounding the strategic and political aims of the PDS to grow and develop into sub-
groups and factions within the party. As a result, inner-party disputes not only 
intensified, but also became personalised, particularly with regard to and even amongst 
the leadership itself. 
After the party’s defeat at the General Election, the Gera conference supported 
Zimmer's strategy of 'gestaltende Opposition' (constructive opposition). The conference 
also gave rise to the Geraer Dialog, a forum within the PDS that sought to facilitate 
dialogue with the aim of socialist reconstruction of the party, and was critical of what it 
saw as a creeping accommodation in the PDS of capitalism and the social market 
 Rouzbeh Taheri was a member of the PDS Berlin but left the party to join the WASG to 22
protest against the policies of the SPD-PDS coalition in Berlin. He later planned to stand an 
alternative list of WASG candidates directly against the PDS Berlin (Hough et al., 2007, p.39). 
Sahra Wagenknecht was a prominent member of the Communist Platform (KPF) in the PDS 
and became deputy leader of the Left Party. Opposed to the coalition in Berlin, Wagenknecht 
was among those for whom credibility was not about the ability to compromise, but the ability to 
resist attacks on social and democratic rights (Wagenknecht, 2007). 
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economy . But the disputes intensified, and the leadership descended into 23
accusations and counter-accusations. In June 2003, an extraordinary meeting of the 
PDS conference took place in Berlin specifically to address the state of the party and 
elect a new leadership. At the conference, Zimmer stood down as leader and openly 
addressed the level of stagnation and conflict within the party leadership, pointing out 
that she had been elected to serve the interests of a party of democratic socialists, not 
to take on the role of ringmaster. Key areas suffering from a ‘strategy deficit’ were the 
debate on the party programme, the theoretical and practical discussion of reform 
alternatives, and concepts for party reform. According to Zimmer, the situation had 
deteriorated to such an extent that the executive was incapable even of agreeing on a 
suitably motivating, inspiring message to accompany the publication of the long-
overdue draft programme. ‘The draft was intended as the basis of discussion up until 
the programme conference. [The message] was rejected by the majority of the 
executive. As a result, the publication went ahead with no comment from the executive 
of the PDS. I still believe this is no way to inspire either members or 
sympathisers’ (Zimmer, 2003). 
An earlier survey of members found that the chief motivations for joining and remaining 
in the PDS were the party’s eastern identity, its position to the left of the SPD and 
Greens and its home for anti-capitalist politics (thus echoing the main streams within 
the party). However, the paper asserted that these reasons, though completely valid, 
were actually quite vague and unlikely to resonate with ordinary voters; instead, the 
party needed to offer convincing and concrete policies (Spehr, 2002). Furthermore, the 
paper argued for a coherent policy on coalitions and supported the goal of a future 
coalition at federal level with the SPD and Greens, with a limited number of clearly 
stated and achievable conditions (ibid.). The office-seeking position was confirmed at 
the Berlin conference, where the reformist wing of the party was able to regain the 
upper hand. Delegates voted for a 'perceptible return to politics' and defeated a 
proposal from the party’s left, including the Communist Platform, seeking to commit the 
PDS to principled opposition and to play no part in implementing Agenda 2010 
cutbacks and other attacks on social welfare. Zimmer’s replacement was Lothar Bisky, 
who was generally regarded as a safe pair of hands and who enjoyed respect and 
broad acceptance across the various streams within the party. Also supporting the 
findings of the paper, Bisky warned delegates that the return of a PDS parliamentary 
group in the next legislative period would be possible only if the party ended its ongoing 
 Following the Berlin Tempodrom conference, a number of Geraer Dialog members left the 23
PDS. Later, those who remained went on to support the collaboration with the WASG. The 
Geraer Dialog became a formally recognised group within the Left Party.
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ideological debates and instead concentrated efforts on concrete policies (Hough et al., 
2007, p.44). 
Bisky was also convinced that the party had to continue its efforts in the western 
Länder. Yet while the demands set out in the ‘Letter from Saxony’ that the PDS should 
abandon the western states to consolidate its role as an eastern regional party were 
roundly rejected, there was no denying that organisationally, electorally and culturally, 
the PDS was still not a western party (Patton, 2000, p.151). The PDS had worked hard 
to increase its presence at basic grassroots level; by 2002, just as its vote in the East 
collapsed in the Bundestag election, the party had over one hundred seats in city and 
local councils in six of the ten western states (Olsen, 2002b, p.150). This was of course 
snail-like progress and the danger remained that even a strengthened grassroots base 
might not make the jump to regional (Land) level. The DKP, which Olsen (ibid., p.151) 
describes as the ‘forerunner’ of the PDS (although the party was, unlike the PDS, 
established in the West), had also gained a number of seats at local level but never 
succeeded in making an impact in regional or federal parliaments. Moreover, while the 
number of western votes for the PDS increased, the voter share stubbornly remained 
at just over one per cent — certainly nowhere near the party’s target of the three per 
cent required to help the PDS achieve the electoral threshold nationwide. But in the 
absence of an identifiable core electorate in the western states, the painstaking 
process of establishing a grassroots base appeared to be the most realistic opportunity 
for the PDS to build its western electorate (ibid.). 
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1.4 Towards a New Left Party
1.4.1. Agenda 2010 and the Hartz Reforms
It was during the most troubled period for the PDS that Chancellor Schröder's 
government announced the Agenda 2010 measures. After three terms of Helmut Kohl's 
CDU-FDP government, the SPD was returned to power with the pledge to tackle 
Germany's growing and increasingly long-term unemployment. The SPD election 
campaign had set out the party's proposed solutions to the job market problem, 
promising a combination of reform and social justice. Achieving 41% of the vote, the 
party managed to increase its share of support from white-collar workers and former 
CDU voters (Gibowski, 1999, p.23). The SPD formed a coalition with the Greens, led 
by Joschka Fischer. 
Although the model had been tried and tested at Land level, this was the first Red-
Green federal government. During its first term, the coalition attempted to overcome 
the Reformstau (reform bottleneck) that came to characterise the closing phase of the 
previous government, but experienced a deterioration in its relationship to the business 
sector, which blamed social-democratic policies for contributing to higher wage costs 
and worsening unemployment (Camerra-Rowe, 2004, p.6). To tackle the problem of 
unemployment, the then SPD Finance Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, favoured a 
reflationary approach, which included urging the European Central Bank to reduce the 
price of borrowing to help stimulate demand, especially among low income groups 
(Anderson, 2009, p.5). 
In 1998, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder drafted a 
manifesto known as the ‘Third Way/Neue Mitte’, arguing that in a modern, globalised 
society where most people had ‘abandoned the worldview represented by the dogmas 
of left and right’, the role of social democracy was to promote maximum flexibility whilst 
maintaining a minimum of social standards (Blair and Schröder, 1998). Furthermore, 
the document challenged the left to focus on the supply side of the labour market in 
order to tackle problems such as unemployment and inflexibility. The manifesto also 
called for limits to ‘tax and spend’ policies and instead for the generation of a 
thoroughly modernised public sector in which the state should step back from the 
provision of public goods and permit the market to produce them more effectively 
(ibid.).
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Therefore, whereas Finance Minister Lafontaine pursued reflationary, counter-cyclical 
policies to stimulate demand, Chancellor Schröder was ideologically committed to 
supply side solutions for the labour market. It was a conflict that could not be overcome 
and resulted in Lafontaine’s abrupt resignation from the government. However, 
Lafontaine’s exit from government further weakened the SPD's left wing; consequently 
Schröder faced fewer obstacles to the implementation a series of austerity measures 
that would prove unpopular not only with the Keynesian left inside the SPD but also 
with the party’s core social-democrat constituency (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.137). 
In an effort to tackle Germany's persistent and related problems of high and especially 
long-term unemployment, welfare/poverty trap , as well as the burgeoning cost of 24
welfare, the Red-Green coalition embarked on a series of reforms known as Agenda 
2010. Once again, a supply-side approach was adopted and the programme aimed to 
reform welfare by reducing unemployment benefit and public health insurance 
provision; it also focused on the job market, proposing to loosen labour protection laws, 
raise the official retirement age and cut the level of state subsidies to industry. 
Supporters of Agenda 2010 welcomed the introduction of measures such as increased 
spending to enhance the provision of day-care facilities and an expansion of all-day 
schools, which were designed to improve accessibility to the labour market, especially 
for women and people in the eastern states (Camerra-Rowe, 2004, p.22). 
An important element of this extensive ‘modernisation’ package was the Hartz 
commission on reform of the labour market . The first three parts of the Hartz concept 25
(Hartz I, II and III) focused on, inter alia, vocational training, new types of employment 
(such as the mini-job) and the reform of employment agencies and job centres. 
However, it was the fourth arm of the recommendations, Hartz IV, that proved the most 
controversial. Hartz IV, approved by the Bundestag in 2003, ushered in the merger of 
welfare benefits awarded to the long-term unemployed (Arbeitslosenhilfe) with means-
tested income support (Sozialhilfe), as a financial ‘incentive’ for people unemployed for 
longer than one year to re-enter the job market. The reform package also included a 
raft of workfare measures designed to get people back into the workforce, with 
eligibility and level of welfare payment contingent on compliance with these measures. 
However, in practice, the Hartz programme essentially amounted to a significant 
 In this context meaning the barriers and disincentives to work allegedly created by means-24
tested welfare payments. 
 The commission was headed by Volkswagen board member Peter Hartz - hence its name. 25
However, the official title of the commission was ‘Kommission für moderne Dienstleistungen am 
Arbeitsmarkt – the Committee for Modern Services in the Labour Market’.
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reduction in the welfare benefits paid to some of the poorest people in society (Green 
et al., 2011, p.138).   
Agenda 2010 and the Hartz reforms represented an important shift in the relationship 
between the SPD and its social democratic interests and constituencies. Signs of the 
transformation were already evident in the 2002 Bundestag election, in which the SPD 
performed rather weakly among the sections of the electorate upon whose support it 
had historically depended, namely trade unions and blue-collar workers. Conversely, 
gains were made among skilled and professional workers and voters in the eastern 
region. Here, the large trade unions did not mobilise workers to the same extent as 
they did in the West and, in a region stricken by high and long-term unemployment, 
were sometimes criticised for failing to represent the interests of workers who were 
either unemployed or facing job insecurity. For instance, in 2003 the IG-Metall union 
campaigned for the introduction of shorter hours (without loss of pay) in the East in 
order to bring working conditions in line with those in the West. The campaign 
collapsed, not least because the proposed measures were perceived to undermine 
jobs, rather than help create them (Camerra-Rowe, 2004, p.18).
The Agenda 2010 measures met with large-scale opposition. Among those resisting the 
measures were trade unionists, the left and people either already affected by or fearful 
of facing the consequences of Hartz IV. But although a large number of PDS members 
participated in the mushrooming protests, the party did not play any significant role in 
the actual initiation and organisation of the early demonstrations in 2003 (König et al., 
2007, p.19). When the resistance to Agenda 2010 took shape, the PDS did not lead, it 
followed. As former PDS Deputy Chair Katina Schubert confirms: ‘In 2003 (...) as it all 
began and the big demonstrations were held in November in Berlin, we were all taken 
completely by surprise. But by 2004, we were there, too’ (ibid.). 
That the early protest movement emerged and flourished in a series of western cities 
whilst effectively bypassing the PDS once again exposed the party's weak links to 
social movements; it was ‘not an organic product of western Germany’ (Olsen, 2007, p.
206) and even in 2003 still lacked a firm anchor in civil society in the western states. As 
a response to Agenda 2010 the PDS presented an alternative concept, the ‘Agenda 
Sozial’. Proposals included tax reform, a minimum monthly pension of €800, a 
Bürgerversicherung (citizens' health insurance), a minimum monthly wage of €1,400 
and an increase in the standard rate of unemployment benefit ALG II to €400, both in 
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the eastern and western Länder . The party also opposed the introduction of the 26
Praxisgebühr, a €10 quarterly fee payable to each medical practice attended . Even 27
though the party had identified and costed concrete alternatives to Agenda 2010, the 
problem was that, bereft of a parliamentary group in the Bundestag and therefore a 
strong, visible presence in federal politics, it was difficult for the PDS to attract much 
attention to Agenda Sozial. Furthermore, the protest to Hartz IV was unfolding not in 
the form of rival policy documents but on the streets. Put simply, the PDS, for all its 
criticism of capitalism and its agenda for social justice, was unable to mobilise 
opposition to a radical attack on welfare and employment conditions.
Instead, the direct response to Hartz IV came from a new formation called the 
Wahlalternative (Electoral Alternative). The group, mainly based in northern Germany, 
was headed by economist Axel Troost, Socialism journal editor Joachim Bischoff and 
public service union Ver.di leader Ralf Krämer. It convened in March 2004 and 
launched a website with a ‘call to action’ for like-minded opponents of Hartz IV (Olsen, 
2007, p.208). Meanwhile, a second group of Hartz IV opponents formed in Bavaria. 
The Initiative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit (Initiative for Labour and Social Justice) 
was led by SPD members and union leaders Klaus Ernst and Thomas Händel, and 
consisted of several members of the IG-Metall union, which had close ties to the SPD 
(ibid.). The leaders of the two organisations met in the summer of 2004, uniting to form 
the Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG). By the end of the year, 
the newly formed interest group — which was not yet a political party — managed to 
attract over 5,000 members and grew into an alliance of social democrats (who by then 
had either left or been expelled from the SPD), trade unionists, peace activists and, in 
the western Länder, leftist organisations such as Linksruck, who had long since 
adopted a critical stance towards the PDS . In this alliance, Solty identifies a 28
weakness in certain aspects of the WASG's membership profile: trade unionists, 
disillusioned SPD members and organised workers fearful of a decline into Hartz IV 
 At the time, the standard ALG II stood at €311 in the East and €345 in the western states. 26
 In Germany it is common to visit a variety of different doctors/practices, depending on the 27
nature of each individual health issue. Therefore, it was likely that patients had to pay the fee 
more than once, to different practices, during any given quarter. The PDS argued that people on 
low incomes might try and save money by not visiting the doctor, thus potentially risking their 
health — also a potentially greater financial expense for the state in the long term. In other 
words, the claim that the Praxisgebühr would generate savings lacked credibility.
 An ‘undogmatic trotskyist’ group with roots in the Sozialistiche Arbeitergruppe (SAG); 28
Linksruck was affiliated to the International Socialist Tendency and closely associated with Tony 
Cliff and the British SWP. In 2007, the organisation dissolved, after several members joined the 
WASG and, post-merger, the Left Party, even though Linksruck had been a long-standing critic 
of the PDS. 
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represented a rather specific and ‘besitzstandswahrende’ group; in other words, they 
were primarily keen to protect their own specific vested interests rather than pursue a 
greater principle or vision (Solty, 2007, p.7). Although this allowed the WASG to avoid 
becoming too ‘confined’ in terms of ideology, it also potentially limited the opportunity 
for the alliance to develop a comprehensive identity beyond the immediate set of 
particular demands (Dietzel et al., 2005, p.33).  
Indeed, unsurprisingly, given its roots in the trade union movement, the WASG 
programme was mainly concerned with improving working conditions and employee 
rights. This aspect of the programme prompted some criticism, including from within 
the PDS, that the WASG was rather nostalgic for the social democratic class 
compromise of the 1970s, an era of welfare state expansion through rapid economic 
growth. Schubert, a former member of the SPD before joining the PDS, summarised 
this particular form of social democracy as heavily ‘étatiste’ (state dominated). In other 
words, ‘It relies on the creation of social justice through redistribution (...) but this was 
always coupled, at least partially, with an authoritarian concept of the state and an 
authoritarian approach to immigration and asylum policy’ (König et al., 2007, p.7).  
The WASG committed itself to the principles of the social welfare state, which it 
regarded as a major achievement of civilisation, and one which needed to become 
more comprehensive in order to take into account developments such as technical 
advancement, social dislocation, different working patterns, the role of women and 
transformations in family life (Bischoff and Radke, 2005). Key policy areas included the 
introduction of a minimum wage, the stimulation of domestic demand, shorter working 
hours as a means of tackling unemployment, tax reforms (including a higher rate of tax 
for top earners and a tax on financial transactions) and the introduction of a citizens' 
health insurance programme. Relating specifically to Hartz IV, the WASG called for an 
extended period (more than one year) of unemployment benefit paid to people who had 
for much of their lives paid into the social security system, after which a reinstated 
Arbeitslosenhilfe (merged with Sozialhilfe under the Hartz reform) would come into 
effect (Dietzel et al., 2005, p.18). 
Though there was certainly some common ground with the PDS’s Agenda Sozial, there 
were some contrasts between the two parties. The PDS, in its programme, 
unequivocally held dominant capitalism responsible for the ‘threat to human 
civilisation’, poverty, war and ecological destruction; driving this imperialistic dominance 
were the governments of a few countries, the leaders of a handful of global 
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corporations and financial capital (PDS, 2003). The WASG, however, did not place 
significant emphasis on capitalism itself; its central theme was social justice (Soziale 
Gerechtigkeit) and it was more concerned with concrete threats to living standards. For 
the WASG, the social state was being destroyed by ‘the politicians in charge’ and the 
policies of the established parties. Although it did hold neoliberal policies responsible 
for high unemployment and cuts in social spending (WASG, 2005), the WASG tended 
to avoid the ‘Systemfrage’ (questioning the whole political system). However, in terms 
of the key policy areas — social justice, eastern interests and peace — both parties 
shared similar aims and policies. The main area of dispute, though, concerned 
government participation versus principled opposition, with the WASG generally 
favouring the latter. The impact on the cooperation and merger process is discussed 
later in this chapter; first it is time to turn to the catalyst which propelled the two parties 
towards that common trajectory.
1.4.2. The NRW State Election
In May 2005 elections were scheduled for Germany's most populous federal state, 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), traditionally an SPD stronghold. To participate in the 
election the WASG membership voted to establish the movement as a political party. 
The outcome of the election would play a significant role in determining any future 
relationship between the WASG and the PDS. If either party cleared the five per cent 
electoral threshold but the other failed, the successful party would be encouraged to go 
it alone and abandon any notion of collaboration (Olsen, 2007, p.209). Particularly for 
the PDS, this was a rather unlikely prospect, given the party's disappointing record of 
election results in the western states. Secondly, success for both parties (also 
improbable) could result in heightened competition and rivalry, therefore also hindering 
any prospects for cooperation. Finally, the failure of both the WASG and PDS to clear 
the threshold would compel the parties to constructively reassess their relationship 
(ibid.). As it happened, the PDS share of the vote declined to an exceptionally poor 
0.9%, while the WASG attracted 2.2%; thus neither party managed to gain seats in the 
NRW parliament. 
Although the result was disappointing for the PDS and WASG, the overall outcome of 
the NRW election in fact proved pivotal for the cooperation between the two parties. 
The SPD lost control of its heartland state, the latest in a series of defeats at regional 
level, and not entirely unexpected, since the party had already suffered losses in the 
previous year's municipal elections in NRW. Nevertheless, the NRW defeat was a 
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serious blow to the Social Democrats and speculation began to grow within the SPD 
about a shift in the party's political direction. Chancellor Schröder instead decided to 
take the unusual step of calling an early General Election (ibid.). Solty (2007, p.7) 
argues that in so doing, Schröder intended to ‘pull the rug’ from under any debate and 
thereby also pre-empt the coup rumoured to be hatching within the party. The decision 
was also intended to ‘strangle at birth’ the growing social protest to the left of the SPD, 
especially the WASG. Although the General Election was deemed unwinnable for the 
SPD, an incoming conservative-liberal government could be expected to retain (and 
perhaps even push further) the majority of the SPD-Green Agenda 2010 measures. In 
fact, compared to an abandonment of Agenda 2010 and a return to more traditional 
social democracy, a defeat by the CDU actually constituted the ‘lesser evil’ for policy 
maximisers in the SPD committed to the supply-side transformation of welfare and 
employment. What is more, a period in opposition would also allow the party to renew 
and regroup and presumably reaffirm its commitment to Agenda 2010 (ibid., p.8).
The results in NRW highlighted the inability of both PDS and WASG to clear the five 
per cent threshold independently and therefore raised concerns about the outcome of 
the early General Election called for that autumn. German electoral law does not permit 
two (or more) parties to form an electoral alliance, whether by running joint lists or 
pooling the votes gathered for separate ones, in order to overcome the threshold 
together (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.144). There was, though, provision for a party to 
open its lists both to independent candidates and/or those from other parties — a 
strategy with which the PDS had been familiar (the Left List) since the 1990s. On the 
other hand, under this rule, only the name of the list ‘owner’ may appear at the top of 
the list and state reimbursements of campaign expenses are paid only to the list owner, 
which in this case would be the PDS. Lack of time was also a significant factor, since 
electoral law stipulates that a party must declare to the Federal Election Commissioner 
its intention to participate in the General Election at least ninety days before polling 
takes place. This procedure requires the party to submit its statutes, manifesto and 
proof of statutory appointment of its executive. Also, in the case of early elections, the 
Interior Ministry is able to reduce these notice periods (Dümde, 2005). Thus, with no 
time to conclude a formal merger, the WASG and PDS, if they wished to avoid 
‘strangulation’, would have to achieve a complex manoeuvre requiring no small 
measure of trust and successfully address a number of tensions between the two 
parties in order to cooperate in September's General Election (Nachtwey and Spier, 
2007).
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1.4.3. The Dynamics and Tensions of Cooperation
Post-communist on one side, post-social democratic on the other; East 
German on one side, West German on the other; established on one side, 
up and coming on the other. In what way should they now grow together, 
what united them? (Jünke, 2007, p. 313)
The cooperation between the PDS and WASG did not get off to an auspicious start. 
Ramelow, chair of the PDS in Thuringia and responsible for steering the negotiations 
with the WASG, described the complex process ahead as a ‘kamikaze mission’ (Berg, 
2005). The challenge was nothing less than ‘the formation of a new left, the framing of 
a through-going critique of the reigning neo-liberalism and the reaching of an 
agreement on a political programme which would embody both credibility and the 
capacity for mobilisation’ (Jünke, 2007, p.311). Furthermore, PDS chair Bisky stressed 
that for the PDS itself, the General Election essentially amounted to a question of 
survival; a second legislative period with no parliamentary group and convincing federal 
presence would effectively destroy the prospects of becoming anything but an eastern 
regional party (Berg, 2005). 
On 17 July in Berlin, the PDS gathered for an extraordinary conference on the 
cooperation process. Faced with time pressure on the one hand and meeting the 
requirements of electoral law on the other, delegates voted for (another) renaming, this 
time to ‘Linkspartei.PDS’. The aim was to seek a ‘cooperation agreement with a 
perspective for a merger’ (Gysi, quoted in Berg, 2005, p.57). The WASG, for its part, 
would not contest the elections as an independent party; instead, its candidates would 
join the PDS open lists, even though this strategy had previously been rejected by the 
WASG membership (Dümde and Strohschneider, 2005). Nonetheless, despite several 
unanswered questions and misgivings from within both parties, the agreement was 
signed on 10 June by Bisky and Ernst, representing the PDS and WASG respectively.  
A significant driving force behind the cooperation, and one which cannot be 
overestimated, was the declaration both by Gregor Gysi and Oskar Lafontaine of their 
intention to stand as candidates in the General Election. Gysi agreed to stand as a 
direct candidate for Berlin Treptow-Köpenick, a seat whose narrow loss in 2002 had 
deprived the PDS of its crucial third direct mandate and therefore group status in the 
Bundestag (Olsen, 2007, p.209). This decision marked Gysi's return to the forefront of 
the PDS, following his unexpected resignation from the Berlin Senate, and battle with 
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serious health problems. In Disput, the monthly PDS membership magazine, Gysi gave 
several reasons for his decision to stand as a candidate. One factor was his close 
relationship with Lafontaine (rumours of their cooperation had been circulating in the 
PDS for some time). Also, the previous handover to the next generation of leaders in 
the PDS (in other words, to Zimmer and her deputies) had not been a success. Further, 
opinion polls showed that support for the PDS had stalled at around 4% of the 
nationwide vote; as an indicator of the party's prospects of re-entering the Bundestag 
as a full parliamentary group, this was a far from encouraging statistic. The General 
Election thus represented both a challenge and an opportunity in which he would be 
fully committed to bringing about a Left alliance of PDS and WASG (Gysi, 2005, p.6). In 
his statement, Gysi clearly signalled that his return to the PDS was conditional on the 
reassertion of his authority and influence in the party, and that the resulting cooperation 
would be driven by both he and Lafontaine (Olsen, 2007, p.209).   
Of the well-known Social Democrats who had declared their interest in the WASG, the 
PDS was particularly keen to attract Oskar Lafontaine onto its open lists. A poll 
published in Spiegel on 24 May 2005 showed that a substantial 18% of respondents 
could see themselves voting for a party in which Lafontaine played a leading role. 
Conversely, only 14% of the SPD members who participated in the survey said they 
would vote for a party headed by Lafontaine (see Table 1.1 below). However, here it is 
important to bear in mind that some SPD members had never forgiven Lafontaine for 
his sudden resignation, either as Finance Minister or as SPD chair. Moreover, he had 
also just announced in the daily tabloid Bild his departure from the party itself, after 
thirty-nine years. Explaining his decision, Lafontaine said that he considered his 
membership of the SPD to be over once and for all if the party entered the General 
Election on a platform of Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV. Further, he declared his 
willingness to stand as a candidate for a new left alliance of the PDS and WASG. ‘It 
makes no sense for two small parties, the WASG and the PDS, to compete to the left of 
the SPD’ (Oertel and Strohschneider, 2005). Envisaging a new left-wing alliance, 
Lafontaine said he was prepared to participate in the event of a joint PDS/WASG 
electoral list in order to oppose the policy of social dismantling pursued by the 
Bundestag parties (Bild, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the statement fuelled feelings of 
resentment and betrayal amongst many Social Democrats, who (again) held Lafontaine 
at least partly responsible for the troubles within their party. Initial responses from the 
SPD to Lafontaine's announcement ranged from dismissive (‘leftist splinter groups 
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have always failed and merely strengthen the political right’) to cautious (the WASG 
‘has already achieved a formidable result’) .29
Table 1.1 Percentage of voters, SPD supporters and PDS supporters who would consider 
voting for a party led by Oskar Lafontaine 
Source: Berg (2005, p. 57)
The joint comeback of Gysi and Lafontaine added a strong element of personality 
politics but also significant impetus to the campaign (König et al., 2007, p.10). Yet the 
Spiegel survey also showed that only half of the PDS respondents to the poll, which 
took place just a few days before the first round of cooperation talks between the PDS 
and WASG, could see themselves voting for a Lafontaine-led party. Although 
Lafontaine undoubtedly created welcome interest in the new alliance, the massive 
publicity surrounding his exit from the SPD also increased the pressure to cooperate, 
whether desired or not, and seemingly at any price (Heunemann, 2006, p.49). Prior to 
Lafontaine's announcement of his decision to stand as a candidate for the WASG, 
Ramelow stated that if he (Lafontaine) were genuinely seeking a new political home, 
rather than a mere publicity opportunity, then he would be welcome in the PDS; after 
all, the party was operating an open list for the General Election. Ramelow also 
stressed that he was keen to preserve the PDS as an entity, rather than cast the net 
wide to attract yet another bunte Truppe (Neues Deutschland, 2005) ; meanwhile, 30
Gysi insisted that Lafontaine ‘had to jump’ (Berg, 2005, p.57). These statements 
showed that PDS was clearly reluctant to make far-reaching changes to the structures 
it had built up since 1990; they also hint at the contradictions and structural tensions 
that emerged in the cooperation process. 
 Rainer Wend (SPD economics expert) and Dieter Wiefelspütz (SPD interior policy 29
spokesperson) quoted respectively in Oertel and Strohschneider (2005).
 ‘Bunte Truppe’ means ‘chequered troop’ – the term was originally used to describe the 30
various streams and interests in the early PDS (‘Gysi’s bunte Truppe’).  
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Gohde (2006, p.139) considers that most of these tensions concerned organisational 
matters rather than political differences, with conflicts centred on ‘recognition, fear of 
absorption and loss of control, and on identity and mutual respect’. Important in this 
context were the size and identity of the cooperating parties. In 2005, the PDS had just 
over 61,000 members nationwide, although this number had fallen year on year since 
1992, when membership had totalled over 146,000 (PDS, 2005) . By contrast, 31
membership of the newly formed WASG stood at approximately 12,000.  Although the 
PDS was by far the larger party, its membership was, of course, predominantly based 
in the eastern states, while the WASG was stronger in the West. At first glance, 
combining forces presented an ideal opportunity for the parties to balance the disparity, 
utilising their respective strengths to complement each other. But for the members of 
both parties, there was much more at stake than numbers.
The western regional organisations, after years of political marginalisation, were now 
ideally suited to field candidates with a real chance of becoming elected to the 
Bundestag, but only because of cooperation with the WASG (Gohde, 2006, p.138). As 
a result, some of the western regional organisations viewed the process as a threat to 
their own — and hard-won — identity. Even the renaming of the party to simply 
‘Linkspartei’ met with a degree of resistance in some states which insisted that the 
suffix ‘.PDS’ was essential for maintaining party identity and as a statement of political 
aims , especially as explicit mention of the term ‘democratic socialism’ was absent 32
from the WASG programme.
The western PDS had managed to build up its membership base slowly but steadily, 
from a mere 617 in 1992 to 5,956 in 2005 (PDS, 2005). These figures were modest 
when compared to membership numbers for the eastern party but, as explained in 
Section 1.3, had been achieved in a challenging political environment, and in the face 
of repeated opposition from sections within the party itself. Indeed, taking a positive 
view of the PDS experience in the western states, one of the outcomes was a group of 
committed and resilient activists who were now well placed to build the new Linkspartei 
in the western Länder. Also, although electoral success had remained elusive, the PDS 
had managed to remain a nationwide party of sorts, at least in terms of party 
organisation and membership. Had the party not developed these organisations, there 
 1992 was when the PDS began to publish membership figures for east and west, as well as 31
nationwide.  
 All but three western regional parties were subsequently known as ‘Linkspartei.PDS’.32
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would have been no structural basis for the rapid construction of the Left Party 
(Meuche-Mäker, 2005, p.68). But running deeper than the organisational challenges 
and extending way beyond the limited time window was the question of the political 
character of the new party. 
Following the PDS’s General Election debacle in 2002, little positive progress had been 
made in terms of ‘regrouping’ or redefining the party's political identity. The Chemnitz 
programme far from quelled the often bitter disputes within the various factions of the 
party, particularly surrounding the meaning of socialism as well as regarding the 
increasingly divisive question of government participation versus opposition. Had 
Schröder not sprung the early election and instead held on until 2006, König (2007, p.
10) doubts whether the PDS would have ever have managed to get any cooperation 
with the WASG off the ground. Yet in 2005, in the sudden glare of media attention and 
spurred on by two ambitious, driving personalities, everything was suddenly moving 
quickly, albeit in a rather top-down process that left little opportunity to address 
fundamental political issues. In an interview with Neues Deutschland, the former chair 
of the trade union IG Medien, Detlef Hensche, called on everyone on the left ‘of good 
will and of sound mind’ to stand together for the new party (Dümde and Strohschneider, 
2005). This and similar urges to seize the narrow window of opportunity prompted the 
following response from the Communist Platform: 
Let's assume that all the obstacles to founding a new party can be 
overcome. There still isn't the slightest guarantee that this collaboration 
would bring about any movement to the left — besides the rhetoric over the 
coming months (...) This isn't ‘just’ an organisational-structural matter. 
Above all it's about determining content. (Brombacher et al., 2005) 
In the rush to participate in the early General Election, there was a very real sense that 
political content was being bypassed. These issues underline the east-west tension 
and relate closely to some of the key policy areas outlined earlier in this chapter.
 
One such tension centred on the PDS heritage as the former state party of the GDR. 
This was of course nothing new and was a subject frequently raised by political 
competitors and the media. The party had taken various steps of its own in the process 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (confronting and coming to terms with the past); for 
example, during her leadership, Gabi Zimmer issued an official apology for the forced 
union in 1946 of the KPD and SPD to form the SED, the forerunner of the PDS. The 
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PDS programme, too, focused on both the positive and negative legacy of the GDR 
and which lessons and values the party had learned from this experience. The 2003 
Chemnitz programme stated that ‘the socialist idea has been damaged through its 
misuse as justification for dictatorship and repression. The experiences of the GDR, 
including the insight into the causes of its collapse oblige us to rethink our 
understanding of socialism’ (PDS, 2003). On the other hand, as we have seen, many of 
the party's policies (and indeed the language in which they were written) were critical of 
the unification process and explicitly represented eastern interests — both aspects had 
earned the party its substantial support in the eastern states. However, the cooperation 
process with the WASG also revived some of the entrenched anti-communism the PDS 
had long encountered in the West, particularly among the traditionally SPD-affiliated 
trade union movements. In addition, the characterisation of the PDS as an extremist 
party was still very much in evidence a decade and a half after unification; during the 
implementation of (and subsequent protests against) Hartz IV, the liberal weekly Die 
Zeit warned that ‘Bisky, Gysi, Lafontaine and the [extreme] right stir up the fears from 
which they profit. (...) On 19 September in Brandenburg and Sachsen, thirty-five to forty 
per cent could vote for the anti-Hartz front of PDS, NPD and DVU (Geis, 2004) . 33
Meuche-Mäker (2005, p.73) points out that the target audience of this statement was 
unlikely to be the respective electorates in Brandenburg and Saxony; rather, it was 
aimed at western readers, intellectuals and elites, in order to add fuel to the belief that, 
where totalitarianism is concerned, ‘red equals brown’.
Moreover, sections of the WASG did not welcome the idea of sharing a party with 
(former) SED members, let alone those who may have had connections to the Stasi 
(König et al., 2007, p.22). Perhaps mindful of the SED's own history, WASG members 
feared that the PDS was merely seeking ‘useful idiots’ in the western states, which 
would see the new party inevitably becoming absorbed into the more established and 
considerably larger PDS (Olsen, 2007, p.210). Conversely, the PDS's organisational 
strength and material wealth presented an attractive prospect for the up-and-coming 
WASG, prompting Gohde to suggest that the old and ‘wallflower-like Fräulein PDS’, for 
all her faults, nonetheless came with an attractive ‘dowry’ (Gohde, 2006, p.137). 
However, the major issue that clearly managed to concentrate attention on political 
content and direction was government participation. Of the SPD-PDS (Red-Red) 
governing coalitions in the eastern states, Berlin became the focal point of the tension 
between the PDS and WASG. The state coalition presented the Berlin PDS with a high-
 Both the NPD and DVU are extreme right parties.33
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profile and symbolic opportunity to demonstrate its Regierungsfähigkeit, something that 
office-seeking sections of the party were keen not to forfeit in the cooperation with the 
WASG (Olsen, 2007, p.212). But the other side of the coin was that as junior partner in 
the governing coalition, the PDS-Berlin also shared the responsibility for implementing 
the Hartz IV measures. In a Communist Platform article critically evaluating the 
performance of the PDS-Berlin and the rationale for government participation, Hecker 
(2005) set out the opposing positions on the implementation of Hartz IV: on the one 
hand, it could be argued that Hartz IV is federal law, and that the political role of the 
PDS as junior partner in a governing coalition was to minimise the negative impact of 
its implementation to the best of its abilities. On the other hand, Hartz IV represented 
‘the most perfidious social scam’ in the history of the Federal Republic, in that it 
claimed to create jobs, but in reality set out to create a low-wage sector in the interest 
of greater profits. The article concluded that the true role of the PDS should not be one 
of mere damage limitation, but that of ‘a strong parliamentary opposition, united with 
extra-parliamentary movements’ (ibid.). 
In 2004, the WASG-Berlin called for the SPD-PDS coalition to resign. The Berlin 
branch of the WASG had been founded by Rouzbeh Taheri, a former PDS member, 
who felt the coalition was untenable. Taheri explained that ‘the assumption of 
“governmental responsibility” where there is absolutely no real influence (...) is actually 
the highest degree of irresponsibility’ because poverty is not alleviated, but merely 
made more governable. He also argued that an honest yet supportive 'no' was capable 
of triggering debate in society, and could therefore be both responsible and 
constructive (Augstein, 2007). The WASG, together with large sections of the western 
left and indeed much of the PDS (and the Communist Platform in particular) shared the 
view that the politics of the PDS in Berlin could not be supported, either in terms of its 
overall aims or in relation to its specific policies. Lafontaine described the actions of the 
PDS-Berlin as an ‘aberration’, while Klaus Ernst (later co-chair of the Left Party) said 
that the Berlin party's decision to remain committed to government showed it was 
‘losing the plot’ (Hough et al., 2007, p.111). 
To sum up, while the WASG emerged out of the protest against the neo-liberal policies 
of the SPD-Green federal government, in the case of the WASG-Berlin, the new 
organisation was also a response to the policies of the Red-Red governing coalition. 
Jünke (2007, p.313) observes that in the context of the new leftist cooperation, this led 
to the paradoxical situation in which the WASG contributed to the fall of the SPD-led 
national government, while the PDS, in the two Länder where it held office, was 
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subservient to the same party of Social Democrats. At the same time, PDS cooperation 
with the WASG intensified the strategic and political focus on the West (the stronghold 
of the WASG) and greater ideological emphasis and diversity of strategy beyond the 
office-seeking goals of the eastern PDS. 
1.4.4. The New Left Party: The Framework Programme
As the debates and disputes continued among the memberships of the respective 
parties, strong public interest was focused on the new Left alliance. In the Bundestag 
election the Left gained an extremely respectable 8.7% of the second vote; more than 
the PDS had ever achieved, and most probably more than the share either party could 
have hoped to gain individually. As a result, the Left won 54 seats in the Bundestag 
(ahead of the liberal FDP), and over half the Left deputies were based in the western 
states (Olsen, 2007, p.210). One of first challenges was to find a legal solution to the 
union of the PDS and WASG.
The safest route in legal terms was to execute a merger (Verschmeltzung) on a similar 
basis to that between two companies. This solution required the smaller entity (in this 
case the WASG) to dissolve and merge with the larger entity (the PDS). The advantage 
of the merger, as opposed to the foundation of a completely new party, was that it 
safeguarded against subsequent legal disputes, for example concerning party assets, 
the eligibility of state subsidies and the legal status of the PDS-affiliated Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation. Both parties had to change their legal status to associations 
(Vereine) for the merger process to proceed (Neu, 2007a, p.8). The organisations held 
parallel conferences to discuss and approve the common articles of association, 
including the programme framework, statute, rules of arbitration and finance as well as 
the merger contract itself. A qualified majority of three quarters was required at each 
congress before approval for the merger of the PDS and WASG to form the Left Party 
was gained in a referendum of both memberships (ibid.).  
The framework programme was a brief document that outlined the basic political values 
and aims of the Left Party. A full programme followed two years later in 2007. Although 
the framework functioned as a basic orientation, it was the product of the long and 
difficult process of negotiations and therefore, despite its brevity, provides some useful 
insights into the influences that shaped the cooperation and into the longer-term 
direction of the Left Party. The following paragraphs highlight the Left Party’s position 
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on the core themes of eastern interests, socialism and peace, as stated in the 
programme framework.
Eastern Interests
Like the PDS programmes that preceded it, the framework emphasised the necessity 
of addressing the interests of the eastern states. However, the influence of the WASG 
was also evident, as the section title referred explicitly to a new beginning for ‘East 
Germany and structurally weak areas of West Germany’ (DIE LINKE, 2007). The text 
reiterated the opportunities that had been lost with the GDR, including the education 
system, comprehensive childcare and economic gender equality, and criticised the 
destruction of easterners’ economic, social and cultural potential as a result of 
unification; it claimed that the achievements and experiences of citizens of the GDR 
had been dismissed, rather than regarded as an enrichment of the Federal Republic. 
Instead, the framework argued that the East had become a region dependent on 
transfer payments, while the constant race to the bottom to create conditions attractive 
for business had resulted in massive inequality at the expense not only of the eastern 
states but also the structurally weak areas in the West (ibid). 
The framework called for regional policy to take into account the development potential 
of each individual region and for a cooperative approach to tackle the problems 
associated with structurally/economically weak, rural and peripheral areas. The most 
concrete policy, though, once again focused on eastern interests, and the demand for 
the pay and pensions of eastern citizens to be equal with those in the West (ibid).   
Socialism and Social Justice
The framework’s statement on the ‘Social, democratic and peaceful reforms for 
overcoming capitalism’ featured a reference to Marx. It declared that the Left Party 
aimed to overcome all forms of ownership and power in which ‘man is an abject, 
enslaved, abandoned and contemptible being’; notably, these were the same goals the 
SPD had cited at the time of its formation (ibid.). The specific positions reflected 
policies that had appeared in PDS programmes, but also demonstrated the trade-
unionist roots of the WASG as well as the circumstances that had led to the two parties’ 
cooperation. There was to be a shorter working week with no reduction in pay; 
employment patterns such as job-sharing would enable men and women to achieve a 
balance between their working and private lives. The framework also called for the 
introduction of a minimum wage, a strengthening of employee rights and measures to 
prevent the exploitation of internships. Corporation tax and the top rate of income tax 
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would be raised. Unsurprisingly, there was special focus on the Hartz welfare and 
employment market reforms. Here, the demand was unequivocal: the abolition of Hartz 
IV. Instead, the Left Party aimed to introduce guaranteed social security provision and a 
system to ensure that jobseekers were only offered roles commensurate with their 
qualifications and experience, and remuneration in line with industry standard rates. 
Furthermore, the Left Party intended to maintain essential services in the public sector, 
such as education, health, social care, transport and utilities (ibid.).  
The programme also focused its attentions on ‘ending the neoliberal Zeitgeist’ (ibid.). 
Here, the Left Party envisaged a ‘new collective movement’ (Sammelbewegung — 
echoing the early PDS strategy for becoming established in the western states) that 
combined parliamentary work and extra-parliamentary activism. There was also an 
explicit reference to governmental responsibility. On the one hand, the party defended 
participation in government as a means of political action and influence. However, the 
programme also set out some general conditions to be met: first, any Left Party 
participation in government had to improve the situation of disadvantaged people and 
increase political codetermination; secondly, a coalition should have a clear left-wing 
character and lead to genuine political change. These rather ambiguous statements 
were then made more concrete in the third condition, namely that the terms of 
government participation would have to comply with the Left Party’s programme. 
Specifically, this meant no privatisation of essential public services and no cuts to jobs 
or social services. The programme also demanded an end to the sell-off of social 
housing — contrary to the policy practised by the Berlin state coalition (ibid.).         
Antimilitarism and Peace
Once again, the framework’s basic position was an evolution of PDS policy. Unchanged 
was the rejection of any German military involvement abroad. As this chapter has 
explained, the PDS — or at least some of its more pragmatic, office-seeking members 
— had wavered over the question of UN-mandated military interventions. But the 
framework programme was quite clear: the Left Party categorically ruled out support for 
such action, a position it said was ‘based on experience’ (ibid.).
Also like the PDS, the Left Party was clear in its call to dissolve NATO and for an end to 
the military capacity of Germany and the EU. It was opposed to the development of a 
bipolar world centred on the USA and Europe. Instead, the military capacity in both 
Germany and the EU was to be non-aggressive and non-interventionist, with no 
development, sale or stockpiling of weapons. Finally, the programme also tackled some 
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more recent developments and committed itself to banning the use of German bases to 
support military action abroad or for the purpose of renditions (ibid.). 
Having set out the Left Party framework programme, the document acknowledged that 
there were several unanswered questions and policies in need of further development. 
Among the list of questions highlighted for future discussion included the opportunities 
and instruments available for the democratisation of the economy and the extent to 
which (and how) the ownership of the means of production should be socialised. The 
document also asked if it was sufficient to provide social security based on need, or 
whether it was time to consider creating an unconditional basic income as the right of 
all citizens. Other themes included the feasibility of full employment, challenges to 
public ownership and more detailed conditions of government participation; also 
identified as a future point of discussion was the role of class interests and the class 
conflict. The broad range of questions and themes to explore illustrate the diversity of 
traditions and interests that were by now gathered in the Left Party (ibid.).  
Summary
Looking back at the PDS from the final months of the GDR right up to the emergence 
of the WASG, the party repeatedly appeared to be in danger of confirming the 
predictions of its demise. This chapter has outlined the principal factors: despite the 
efforts and resources invested in establishing an organisational and electoral base in 
the East, the strategy of Westausdehnung did not yield convincing results. Potential 
cooperation partners in the form of existing left-wing groups in the western states 
regarded the former GDR party of state socialism as too authoritarian, too rigid and 
simply too ‘eastern’. In the East, the party enjoyed considerable support among former 
functionaries and, later, eastern Germans disillusioned with the realties of unification, 
but these groups did not provide the PDS with a sustainable electoral base. 
Organisational and electoral strength in the eastern states paved the way for the PDS 
to gain experience of government responsibility, but the compromise required was 
unacceptable to the party’s left and particularly to the western party organisations. The 
party leadership, meanwhile, favoured government participation in the eastern states 
yet also remained committed to the strategy of western development; periods of 
minimal vertical coordination did not help to quell the tension in the party at regional 
level. 
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The chapter has also identified and outlined the PDS’s three main policy areas: the 
representation of eastern interests, social justice and peace. Disputes frequently took 
place over the compatibility of principles and pragmatism; on the whole, though, the 
party remained consistent in its demand for a better deal for the East, its criticism of 
capitalism and opposition to militarism. But even when the Agenda 2010 and Hartz 
reforms were implemented, the PDS seemed incapable of harnessing the mood of 
opposition and challenging the SPD as a socialist party; on the other hand, it is just as 
doubtful whether the WASG could have mobilised support over the long term. 
Adopting a more retrospective and holistic view, it can be argued that the experience of 
the PDS in the western states was not exclusively one of failure. Before unification 
introduced the PDS to the western states, the existing West German left too had been 
unable to develop into a credible political force. The struggle of the PDS to overcome 
this structural weakness, as well as its own inadequacies and contradictions, produced 
the motivation and opportunity for the party to cooperate with the WASG and then, as 
Die Linke, to transform the German democratic socialist left. But the question that 
follows is why the Left was successful in 2005 and, moreover, what explains the newly 
merged party’s ability to establish an electoral base in the western states. To answer 
these questions, the research now considers the strengths of two theoretical 
approaches. The next two chapters set out each theory in detail and identify key 
aspects to be applied to the case of the Left Party in a selected western federal state, 
Bremen.  
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Chapter Two: 
Explanatory Framework I - Cartel Theory
Introduction
This chapter introduces the first of the two theoretical frameworks explored in the 
thesis. The overall aim of the chapter is to identify the aspects, characteristics and 
developments within Cartel Theory that might explain the success of the Left Party in 
Germany’s western federal states.
Section One sets out the basic principles of Cartel Theory. It is argued that in reaction 
to social and economic change parties have faced a series of coordination dilemmas 
whose responses have in turn provided the catalyst for further change. The nature of 
party evolution can therefore be understood as the ‘answers’ to these dilemmas. 
Certain key features distinguish the cartel party type: first, there is an interpenetration 
of parties and the state. Secondly, there is a high degree of cooperation between 
political rivals in reaching common decisions. Finally, the cartel system's development 
is largely contingent on the extent of state support available in that country, and finds 
the most fertile ground in those political structures with a tradition of cooperation and 
accommodation. Parties become increasingly anchored in the state and, accordingly, 
more remote from civil society. This break with civil society is rewarded by the access 
to resources offered by the state, such as subsidies and funding. As a consequence, 
parties are no longer the democratic agents, but the democratic principals. The 
characteristics of the cartel party constitute a distinct contrast to previous models, yet 
considering various social and political context, cartel theorists argue that they 
constitute the next stage in a dynamic evolutionary process.
Given that the core of these developments is the growing identification of parties with 
the state, Section Two takes a closer look at the various state resources and incentives 
available to parties, as well as how these represent a formalised source of support for 
‘insiders’ and, simultaneously, act as a barrier to ‘outsiders’. Focusing on the German 
state in particular, the specific privileges and subsidies at the disposal of parliamentary 
parties are also described in this section. 
Important challenges and refinements to Cartel Theory are discussed in Section Three. 
One criticism argues that parties’ embeddedness in the state is not necessarily 
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symptomatic of their remoteness from civil society, but instead a natural consequence 
of the state’s own reach in society. An additional challenge centres on the inherent 
weakness of unrepresentative parties and the subsequent threat to the cartel from 
newcomers. The section then turns to a further development of Cartel Theory that 
applies the concept of the economic oligopoly to explain why and how political leaders 
curtail the policy supply and safeguard against the risk of external challenges. It argues 
that parties are motivated by the goal of maintaining power and influence and therefore 
‘collude’ to restrict the range of policies on offer. This concept of Cartel Theory also 
predicts certain features of leadership and representation within parties and the 
consequences for electoral competition. 
These characteristics are discussed in greater depth in Sections Four and Five. 
Section Four considers the issues of leadership and representation, especially in terms 
of decision-making and the relationship between the different ‘layers’ of the party and 
the distribution of power. There is a strong emphasis on the parliamentary party (or the 
party in office) and the ascendancy of the party in central office as the party leadership 
acquires greater independence from the party basis. Essentially, power is concentrated 
among the leadership, while the grassroots membership is confined to lending formal 
support and legitimacy to the party. Section Five is concerned with parties’ conscious 
decision to narrow the supply of policy and the resulting impact on electoral 
competition. Parties signal their intent to restrict policy and manage voter expectations 
using language framed in the concept of globalisation and the rhetoric of ‘no 
alternative’. Meanwhile, challengers likely to overcome electoral barriers are invited to 
become ‘socialised’ into the cartel. As a result, with little to distinguish between the 
parties and their policy offer, the democratic process itself becomes a means to ensure 
the cartel’s continuity. Both Sections Four and Five are illustrated using examples from 
the German context and, where relevant, the PDS/Left Party. To conclude, the chapter 
identifies the specific aspects of Cartel Theory to be further explored in relation to the 
Left Party in Bremen.  
 72
2.1. Parties' Changing Relationship with Civil Society 
and the State
Katz and Mair (1995) construct their theory of cartelisation in response to the broadly 
accepted view that parties are understood within the context of their relationship to civil 
society (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.6). In their view, this approach produces two misleading 
outcomes; firstly, the mass party model becomes a kind of benchmark for evaluating 
other types of model; secondly, it neglects the role of parties' relationship with the state 
(ibid.). Their dialectic approach explains how the mass party model and later variants 
such as the catch-all party directly reflect a specific notion of democracy and therefore 
become outdated when this notion is no longer characteristic of society. In other words, 
each new party type is not only a reaction to what has gone before, but is also the 
catalyst for further change in that a new party type stimulates a reaction which 
subsequently brings about further development. The result is again a new party type, 
which in turn triggers a new set of reactions. Therefore, party models are not stations 
along a linear route of development towards some end point, but merely one stage in 
an ongoing process (ibid.). Furthermore, while the dialectic is driven by changes in the 
relationship between parties and civil society, it is also a consequence of the changing 
interaction between parties and the state, a factor which plays an increasingly 
important role in an ‘ever closer symbiosis between parties and the state’ (ibid.) and 
provides the conditions for a new party type, that of the cartel party.
The dialectic approach is again applied in the identification of three specific 
‘coordination dilemmas’ which need to be overcome by the parties, and whose 
solutions in turn create new challenges (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.34). The first dilemma 
is internal and refers to the organisation of members in assemblies and parliament, for 
example, Germany’s regional Land parliaments or the Bundestag. The second dilemma 
is external and focuses on the coordination and mobilisation of grassroots activists (or 
party on the ground), particularly at elections. Finally, parties also need to solve the 
network dilemma, which combines both the internal and external challenges and is 
concerned with the optimum coordination of the parliamentary party and the numerous 
and diverse supporting activists (ibid., p.35). Like the changing relationship between 
parties and the state, each coordination conflict and solution, as well as the new 
challenge that arises as a result, can be clearly traced as the catalyst of evolution in 
party structure and organisation. Therefore, this chapter’s account of each stage of 
party evolution also considers the nature and impact of the related coordination 
dilemmas.  
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The development of parties is seen from the perspective of the relationship between 
the party organisation and the state. There are four distinct stages, each consisting of a 
series of stimuli and responses. The first stage dates back to the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. At that time, suffrage and political activity in general were the 
reserve of a privileged few. These ‘groups of men’ were understood to act in the public 
interest and bear the responsibility for defining and implementing policy (Katz and Mair,
1995, p.9). This concentration of power and activity rendered a complex and extensive 
party organisation largely unnecessary, since those whose role was to influence the 
state were by nature of their social status and privilege already equipped to fulfil this 
function directly. In terms of the relationship between party, state and civil society, the 
separation of civil society and the state was far from distinct, since people in politically 
powerful positions in the state simultaneously enjoyed influential status within civil 
society and vice versa, resulting in the ‘interpenetration’ of state and civil society (ibid.). 
Where organisations did emerge, for example in order to exert influence in parliament, 
these parties occupied a position along the interface between state and civil society. 
Owing to the small circle of individuals involved, this party type is known as the cadre 
or elite party.    
Figure 2.1. The cadre/elite party interpenetrating both civil society and the state  
(Katz and Mair, 1995, p.10) 
However, the onset of increasing industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation also 
saw a climb in the number of people fulfilling suffrage requirements. Furthermore, 
existing restrictions on working class organisation were no longer enough to prevent 
mobilisation along political and industrial lines (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.9). As a result, 
and to accommodate the increased number of participants in the political process, 
parties began setting up mass membership structures, supported by formal party 
organisations. Not surprisingly, much of this new activity took place among people who 
had previously not qualified for the franchise, and could therefore be seen as the 
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reward for their struggle to gain a voice and exercise influence and ultimately control 
over state structures (ibid., p.10).
Coordination dilemmas are already evident in these changes and developments. The 
cadre/elite party type consisted of a small and loosely organised network surrounding 
individuals who already enjoyed a degree of power and influence in society and 
connections to state structures. Therefore, their coordination dilemma was essentially 
an internal one, concerned with the organisation of these members, particularly at 
constituency level, and establishing a disciplined structure and authority in order to 
secure parliamentary majorities (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.35). However, the growing 
demand among the population for increased political rights, particularly the campaign 
for expanded suffrage, opened up an external challenge. Although internal issues 
surrounding parliamentary majorities persisted, the extra-parliamentary pressure on 
parties became an increasing problem for parties now faced with an expanded 
electorate. Furthermore, the extension of suffrage to a large section of the population 
led to an increasing range of policy demands, which compounded this external 
coordination pressure (ibid., p.36). In short, the conditions had transformed, giving rise 
to a new series of challenges to the cadre/elite party model.
Comparing the cadre/elite party type with the newly emerging and growing parties, 
several contrasts are clear. At the heart of these differences is that while the former 
relied on the ‘quality' of its supporters, in other words their position and influence in 
both civil society and the state, the new mass party counted on quantity in a number of 
aspects. First, what these parties lacked in terms of wealthy patrons, they made up for 
through the considerable number of subscribed members. Second, rather than rely on 
the influence of powerful individuals, mass parties organised their ranks and embarked 
on collective action (ibid.). What is more, lack of access to the established commercial 
press was overcome by the production and publication of party newspapers and other 
channels of communication (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.10). To put it simply, the mass 
parties shifted the focus of activity from the state to the party and gained their strength 
from organisational rather than individual influence. Whereas the cadre/elite party type 
was ‘of parliamentary origin held together by exchanges of influence or material 
rewards among its leaders’, the mass party constituted ‘the archetypal party of extra-
parliamentary origin’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.35). 
Turning to the role of civil society in relation to the party, the mass parties enabled the 
extra-parliamentary aspect or ‘face’ to become first recognised and then formalised by 
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means of the party organisation. That is to say, even when the party won enough votes 
to participate in government, this extra-parliamentary element endured, maintaining a 
platform for activists to continue the struggles and campaigns. However, since the 
mass party's strength lay in its structure and organisation of members, it also promoted 
unity and insisted on discipline, actually to a far greater degree than that necessary in 
the cadre/elite party with its narrowly concentrated political activity (ibid., p.36). Mass 
parties also broke with the past in that they explicitly declared their intention to 
represent the interests of a specific section of society rather than act on the behalf of a 
purported ‘national interest’ as pronounced by the cadre/elite parties (Katz and Mair, 
1995, p.10). Consequently, the mass party acted as agent on behalf of particular social 
groups, becoming a forum for these groups to articulate their interests.  
The mass party emerged as a result of the extension of suffrage to the majority of 
citizens; therefore, it can be understood as a response to a new conception of political 
circumstances. In turn, the mass party model altered the relationship between citizens/
voters and the state. Whereas elections had in the past presented a limited number of 
voters with a limited choice of trustee, they now provided the means of selecting 
representatives or delegates from the mass parties (ibid., p.11). Moreover, the function 
of elections was transformed from the means of gaining formal consent from the 
population to be governed into a method for holding delegates in office accountable to 
voters.
Figure 2.2 below shows that in the second stage of party development, the state is 
distinct from civil society, with the mass party performing a ‘bridging’ function between 
the two entities. The parties remain based in civil society, thanks to their broad 
membership and activists, despite the fact they simultaneously penetrate the state, for 
example by way of parliamentary representation or occupation of ministerial office. 
Figure 2.2. The relationship between civil society, parties and state in 
the mass party model 
(Katz and Mair, 1995, p.11)  
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Not only the mass party model's conception of democracy but also its very organisation 
presented a challenge to the older, established parties. During a time of limited 
suffrage, these parties had been well served by an informal network of supporters who 
could be counted on to mobilise when necessary (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.11). Yet in 
this new environment some parties found it difficult to adapt to the organisational 
structures, such as the representation of specific sections of society. Groups with 
traditional ties to the older type parties were often minorities or specific groups, such as 
farmers and industrialists. The dilemma was compounded by a general reluctance on 
the part of leaders, accustomed to occupying positions in the traditional establishment, 
to accept the rise of the increasingly extra-parliamentary nature of party organisation 
(ibid.). A deterrent to adopting the mass party model also existed in the form of material 
resources. The traditional parties were still in a position to rely on substantial 
contributions from individual supporters and continued to enjoy ‘sympathetic access to 
the “non-partisan” channels of communication’ (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.12). As a result, 
while they often constructed organisations resembling those of the mass party, in so far 
as they included registered members, formal structures such as a party congress and a 
party newspaper, the parliamentary party remained rather aloof from these structures, 
which were mainly served by the mass organisation (ibid.).  
Nonetheless, it was the approach to ideology that would form a pivotal stage in this 
evolutionary process. The restructured traditional parties did indeed open up to the 
recruitment of members on a mass basis, but since their ‘natural’ constituency was 
formed of various minority interest groups, new support had to be won from a much 
broader range of the electorate. Therefore, the key for the traditional elite parties was 
not to offer an ideology as such, but to remain committed to the notion of a single, 
national interest which would also manage to intersect with various groups across 
society (ibid.).  
While the traditional parties were in the process of formulating their response to the 
challenges forced upon them by the mass party model, the mass parties themselves 
were facing their own difficulties. Many of the welfare and social measures (‘club 
goods’) introduced to benefit certain sections of society had gained broad acceptance 
as a norm, and become accepted and available on a more or less universal basis (Katz 
and Mair, 1995, p.12). Furthermore, improvements in social conditions, increased 
mobility and the spread of the mass media meant that parties found it more difficult to 
claim they represented only very specific interests; these interests were shifting and 
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were no longer limited to narrow and defined groups. Added to this was the diminishing 
solidarity, or at least the perception of such, between the formerly ‘natural’ constituency 
and the party once leaders of mass parties had acquired experience of, and 
subsequently a taste for, government and the power of office (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.
12), whereby voters feel that elected politicians have lost touch with ‘the real world’.      
The role of leaders in office forms a prominent part of Katz and Mair's Cartel Theory. In 
the specific context of mass party leaders in office, it is argued that it was important for 
these leaders to maintain their position in order for them to continue formulating and 
implementing policy they believed to be in the interest of their supporters among the 
electorate. Yet at the same time, leaders were faced with the need to appeal to a 
considerably broader section of the electorate than their previously defined 
constituency. Meanwhile, the very nature of office and the business of getting things 
done required parties to work alongside or even cooperate with their electoral 
opponents (ibid.). Both the broadening of policy and the cooperation among 
professional politicians are key aspects of Cartel Theory applied to the Left Party in this 
research. Here they are placed within the broad context of party evolution; Sections 
Four and Five of the chapter then return to consider both themes in detail and frame 
them in the German setting.   
The mass party was the party type that embodied the extra-parliamentary character of 
organised political participation, and proved to be a great success, with several of the 
former cadre/elite parties embracing many of its features. Mass parties had generally 
adopted one of two methods of dealing with problems of external coordination 
concerning supporters and activists. The first of these was to reaffirm party identity and 
loyalty throughout the ranks, emphasising not only the close association between party 
and defined social groups, but also the threat of other parties or groups (Blyth and 
Katz, 2005, p.36). Alternatively, parties could make policy commitments to the benefit 
of their specific client groups and aim to deliver these once in office. However, 
occupation of public office demanded the successful coordination both of the 
parliamentary party and the large basis of members and activists; in other words, it 
required a strong party in central office (ibid., p.37). Thus, the mass parties' electoral 
success was, at the same time, the catalyst for another type of coordination dilemma, 
namely how the party could manage to secure reliable majorities in parliament (internal 
dilemma) and, through its central office, still maintain and organise its considerable 
group of activists and extra-parliamentary supporters (external dilemma). This 
combined challenge forms the network dilemma.
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In order to overcome this problem of network coordination, the mass party underwent a 
shift in its own democratic structure. Until this point, the basis had at least in principle 
exercised authority over the leadership in the form of the party congress. Yet because it 
was impossible to expect the congress to convene on a permanent basis, a less 
unwieldy committee or group was formed from within the congress (ibid.). In theory, this 
committee remained answerable to the party basis, but in practice was able to act and 
make decisions independently, therefore overcoming the network coordination 
problem, but consequently also superseding the grassroots membership base in the 
process (ibid.).
It is therefore possible to detect the beginnings of a third stage in the evolution of 
parties. The traditional party, in response to the success of the mass party model, 
identified a way forward which came to be adopted by the mass parties themselves, 
resulting in a new ‘catch-all’ model (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.12). In this model, while 
parties continued to maintain a membership base, the relationship between the party 
was not based on articulating the interests of a clearly defined group in the form of an 
ideology; rather, because of the need to appeal to various groups right across society, 
the party came to regard its members and supporters as a broad collection of 
individuals (ibid., p.13). The new catch-all party model was therefore characterised by 
diminishing ideological differentiation on one hand and, subsequently, growing policy 
consensus on the other.  As a result, the requirement of maintaining a loyal and distinct 
section of the electorate became less compelling, a condition compounded by further 
advances in mass communication, particularly television, as this enabled parties to 
appeal to the electorate en masse, rather than limit themselves to mobilising core 
supporters via party publications (ibid.).   
In the view of the cartel theorists, the catch-all party model therefore developed as the 
result of two elements. First, the cadre/elite parties' answer to the challenge of the 
mass parties impelled them to establish a party basis similar to that of their rivals but, 
unlike the membership of the mass party, one without the at least nominal control of the 
leadership. A further difference was that while the mass parties’ success was based on 
clear identification with defined sections of the population and the provision of public 
sector services and welfare, the former elite parties were unable to successfully pursue 
this strategy. Historically, they lacked the extensive and dependable clientele, and the 
'club goods’ inspired little loyalty among largely well-off voters (Blyth and Katz, 2005, 
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p.37). In short, the catch-all model provided a strategy that gave the struggling cadre/
elite parties a reliable networked structure.
Like its cadre/elite party and mass party predecessors, the catch-all model represented 
a new conception of democracy and a shift in parties' relationship to the state and civil 
society. In this model, parties cease to act either as agents of civil society who first 
influence and then penetrate the state, or even as a bridge between the two entities 
(Katz and Mair, 1995, p.13). Instead, they set forth the demands from civil society to 
the state and simultaneously act as agents of the state to justify their policies to the 
public, in other words to civil society. Katz and Mair (ibid.) refer to this brokering role as 
a ‘Janus-like existence’ and point out that although mass parties also fulfilled a similar 
brokering function, this had not diminished ties between the parties and the specific 
aggregated interests they represented. By contrast, precisely this phenomenon would 
constitute a fundamental attribute of catch-all parties (ibid.).
Figure 2.3: The catch-all party acting as broker between the state and civil society  
(Katz and Mair, 1995, p.13)
Cooperation between the catch-all parties and various groups was not completely 
severed, though, and as a result formal links did continue to exist, one important 
example being the ties between social democratic parties and trade unions. On the 
other hand, trade unions had since become accustomed to dealing not only with their 
‘natural’ social democratic allies, but also bourgeois parties if these happened to hold 
office. What is more, as agents of the state, social democratic parties would also 
defend policies which they claimed unavoidably conflicted with the interests of trade 
unions (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.14). Thus, the parties' brokering role strengthened the 
pluralist notion of democracy, in which parties represented various and often competing 
interests. In order for this approach to work, parties had to remain open to a broad 
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range of interests. Subsequently, the focus of elections shifted away from a choice 
between clearly defined policies based on specific interest groups and ideology and 
instead towards a competence-based choice between ‘teams of leaders’ (ibid.).
As far as the implications for the relationship between the parties, civil society and the 
state are concerned, Katz and Mair (1995, p.14) suggest the parties may in fact have 
their own set of interests, which are quite different to those of either civil society or the 
state. Parties perform a service in the form of their brokering role, which requires them 
to appeal to the electorate on one hand and, on the other, to manipulate the state in 
order to deliver policy in the interests of their clientele based in civil society. If they do 
this successfully, the parties are recompensed, for example with positions in public 
office and the vindication of their policies. In other words, parties are able to use the 
power and resources of the state as a means to achieve their own distinct interests 
(ibid.).   
So far, Cartel Theory has explained that club goods, previously an integral factor in the 
mass parties' appeal, became established as basic and universal elements of the 
welfare state, reducing the identification and loyalty between specific sectors of the 
electorate and the party. The results were two-fold; there was less compulsion for the 
party to remain focused on the interests of the basis and core constituent groups and, 
secondly, leaders sought to appeal to a much broader electorate. This would eventually 
see party leaders detaching themselves from the constraints of the grassroots 
organisation and instead intensifying their pursuit of catch-all electoral appeal. 
However, a weakness of the catch-all model is its instability, since it is based on 
offering ever-fewer public goods whilst striving for the support of ever-broader sections 
of the electorate. As the resulting network problems became more acute, the answer 
was sought in a new model that allowed parties the opportunity to liberate themselves 
from commitments to the ongoing provision of public goods.
To sum up, the various shifts in party strategy and type were partly caused by factors 
such as industrialisation and growth, as well as the expansion of suffrage and the 
development of the welfare state. Confronted with these factors and their associated 
coordination dilemmas, the parties went on to modify their organisational form and 
strategy. Thus the development of these party types can be seen as both an 
evolutionary response to specific conceptions of democracy (Katz and Mair) and as a 
series of adaptations in order to survive changing circumstances and dilemmas (Blyth 
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and Katz). The cartel party model constitutes the most recent stage of this evolutionary 
process.
The models described above and represented in figures 2.1–2.3 form a dynamic 
process of parties drifting away from civil society and towards the state. The dialectal 
approach of this development therefore implies that, if continued, parties could in fact 
sever their relationship to civil society to such an extent that they actually become part 
of the state apparatus itself (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.14). According to Katz and Mair, 
precisely this development took place from the mid-1970s onwards.           
A number of social, cultural and political changes are cited as contributory factors of 
parties' increased anchoring within the state. One development that occurred in the 
1970s was a growing preference among sections of the electorate for the far more 
concentrated and targeted range of interests put forward by specialist groups (Katz and 
Mair, 1995, p.15), for example in the New Social Movements that sprang up around 
issues such as peace, feminism and the environment . This trend diminished 34
participation in party activity because such organisations were able to offer a fresh and 
attractive prospect and alternative to parties; they offered a limited and even single 
policy focus and a more direct, immediate approach that contrasted with the perceived 
jadedness and aloofness of the national political party hierarchy (ibid.). The 
consequences for parties were not limited to dealignment among voters; party 
membership itself diminished in terms of numbers as well as active engagement, since 
social movements offered activists alternative channels for campaigning on particular 
issues. At the same time, confronted by falling subscriptions and rising costs of party 
activity (for example, as a result of the increasing professionalisation of campaigns), 
parties found themselves forced to consider alternative financial resource channels. 
Extremely important in this respect is the provision of state subventions to parties 
(ibid.). The following section therefore explores the type of resources the state 
provides, their impact on parties’ relationship to civil society as well as the implications 
for political representation and competition. 
 Interests addressed by these groups include, for example, the environment, peace and 34
feminism. Chapter Three discusses party dealignment in the context of Social Cleavage Theory.
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2.2. The State and its Resources
Cartel Theory explains that the elite parties were formed and supported by a network of 
influential individuals during an era of limited franchise. Consequently, the cadre/elite 
model did not require intense campaigning and remained largely self-financing. But in 
light of the expanded suffrage and participation that characterised the era of the mass 
party, it then became necessary to conduct extensive campaigns and maintain 
communication channels, supported by a subscription-paying membership. While 
membership remained an important resource for catch-all parties, support was also 
found elsewhere to finance the costly professional expertise increasingly utilised for 
campaigns conducted in non-partisan media networks. The cartel model pursues this 
approach to an even greater degree; increasingly professional and centrally managed 
campaigns require substantial finance, which is secured from the available state 
resources.   
Although public funds had already been used to financially support selected parties, 
state subsidies paid directly to parties, including those outside the legislature, first 
appeared in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Federal Republic of Germany 
was the first European country to introduce party subsidies in 1959. This occurred as 
part of the country's post-war democratisation process, and the special responsibility of 
parties is enshrined in the Basic Law (constitution) (Ashton, 2006, p.4). Many other 
western European states followed suit to varying degrees and introduced their own 
subsidies system shortly afterwards. A key feature of the new approach was that 
finance was available to all parties that fulfilled certain criteria; as a result, even those 
parties not represented in parliament became eligible to receive state subsidies 
(Scarrow, 2006, p.620).  
There were two main motivations behind the introduction of state subsidies to political 
parties. The first is based on a positive view of parties, which considers funding to be a 
means of support enabling parties to fulfil an essential role as representative of 
interests, mediator of conflict, and vital component of the continued success of 
democracy. As new, pro-democratic parties emerge as a result of these subsidies, the 
quality of democratic competition is improved, since these new parties, through their 
participation, acknowledge and lend support to the democratic system (Scarrow, 2006, 
p.621). The second motivation adopts a less favourable view of parties and regards 
state subsidies as the means by which to address their over-reliance on donations from 
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corporations and individuals. Subsidies allow parties to operate without excessive 
obligations toward these sources and thereby help to improve democratic standards 
(ibid.). However, the rules for eligibility vary from country to country and, moreover, the 
scope and impact of the subsidy are also difficult to define. For example, even though a 
payment may be specifically intended to support staff working in the parliamentary 
party, the same payment might also be of secondary benefit to the extra-parliamentary 
organisation of that party, in that it can now allow resources previously earmarked for 
the parliamentary work to be released to fund extra-parliamentary activities (ibid., p.
623).
Although there are different categories of subsidy, the type most closely associated 
with impact on political competition is the payment intended for extra-parliamentary 
work; it is also the type of funding often considered effective in addressing over-
reliance on corporate/private donations (ibid., p.624). There are three rules concerning 
the eligibility and payment of subsidies: the first is the payout threshold, which can 
either apply exclusively to parties represented in parliament, or can also include parties 
who fail to gain parliamentary seats. Thresholds can be set in different ways, for 
example, based on candidate nominations and vote total or share (ibid.). 
Secondly, the payout principle refers to the basis upon which subsidies are paid. The 
most common principle is to distribute the available sum according to the voter share of 
each party fulfilling the threshold criteria. Alternatively, parties might receive a specified 
amount per share, a system which rewards high voter participation. Furthermore, it is 
possible for a flat rate to be paid to all parliamentary parties or those who gain a 
particular number of seats. While this method benefits small parliamentary parties, it 
does disadvantage the very smallest parties who do not overcome the payout threshold 
(ibid.). 
Finally, there is the payout purpose. In some countries, subsidies come with explicit 
conditions for their use, although sometimes no specifications are made. Here, too, 
there may be an impact on electoral competition if the payments are made specifically 
as a reimbursement for election campaign expenses. This is because small parties 
could find it difficult to raise sufficient money to finance their campaign up-front, thus 
restricting the scope and impact of their activities (ibid., p.625).
One of the main criticisms of public funding of parties is linked directly to a main 
argument of Cartel Theory, namely that it can deliberately constrict competition. Given 
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that it is usually parties represented in the legislature or in government that determine 
the eligibility for state subventions (payment threshold) as well as the distribution of the 
subsidy (payment principle), this valuable resource is not exogenous. As a result, 
subsidies give politicians a tool which they may use to serve their own self-interest. 
In Germany, parties have access to state funding proportionate to their share of the 
vote. Once in power, ruling parties are able to grant opposition parties a degree of 
influence, for example in the form of patronage positions. However, even if this 
patronage is utilised, power remains firmly within the grip of the governing party or 
coalition. Katz and Mair (1995, p.17) identify Germany as providing favourable 
conditions for the development of the cartel party type, not least due to the provision of 
state subsidies and privileged position enjoyed by parties in relation to the state. 
Thanks to the decentralised structure of the Federal Republic and the special 
representative and educational role assigned to parties in the Basic Law, German 
parties were able to use their dominant position in federal and regional parliaments to 
expand their influence both within state areas (such as administration and the judiciary) 
and public services (public media, state universities, public sector businesses). Thus, 
they created what has become known as the Parteienstaat — a state determined by 
and characterised by political parties (Detterbeck, 2008, p.30). 
This process began in the late 1950s. As the welfare state expanded and economic 
activity grew, the state and parliament were faced with greater responsibilities and 
challenges. In response, parliamentary parties expanded their expert and professional 
staff, which in turn increased the demand for organisational resources (ibid.). German 
parties are therefore described as ‘self-appointed beneficiaries’ who are anchored in 
the state and benefit from three major forms of state resources (ibid., p.28). First, 
salaries and allowances are provided for a team of staff fulfilling secretarial, research 
and PA roles; secondly, party-affiliated and state-funded political foundations use 
seminars, meetings, projects and publications to build a linkage between the party and 
society and provide a source of recruitment; thirdly, there is a system of reimbursement 
for regional and national electoral campaigns (the payout purpose). Since 1992, this 
funding has been based on a party's success in elections (payout threshold) and 
corresponds to membership fees and donation (payout principle) (ibid., p.29).
One striking aspect of this development, and one which is highly significant for 
understanding the significance of Cartel Theory in the case of Germany, is that it did 
not take place within the context of a crisis among the parties, such as the network 
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dilemmas described in Section One. In fact, the parties began to seek additional and 
alternative sources of income at a time when they had been successful in consolidating 
their position in the political marketplace. Between 1961 and 1983 only three parties 
were represented in the Bundestag federal parliament (the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the 
FDP), while the same parties also dominated the regional parliaments, underlining their 
stability. Furthermore, both the CDU and SPD, the two largest parties, managed to 
more than quadruple their membership, which meant they not only gained valuable 
revenue from subscriptions, but also deepened the reach of their roots in society 
(Detterbeck, 2008, p.30).  
However, the two-and-a-half party system was eventually broken. First, the Greens 
became an established presence at regional level, and then went on to become a 
partner in the national government for two terms. Secondly, after 1989, the PDS 
became a significant force in the eastern states and gained seats in the national 
parliament, while the Left Party, following the merger of the PDS and WASG, is strongly 
represented in the Bundestag. Overall, membership of German parties gradually 
declined over the years (see Section One for an explanation of this general decline) 
and party alignment decreased across portions of the electorate, both in eastern and 
western states. This is especially pronounced at regional level, where it is not 
uncommon for small parties to muster some success, even gaining seats in 
legislatures, notably in the city-state of Bremen. Therefore, from the 1980s, German 
parties began to display the conditions Katz and Mair associate with Cartel Theory: 
with shrunken support from voters and members, they had to focus on securing state 
resources in order to maintain their organisational strength. Consequently, their ties to 
society became looser and more firmly anchored in the state. Nonetheless, it should be 
pointed out that membership continues to play an important role within German parties. 
The CDU and SPD, for example, obtain 20% and 25% respectively of their national 
budgets from membership subscriptions. Furthermore, since 1994, state funding has 
been linked directly to membership fees.
Since payment thresholds are most commonly linked to parties' electoral performance, 
subsidies naturally favour and perpetuate those parties who either hold governmental 
office or are represented in parliament — in other words legislators — while at the 
same time potentially constituting a barrier to both parties or electoral alliances failing 
to meet the set criteria. Nonetheless, even though some countries adopt quite 
formidable electoral thresholds and maintain a system of state monopoly of financial 
resources, such tools are not a particularly new phenomenon and add to an array of 
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long-established state resources at the disposal of parties, including the power of 
patronage. The extent to which subsidies impact competition has been outlined by 
Scarrow (2006) and is summarised in the following table:
Table 2.1: The likely impact of public subsidies on party competition 
 
(Scarrow, 2006, p.625) 
Cartel Theory asserts that subsidies constitute a barrier preventing newcomers from 
entering the parliamentary arena and reduce the impact of challengers, such as small 
or new parties, to the established political constellation. Yet while low payout amounts 
might be of little consequence to larger parties, if the threshold is set low, even a 
modest amount of funding could prove to be a vital financial resource to a small party. 
In fact, subsidies, especially in a party's formative years, could prove the make or break 
factor for future survival. Without this resource, a small new party could die out before it 
has a chance to develop a sound voter base or electoral credibility (Scarrow, 2006, p.
625). On the other hand, if there is a sizeable payout amount with a corresponding 
threshold, small parties could suffer, as the subsidy would only be available to the 
larger parties with a substantial share of seats in the legislature (ibid.). 
It is quite common for European countries with a system of political subsidies to fix the 
payout threshold at a lower level than that of the electoral barrier. Moreover, alterations 
to the threshold display a clear downward trend (ibid., p.627). In Germany, for example, 
when the subsidies system was first introduced in 1959, the payout threshold required 
parties to gain seats in the lower house, the Bundestag (i.e., it was set at the electoral 
threshold). In 1967 the payout threshold was lowered to 2.5% of the list vote and, since 
1969, has required parties to gain 0.5% of the list vote for the Bundestag (ibid., p.628). 
Citing the introduction of state subsidies for parties in (West) Germany, Koole (1996) 
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refers to the Etatisierung  of party finance and how this created a degree of 35
Chancengleichheit (equality of opportunity), which served to cushion and preserve 
smaller parties. It was in this environment that the Greens managed to achieve 
significant electoral success, which, argues Koole, adds to the difficulty of identifying 
any cartel, perhaps beyond the rhetoric of such challengers themselves (Koole, 1996, 
p.517). Therefore, taking into account the fragmentation and number of parties to have 
emerged, any attempt by established parties to keep out newcomers has failed.
The political landscape can be influenced by subsidies in two ways; first, the survival or 
absence of the newcomer and, second, the precedent this sets for subsequent parties. 
A lack of realistic prospects of even a modest measure of success could deter the 
formation of new parties (Scarrow, 2006, p.629). Furthermore, there are also 
implications for measuring the well-being of a democracy; the existence of small and 
unpopular parties lends credence to the more successful parties' claim that having 
competed against a broad range of parties they genuinely reflect the electorates' 
general political preferences. On the other hand, increasing numbers of small parties 
results in what might be regarded as more ‘wasted’ votes, i.e., votes for parties which 
fail to win seats (ibid.).
Research focusing on European democracies has yet to establish an identifiable link 
between the introduction of subsidies and the various payout thresholds on the one 
hand and, on the other, the proliferation or survival of small parties, even among those 
countries such as Germany, where the threshold was lowered . The data obtained in 36
comparative analysis of these countries therefore does not support the assertion that 
subsidies stifle and squeeze out small, marginal parties. However, despite the absence 
of hard evidence of a conspiracy among established parties to exclude challengers by 
introducing subsidies, it can nevertheless be argued that the specific nature of financial 
resources, even if they do not actually prevent the emergence of newcomers to the 
party system itself, still puts them at a distinct disadvantage and therefore impedes 
their entry into parliament and other positions of power (Katz and Mair, 1996, p.531). 
For example, subsidies paid after the election are of little help to small parties 
struggling to run their election campaign. Subsidies can even involve an element of risk 
for small new parties. German parties confident of achieving the required share of the 
vote are able to apply to the Federal President for an advance payment on the subsidy. 
 From the French ‘état’, meaning ‘State’; in other words, party finance became increasingly 35
state-orientated.
 See Scarrow, 2006, pp.631ff.36
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This advance is invested in producing a bigger and better election campaign with the 
aim of enhancing the parties’ electoral performance, on the understanding that the 
subsidy amount is to be paid back should the party fail to achieve the payout threshold. 
Therefore, tempting though the advance funding might be for small parties, it also 
means they are potentially faced with the ruinous scenario of having to pay back the 
entire amount if the campaign fails to attract the sufficient voter share (Ashton, 2006, 
p.6). 
In addition, large and established parties are in the fortunate position of attracting 
financial resources in addition to their direct subsidy, even though private donations 
may be outlawed (Scarrow, 2006, p.635). Small parties are unlikely to enjoy this 
wealth, and find it difficult to make significant inroads into the competitive political 
environment, unless one of their campaign issues becomes increasingly significant and 
thus a strong mobilisation platform, or if there is a crisis among the established parties 
themselves.
Finally, a system of direct subsidies that favours the participation of small parties (a low 
payout threshold for example) might result in the party competitive environment 
remaining fragmented. In this case, there are several small parties that have few 
prospects of electoral breakthrough (because of the higher electoral threshold), but are 
nevertheless sustained because they qualify for direct subsidies. This too could 
potentially provide a tool with which established parties maintain a cartel. The reason 
for this is that the subsidy provides political opponents with an incentive to organise in 
small factions and therefore a disincentive to join forces with parties or groups with 
common policy ground. Consequently, there is a reduced likelihood of opposition 
uniting in a broad front to challenge the established (cartelised) parties (Scarrow, 2006, 
p.629).
It is not only financial resources that provide parties with a powerful self-preservation 
tool. As the volume of electronic media increased, its distribution generally became 
more restricted and subject to stringent state control and regulation. The result is that 
parties which have penetrated and become agents of the state were in the privileged 
position of accessing this information, while parties outside the state had no such 
guarantee. Given the importance of electronic media as a channel of political 
communication, its access or denial constituted a powerful weapon in the hands of the 
established state parties (Ashton, 2006, p.11). Furthermore, parliamentary groups in 
the Bundestag have the power to approve or refuse applications from smaller parties 
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who do not quality for full Fraktion status and the privileges associated with 
parliamentary groups. As Chapter One has explained, following unification, the 
established Bundestag parties denied this status to both the Greens and the PDS, 
thereby restricting their access to committees and debating time.
 
As such, it was the drive to enhance the parties' own positions, allowing them to meet 
the demands placed on them in terms of organisation and funding, that initiated the 
adoption of practices associated with the character of the party cartel. This drive was 
assisted by the emphasis on consensual politics and the relative absence of deep 
political cleavage between the parties . These conditions eased the path towards 37
allowing the parties to negotiate the shaping of institutions and processes according to 
their common needs (Detterbeck, 2008, p.30). 
In Germany, it is inter-party agreement and cooperation that account for much of the 
dependence on state resources. By the 1980s, the established parties (CDU/CSU, 
SPD and FDP) had between them been able to extend the subsidies available to 
themselves and their affiliated organisations. Ashton (2006, p.11) observes that it was 
the CDU that introduced the subsidies system, chiefly as a means of obstructing the 
SPD from entering the federal government. Once the SPD achieved governmental 
power (in a Grand Coalition with the CDU), both parties maximised the level of state 
funding due to them. Despite the Greens’ early criticism of this ‘self-service 
mentality’ (ibid.), the party soon learnt to rely on the same system of funding after it too 
entered the Bundestag in the 1980s. These subsidies enabled the party to establish its 
own affiliated political foundation (the Heinrich Böll Stiftung), recruit paid staff and, 
moreover, support the transformation of activist volunteers into professional politicians. 
The PDS/Left Party has also utilised and benefited from state resources. Following the 
1998 national election, the PDS qualified for full parliamentary group status and 
consequently the entitlement to greater financial resources in order to support its 
parliamentary group, the right to speaking time in parliamentary debates and to 
participation in parliamentary committees. The PDS also followed the example of other 
parties and established its own affiliated political foundation, the Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung. Therefore, placing this development within the context of Cartel Theory, the 
Greens and PDS fitted the description of the 'outsider' parties who ‘proved to be 
increasingly willing to play according to the established rules, e.g., accept the parties’ 
need for public funding’ (Detterbeck, 2005, p.186). Yet the PDS also declined to 
  See Chapter Three for a full discussion of parties and social cleavage.37
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cooperate in a number of cross-party initiatives and plans regarding party funding, and 
was also the only party in the Bundestag not to support a proposal which, had it been 
allowed by the Constitutional Court, would have raised the qualifying (payout) threshold 
for state reimbursement of electoral expenses (Detterbeck, 2008, p.36). It also 
opposed a bill that aimed to introduce heavier penalties for parties violating party 
finance, arguing that there should instead be a complete ban on corporate donations 
and a cap on the overall amount of donations permitted to parties (Scarrow, 2006, p.
665). In this respect, although the party certainly benefited from state resources, the 
PDS/Left Party can be understood as positioned somewhere on the fringes of the 
‘cartel’ in terms of its stance towards excluding others from such advantages 
(Detterbeck, 2008, p.29).
Thanks to their role as legislators and occupiers of ministerial office, parties are able to 
turn to the state as an obvious and accessible source of support (Katz and Mair, 1995, 
p.15). Subsequently, they are in a position to draw upon the state resources made 
available and utilise these in such a way as to ensure their own continuity and ability to 
withstand challenges from new and opposing forces (ibid., p.16). As a result, the state 
provides an established, formalised source of support for ‘insiders’ and simultaneously 
acts as a barrier to ‘outsiders’. Having first penetrated the state, parties then proceed to 
formulate the policies of the state. Upon arriving at this point, parties are no longer 
mere agents of the state who broker and defend policy between civil society and the 
state; the consequence of their absorption is that parties actually become the state 
(ibid.).   
This development is not without its dangers for the parties involved. First, they rely on 
the perpetual availability of the state resources. Legislation might be passed which 
restricts or withdraws certain resources, while a party suffering electoral defeat might 
find itself not only excluded from parliament or government, but also barred from 
access to valuable state resources, whether in the form of subsidies or access rights to 
media and committees (ibid.). In the past, electoral success or failure shaped a party's 
political objectives. For example, following a heavy electoral loss, unpopular policies 
would be scrutinised and amended or dropped accordingly. However, during this latest 
stage of development, because elections are contested not on grounds of ideology and 
defined constituencies but according to the perceived competence of leadership teams, 
electoral outcomes exert less influence on political objectives (ibid.,16). Similarly, while 
mass parties could count on their sizeable membership as a substantial and valuable 
resource (for example income from subscriptions) even during periods when they were 
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out of office, the new model compels parties to maintain their access to state resources 
in order to survive.  
Even before Cartel Theory was developed, warnings about the toning down of electoral 
competition had been raised by Smith (1989, p.83, cited in Ashton, 2006, p.6), who 
singled out the subsidies system as a disincentive for parties to recruit and retain 
subscription-paying members, and pointed to the reliance on expensive professionally 
run campaigns as a route to greater bureaucracy and state dependency. The result 
would be less competitive choice between the parties (Ashton, 2006, p.6). Placing 
these developments in the German context, Detterbeck considers that when regarded 
from a systemic rather than organisational perspective:
Cartelisation may be less suited to explain the development of individual 
parties than to explain the extension of inter-party cooperation and the 
move towards the state. While talking about the cartel party organisations 
in Germany does not seem to be particularly plausible, it makes perfect 
sense talking about a German party cartel. (Detterbeck, 2008, p.38)
Although parties require ongoing access to state resources in order to safeguard their 
own future, this does not in fact require them to compete against each other. In the 
past, competition between parties could be quite fierce, as they battled one ideology or 
a set of policies against another. However, with the focus on leadership competence 
rather than ideology, parties can put forward what are little more than variations on a 
very limited policy range and still secure participation in parliament and/or government 
coalitions. In this way, it is possible for parties to mutually share in state resources and 
safeguard their own survival, particularly in democracies with a culture of cooperation 
and consensus building among the political parties. These are the conditions from 
which the cartel party emerges.
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2.3. Challenges and Developments in Cartel Theory
2.3.1. Civil Society and the State
Since Katz and Mair’s original account of parties’ evolution, and the emergence of the 
cartel party type, Cartel Theory has been the subject of challenges and refinements. 
This section considers the key developments, beginning once again with parties’ 
relationship to the state. Koole (1996) argues that despite the closer relationship, 
parties’ growing identification with the state is not necessarily an outcome of a shift 
away from civil society; rather, the distinction between state and civil society has 
diminished (Koole, 1996, p.510). A differentiation is made between society and civil 
society, with the right to vote the criterion for membership of the latter. As suffrage was 
extended in the late nineteenth century, civil society grew as it incorporated more 
people (i.e., citizens eligible to vote), but at the same time, the state penetrated further 
into civil society itself. Social welfare had once been a matter for family, church and 
workers' organisations, but this was transformed into a role for the state, with the 
consequence that a large amount of people depended on the state for their income, 
either as recipients of welfare payments or as salaried employees in the public sector 
(ibid.). Also, as the state intervened in society through its provision of social welfare, 
parties’ close association with the state meant that they too also naturally interacted 
with society (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34). Increasingly, because of its proportions and 
reach, the state became an obvious object of criticism concerning all manner of 
personal dissatisfaction. The key point, however, is that even though ‘the state’ is often 
described as outmoded and even undesirable, especially in the drive towards 
deregulation and privatisation, it remained ‘omnipresent and its responsibility for the 
(personal) welfare of its citizens has grown to enormous proportions’ (Koole, 1996, p.
510). 
This trajectory is illustrated in the next series of diagrams. First, Figure 2.4 shows that 
the mass and cadre/elite party types were only partially based in civil society and even 
less in state structures. Koole’s distinction between society and civil society is also 
represented in this figure. At this stage, the mass parties concentrated on garnering 
support among members of disenfranchised society with the intention of one day 
transforming these people in to voters, while other parties sought to maintain a civil 
society characterised by the limited suffrage of the time (Koole, 1996, p.511). Parties 
could therefore be categorised into two types; the mass parties of social integration 
(often, but not exclusively, socialist/social democratic) and the cadre/elite parties, 
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consisting of individual representation or elite organisations based in a limited section 
of civil society (ibid.).
Figure 2.4: The position of political parties before the introduction of general suffrage  
(Koole, 1996, p.511)
With the introduction of general suffrage, parties needed to ensure support among the 
mass electorate if there was to be any hope of gaining representation in parliament or 
government. Regardless of whether the cadre/elite parties adopted all the 
characteristics of the mass parties, they still operated in an environment with a 
substantially enlarged civil society (ibid.). Civil society was in turn permeated by the 
state, as shown below in Figure 2.5, following the introduction of legislation and 
measures tackling sickness and incapacity as well as regulation of working conditions 
(ibid., p.512). 
Figure 2.5: Position of political parties during the first decades after the introduction of 
general suffrage 
(Koole, 1996, p.512) 
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One significant effect of the greater role of the state in civil society was the 
corresponding decline in the role of parties, which points to the diminishing 
‘encadrement’ of the electorate. This developed into an increased sense of 
individualism in civil society, with much looser ties to parties, clearly defined groups and 
‘natural constituencies’ (Koole, 1996, p.512). Instead, as Katz and Mair have also 
explained, a greater preference developed for organisations directly addressing single 
issues, as well as an increased reliance on the media, rather than party publications, 
for political information. Meanwhile, the lobbying power of trade unions and other large 
interest organisations enabled people to exert influence on the state whilst bypassing 
parties (Koole, 1996, p.512). The result of this is shown in Figure 2.6, which illustrates 
the diminished role of parties, and, consequently, far greater direct interaction between 
the state and civil society.
Figure 2.6: The position of political parties today 
(Koole, 1996, p.514)
This overlap of civil society and the state directly challenges a key assertion made of 
cartel theory, namely that parties become isolated from civil society (see Figure 2.6). 
Rather, the function of parties was to: 
(A)ct as a binder between state and society by offering voters a certain 
context for political orientation and a channel to voice approval or 
dissatisfaction, but are no longer vehicles for mass encapsulation.  
(Koole, 1996, p.513)
A further tendency casts doubt on the notion that parties anchor themselves in the 
state. Political power is located not only at the highest levels of the state, but also 
dispersed at various strata, for example among regional or local authorities (such as 
Germany’s federal states), in non-state organisations and, within the context of 
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globalisation and European integration, international bodies beyond the state itself. 
This carries major implications for parties seeking to gain and exercise control over the 
state, as it raises the following question: ‘If political power is hard to locate, what does it 
mean to be in power?’ (Koole, 1996, p.514). Because of the direct interplay between 
civil society and the state, parties cannot accurately be described as a mere 
‘broker’ (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.16). Furthermore, the dispersal of power from the 
unilocus to various loci at various levels implies the state does not act as a monolith 
(Koole, 1996, p.515). Therefore, what is the rationale for parties to embed themselves 
in the state?
Katz and Mair (1996) respond to these challenges by pointing out that while greater 
party identification with the state does not necessarily have to result in actual 
separation from society, there is reason to believe disconnection nevertheless occurs. 
The interpenetration between state and society allows parties to shift their focus away 
from society and instead onto the state, complete with its resources (Katz and Mair, 
1996, p.527). Here, the important factor is the electorate’s perception of this process; 
parties' involvement with the state and its finances creates an impression of separation 
and distance from the electorate and therefore from society (ibid.). Furthermore, Katz 
and Mair clarify the meaning of (civil) society as not merely the population which is 
entitled to full citizenship, but also the organisations which grow out of society to 
convey and mediate the various interests in society itself, as well as those between 
society and the state (ibid., p.528). It is this type of interpenetration between society 
and state which has grown over recent years and, importantly, far from transforming 
parties into ‘binders’, has actually undermined the linking role of the party between 
these two aspects. Citizens have a wider range of opportunities (including social 
movements, as well as courts of law and corporatism) through which interests can be 
aggregated and articulated. Because parties as a result become less embedded in 
society, they turn their attention to the state itself (ibid.). 
According to Koole, rather than seek to identify the ideal type for a specific period of 
time as the next stage in an evolutionary process, the most useful approach would be 
to consider the conditions which give rise to a particular category of party, and which 
different circumstances produce diverging party types (Koole, 1996, p.520). Here, 
national characteristics need to be considered. For example, Germany’s five per cent 
electoral threshold for entry into national and regional parliaments is cited as a clear 
example of a means of exclusion (see Section Two). Yet Detterbeck (2008, p.36) 
argues that Germany's history and particularly the chaotic political character of the 
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Weimar Republic is a plausible justification of this tool, rather than any self-interested 
desire for cartelisation. The threshold functions as a barrier to radical/extreme parties 
gaining a foothold in the party political system. Meanwhile, the electoral system of 
proportional representation, combined with the country's federal structure, has 
maintained the prospect for small and new parties such as the Greens to gradually 
establish themselves and achieve a parliamentary presence, most likely beginning at 
local/regional level. Even the system of state funding, also cited as evidence of 
cartelising tendencies, has proven helpful in facilitating the establishment of 
newcomers. The Greens were increasingly able to take advantage of this funding to 
develop the party’s organisational structures and support election campaigns, and were 
subsequently rewarded with electoral success (and further financial resources) (ibid.). 
However, while specific national circumstances undoubtedly play an important role, 
Katz and Mair maintain that an evolutionary element still exists in so far as party 
organisations develop according to a ‘stimulus-response dynamic’ (Katz and Mair, 
1996, p.532). Yet this does not imply a single, pre-defined course for each and every 
party; rather, the cartel model forms part of a ‘repertoire’ of party types which political 
actors may utilise (ibid.), with the individual circumstances of the respective party 
system determining which of the available models is adopted. According to Smith 
(1996, p.72), even if the cartel party does not represent a new party type as a 
successor to the catch-all Volkspartei model, certain features are still conspicuous in 
the German party system, where parties act within a framework that imposes stringent 
regulation and simultaneously confers on them a privileged role in society. These 
characteristics, described above in Section Two, include the educative function of 
political foundations, a detachment from civil society (despite, in the case of Germany, 
relatively high membership levels), greater reliance on public funding, subsidies based 
on parties' electoral outcomes and the ability of parties to generate their own income 
and, finally, a system of patronage which sees party-related appointments at federal 
and Land level, including in the civil service and Länder banks (ibid., p.73).
A further challenge to Cartel Theory argues that compared to the mass party, the cartel 
appears to be in a weaker position, at least in terms of membership, voter loyalty and 
political identity. It would be reasonable to assume that any new party type would be a 
successful one in relation to previous party types. Yet Koole (1996, p.516) is not 
convinced that the cartel party fits this description, since there is no trend of 
concentration in party systems; in fact, due to the increased volatility in voting (as the 
natural constituency and ‘encadrement’ weaken) there is a greater than ever chance 
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for parties to gain parliamentary representation. Furthermore, the system of state 
subsidies in the respective democracy may incentivise small parties to challenge the 
established parties. Two conclusions are derived: on the one hand, parallels have been 
drawn between the cartel model and the ‘failure of parties’ (Kitschelt, 2000, p.151). On 
the other hand, it can be argued that parties have in fact strengthened their position. 
Once again, Germany’s Greens illustrate that not only does absorption into the state 
reward parties with valuable resources, this very phenomenon strongly underlines 
parties' ability to adapt to challenges and circumstances in order to ensure their 
continuity and prosperity (Koole, 1996, p.516).
Although stability and self-preservation are pivotal to the cartel party type, this model 
does still carry inherent risks. In the past, the role of the mass party was to act as a 
bridge between the state and civil society. However, the basis of Katz and Mair’s 
analysis is that in the cartel model, the population is less able to utilise parties in order 
to make demands on the state, as these parties are now embedded in the state itself. 
Therefore, if people seek alternatives to parties, this could give rise to further popularity 
of single issue pressure groups (the failure of parties). Yet it is not unusual for the state
— and certainly parties in office — to cooperate with large, established interest 
organisations such as trade unions and employers' associations; agreements can be 
reached whereby the organisation's support is promised in exchange for privilege and 
security. In short, the cartel can consist of more than co-opted parties and may extend 
to include non-aligned interest organisations. There is the subsequent risk that new, 
dynamic and possibly extreme groups capture the attention of a frustrated electorate, 
but even though the cartel is unable to prevent their emergence completely, it can 
certainly limit the challenge they pose. Electoral barriers can prevent small, new and 
special interest-based groups from competing in elections, while state subsidies may 
be awarded in accordance with electoral success. Once again, this carries a degree of 
risk in that it can fuel and reinforce protests from fringe parties, but while such threats 
can target particular policies or parties, they do not necessarily call into question the 
party political system itself; the cartel therefore remains secure.   
2.3.2. ‘Oligopolies’ and the Restriction of Policy Supply  
The main challenges to Cartel Theory have so far concerned parties’ relationship to the 
state and to civil society. There is also a threat that new parties capture the votes of an 
unrepresented and frustrated electorate. This risk is now explored in greater depth: 
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what compels political leaders to adopt strategy and policy choices which are non-
representative of voter interests, and how does the cartel prevent defection? The 
explanation lies in developments in the global economy and subsequent shifts in 
expectations of government. To understand this cartelising tendency in party systems, 
it is first useful to consider why and how cartels emerge in the economic context.
The birthplace for the cartel is the oligopoly. This type of market structure is 
characterised by many buyers but only few firms. Secondly, these firms' products can 
be differentiated; on the supply side differences could refer to quality and performance, 
while on the demand side there might be 'imaginary' differences created by advertising 
to create brand loyalty. Third, it is also difficult for new firms to enter this market due to 
the prohibitive barriers in place, for example the economies of scale which could 
provide cost advantage for established firms, consumer preference for established 
firms' products (also a result of differentiation), or the established firms' ownership or 
control of crucial raw materials and market outlets (Pass et. al., 1993 ).  38
If a company suddenly reduces its prices it has a direct effect, namely reduced profit, 
on the others operating within the oligopoly. There is therefore an incentive to consider 
the reactions of competitors, to avoid price competition and to employ alternative 
mechanisms in order to maximise profit. Producers of a particular type of good might 
try to take control of the market by forming a cartel in which it operates and determines 
price and output levels for that good. The result of full cartelisation is the restriction of 
output in the industry concerned; both output and consequently price are maintained at 
a level for a profit-maximising monopoly. While producers collude to form the cartel, it is 
not necessarily a completely closed entity; it may indeed admit other, new producers on 
the condition that they observe and respect the practices of the cartel, in order to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the cartel itself (ibid.) 
    
As described above, cartel formation and maintenance is subject to the ever-present 
threat of exit, where each member has an incentive to leave the cartel. Given that the 
market is characterised by short-run elasticity, in other words is responsive to change, 
and because a potential cartel consists of a number of firms, this danger is magnified 
many times. Considering these factors together, Blyth and Katz (2005, p.39) 
acknowledge on one hand that the potential for a stable cartel is actually rather slim 
and that defection would be assumed to occur from the very start, but on the other, that 
there are also conditions which might reduce this threat, and in this respect they refer 
 Pass et.al. (1993), Dictionary of Economics. Search term: ‘Oligopoly’.38
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to the equilibrium created by oligopolistic markets, whereby firms respond to each other 
and arrive at a point where they reach a mutually beneficial agreement on output levels 
and from which they have little incentive to withdraw (ibid).  
 
Cooperation allows firms to make decisions based on full knowledge of each others’ 
demand curve, which in turn enables them to establish their own level of output in 
accordance with those of the other firms. Again, this does not automatically result in a 
cartel, but it can provide conditions in which a cartel can develop. A firm might decide to 
raise its price or reduce its output, resulting in others following suit (at which point the 
firm becomes price leader). By following this lead, the firms can restrict output and 
achieve higher profits than those they might obtain by pursuing their own pricing and 
output policy (i.e., defecting unilaterally) (ibid.). In short, cooperation creates the 
environment in which firms no longer have an incentive to defect. 
A number of parallels are drawn between the above economic context, with its firms 
and quantities, and that of the political party. First, the oligopolistic economic market is 
compared to the competitive party system in which power is usually shared by a 
relatively small number of parties. Next, while economic ‘quantities' refers to output, the 
output equivalent of political parties concerns policies. Consequently, policies represent 
‘quantities’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.40). However, although collusive tendencies to 
determine price and output rewards among economic oligopolies, how does the 
analogy explain how parties would ‘fix’ their output (policies) or why they would prefer 
to collude rather than to compete in order to achieve this outcome?  
If it is indeed true that parties ‘fix’ their output of policies (thereby minimising their 
representative function), then there is a great incentive for one member of the cartel to 
break ranks and appeal to these preferences, thus attracting a large number of votes 
(Kitschelt, 2000, p.168). There would have to be a very strong overriding incentive to 
prevent defection and Kitschelt doubts that identification with the state or resources 
provided by the state fulfils this criterion. In fact, access to state resources could even 
provide an additional incentive to defect from a cartel, since the payout principle is 
usually based on electoral success. The prospect of state resources could actually 
provide challengers with an incentive to enter and participate in the electoral 
marketplace (Kitschelt, 2000, p.168), especially if the payout threshold is low (see 
Section Two above). Furthermore, there appears to be no obvious reason for parties 
whose aim is to achieve public office or at least to maximise their voter share to make a 
conscious decision to abandon voter preferences. In a highly competitive climate, the 
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approach most likely to attract voter support and thus deliver victory over competitors 
would be one of greater rather than less sensitivity and responsiveness to demands. If 
a substantial section of the electorate is unrepresented by the cartel members, one 
party could make a deliberate appeal to this disaffected group, increase its voter share 
and enjoy continued or greater access to state resources and the rewards of office.
One important phenomenon of Katz and Mair’s cartel model is the growing relationship 
of solidarity and loyalty among professional politicians who through their cooperation in 
power share similar career goals and concerns, creating a close association of political 
parties at the expense of representation of traditional democratic principals. This is 
symptomatic of an ascendant party in public office and is underpinned by a sense of a 
common professional identity among parliamentarians, shared concerns such as job 
security after the next election and financial reward (for example, pay, subsidies and 
due allowances and expenses). In addition, a collegial relationship is developed 
through participation in cross-party committees. 
However, Kitschelt (2000, p.157) points out that even assuming such a relationship 
exists, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that this sense of fraternity should 
inevitably be responsible for violating the representation of constituency interests. What 
is more, even if voter preferences are disregarded due to some sort of policy 
compromise designed to benefit the professional political class, this would imply the 
existence of a large group of voters whose preferences are not represented anywhere 
within the span of this compromise and, consequently, a majority that favours radical 
policies. Kitschelt doubts the plausibility of this ‘dual-peaked’ voter preference in 
advanced industrial countries, claiming there are no indications to suggest that there 
are progressively fewer voters located in the median policy position (ibid.). Also, given 
that becoming and remaining part of this association of colleagues depends on 
electoral success, it is not clear why parties would not choose to exit an 
unrepresentative cartel, appeal to the median position, maximise their voter share and 
continue to enjoy the rewards of public office (Kitschelt, 2000, p.168). Thus, the 
enticement to exit the cartel is a very powerful one.   
2.3.3. Incentives for Cartelisation
Blyth and Katz (2005) offer two explanations for parties turning their collective backs on 
competition and instead opting for collusion. The first is the fiscal limitation of catch-all 
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politics, while the second is based in the ‘rhetoric and reality of globalisation’. Both of 
these factors in turn create the conditions for the formation of a party cartel. 
Fiscal Limitation  
A party system might consist of two successful catch-all parties. Both parties pursue 
policies designed to expand the provision of public goods and these policies have 
proven popular among the electorate, so it may be assumed that the electorate 
generally favours generous rather than restricted welfare and public goods provision. 
Even so, the population is only prepared to accept a certain fiscal burden. Eventually, 
parties face the prospect of either reducing the fiscal burden or restricting public goods 
provision, with both options threatening to lose voter share. Given that the previous 
basis for policy competition is no longer viable, electoral competition itself also 
becomes less feasible. Furthermore, a new network dilemma arises in this context 
(Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.40).  
 
Election campaigns no longer rely solely on the mobilisation and input of large numbers 
of members and activists, thus reducing the value of organisations such as unions, 
which were previously useful sources of mobilised support in the run up to elections. 
Instead, media marketing is favoured over and above mass participation. However, just 
as the electorate eventually considers a certain level of public goods provision too 
costly in fiscal terms, the party’s grassroots organisation (the party on the ground) 
similarly reaches a point where it no longer accepts the expenditure for direct, 
professional media campaigns. The catch-all party's ability to provide party success 
and stability reaches its limit and is no longer the optimum model to ‘promote party 
success and stability’ (ibid.). The solution to this dilemma is sought in the cartel party 
model.  
The Rhetoric of Globalisation 
One extremely important incentive, again with an economic context, is globalisation, 
defined as ‘the progressive disembedding of market transactions from regulation such 
that the role of the state — and thus the party — has diminished’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, 
p.41). As both exports and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) become increasingly 
important for economic growth, states are less able to practise an independent 
monetary policy, as this threatens currency stability, an essential factor in an open 
economy. Furthermore, under the rule of globalisation, it becomes necessary to 
deregulate production, employment and financial markets in order to attract capital 
inflows (Blyth et al., 2010, p.2), while at the same time restrict fiscal expansion, which 
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is of course the key support of welfare provision (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.41). What is 
more, it is essential for globalisation to maintain conditions favoured by international 
finance in order to prevent its defection to more favourable environments (ibid., p.42). 
The consequence is that the fiscal tools which could be used to stimulate demand and 
maintain maximum employment fall out of favour with governments and parties whose 
economic policy is determined by the requirements of international market opinion. 
What is more, the fiscal constraints and deregulation restrict the scope of social 
democratic governments to implement a leftist redistributive policy programme (Blyth et 
al., 2010, p.2). 
A further important aspect of the theory is that economic agents collectively are fully 
aware of the economic system and therefore make only correct decisions. Therefore, it 
is assumed that while an individual market participant could make a mistake, there 
could be no error on the part of ‘the market’ as a whole (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.42). 
Conversely, market distortions are by their nature deemed inefficient (Blyth et al., 2010, 
p.7). This concept is of great significance to the discussion concerning cartelisation 
because it sweeps aside any notion of choice or any possibility of alternatives, 
therefore ‘limiting what is in fact demandable’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.45). For social 
democratic parties, which have traditionally pursued market interventionist policies, this 
means that such measures, whether intended to attract votes or boost economic 
growth in a particular sector, are also regarded as counterproductive (Blyth et al., 2010, 
p.7). In response, the social democratic parties in particular pursued two strategic 
approaches that allowed them to ‘reform social democracy back into power; or more 
appropriately, to cartelize it’ (ibid.).
The first of these strategic responses was to redress the expectations of voters. As 
described above, parties (and in particular social democratic parties) found themselves 
unable to continually fulfil the demand for increasingly expensive public goods. Blyth 
and Katz (2005, p.43) therefore point out that the perceptions of globalisation provided 
parties with the opportunity to emphasise that it was the (infallible) market, rather than 
the state that was best suited to meet this demand for public goods. This can be 
understood as signalling intention and cooperation — the collusive element — which 
created knowledge among parties and provided them with justification for the mutual 
withdrawal from public good provision (i.e., joint maximisation and limiting output) 
(Blyth et al., 2010, p.7). This occurred regardless of whether the parties were 
traditionally and ideologically supportive of or opposed to state intervention (Blyth and 
Katz, 2005, p.43). 
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Discourse, too, plays a key role in what Blyth et al. (2010, p.8) describe as ‘ratcheting 
down expectations’. For example, in the case of Germany, the concept of the ‘Neue 
Mitte’  created the justification for social democracy to cease producing public goods, 39
because it was claimed the market could do so better and more efficiently. Supporting 
this justification is the notion of market infallibility. According to Blair and Schröder, ‘The 
essential function of markets must be complemented and improved by political action, 
not hampered by it’ (Blair and Schröder, 1998, p.2). Above all, the important 
consequence for social democracy was that it was absolved of the responsibility for the 
supply of public goods (Blyth et al., 2010, p.8). The discursive process underpinning 
the Neue Mitte can be understood not only as downsizing voter expectations 
concerning the role and activities of the state, but also as a signal from the centre-left 
parties to those on the centre-right, indicating their commitment to narrow policy scope, 
or, in the language of Cartel Theory, a willingness to cease competition and to restrict 
output. 
Although the SPD had traditionally been an advocate of collectivism, labour rights and 
the social state, the Neue Mitte declared that ‘Modern social democrats want to 
transform the safety net of entitlements into a springboard to personal 
responsibility’ (Blair and Schröder, 1998, p.10). Agenda 2010 also marked a significant 
step for the Greens, who demonstrated they had clearly ‘arrived’ in the political 
mainstream and could no longer be considered outsider challengers to a ‘cartel’ of 
established parties. 
   
The downsizing of expectations is reinforced by a second approach, the externalisation 
of policy (Blyth et al., 2010, p.7). This relates to the institutional framework, whereby 
policymaking is transferred to institutions with no direct accountability to those affected 
by its actions, thus ‘truncating supply’ of policy (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.45). One 
example of this is European integration, which obliges Member State governments 
(and therefore parties) to maintain their commitments to EU policy, which can also be 
interpreted as quotas limiting domestic policy output. Similarly, an independent central 
bank limits the scope of democratically elected governments to manage economic 
outcomes and is therefore regarded as a safeguard against political ‘interference’ in the 
economy (Blyth et al., 2010, p.8). In both instances, voter preferences are unable to 
bring about change in an unpopular policy. In short, the institutional framework and 
 See Chapter One for an explanation of ‘The Third Way/Neue Mitte’.39
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externalisation of policy function as ‘binding quotas’ (ibid.) on policy output, which in 
turn ‘effectively curtails the supply curve of policy, thus cartelising the party 
system’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.44). In fact the resignation of Oskar Lafontaine, who 
favoured reflationary economic tools to stimulate domestic demand, can at least in part 
be regarded as an illustration of the strength of EU institutions, and the ECB in 
particular, over national government (policy externalisation) as well as an indicator of 
the deflationary policy established in the eurozone. The consequences apply not only 
to policy output and the provision of public goods, but also to the political parties 
themselves. The curtailed supply curve allows parties to maintain the status quo, which 
in turn reduces the risk of defection, previously the greatest threat to the formation and 
maintenance of cartels. What is more, the restricted policy output resulting from the 
institutional framework allows parties to predict each other’s policy and strategy, thus 
minimising the need for obvious inter-party collusion (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.45). 
A further aspect of this transformation centred on the parties' strategy of re-orientating 
policy and funding towards those constituencies which place fewer policy demands on 
the party (lower production costs) and involve less risk (cost of losing an election). The 
method employed by these 'post-catch-all parties' constitutes a shift in the relationship 
between the democratic principal and the democratic agent (ibid.). The importance of 
the mass electorate (the democratic principal) for the parties (democratic agents) is 
greatly diminished, for the electorate has a considerably reduced ability to bring about 
change, to influence parties or punish unpopular or unrepresentative governments at 
the polls, as a result of the narrowed policy field and — as a consequence of the 
rhetoric of globalisation — because of the perception that no alternative exists. In 
addition, considering the fact that parties can secure funding from sources other than 
the party basis, Blyth and Katz (ibid.) therefore conclude that parties may no longer be 
regarded as agents, but as principals who periodically utilise the support of voters, 
themselves now transformed into a resource for endorsement on demand, to add a 
legitimising aspect to the party.  
This section has described how established parties are concerned with two main 
objectives regarding party political competition. First, they need to reduce instability 
and secondly they must minimise the negative effects of elections. The exclusion of 
newcomer parties and cooperation between government and opposition parties are the 
respective means of achieving these objectives. The threat presented by challengers 
can be measured in terms of their appeal to voters, the degree to which existing 
alignments are upset if established parties adopt the appeal of these new groups (for 
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example, by adopting aspects of their policy offer) and their chances of overcoming 
institutional barriers such as electoral thresholds. 
Furthermore, fiscal limitation and the rhetoric of globalisation provide parties not only 
with incentives but also the tools to act in the manner of an economic oligopoly. The 
chief incentive to collude and restrict output (policy) is the maximisation of ‘profit’ — in 
other words, security of tenure — whether governmental or public. Key tools at parties’ 
disposal include the reduction in voter expectations and the externalisation of policy. As 
a result, the party is isolated from any defined constituency. These developments are of 
particular significance for social democracy. According to Blyth et al., (2010, p.6), 
‘driven by organizational survival more than conviction, left parties began to not 
compete on the issue of unemployment’. 
Arising from these conditions are four implications for parties, which in turn highlight the 
two key aspects of Cartel Theory (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.45). The first two 
implications concern the internal aspect of the party and closely recall the 
characteristics of the cartel party type described at the beginning of this chapter:
Funding: There will be a shift from reliance on the party basis towards resources made 
directly available by the central party (reliance on state resources). 
Internal organisation: Measures will be taken to give the party leadership greater 
autonomy with regard to the party basis (ascendancy of the party in central office).
The third and fourth implications concern the conditions in the competitive political 
‘marketplace’ or, in other words, inter-party competition. Here, the emphasis is on the 
establishment of a cartel of parties (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.46): 
Inter-party relations: There will be growing cooperation and similarity among 
‘oligopolistic’ parties in order to ensure that voter expectations are kept consistently 
low, thus absolving parties of responsibilities such as provision of public goods. Hand in 
hand with this, there is a strengthening of the institutional framework that facilitates the 
externalisation of policy. 
Policy area: As parties converge and collude, ideology and principles will place 
increasing emphasis on managerial competencies as the chief differentiating factor 
between parties.
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2.4. Party Leadership and Representation
This section focuses on internal implications of Cartel Theory in terms of leadership 
and representation within the party. The aim is to provide a more detailed account of 
these characteristics and, most importantly, to identify which features are likely to apply 
to the Left Party in the western states. These aspects will subsequently be explored in 
the Bremen Case Study.
 
First, it is necessary to briefly revisit the model of party evolution developed by Katz 
and Mair and consider the internal organisation of the party types. Whereas the cadre 
parties' membership and leadership were essentially one and the same, the mass party 
developed a large membership base centred around the articulation of specific 
interests and shared ideology. The party elite was expected to act in the name of the 
grassroots party, while structures such as the party congress or conference made the 
leadership formally accountable to the mass organisation. Later, the catch-all party 
began to seek support from beyond its own organisational structure and, no longer 
maintained solely by the membership, was able to gradually shed its reliance upon, 
and therefore accountability to, the grassroots membership. With power concentrated 
among the leaders, the catch-all party became characterised by a top-down structure 
of authority. In the cartel model, while party membership of course continues to exist, 
its chief role is to lend formal support to the leadership. Furthermore, as supporters and 
experts outside the party participate in decision-making processes, the relationship of 
accountability changes and party activists find themselves ‘divorced’ from their 
leadership. 
Kitschelt (2000) doubts there is a party of two ‘fronts’ consisting of the leadership 
together with moderate, inactive members on one side and the more radical activists 
on the other, and instead argues it is more plausible that the leadership will simply seek 
the support of the party median, regardless of whether those individuals happen to be 
activists or part of the larger grassroots organisation (Kitschelt, 2000, p.158). After all, if 
the leadership persistently represents an unpopular minority view within the party, 
those members dissatisfied with the situation have the option of leaving the party (or 
threatening to do so). In addition, party statutes provide mechanisms for the censure of 
the leadership: ‘Exit and voice mechanisms rarely permit national leadership levels to 
become entirely impervious to the control by a variety of external principals, be they 
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local activists, members or voters’ (Kitschelt, 2000, p.159). Parties are therefore faced 
with a network dilemma; how, on the one hand, to maintain freedom and networks for 
leaders to engage in policy making based on negotiation and compromise; and on the 
other hand, how to meet the activists' demands for influence in the policy making 
process. As a result, German parties have to juggle two types of organisational identity:
(T)hey are rational-efficient and professional service organisations focused 
on election campaigns and policy making as well as membership 
organisations focused on programmatic debates, social community and 
political participation. (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34)
How do parties reconcile their sometimes conflicting roles as policy makers and 
membership organisations? One explanation focuses on the structure and coordination 
within the party itself. In the case of the cartel party type, the concentration of power is 
reinforced by its organisation as a ‘stratarchy’. In this model, the local and regional 
office strata are maintained, manage their own affairs and are able to exercise 
independence concerning the issues that specifically affect them at sub-national level. 
At first glance, this stratarchy strengthens these organisations by granting them a 
degree of autonomy from the national party leadership (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.21). But 
if a local party threatens to mobilise members in order to protest against or contradict 
official central party policy, the national leadership is able to bypass the troublesome 
local branch and appeal directly to the general (and less active) membership. 
Nevertheless, given the increasing influence of national politics and public opinion of 
national politicians on the outcomes of regional and even local elections, leaders at 
sub-national level do of course have an obvious interest in shaping policy and 
leadership conduct at the central (national) party level. Koole (1996, p.518) therefore 
disputes the apparent readiness of local party leaders to accept the pre-eminence of 
the central organisation in return for autonomy over their own local matters. However, 
Katz and Mair (1996, p.532) argue that although it might indeed be feasible to imagine 
a challenge to the dominant central organisation if local party branches acted together, 
it is atypical to find a common initiative among party organisations at this level.
The party conference illustrates this point. The party executive presents a package of 
policies and amendments on which conference delegates are to vote. A delegation 
from the regional level can struggle to directly challenge a particular policy or strategy 
on the basis of its impact on local politics: it could be difficult to muster support among 
other regional delegations not similarly affected by the proposal, whereas the 
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leadership is able to draw support from the wider membership. Developments in 
technology have further supported this approach. Some parties (notably the Pirate 
Party) have either used or explored platforms such as Liquid Feedback to facilitate 
direct participation by ordinary members not attending conference in person; in 2011 
the Left Party also launched a programme discussion using the Liquid Democracy 
platform. On the one hand, this formal empowerment of the grassroots membership 
naturally enhances democratic legitimacy. But on the other, it creates the means to 
circumvent organisations as well as activist groups at sub-national level, therefore 
securing the dominant role of the central leadership in the party (Katz and Mair, 1995, 
p.21).
The focus on layers of party organisation also has to include consideration of 
Germany’s decentralised, federal structure. Although the federal system facilitates 
‘important channels of aggregating territorial interests and of resolving internal conflicts 
between the different party levels’ (Detterbeck, 2008, p.32), it can also give rise to 
conflict and debate. Hough et al. (2007, p.49) observe that while parties are often 
discussed as unitary actors, differences and conflict between the internal structures 
and streams can manifest themselves. This arises particularly if the national party 
leadership fails to (or chooses not to) exert authority over, and provide clear direction 
to, the structures and organisations at sub-national level. Chapter One has described 
how under the leadership of Gabi Zimmer the approach of the PDS national executive 
was based on informality and only sporadic coordination between the national and 
regional organisations within the party. As a result, there was greater autonomy among 
the Land organisations (Hough and Koß, 2008). This was particularly the case 
following the 2002 general election, when the then PDS failed to clear the five per cent 
hurdle. The result of this failure was the dissolution of the national parliamentary party 
— the highest level of party in public office . Moreover, the national executive itself 40
was riddled with tensions and conflict between its members and the ‘party in central 
office’ was therefore weakened (ibid.). Furthermore, Hough et al. refer to the ongoing 
and unresolved debate concerning opposition vs. participation in regional governments 
as: 
(E)vidence that the sub-national level does matter. This takes on even 
greater importance when the groups/units adopt radically different 
positions towards such issues as government participation — and there is 
 Only two deputies remained in parliament, and did not qualify for any group status.40
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no issue that has proved as problematic for the Left Party in recent years 
as this one. (Hough et al., 2007, p.49)
The federal structure can therefore facilitate heterogeneity both vertically (between the 
federal party and regional organisations) and horizontally (among the regional 
associations), resulting in the ongoing existence of Streitkultur (culture of criticism and 
controversy) within the party. Nevertheless, even though German federalism has 
allowed leading regional politicians to adopt key positions and influence at national 
level, it is still the Ministerpräsidenten (Prime Ministers of the federal states) and other 
office holders who tend to dominate executive committees and policy making 
(Detterbeck, 2008, p.34). In other words, while federalisation plays an important role in 
determining power relationships within German parties, the ascendency of the party in 
public office is still evident (ibid., p.32).  
The party leadership has a number of tools at its disposal with which to manage the 
coordination of the wider membership. In addition to recent conference technology, 
postal ballots are a further means of effectively dispersing the membership, since 
members act as individuals, rather than as an organised bloc. It may even be possible 
for members to ‘leapfrog’ the regional layer of the association and join the national 
party, a process which does not integrate the member into their local networks. 
Germany’s federal structure means that members are formally registered in their 
respective regional association, but even at this level activists remain in the minority. 
More recently, parties have also taken steps to involve non-members in decision-
making. The SPD, for example, sought to involve non-members in candidate selection 
and to open up its working groups and policy forums to include sympathisers outside 
the party, albeit with limited rights (representative roles on committees would remain 
the reserve of party members) . All in all, an isolated and generally passive 41
membership provides the party in central office with a win-win situation: on the one 
hand the party can legitimately claim to have a large membership basis, and on the 
other it is unlikely to experience a united challenge to leadership or policies, thanks to 
the rather atomised and passive nature of the membership.
The membership referendum is a further instrument available to the leadership. The 
referendum could naturally be welcomed as a positive step towards increasing inner-
party democracy, and indeed German parties have, since the 1990s, used the 
 See Vogt, R (2011) and Castellucci, L. (2011) for suggestions on membership organisation 41
reform in the SPD.
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plebiscite as a means of engaging local members in the candidate selection process. 
But aside from matters such as personnel selection, this democratic tool has rarely 
been utilised for actual policy decisions at national level. Its chief function, therefore, 
appears to be to serve ‘electoral and image-fed motives’ rather than to transform 
‘internal power distribution’ (Detterbeck, 2008, p.32).
During the cooperation between the PDS and WASG, the respective memberships of 
both parties took part in a referendum on whether to proceed with the formal merger. 
The proposed fusion did not enjoy universal support within the PDS, especially among 
those on the left of the party, and the vote gave ordinary members (beyond office 
holders and activists) the opportunity to participate in decision-making about their 
party’s future. However, despite the misgivings of some activists and groups in the 
PDS, by the time the referendum took place it was highly unlikely that members would 
have voted to reject the merger. Prominent leaders such as Gysi and Lafontaine had 
been instrumental in bringing together the two parties and both wielded considerable 
influence in the media and within the respective parties. With ninety-six per cent of the 
members voting in favour of the merger, the outcome of the referendum strengthened 
the position and legitimacy of the party leadership. 
Certain methods and styles of communication can also reinforce centralised power 
within a party. Cartel Theory was formulated at a time when political campaigning was 
becoming increasingly professionalised (see Section One). The expense and 
coordination involved in producing campaigns for television or for the national media 
required access to the resources (professional and financial) available to the party in 
central office. In turn, these professionally produced campaigns were able to appeal 
directly to individuals, thus circumventing local party organisations or activist networks. 
But as Blyth and Katz (2005) have pointed out, these professional channels of 
communication were also expensive, and were no longer able to deliver party success 
and stability, thus posing the leadership with a new network dilemma. Since then, 
however, technological advances have given rise to various forms of social media, 
such as YouTube, Facebook and the microblogging platform Twitter. The latter has 
proven particularly popular in the communication of political ideas. Furthermore, it has 
facilitated the coordination of activists and protests and allowed people to follow events 
as they unfold. At first glance, then, it appears that social media has shifted the focus 
away from political elites and has instead placed influence into the hands of activists 
and the electorate.
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Yet there is some debate as to whether this technology actually promotes grassroots 
issue-based campaigns or whether it is in fact a tool by which prominent political 
figures are able to set their own agenda (Adi et al., 2014, p.3). A study into the use of 
Twitter during a general election campaign in Sweden identified three broad categories 
of communication — dissemination of facts, updates on daily activities and statements 
for the purpose of self-promotion — and noted that these neither provided genuine 
insights into political processes, nor enhanced transparency (Larssen and Moe, 2011, 
p.733). The study also revealed that use of Twitter spiked following televised debates 
or media coverage of political events (such as rallies), suggesting that although it 
clearly contributes to the overall volume of political communication, Twitter builds on 
the representation of events and issues in the traditional/established media (ibid., p.
741). Moreover, the timing of the peak in usage underlined the emphasis on 
parliamentary politics.
The use of this social media platform highlights some interesting questions that are 
relevant for Cartel Theory and specifically for the issue of party leadership and 
representation. For instance, Twitter allows people to follow (and therefore monitor) the 
activities of politicians. The other side of this coin is that it also offers politicians, very 
much aware of this audience, with a channel for augmenting the same messages 
already (or about to be) published in traditional media (Adi et al., 2014, p.7). Also, while 
activity might increase during parliamentary elections, communication is by no means 
confined to election coverage and politicians are therefore able to ‘circumvent 
traditional media and continuously campaign throughout the year’ (ibid., p.14). In 
addition, it facilitates the direct appeal to the broader membership whilst bypassing 
regional organisations and activists. What is more, Twitter’s brevity is ideally suited to 
the communication of catchy and sometimes emotive statements and soundbites (ibid., 
p.7). It therefore allows the poster to appeal to his or her followers frequently and on a 
very direct and personalised level — and not necessarily on strictly political issues. In 
short, although social media can be seen as a means of ‘democratising’ political 
communication, Twitter, as just one example of this type of technology, is also a 
powerful tool in the hands of party leaders that is ‘more akin to one-way, top-down 
communication’ than a means of ‘actually engaging with the citizenry’ (Larssen and 
Moe, 2011, p.733).
But even though policy making and communication remain to a large extent the domain 
of the leadership, parties cannot completely ignore the demands among members and 
activists for participation in this process, and the leadership would presumably not wish 
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to see a sizeable exit from the party (Kitschelt, 2000, p.158). Credibility issues would 
also arise, possibly even triggering a leadership crisis. Dissent and the threat of exit are 
therefore important weapons in the hands of the party membership wishing to exert 
influence on the leadership. The PDS/Left Party itself is no stranger to inner-party 
discord. Disputes over policy and strategy have indeed prompted resignations from the 
party (notably concerning the perennial conflict over government participation but also 
the question of support for UN-mandated military action). However, the culture within 
the party itself also plays an important role. Olsen (2002a, p.207) observes, for 
example, that eastern members in particular had a strong sense of loyalty to the PDS, 
and likens the prospect of their leaving the PDS to that of leaving the Church. In 
addition, there are also sections of the membership (for instance in the Communist 
Platform) who despite their opposition to pragmatic reforms and participation in 
coalitions are convinced they still have a more realistic chance of achieving political 
goals from within the party. The threat of defection also assumes there is an alternative 
political Heimat (home) ready to welcome ex-members. Some PDS members, including 
office holders, have indeed defected to the SPD over what they perceived as 
ideological rigidity and lack of pragmatism . However, for those fundamentally 42
opposed to or critical of capitalism and policies such as Hartz IV, it is not clear to which 
party they might defect. The other parliamentary parties offer variations on the very 
policies opposed, while alternative leftist movements do not offer a parliamentary 
platform for opposition. As such, leaving the Left Party would lead to ‘political 
irrelevance’ (ibid.). Moreover, members can be reluctant to surrender ‘their’ party to an 
unpopular leadership, and therefore resolve to remain as a ‘corrective’ force, to steer 
the party back onto the right path . 43
Cartel Theory points out that in spite of the tendency for decision-making to take place 
at leadership level, activists are not completely superfluous. After all, an active 
membership reinforces the party's democratic image and lends legitimacy to the claim 
of societal representation (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34). Secondly, it is likely that leaders 
begin their own political involvement as activists; consequently, the party on the ground 
continues to fulfil the important function of nurturing and developing talent (ibid.). Yet 
 Examples of PDS/Linke office holders at various levels who are now members of the SPD 42
include Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (MEP), Angela Marquardt (former national executive and 
Bundestag member) and Sirvan Cakici (former Bremen Bürgerschaft member).
 For example, the Communist Platform has stated: ‘We shouldn’t leave the party to those who 43
would misrepresent history for the sake of government participation today, or vote for military 
deployment of the Bundeswehr tomorrow (…)  Let’s not do anyone the favour of allowing 
ourselves to be forced out of the party.’ (Kommunistische Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE, 2014)
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activists, who actually constitute a minority of the overall membership, can still find 
themselves sidelined. Open party lists, for example, can mean that the most promising 
list positions are allocated to candidates who are likely to appeal to the public, but who 
are not even necessarily members of the party and maybe have little experience of 
grassroots campaigning or knowledge of local issues. Another practice is that of 
‘parachuting’ a central office-approved and often high profile candidate in need of a 
safe seat into the regional branch at the expense of the constituency’s own candidate. 
Despite a degree of autonomy among sub-national organisations, central office is able 
to exert influence on the focus of regional election campaigns. The political work of the 
regional association includes activism regarding certain issues that specifically affect 
the area, such as local industry, environmental impact or housing. Political work is also 
likely to involve collaboration with related local interest groups. In the absence of an 
existing cultural and electoral base in the western states, the PDS strategy for western 
expansion was a long term one that focused on cultivating ties to various social 
movements. Only then could the party hope to establish a significant and sustainable 
voter base in the West. However, the sudden emergence of the WASG and the 
subsequent cooperation between the two parties drastically transformed the political 
environment for the left in the western states. Although the results for both parties in 
the 2005 North Rhine-Westphalia election were disappointing, they also indicated that, 
as a combined force, the PDS and WASG had a strong chance of attracting a sufficient 
voter share to enter parliament — not just in the Bundestag (where the PDS was 
already represented), but also in the western regional legislatures, beginning with 
Bremen in 2007.
If entry into the regional parliamentary becomes a realistic goal, then central office — 
which provides material resources as well as support in the form of public appearances 
by well-known politicians — can insist that the focus of the election campaign conform 
more closely to the party’s national strategy and programme. As a result, emphasis on 
ongoing local political issues could become secondary, thereby interrupting cooperation 
with other social movements the party has established around this theme. Furthermore, 
an activist who might have emerged as a prospective candidate on the strength of their 
engagement on local issues could find that the party in central office favours another, 
perhaps more ‘reliable’ candidate, better versed in the policies and strategy prioritised 
by the leadership.
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Active grassroots members are a valuable and inexpensive campaigning and 
recruitment resource. In the run-up to elections, they regularly donate their time and 
energy to carry out door-to-door leafleting and canvassing. However, their mobilisation 
is required chiefly in the context of election campaigns, whether at local, regional or 
national level; in other words, for the promotion of the parliamentary party. With a real 
prospect of gaining parliamentary representation, the work of activists would need to 
reflect this priority. Therefore, whereas activists had been closely involved in extra-
parliamentary work and cooperation, their efforts would now be geared towards the 
goal of entering parliament and, following electoral success, supporting the work of the 
parliamentary party. 
A further characteristic identified by Cartel Theory is the collegial relationship that 
develops among office holders of different parties. Political adversaries, once in a 
position of responsibility such as a member of a parliamentary group or a parliamentary 
committee, become regarded as professional colleagues. This characteristic was also 
evident in the PDS/Left Party in the eastern states. PDS politicians in regional 
parliaments and coalitions could generally be considered trustworthy partners; as a 
result, SPD politicians came to respect their PDS ‘colleagues’, with whom they shared 
similar office-seeking goals. Conversely, this collegial element was of course far less 
identifiable in the West, where the PDS/Left Party had no seats in regional parliaments, 
and where sharing office was a decidedly remote prospect. However, an important 
practice identified in Cartel Theory is that of ‘signalling’ intent to other parties. When the 
PDS cooperated and later merged with the WASG it became increasingly apparent that 
the Left Party was on the point of an electoral breakthrough. Even before the regional 
elections, the prospect of future toleration models and even ‘Red-Green-Red’ coalitions 
in western states was already being discussed in the media and among political 
parties. Particularly in target Länder such as Bremen, it can therefore be anticipated 
that the professional working relationship between SPD and PDS office holders in the 
eastern states — as well as the selection of the regional candidate — could play an 
important role in indicating the party’s readiness to become a responsible 
parliamentary Fraktion and future coalition partner, also in the western states. 
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2.5. Electoral Competition
The final section of this chapter now takes a closer look at Cartel Theory and its impact 
on electoral competition in order to establish the characteristics of electoral competition 
to be investigated in the Case Study. Once again, the starting point is Cartel Theory’s 
model of party evolution.
The cadre/elite parties had been able to compete within a restricted and therefore 
controllable environment. Political goals closely reflect the nature of the prevailing 
organisation of society; consequently, the party was concerned with the distribution of 
privileges during a time of limited suffrage. This controlled environment was subverted 
by the social reform and mobilisation which typified the mass model, characterised by 
an ideologically based appeal to clearly defined constituencies (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.
19). The mass party model was born out of a period marked by social reform and 
organised opposition, both of which featured strongly in this party type's political goals. 
By the time the model had once again shifted, this time towards that of the catch-all 
party, much of the welfare provision had become established in society, so the 
emphasis was less on reform and more about social amelioration. Ideology therefore 
gave way to broad appeal and policy effectiveness as the basis of competition between 
catch-all parties. Within the cartel party model, the emphasis is once again on efficacy 
and management, but this party type is concerned with participation in politics and 
holding office as goal in its own right (ibid.). Therefore, parties, aware they are able to 
share the rewards of state resources by cooperating with their political rivals, collude 
with rather than challenge their competitors. In other words, the cartel model sees a 
return to controlled competition between parties.  
The cartel party model is similar to previous model types in that it is associated with 
certain conception of democracy. But there is a vital difference between the cartel and 
previous stages in party type development. Even though the parties' relationship with 
the state and civil society transformed and underwent increasing professionalisation, 
earlier models would still produce some degree of alternation of ideas and policy. The 
prospect of languishing in opposition, excluded from access to important state 
resources, provided a powerful incentive for parties to aggregate and articulate the 
interests of the electorate. The cartel, on the other hand, demands not only the 
participation of the major parties, but also safeguards against their exit. Indeed, a 
cornerstone of Cartel Theory is that parties within the cartel can effectively ‘close down’ 
electoral competition. In short, the cartel is supposed to be able to bridle outside 
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challengers, either by blocking access to state resources or assimilating them into the 
cartel.
In the first approach, parties join together in order to consciously restrain voter choice. 
An indication of this practice would be the ‘convergence of all significant parties in their 
programmatic concerns, as measured by the distance of the parties in the left-right 
space’ (Kitschelt, 2000, p.166). However, an alternative explanation of the closer 
proximity of policies in post-industrial countries claims that, following the decline and 
collapse of the socialist economies, political leaders and the electorate no longer 
countenance radical socialist solutions to the challenges confronting mature welfare 
states, such as worsening conditions for poorly skilled workers, an ageing population 
and the resulting pressure on welfare systems (ibid., p.161). As a result, a series of 
policy trade-offs is required. However, according to this explanation, the factors 
constricting policy choice are external to the parties themselves and therefore 
demonstrate that the parties reflect and are consequently responsive to electorate 
preferences; to put it simply, radical policies fail to attract support and therefore are not 
represented in the policy package. Political and economic developments might affect 
people's preferences and restrict the policy scope available to parties, but this does not 
provide evidence of the idea of parties' conscious decision to disregard voters (ibid.).
Following this line of argument within the context of German parties specifically, 
Detterbeck (2008, p.37) also finds there is no compelling evidence of collusion with 
regard to policy and instead identifies programmatic differentiation between parties. 
Despite broad acceptance of basic principles such as liberal democracy and a mixture 
of the welfare state and market economy, discernible policy differences exist between, 
for instance, the CDU and SPD. Also cited are examples of significant reform, namely 
the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms, as evidence that policymaking has not simply 
stood still (ibid.). In fact, Agenda supporters within the Red-Green coalition have 
highlighted the labour supply measures such as investment in training and childcare as 
evidence of a distinction between the SPD on the one hand, and the conservative CDU 
and FDP on the other. Camerra-Rowe (2004, p.22) argues that maintaining the policy 
distinction between the Social and Christian Democrats was a contributory factor in the 
inclusion of more ‘social’ measures in Agenda 2010.
A further method of protecting a cartel is co-opting new potential challengers into the 
cartel itself.  Co-option can be understood as a process in which these new challengers 
are able to participate in the procedure of decision making, but do not leave their mark 
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on the content of the decision (Kitschelt, 2000, p.173). In other words, although the 
newly recruited political actor participates in the cartel, it fails to leave any imprint 
whatsoever in the cartel’s policy output. Criticism of the co-option notion claims that too 
little consideration is given to the impact of left-libertarian and right-authoritarian parties 
on mainstream parties, for example concerning environmental/family issues and 
immigration respectively. Even though such parties cannot expect their policy 
programmes to be fully implemented, it is usually possible to reach a compromise, 
particularly if the parties play a role in a coalition (ibid.) . Therefore, the parties who 44
remain 'frozen out’ are those who tend to have an extremist orientation, attract little 
support among the electorate, and are unwilling to adopt policy compromises. 
According to this critique, in the case of German parties, not only have the established 
parties maintained their distinct policy profiles, it is also possible to observe the impact 
of the newer parties on these policies (Detterbeck, 2008, p.37; also Kitschelt, 2000, p.
173). Examples include the commitment to the gradual decommissioning of Germany’s 
nuclear power programme or the introduction of the ‘Ökosteuer’ (‘eco-tax’), both of 
which occurred while the Greens governed alongside the SPD. In other words, the 
newer, smaller parties have not merely been 'swallowed' by a party cartel, but have 
made their impact felt (Detterbeck, 2008, p.37) Meanwhile, the emergence and 
continued popularity of smaller left-libertarian and right-authoritarian parties  able to 45
attract voters from the more established parties is also said to cast further doubt on the 
idea that parties in a cartel are able to block the entry of new challengers (Kitschelt, 
2000, p.171). 
Conversely, it can be argued that exclusion applies not only to entry to parliamentary 
representation, but also access to public executive office. It was only after a period of 
nearly a decade after their entry into the Bundestag that the Greens were deemed a 
feasible coalition partner for the SPD at national level. Moreover, before this potential 
eventually became a reality, the Greens had undergone a significant transformation 
both in terms of programme and organisation. It is difficult to imagine that the Greens of 
the 1980s, even as a new parliamentary group, would countenance either military 
intervention or the fundamental welfare and employment reforms the party was jointly 
 Kitschelt (2000, p.173) argues that if voters do give their support to more extremist parties, 44
particularly those on the right-authoritarian periphery of the political spectrum, this is not 
necessarily indicative of an anti-cartel protest. The right-authoritarian parties tend to find the 
greatest approval among specific, narrow groups in society. Yet if the backing for such parties 
were genuinely indicative of a broad, anti-cartel backlash, it would be reasonable to expect 
much wider appeal.
 See Chapter Three for a more detailed description of social cleavage and parties.45
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responsible for implementing in government. Also, in the case of the German Greens 
there was no attempt to exclude the party or challenge its right to exist — the 
established parties instead sought to ‘socialise’ them into the political mainstream (Katz 
and Mair, 1996, p.531), and this socialisation was a prerequisite to being granted entry 
into the ranks of national office. By contrast, PDS faced challenges to its legitimacy as 
the former state party of the GDR, while sections of the Left Party even today remain 
under the observation of the domestic intelligence service. The party has yet to 
become a credible potential associate for the SPD at national level, despite instances 
of cooperation in some eastern federal states; even though, during those periods of 
office, the PDS/Left Party has generally proved to be a compliant junior partner 
(Detterbeck, 2008, pp.36ff). 
An internal explanation for programme convergence (restricted supply of policy) is that 
parties collude with each other in order to share the various rewards of the state. 
Because of the extent to which parties are embedded in the state, it is possible for a 
situation to arise where the major parties are never categorically out of power. Even if a 
party is voted out of power and spends a legislative period in opposition, it is still likely 
to be represented on various cross-party committees and therefore has some influence 
over policy. In addition, due to policy convergence and a weakened ideological 
distinction between parties, the party can rest assured that at least some of its key 
policies are retained by the (opposing) governing party or coalition (Katz and Mair, 
1995, p.22). For example, the SPD-Green Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms were 
generally supported by the opposition CDU and FDP. When these two parties formed 
the federal coalition in 2009, there was no abandonment or even major reform of the 
policy. Therefore, even though the SPD and Greens found themselves in opposition, 
their access to state resources continued, their deputies continued to influence 
decision-making on Bundestag committees and, above all, their most far-reaching 
welfare and employment policies remained intact, if not strengthened.  
Furthermore, as a result of the diminished policy differentiation and recognition of 
resource sharing based on cooperation, the sense of rivalry also further abates. This in 
turn strengthens the growing regard for politicians from other parties as fellow 
professionals who can be seen as future colleagues, peers and partners in 
government, and who share similar concerns over job security, in other words 
remaining in power, whether directly in government or not. 
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The result of this continuity does not only concern parties’ anchoring in the state, as 
there are also implications for the democratic process. Elections are no longer the 
means by which the population holds its political leaders accountable; rather, they 
become a tool permitting ruling parties to retain their hold on power. In this respect, the 
cartel is far removed from the mass party, which originated as a force for social 
change. The cartel’s priority is stability, not least in terms of its own endurance. 
Therefore, the role of elections is to peacefully legitimise the parties' control, and to 
provide feedback concerning approval of specific policies and performance. Since 
elections by nature also demand the participation of parties, the democratic process 
itself safeguards their future indispensability (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.22).
Koole (1996, p.516) finds Cartel Theory’s 'toning down of competition’ to be merely 
speculative. There is no doubt that most major parties, including smaller newcomers, 
can now be considered regierungsfähig, (i.e., capable of participating in government); 
furthermore, coalitions consisting of opposing parties (such as a Grand Coalition) have 
become increasingly common. But Koole has argued that this has been an ongoing 
tendency, especially in consensual democracies such as Germany, since 1945, and is 
therefore not a new phenomenon linked to global economic developments. Moreover, 
the greater number of parties increasing in elections once again raises the ever-
present threat of exit, meaning that the stakes are surely greater than before. 
Cartel Theory answers this criticism by maintaining exactly the opposite to be the case. 
While there is indeed nothing particularly new about these characteristics, what does 
demand attention is that they are no longer anomalies but instead have become 
commonplace throughout the western democracies — and not just those with a 
consensual political tradition. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a convergence 
of parties on the traditional left-right spectrum, giving rise to increased ‘promiscuity of 
coalition formation’ (Katz and Mair, 1996, p.530), in which combinations of nearly all 
political colours are now conceivable. For example, ‘Black-Green’ coalitions have been 
formed of conservative Christian Democrats and Greens in the regional parliaments in 
Hamburg and most recently Hessen. As a result, increasingly intense electoral 
competition in which more parties compete in a narrower policy space goes hand in 
hand with a decline in the ‘relative importance of the outcome’, which Katz and Mair,
(1996, p.530) refer to as an ‘inverse relationship’ between competition and policy 
supply.
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Past and existing policy commitments and restraints, international pressures such as 
globalisation and the demands of foreign direct investment have resulted in little room 
for manoeuvre in terms of fiscal policy, or at least the perception of such. Therefore, 
the outcome of the election depends less on policy choice, but simply how the ‘game’ is 
played. Here, too, the rhetoric of ‘no alternative’ plays an important role. The PDS was 
a coalition partner in eastern regional governments and, as Chapter One has 
explained, consequently shared the responsibility for implementing the Hartz 
measures, as well as cost-cutting and privatisation policies. Undoubtedly, budget 
constraints were tight, particularly in Berlin, and many of the problems were inherited 
from the previous government. But the party’s justification for cuts and privatisation 
continued in the same vein as the demands made by office-seeking PDS politicians in 
the East, who had called for ‘practical’ and ‘pragmatic' politics unfettered by ideology. 
Although critics called for the PDS to reject participation in favour of principled 
opposition (resigning from coalitions if necessary), defenders of the coalitions argued 
that, having won substantial support among the electorate, the PDS in fact had a duty 
to ensure that tough and unpopular measures were implemented in the most socially 
just way possible. But the adherence of parties across the political spectrum to the 
Hartz reforms exemplifies Cartel Theory’s description of a narrowed supply of policy. 
Moreover, in the absence of unequivocal opposition and the offer of alternative to Hartz 
IV and privatisation, the main differentiation among the parties — even by the 
admission of PDS/Left Party politicians — was the ‘management’ of the existing policy. 
The ‘rhetoric of no alternative’ thus applied twofold: both to the unwelcome and 
controversial political decisions, and to the involvement of the PDS itself, to alleviate 
the worst outcomes of those decisions.   
Naturally, the PDS regional associations in the western states, while often critical of 
Red-Red government coalitions in the East, had not been required to confront this 
situation, as they had yet to gain even parliamentary representation in western 
legislatures. Furthermore, the WASG, whose origins were directly in the anti-Hartz 
protest, was far more prolific in the West; indeed the Left Party’s main source of 
support was to be found among the anti-Hartz movement. Therefore, while the Left’s 
response to the Hartz measures was characterised by parliamentarianism and 
‘management’ in the East, opposition to the measures was clearly based in the extra-
parliamentary movement in the West. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section Four, 
prospects of entry into target western parliaments grew substantially as the PDS and 
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WASG merged. Naturally, the national leadership, committed to its strategy of the 
party’s western establishment (see Chapter One), would be keen to ensure electoral 
success. Mindful of future parliamentary work and potential office-seeking goals, it is 
therefore possible that in its election campaign in target states, the Left Party adopted 
quite moderate criticism of Hartz and other austerity policies, or at least offset its critical 
rhetoric with a modest set of promises, which, while appealing to its main source of 
support, could be interpreted as signalling reasonableness and openness to other 
parliamentary parties.   
Conclusion
This chapter set out to identify certain features of Cartel Theory that are of particular 
relevance in relation to the Left Party. First, however, it is important to bear in mind that 
the party combines different histories and political cultures not only as a result of the 
PDS-WASG merger, but also within the PDS itself. The PDS, as the successor to the 
state party in the GDR, was organisationally and electorally rooted in the eastern 
states. Despite a dwindling membership in the aftermath of unification, the party 
remained closely integrated in society at grassroots level and retained considerable 
support among sections of the eastern population (see Chapter One). At the same 
time, though, the PDS had a very strong identification with the state, through its 
heritage as East Germany’s ruling state party (SED). Although in united Germany the 
PDS was initially a party of opposition, the party was sustained by its solidly-
established network, also a legacy of its state role. Furthermore, from the outset, the 
party was represented on local councils and in regional parliaments, and by 1998 the 
PDS was once again an office-holding party at regional level. As such, the PDS-East 
continued to be integrated in the state and had an established parliamentary party as 
well as the party on the ground. Moreover, as a socialist party, the PDS had a distinct 
ideological basis. Despite calls from some eastern politicians to abandon the strategy 
of western development and instead broaden its appeal among voters based in the 
eastern states, with the aim of becoming a catch-all regional party, the PDS resolved to 
continue with its strategic commitment to becoming a nationwide party and its 
programmatic commitment to socialism. In this respect, it is possible to view the PDS 
as a mass party in the eastern states. 
The same cannot be said of the party in the western states, either in terms of 
organisation or electoral outcomes. Seemingly destined to remain a perennial ‘Null-
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Komma’ (‘zero point x’) party, the PDS struggled to maintain visibility in the West and 
often lacked the personnel and resources to establish an effective grassroots party and 
also lacked a parliamentary party. The support it did muster was mainly found among 
the already divided western left, such as former members of the communist DKP, and 
the cooperation between the PDS and these groups was far from straightforward. 
Consequently, in addition to the structural contrasts, there were tensions between the 
western and eastern branches of the party concerning policy as well as strategy.
Given this disparity, it is therefore not possible to categorise the PDS in its entirety as a 
mass party. Yet neither was it strictly a fringe party, even in the West. Despite its 
weakness, the PDS-West was supported by a strong party in central office that 
included several prominent politicians; moreover, the PDS was represented in the 
parliament continuously, which is also uncharacteristic of a fringe party. The national 
executive’s long-term strategy for the western states was to build and develop a 
grassroots network among various social movements, with the aim of establishing an 
electoral base; ultimately, the goal was to eventually gain parliamentary representation, 
alongside the eastern organisations. Therefore, although the research question is 
concerned with the Left Party in the western states, it is inevitable that the eastern 
party organisation is also influential. 
While the Left Party has not followed the evolutionary path set out in Cartel Theory or 
conformed to the cartel party type, Cartel Theory does identify characteristics and 
behaviours that could have been relevant to the electoral success of the party in the 
western states. Drawn from the discussion of leadership and representation as well as 
electoral competition in Sections Four and Five, the themes can be grouped into two 
broad categories:
Policy: Cartel Theory foresees a narrowing of policy supply. The scope and language of 
election campaigning are ‘toned down’ to reflect a readiness to become a parliamentary 
party. Furthermore, campaigning conforms more closely to national policy and focuses 
less on specifically local issues and cooperation.
Organisation: Cartel Theory predicts an ascendant party in central office. At a regional 
level, this can be evident in, for example, the selection of election candidates and the 
focus of election strategy; it can also influence decision-making within the party itself as 
well as in communication. All in all, there is an increasingly top-down approach within 
the party. Cartel Theory anticipates that activists continue to play a role, but one that is 
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subservient to the needs of the parliamentary party. This may lead to discontent among 
activists on the grounds that ongoing political work on local issues and cooperation with 
local organisations are being neglected. 
These themes will be explored in the case study of the Left Party in Bremen, but it is 
first necessary to consider the second explanatory framework, Social Cleavage Theory.
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Chapter Three: 
Explanatory Framework II - Social Cleavage 
Theory
Introduction
This chapter presents the second of the two theoretical frameworks explored in the 
research. Following a similar pattern to Chapter Two, the aim here is to establish how 
Social Cleavage Theory can be applied to explain the electoral success of the Left 
Party in western Germany. As Chapter One has shown, one of the Left Party’s key 
policy themes is social justice (soziale Gerechtigkeit). The party campaigns strongly on 
the issues of welfare, employment rights and poverty and advocates social ownership 
of key industries and services. The focus of the discussion in this chapter is therefore 
the class cleavage concerning the tension between capital and labour.  
Section One defines social cleavages according to the model developed by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) and describes the conditions affecting their formation and articulation. 
Germany has been characterised by two prominent cleavages: the religious cleavage 
and above all the class cleavage. Both of these cleavages were broadly represented by 
the two largest political parties in the Federal Republic, the CDU and SPD, and are 
explained in this section in the context of Germany’s post-war economic and social 
development. By the 1980s, however, a new cleavage emerged, focusing on the 
tension between materialism and post-materialism, and was expressed by a successful 
newcomer to party politics, the Greens. Section Two looks at the rise of this new 
dimension and outlines further arguments which call into question not only the 
continuing importance of the capital-labour cleavage but also the relevance of class for 
party support over recent decades. These arguments centre on the changing nature of 
economic activity and the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society. 
Section Three takes up the theme of class to confront the criticism that definitions such 
as ‘traditional working class’ no longer accurately portray types of work or social 
mobility brought about by economic development. Drawing on a reclassification of 
class according to modern types of employment, this section argues that the distinct 
sets of characteristics and challenges associated with each of the occupational groups 
clearly demonstrate that socio-economic class continues to be relevant today. 
Furthermore, the flexible labour market and trend towards part-time employment has 
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given rise to an increasingly common mode of precarious work, which, in light of its 
own distinct set of characteristics, can even be considered a class in its own right — 
the precariat.
Section Four returns to the employment market and welfare reforms introduced by the 
SPD-led federal coalition. While Chapter One has already set out the content and 
impact of the reforms, the emphasis here is the explanation of Agenda 2010/Hartz in 
terms of the class cleavage. The measures set out to achieve a ‘flexible’ labour market 
characterised by low wages and, importantly, shifted risk to the individual. The second 
part of the section considers attitudes towards the scope and activity of the welfare 
state and finds that although job insecurity might be expected to generate wariness of 
redistributive policies perceived as hostile to business interests, support for welfare 
actually remains remarkably resilient, particularly among workers and the unemployed, 
thus indicating the influence of socio-economic class in shaping these attitudes.
Section Five turns to the relationship between class and party political voting for the 
SPD and the PDS/Left Party. Based on the categories of class described earlier, the 
aim is to identify the trends in support for both parties among each of the occupational 
groups over time. The evidence of class-based voting is further strengthened by data 
showing workers’ propensity to vote for the SPD and PDS/Left Party compared to that 
of the electorate as a whole. Furthermore, socio-economic class is even more likely to 
influence voting in the western states, suggesting that class plays an even greater role 
in the Left Party vote in the West than it does in the East. Finally, the chapter considers 
how the findings can be applied to the case study of the Left Party in Bremen.  
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3.1. Social Tensions and the Formation of Social 
Cleavages
A social cleavage can be understood as ‘a socio-political fault line between social 
groups’ (Webb, 2002, p.16). There are many lines of conflicts in society and their 
development is far from uniform, with cleavages emerging over time, some enduring 
and others diminishing, some uniting adversaries and others entrenching existing 
tensions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.1). Furthermore, not all social conflicts 
necessarily become fully-fledged social cleavages. In fact, a fault line (for example a 
social disparity or clash of interests) might exist for a period of time before mobilisation 
actually occurs around this potential source of conflict. In order for a political tension to 
develop into a social cleavage, a clearly defined social group first needs to emerge 
around the respective fault line, based on common attributes such as class, location, 
ethnicity or religion. Secondly, this social group requires some notion of collective 
identity, which in turn must be expressed through political organisations. Typically, but 
not always, the organisation which lends itself to the expression of these tensions is the 
political party (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p.116).
Although many social tensions can exist at a given time, only a few have the strength 
to actually polarise society (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.6). According to Lipset and 
Rokkan’s model, these social divisions are mainly rooted in the nation building and 
industrial revolutions. The former saw the developing nation state build ‘a wide range of 
agencies of unification and standardization’ (ibid., p.13). This ultimately generated two 
enduring social conflicts: the centre-periphery cleavage and the religious cleavage, 
whether in the form of the confessional cleavage between religious denominations 
such as Catholicism and Protestantism or, more recently, between organised faith and 
secularism.  
The industrial revolution also provoked two perennial social fault lines. The first of 
these can be described as the urban-rural cleavage — ‘the conflict between the landed 
interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs’, while the second is the 
capital-labour cleavage — ‘the conflict between owners and employers on the one side 
and tenants, laborers and workers on the other’ (ibid., p.14). Together with the centre-
periphery cleavage and religious cleavage, these constitute the ‘four critical lines of 
cleavage’ (ibid.). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the religious cleavage and the 
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labour-capital cleavage became prominent throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Since this 
thesis is concerned with explaining the electoral success of the Left Party, it is the 
labour-capital cleavage that forms the main focus of the chapter.
The channel of tension articulation and the impact on the political party system is 
contingent on a number of related factors, known as thresholds (ibid., p.27). The first 
threshold concerns the political culture of the society in which the tension exists. For 
example, protest and criticism might be regarded as legitimate expressions of 
opposition (indicating a low threshold); they may, however, be perceived as attempted 
subversion (characteristic of a high threshold). A high threshold of legitimacy is 
therefore not favourable to the mobilisation of public protest and expression of the 
social cleavage. Related to this is the incorporation threshold, which concerns the 
ability of people mobilising around a cleavage to participate in the processes of 
representation. The threshold is high if the franchise is limited to the few, whereas a 
low threshold indicates broad access to democratic participation. In general, both the 
legitimation and incorporation thresholds have been lowered (although not in a uniform 
manner) as political parties, petitions and protests have become accepted means of 
expression in society, and as universal suffrage has been introduced (ibid.).     
The representation threshold concerns the degree of assimilation of a particular tension 
into the political system. The key issue here is the extent to which existing political 
parties and other organisations of representation, such as trade unions and interest 
groups, identify with the cleavage in question, as well as their willingness to represent 
and articulate this conflict. If the representation threshold is low, a movement arising 
from a social tension may be able combine forces with an existing organisation or 
party; conversely, opportunities for assimilating the cleavage could be minimal (in other 
words, the threshold is set high), which could leave the movement with little choice but 
to seek its own channels of representation. The entrenchment of other cleavages can 
also prove decisive in this respect. For instance, even if parties represented in 
parliament are united along one side of the class cleavage (e.g., that of capital), the 
extent of rivalry between them concerning the religious cleavage or the rural-urban 
cleavage could prevent cooperation on the class issue, thus easing the emergence of a 
new working class party (ibid.). Once again, depending on the nature of the legitimacy 
threshold, the movement may engage in strikes, demonstrations and direct action or 
exert external pressure on established political parties in order to persuade them to 
represent its demands. Alternatively, in the absence of a sympathetic partner among 
the existing parties, it may opt for the formation of a new political force. This leads us to 
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the fourth threshold of majority power, which describes the institutional framework and 
the extent to which it places limits on the majority rule within the system. For instance, 
a high threshold would mean a majority party is constrained by checks and balances, 
whereas a low threshold enables the party to initiate radical change once in power 
(ibid.). In addition, the previous chapter on Cartel Theory has explained how 
institutional factors such as the electoral system, state subsidiaries and electoral 
thresholds can hinder or ease the path of a newcomer to the political marketplace.
Over time, the salience of a particular cleavage fluctuates, reflecting the current 
relationships within the respective society. While some circumstances facilitate 
accommodation and consensus, others sharpen the profile of conflict. These 
approaches are identified by Lipset and Rokkan (ibid., p.10) as the functional 
dimension. At one end of this dimension is the instrumental pole, where the social 
tension is articulated and addressed through negotiation in order to secure benefits and 
concessions. At the other pole, the cleavage is expressed in terms of ideology, with an 
emphasis on principles rather than individual and tangible gains. Nevertheless, most 
political expression of social tension occurs somewhere between the two poles (ibid., p.
11). Certainly the labour-capital cleavage has displayed features of both instrumental 
and ideological approaches; small opposition (including extra-parliamentary) parties 
often lean towards a more ideologically polarised character, while larger, parliamentary 
social democratic parties tend to adopt a more conciliatory approach. As we have seen 
in Chapter Two, this characteristic is particularly associated with office-holding and 
becoming embedded in the state. 
Lipset and Rokkan suggest that social cleavages and therefore voter alignment to 
parties became ‘frozen’. In other words, despite the upheavals of fascism, National 
Socialism and World War II, ‘the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but 
significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s’ (ibid., p.50). Ware (1996, 
p.225) also points out that the significant party families — such as communism, 
socialism, Christian democracy and liberalism — largely resembled the political families 
that had participated in elections over decades, with no new, significant party type 
emerging for many years. But in Germany this frozen party system would be broken. 
The 1950s saw the establishment of a powerful catch-all party, while the New Social 
Movements’ focus on issues such as the environment, peace and feminism gave rise to 
a completely new type of party, the Greens. The following section considers the 
development and expression of the capital-labour cleavage in Germany, alongside its 
representation in the party system.
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3.1.1. Political Parties and the Class Cleavage in Germany 
Europe's industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries gave rise to mass political 
parties which articulated the dominant cleavage, namely that of capital and labour. 
Dalton (1996, p.322) elaborates on the focus of this cleavage as the provision ‘for the 
economic security of all citizens and ensuring a just distribution of economic rewards’, 
while Graf (1977, p.189) describes the class cleavage as the conflict between those 
who possess and control productive capital and those who are excluded from its 
ownership. Mass parties articulating this tension formed throughout Europe; Webb 
(2002, p.118) emphasises that while expression of the capital-labour cleavage has not 
been uniform in its intensity, no European society or political system has remained 
unaffected by this conflict. Furthermore, the class cleavage has proved to be one of the 
most divisive (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.21).   
The nineteenth century saw an increase in wage labour. In the hope of finding better 
conditions offered by large companies and as a result of technological developments, 
workers left rural areas and headed to the major towns and cities (Mochmann, 2002, p.
50). Growing industrialisation gave rise to an increase in waged labour working in 
large-scale farming and in the industrial sector. Working conditions, the insecurity of 
employment contracts and labour’s sense of isolation from employers and factory or 
large farm owners all contributed to growing resentment among especially factory-
based workers who were ‘most strongly exposed to the industrial socialisation and the 
tensions between employers and workers’ (ibid.). 
The expression of these resentments was dependent not only on the factors described 
above, but also circumstances relating specifically to the class cleavage. The relative 
openness of the respective society played an important role in that it determined 
whether wage labour stood any realistic opportunity of social or economic 
advancement, such as through education or establishment of an independent business 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.21). In the Europe of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, this status threshold was set quite high, since education was not universally 
available, thus preventing younger generations from acquiring the knowledge and skills 
that could improve their standard of living (ibid.) through self-improvement and 
entrepreneurship. It was possible for some conflict between rural and urban interests to 
be addressed through specific interest organisations and bargaining; these conflicts 
therefore remained non-party forming (ibid.). But the capital-labour cleavage resulted 
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not only in a number of trade unions but also in the founding of socialist parties, with 
Germany’s Social Democratic party, established in 1875, the first mass party that set 
out to represent specifically the interests of workers. Articulating the demand by rural 
and industrial workers for improved conditions, the SPD was able to absorb the 
growing ranks of wage labour that resulted from greater industrialisation, thus creating 
a solid left voter base in Germany’s industrial cities (Mochmann, 2002, p.51).  
But the fragmentation of Germany’s pre-war party system was echoed among the left 
of centre parties at the time. Representing the left were, in addition to the Social 
Democrats (SPD), the Communists (KPD) and, until 1931, the Independent Social 
Democrats (USPD). Voters often switched between these parties, all of whom had their 
roots in the manual working class and addressed the tensions between capital and 
labour (Jeffery, 1999, p.97). Furthermore, even though the manual working class could 
be described as a clearly identifiable social group that supported the parties of the left 
(ibid., p.105), the same could not be said of those opposed to the left: the centre 
ground consisted of an array of parties representing agriculture, civil servants and 
salaried workers as well as religious and regional tensions (ibid., p.98). Apart from their 
general opposition to the left, these parties shared little common ground. In terms of 
the religious cleavage too, although Catholics constituted a distinct social group, a 
similar degree of coherence and party alignment was not evident among non-Catholics. 
Jeffery (ibid., p.105) therefore describes the middle class in the pre-war era as rather 
‘fluid’. What is more, parties’ failure to overcome their differences contributed to a 
period of government that was frequently interrupted by broken coalitions. For this 
reason, the Weimar Republic was identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p.29) as 
being characterised by low thresholds in all four aspects. 
The social cleavages of class and religion, which had dominated the prewar era, were 
also evident in the postwar Federal Republic. Manual workers, particularly in industrial 
cities and as a result of organised labour, continued to form the core constituency of 
the Social Democrats, while the communist KPD represented the far left. However, it 
was a new party, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), that attracted the support of 
what had been the rather disparate middle class, including landowners, farmers and 
owners of financial and industrial capital, as well as a new generation of self-employed 
workers (Jeffrey, 1999, p.105). The CDU/CSU succeeded in becoming a Volkspartei or 
catch-all party (see Chapter Two) offering a package of moderate policies that were 
simultaneously committed to the social market economy and strongly opposed to 
communism. In terms of the religious cleavage, too, the CDU/CSU won the support of 
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Catholic voters as well as church-going Protestants, while the SPD tended to attract 
more secular voters. The formation of the CDU catch-all party precluded the 
establishment of Christian trade unions and a new specifically Christian party, therefore 
‘shattering’ ties between the party and narrowly defined social groups (Mochmann, 
2002, p.53). With the addition of the FDP, which represented both the social and 
economic aspects of liberalism (Jeffery, 1999, p.102), the comprehensive appeal of the 
SPD and CDU/CSU made it difficult for additional and smaller parties to compete 
electorally (the Catholic centrist party Zentrum, for example, would fail to gain 
representation in the Bundestag after 1957). Meanwhile, parties positioned towards the 
more ideological pole of the functional dimension of social tensions fared no better: the 
Constitutional Court banned the KPD in 1956, thereby removing a potential challenge 
to the SPD from the more ideological left, albeit a small one in terms of voter share. 
Whereas eleven parties had gained parliamentary representation in the first national 
election of 1949, by 1961 only three parties were present in the Bundestag, namely the 
CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP (Dalton, 1992, p.53). As both major cleavages 
overlapped to an extent in that tensions reached across both religious values and 
economic interests, the major social tensions were therefore largely accommodated 
within Germany's moderate catch-all political parties. What is more, in contrast to the 
Weimar era, ‘non-left’ interests were broadly incorporated by one party, the CDU 
(Mochmann, 2002, p.53). Figure 3.1 below places the main political parties within a 
simple left-right and religious cleavage framework. 
Figure 3.1: Cleavages in the West German party system in the 1950s and 1960s  
(Based on Mochmann, 2003, p.55). 
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It is important to understand the development of the capital-labour tension within the 
context of Germany's post-war economic recovery. The German Social Market 
Economy was based on the principle of ordoliberalism, in which state intervention 
rather than the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market provides the framework in which 
competition is able to thrive. It therefore constituted an alternative to full free market 
liberalism on the one hand and the full command economy on the other (Green et al., 
2008, p.112). The SPD was committed to the concept of social integration and sought 
to combine both economic efficiency and social justice by maximising competition in 
the commodity, services and capital markets and simultaneously strengthening the 
position of workers in the labour market. This approach, which can be described as 
Keynesian productivism , regarded increased wages, social spending and public 46
services as a ‘productive side-effect’ of redistribution (Nachtwey, 2013, p.237) in that 
they created wealth and therefore stimulated economic demand. 
Yet the SPD was unable to muster sufficient electoral support beyond its working class 
core and therefore remained in opposition at national level. The turning point came in 
1959, when the party adopted its Bad Godesberg programme. This programme was 
the culmination of ‘pragmatic’ inner-party reforms and marked the party’s break from its 
remaining formal allegiance to Marxist principles. Previously, the SPD had considered 
nationalisation a key instrument of controlling productive power (Graf, 1977, p.188) but 
the new programme, which fully committed the SPD to the market-based approach of 
ordoliberalism, renounced large-scale nationalisation as a hindrance to optimum 
competition (Nachtwey, 2013, p.236). Instead, it was envisaged that small and 
medium-sized businesses, together with cooperative and public enterprises, would 
provide the counterbalance to big business (Graf, 1977, p.188). As such, the SPD 
embarked on a programmatic transformation. Previously, as a mass party, it had clearly 
articulated workers’ interests, but was now broadening its appeal in the manner of a 
left-of-centre catch-all party (Jeffrey, 1999, p.103). According to Graf, the SPD was 
‘orientated primarily towards the acquisition of power within the context of the 
advanced capitalist system and the CDU state’ (Graf, 1977, p.189). 
The Federal Republic was based on the decentralisation of political authority and on 
corporatism, the control of the state by large interest groups. The federal structure 
meant that policy-making responsibility lay with the competent level of government plus 
 Productivism refers to the objective of economic productivity that in turn leads to economic 46
growth.
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the relevant social partners. State organisations such as the Federal Labour Office 
(Bundesanstalt - later Bundesagentur - für Arbeit - BA) were charged with the 
administration of employment market programmes, while employers' associations and 
trade unions were partners in the process of collective wage bargaining. This system of 
free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie), which was enshrined in law, brought 
together employers and trade unions to set wages and foresaw only minimal 
government involvement (Bowyer and Vail, 2011, p.684). Consequently, the federal 
government adopted a 'hands off' approach to wage and employment relations, and 
intervention was limited to mediation in the event of entrenched disputes between the 
social partners (ibid.). However, one of the outcomes of government inability to 
‘interfere’ in negotiations has been the lack of a national minimum wage in Germany 
(Green et al., 2008, p.115). A further important point is that because of the expectation 
that the Social Market Economy would continue to ensure economic security, the issue 
of inequality and poverty was not placed at forefront of central government policy 
(Bowyer and Vail, 2011, p.683). For example, the 1962 Bundessozialhilfegesetz 
(Federal Social Assistance Law) was constructed on the assumption that poverty would 
be an issue that affected only the smallest minority of the population. Once again, 
implementation of the Assistance Law was devolved to the Länder rather than a 
competence of central government. The benefit consisted of a modest payment 
intended only as a stopgap measure, rather than as a longer-term source of financial 
support for the poor; its value was even reduced in the 1990s (Bowyer and Vail, 2011, 
p.686).
The weakness of a model dependent on corporatism and lacking robust redistributive 
measures would become apparent during subsequent decades that revealed 
Germany's lack of both readiness and federal government tools for tackling declining 
economic growth and growing poverty (ibid., p.687). In the meantime, though, workers 
enjoyed relatively high wages at a time of low unemployment, while employers 
benefited from low non-wage costs thanks to the volume of social contributions made 
by the large workforce. Therefore, the high rate of employment and the growing 
incomes gave both labour and capital a stake in wealth creation and, at the same time, 
supported a comparatively generous welfare state, at least for the majority.
 134
3.2. Challenging the Capital-Labour Cleavage
Following its experience of dictatorship, war, defeat, occupation and national partition, 
post-war Germany did not easily conform to Lipset and Rokkan’s concept of ‘frozen’ 
party systems and cleavages (Jeffery, 1999, p.105). First, whereas the centre ground 
before the war had lacked cohesion, both in terms of a shared identity (beyond an anti-
left stance) and party alignment, the centre in the post-war Federal Republic was now 
broadly united in support for the catch-all CDU; meanwhile, the liberal FDP, also a party 
of the centre, had become a reliable coalition partner for the Christian Democrats. 
Secondly, the array of political parties in the 1920s bore little resemblance to what 
Jeffery (ibid., p.97) terms the ‘hyperstability’ of the two-and-a-half party system that had 
become established by the 1960s. What is more, of the profusion of political parties 
that existed in the Weimar era, only one party would go on to thrive in the Federal 
Republic, namely the SPD. Even though the Social Democrats’ policy orientation had 
broadened following the Bad Godesberg programme, the party nevertheless continued 
to attract the support of its working class core. The SPD’s endurance as a party, as well 
as the support of its traditional voter base, therefore actually indicated the continued 
relevance of the class cleavage in post-war Germany. Nevertheless, social and 
economic developments have been cited as reason to doubt the durability of the class 
cleavage. The key developments and arguments are set out in this section. 
3.2.1. The Decline of the Manual Working Class?
Over the years in western Germany, employee rights as well as a comprehensive 
social state became popular demands among the SPD's traditional constituency of 
blue-collar and unionised workers. But from the late 1960s, deindustrialisation and 
technological developments led to a decline in the number of manual workers that 
continued into the twenty-first century. Figure 3.2a shows the occupational status of 
people in employment in West Germany from 1984 to 2002, the beginning of the SPD-
Green government’s second term in office. Immediately obvious is that of the four 
occupational groups, blue-collar employment alone decreased steadily over the 
eighteen-year period, falling from just under 40% in 1984 (having already experienced 
decline in preceding decades) to below 30% in 2002. Conversely, the share of white-
collar group increased, accounting for over 50% of employment by 2002.
 135
The trend was similar in East Germany (Figure 3.2b), for which data is shown from 
1990 (unification) until 2003. Once again, the proportion of blue-collar employment 
experienced a marked decline that contrasted with the steady increase in other types of 
work: whereas around 45% of the workforce were in blue-collar employment in 1990, 
this was true of less than 30% of the workforce within a twelve-year period. Even 
though unification increased the net number of workers, the pace of deindustrialisation 
of the new Länder within the unification process, meant that the additional workers from 
the former GDR did not manage to reverse the overall downward trend.
Figure 3.2a: Occupational status of people in employment, West Germany (%) 
Figure 3.2b: Occupational status of people in employment, East Germany (%) 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2005, p.3)
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Deindustrialisation and the declining proportion of the blue-collar workforce resulted in 
a smaller core constituency of traditional working class support for centre-left parties 
such as the SPD. However, this raises two important points. First, it is reasonable to 
expect that a party faced with a sustained numerical contraction of its core voter base 
might choose to find ways to broaden its appeal and seek voters from alternative 
occupational groups. But this strategic reorientation need not inevitably involve the 
abandonment of the remaining traditional core voters. The choice lies with the party as 
to whether or not such a strategy is to be based on a policy shift that is likely to alienate 
the working class and abandon the articulation of what might still be acute divisions 
centred on the class cleavage (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.109). In other words, 
broadening electoral appeal is not necessarily a case of 'either-or' for the party's policy 
supply. In addition, this kind of reorientation is not without potential pitfalls for the 
parties concerned; indeed, Kitschelt (2004, p.9) acknowledges that in the process of 
casting their nets ever wider, social democratic parties pursuing such a strategic course 
that risks completely undermining support from the traditional voter base.
Related to this, the second fundamental point to consider is that the numerical 
downturn in the working class does not equate with an inevitable decline in the 
significance of class tensions. This is because the size of the respective social group 
does not necessarily correspond with the depth or acuteness of the divisions between 
these groups (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.109). As such, the cleavage — the 
tension between capital and labour — continues to exist, even if there is a decline in 
the overall number of people mobilising around it at a given time.
The social mobility and rising incomes of the postwar era were accompanied by 
enhanced educational attainment and improved access to information. Arising from this 
development is the argument that 'cognitive mobilisation' in turn facilitated further social 
and economic mobility. As a result, voters were better equipped to make electoral 
choices based on independently acquired information and political awareness (Evans, 
1999, p.7). As such, divisions between the working class and middle class became less 
distinct in terms of income and lifestyle, a process also known as the levelling-off of the 
middle class (Graf, 1977, p.192). According to this notion of the 'embourgeoisement of 
the working class' (Evans, 1999, p.6), social mobility facilitated greater interaction 
between social circles; consequently, individuals would identify increasingly with their 
own particular situations, rather than consciously associate themselves with their social 
or occupational group. Consequently, the so-called 'affluent worker' became less and 
less attached to status or class ('jenseits von Stand und Klasse’) (Müller, 1999, p.1). In 
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other words, the relationship to the respective social class was to have become 
increasingly ambivalent, thus further blurring Germany's already weakly defined labour-
class cleavage (ibid.). Yet Graf (1977, p.192) points out that although improved 
standards of education were accompanied by higher wages and longer leisure time, an 
increasing proportion of this income and time was actually taken up by the cost of 
everyday living, as well as the cost and acquisition of consumer goods. Furthermore, 
the greater share in the consumption of goods was not matched by a greater share in 
power over the means of their production (ibid.). 
Even though the relative size of the SPD’s core constituency declined, parties on the 
centre-right, including Germany’s CDU, had been unable to garner mass support for 
openly free market policies, since the basic and universal elements of the welfare state 
had found broad acceptance across society (Green et al., 2008, p.78). But unification, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the wave of economic 
deregulation associated with globalisation all served to undermine the perceived 
validity of economic planning as a tool available to governments — there appeared to 
be no credible alternative to capitalism. Eager to provide the optimum market 
conditions to attract international finance, governments curtailed their utilisation of fiscal 
tools to stimulate demand and employment. The capacity for wealth redistribution and, 
consequently, welfare provision, was therefore narrowed. With voter expectations of 
welfare and redistribution ‘ratcheted down’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.43), parties were 
able to maximise their appeal despite offering policy packages that promised less.
Deindustrialisation, the subsequent shift towards a post-industrial society as well as the 
sell-off of public goods and services, meant that a diminishing number of employee 
groups were shielded from the pressure and demands of international markets. 
Instead, employees were increasingly involved in ‘private, market-exposed and even 
internationally traded sectors of financial and managerial business services, 
information technologies, and personal services’ (Kitschelt, 2004, p.6). With the decline 
in the manufacturing sector and loss of many manual jobs, workers found themselves 
driven into increasingly precarious employment which often failed to pay a living wage 
or offer basic social security. The demand for redistribution via welfare benefits such as 
income support would presumably remain consistent among this group . Yet it is also 47
argued (ibid.) that the workers who did manage to retain their jobs in the manufacturing 
sector were likely to have a better set of qualifications and skills and, most importantly, 
 This claim is supported by data presented by Kitschelt (2004, p.3) which found that of seven 47
social groups, low-intermediate skill public service sector and domestic private sector low skilled 
wage earners displayed the greatest propensity to support redistributive policies. 
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believed that their continued employment depended on company profitability in a 
market which was exposed to international economic factors. Kitschelt therefore 
suggests it is feasible that these employees, anxious to protect their jobs, prioritised the 
economic wellbeing of the company over any sense of identification with a particular 
class, and consequently favoured less redistribution and public sector activity . 48
Furthermore, times of particularly severe economic pressure can lead to the perception 
that the future profitability of the employer takes precedence not only over any class 
identity, but also over one’s tangible needs. For instance, the individual might make the 
conscious decision to avoid 'burdening' the employer with the responsibility and cost of 
providing more comprehensive parental leave schemes; in a difficult employment 
market, he or she might ‘self-exploit’ in the hope of retaining a job or progressing within 
an occupation (Standing, 2011, p.18). The key aspect about these choices is that they 
are based on the values and perceived interests of the individual, rather than in 
accordance with class identity.
Yet Anderson (2009) offers a historical explanation to argue that support for egalitarian 
policies continued in both the western and eastern regions of Germany. After the fall of 
the Third Reich, the Federal Republic underwent a transformation in its industrial 
structure, that shifted the emphasis from huge corporations to the growth of the 
privately owned, medium-sized companies that still characterise the German economy 
today. According to Anderson, although this restructuring created the sense of 
classlessness at the top, there remained at the bottom a collective awareness of 
history and political potential (Anderson, 2009, p.23). As Lipset and Rokkan have 
described, this consciousness is essential for the expression of a social cleavage. 
Moreover, even despite deindustrialisation, the Federal Republic did manage to 
maintain a manufacturing base. As a result, a labour force continued to exist, albeit 
smaller in size and not especially militant (ibid.). Meanwhile, in the socialist GDR, 
redistribution and the welfare state had become the norm, and it could therefore be 
anticipated that such attitudes continued to exist among the eastern population, 
especially in the years immediately following unification. However, this leads Anderson 
to make an important distinction between the roots of attitudes favouring redistribution 
and welfare. While in the East this ongoing support was largely attributable to the 
socialist heritage, in the West it was the result of the ‘residual strength of labour’ (ibid.). 
In other words, it was in the western states that class actually played a significant role, 
 The same data shows that ‘trade-exposed sector intermediate skilled wage earners’ were 48
among the social groups least likely to support redistributive policies (Kitschelt, 2004, p.3).
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especially when the labour force was confronted with rising inequality and the 
concentration of wealth at the top (ibid.).
3.2.2. The Post-Materialism and the Socio-Cultural Dimensions
In 1966 the SPD formed a Grand Coalition with the CDU, and entered government at 
federal level for the first time. This period saw the coordinated action (Konzertierte 
Aktion) of state, the Bundesbank, employer organisations and organised labour to 
implement a programme of deficit-funded public spending. To counter the effects of the 
tight control of wages, social policy concentrated on easing differences in the 
employment status between manual and skilled workers and bolstered welfare 
payments (Nachtwey, 2013, p.237). However, the Grand Coalition — a coalition of the 
two largest (and usually opposing) parliamentary parties — is naturally characterised 
by weak opposition in parliament. During the CDU-SPD coalition, the only other party 
represented in the Bundestag, and therefore the sole opposition to the coalition, was 
the liberal FDP, with just forty-nine seats. It was this period that also saw the 
emergence of political disillusionment (Verdrossenheit) amidst a growing sense among 
voters of bureaucratisation and self-interest regarding the parliamentary parties 
(Jeffery, 1999, p.109) . What is more, the Social Democrats’ ascension to power at 49
federal level relied on their cooperation with parties on the centre-right: first with the 
CDU and then later with the FDP, thus continuing the SPD’s own convergence towards 
the centre (ibid., p.105).
The SPD was also experiencing internal conflict. Its youth/college arm, the Socialist 
German Student Union (SDS), became one of the leading organisations in the extra-
parliamentary opposition. Founded in Hamburg in 1946, this had also served as a 
school for future party functionaries and leaders, including Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
(Graf, 1976, p.225). It went on to adopt a distinctly left-wing character and its anti-
nuclear stance brought the group into conflict with the SPD leadership over the party's 
support for German rearmament. Yet the SDS also focused its attention on issues 
beyond the scope of economic redistribution, such as pacifism and oppression in the 
developing world. It also campaigned for the right to abortion and liberation from sexual 
taboos and demanded a normalisation of relations between the two Germanys. 
Eventually, in the face of dwindling membership and support, the SDS dissolved in 
1970. Many of its former members returned to the mainstream SPD, while a minority 
rejected the conventional SDS tactics of sit-ins and demonstrations and turned instead 
 See Chapter Two for an explanation of Germany’s ‘Parteienstaat’.49
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to armed struggle. However, other former SDS supporters became increasingly 
involved in single issue politics and set up various grassroots initiatives which would go 
on to form the new social movements (NSMs) in the 1970s (Pulzer, 1992, p.312). 
 
The rise of the NSMs has been attributed to the growing disenchantment with 
mainstream politics and parties on the one hand and, on the other, increased 
awareness of post-materialist issues which, according to Inglehart, moved beyond the 
traditional (or materialist) politics of redistribution or consumption, and prioritised 
‘“post-materialist” values, emphasising autonomy and self-expression’ (Inglehart, 2008, 
p.130). These issues resonated especially among younger people who became 
politically relevant in a period characterised by relative prosperity and peace but also 
the decline of the manufacturing base (and less emphasis on the capital-labour 
conflict). This ‘new politics’ approach emphasised non-material or post-materialist goals 
relating to quality of life, such as the environment, the abolition of nuclear weapons and 
power, democracy and participation, personal liberty, racial and gender equality and a 
shift towards sustainability and little or zero economic growth (Dalton, 1992, p.66).
As this chapter has explained, political culture shapes the expression of emerging (and 
revived) cleavages. The expression of the post-materialist dimension was therefore 
contingent on several factors: first, the mobilising actors had to decide on a strategy, in 
other words, whether they preferred to take an extra-parliamentary route (e.g., remain 
a single issue pressure group) or to organise themselves as a political party (perhaps 
later on becoming office-seekers). The parliamentary route is in turn dependent on the 
threshold of representation and the willingness and ability of existing parties to 
successfully respond to and accommodate post-materialist concerns. If the established 
parties do not accommodate these demands, a new party may emerge around the 
specific cleavage. Whether the new party can realistically expect to break into the 
competitive party system is determined by institutional factors such as the electoral 
system, for example, Germany’s five per cent electoral threshold. In the Federal 
Republic, the party that embodied the dimension of post-materialism and successfully 
entered into electoral politics was the Greens.              
Having already experienced a degree of dealignment among its core constituency, the 
SPD went on to concede support among young and educated voters, as well as those 
identifying with the post-materialist left (Jeffery, 1999, p.105). Here, a degree of 
realignment occurred along the emerging post-materialist tension, in favour of the 
emerging Greens. However, while the core group of voters for the SPD declined 
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numerically, the importance of labour-capital cleavage for the party did not recede 
altogether. Sections of the SPD sought to reposition the party further from the middle 
ground in order to win back some of the left vote. In addition, the emergence of the 
Greens (a left-of-centre potential partner for the Social Democrats) and the SPD’s 
response also reduced the likelihood of a future coalition with the FDP, which had by 
then aligned itself more closely to the CDU. As a result, it is possible to identify a 
‘rudimentary two-bloc party system’ (Jeffery, 1999, p.109) along the continuing left-right 
divide. In Figure 3.3 the determinant cleavage structure of the 1980s is therefore 
depicted to include, in place of the less prominent religious-secular divide, a new 
‘materialism/post-materialism’ dimension, placing the Greens on the left, within the field 
of ‘new politics’. The class cleavage, represented by the left-right dimension, 
nevertheless remains a defining social tension. 
Figure 3.3: Cleavage structure of the Federal Republic in the 1980s 
(Based on Busch, 2007, 6)  
However, according to Kitschelt (2004), in addition to the emergence of the materialist/
post-materialist cleavage, the 1980s also saw a further shift of emphasis; this time from 
the primarily distributive economic policy preferences associated with the class 
cleavage and towards the values of socio-cultural (left) libertarianism and (right) 
authoritarianism. Both approaches are concerned with attitudes to society, the family 
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and individual rights and responsibilities. Libertarianism is based on the autonomy of 
the individual to determine lifestyle, as well as ‘respect for socio-cultural difference’. 
Authoritarianism, on the other hand, emphasises compliance with ‘cultural 
homogeneity’ and its moral standards and regulations (Kitschelt, 2004, p.2). This 
argument, which is represented in Figure 3.4 below, acknowledges that policy 
preference distribution during the post-war era was essentially concentrated along one 
dimension between redistribution of income on the left and allocation of income in line 
with market constraints on the right. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, it is claimed 
that the axis shifted away from the distributive (materialist) concepts of left and right 
and policy preference began to take into account socio-cultural libertarian and 
authoritarian positions, with the Greens occupying the left-libertarian (LL) position on 
the framework (ibid., p.8).  
The diagram also illustrates how, according to this reasoning, the various party 
‘families’ have accommodated these positions in their policy offerings. For example, it 
can be assumed that the political programme of the left-libertarian party (LL) will 
include a range redistributive taxation and welfare policies — more so than that of the 
social democratic party (SD) — as well as a raft of libertarian socio-cultural policies 
(ibid., p.9). Conversely, the diagram shows that the party furthest to the right (NR) can 
be expected to present a programme that emphasises more market-orientated 
economic policies combined with an authoritarian approach to socio-cultural issues 
(ibid., p.10). Thus, it is possible to discern an association between the economic left 
and socio-cultural libertarianism on the one hand and between the economic right and 
socio-cultural authoritarianism on the other.   
What is more, the catch-all parties, which by now also included ‘modernised’ social 
democrats, succeeded in absorbing social issues beyond the traditional left-right 
dimension of economic (re)distribution to encompass religious and centre-periphery 
cleavages (Green et al., 2008, p.78). The argument follows that this process in turn led 
to further dilution of the class cleavage; in its place, growing importance was attached 
to individual liberty and to socially managed ‘responsible’ capitalism. 
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of political preferences from the post-war decades to the 1970s 
and 1980s 
(Kitschelt, 2004, p.7)
The post-materialism dimension is also associated with the changing orientation of 
values. Underpinning this concept is a hierarchy of motivational needs . The first set of 50
needs centres on basic physiological survival (necessities such as food, water and 
shelter); their fulfilment allows the individual to prioritise the activities and resources 
(e.g., employment and health) that ensure security and stability. Then, having secured 
these basic needs, the individual can focus on more social needs that include a sense 
of belonging (e.g., family and relationships) as well as esteem (acknowledgement, 
status, respect). Only when these needs have been met is it possible to turn attention 
to fulfilling what are known as self-realisation needs, such as creative expression 
(Mochmann, 2002, p.40). As each level of the hierarchy is fulfilled, a change in the 
individual’s value orientation occurs.
Applying this hierarchy of needs and the associated value change to the context of 
social cleavage, it can therefore be argued that increasing economic prosperity 
 The hierarchy of motivational needs was conceptualised by the psychologist Maslow (1943, 50
p.375), who was concerned with the question: ‘It is quite true that man lives by bread alone — 
when there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and 
when his belly is chronically filled?’ Maslow claimed that other and ‘higher’ needs become 
progressively dominant and, once satisfied, are superseded by still ‘higher’ needs, thus resulting 
in a ‘hierarchy of relative prepotency’.  
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unburdened the expanded or ‘levelled-off’ middle class of the challenge of securing 
basic needs. It would follow that the ability to take for granted resources for 
physiological wellbeing and economic security through wage labour and the welfare 
state brought about a change in values that prioritised the fulfilment of ‘higher’ goals. 
Many of these priorities coincided with the post-materialist issues articulated by the 
new social movements and the Greens; the attainment of these needs and the 
changing values they represent are therefore central to the post-materialism 
dimension. At one end of this dimension, materialists are concerned with obtaining 
resources and security, whereas post-materialists at the other pole strive to achieve 
self-realisation (ibid.).   
It is acknowledged that a person can strive for both ‘basic’ needs and ‘higher’ goals 
simultaneously. For example, an individual might be concerned with achieving greater 
economic security and at the same time seek creative self-expression. In addition, 
values and therefore the prioritisation of these goals can easily change at various 
stages of life (ibid., p.41). But above all, the key to this concept is that the motivation 
and ability to achieve higher goals remain contingent on the continued and reliable 
fulfilment of the more basic needs. As a result, if individuals, groups and even regions 
are unable to achieve material and economic security, it can be expected that there will 
be a weaker emphasis on post-materialist goals and values (ibid.) and, conversely, a 
stronger prioritisation of securing basic necessities. In other words, although the 
hierarchy of needs is a concept closely associated with the materialist/post-materialist 
dimension, the importance of continued job security and reliable employment 
conditions and wages means that it inevitably touches on aspects of the labour-capital 
cleavage, too.   
In addition, although the emerging post-materialist dimension was concerned with 
attitudes beyond economic redistribution and consumption, there is often no clear-cut 
distinction between material and post-material values. For example, the issue of the 
environment — frequently identified with 'new politics’ and post-materialism — is in fact 
heavily concerned with physical security and material questions, such as the allocation 
and use of finite natural resources. Moreover, neither is it possible to strictly separate 
post-materialist concerns surrounding the environment from the issue of social and 
economic class, for it is frequently the poorest in society who suffer the most immediate 
and severe effects of environmental degradation, for instance as a result of pollution 
and resource depletion (Woodin and Lucas, 2004, p.34). Similarly, while gender politics 
is also a central theme of post-materialism, this too concerns economic rights and 
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physical security (Ware, 1996, p.229); in addition, socio-economic factors and class 
clearly influence choices relating to fertility, childcare and life opportunities (ibid.), once 
again highlighting the intersection with the labour-capital tension. 
Education and training are also linked to greater acceptance of a modern (libertarian) 
socio-cultural outlook, while those with low or intermediate level skills are associated 
with a more authoritarian approach . Kitschelt (2004, p.2) therefore anticipates a shift 51
away from the preference for redistributive and authoritarian policies often linked to the 
working class in favour of market-orientated and socially liberal policies. If highly 
educated professionals and the self-employed are also more closely associated with 
the market-exposed sector, then Kitschelt considers that left-libertarian parties such as 
the Greens, who traditionally enjoy support amongst the most educated voters, will 
focus on offering more market-orientated policies to attract voters, whilst at the same 
time retaining the appeal of their libertarian identity on the socio-cultural dimension 
(ibid., p.6). In addition, to secure the support of young professionals and entrepreneurs, 
social policy would also endeavour to emphasise issues of concern to younger people, 
such as education and improved childcare provision. Thus, it is argued that left-
libertarian parties increasingly count young professionals and entrepreneurs amongst 
their core voters (ibid., p.9). The extent of this shift in preferences, as well as the 
response by political parties, is portrayed in Figure 3.5 below. 
Figure 3.5 shows that in a period characterised by restricted redistribution and policy 
preferences, the positions of parties once again shifted. Although there is still a two-
dimensional dispersal, the diagram also portrays the greater emphasis on 
libertarianism and authoritarianism, and their respective solutions to socio-cultural 
issues. Focusing on the parties of the broad left, the diagram reveals a perceptible 
move away from redistributive political allocation of income by the social democratic 
(SD) parties (ibid., p.9) and in particular the left-libertarian (LL) parties (who sought to 
attract the votes of young, educated professionals), with these two party families 
occupying a similar centrist space in terms of redistributive policy. All in all, the diagram 
conveys a general narrowing of policy space. On the one hand, there is greater 
emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension and libertarian or authoritarian remedies as 
the chief means of differentiating parties and policy preference distribution (ibid., p.11). 
Consequently, the model portrays a significantly less pronounced left-right economic 
 ‘Low-intermediate skill public service sector’ and ‘domestic private sector low skilled wage 51
earners’ were among the least likely to favour libertarian socio-cultural approach (Kitschelt, 
2004, p.5).
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dimension that in turn suggests a decline in the importance of the capital-labour 
cleavage for political parties. 
Figure 3.5: Distribution of political preferences from the 1980s to the turn of the 
millennium 
(Source: Kitschelt, 2004, p.7)
Yet even though the political parties promised less in terms of redistribution and welfare 
and offered policies that were less defined in terms of class-related difference, it is 
important to bear in mind that social and political divisions endured. Poverty and social 
problems such as homelessness and crime did not simply go away (Dalton, 1996, p.
330). Furthermore, although arguing that the scope of ‘distributive disagreements has 
narrowed, Kitschelt (2004, p.8) nevertheless acknowledges that the conflict over 
redistribution nonetheless ‘remains salient’ (ibid., p.8) and has the potential to intensify, 
during periods of sharpened economic constraint. 
Social Cleavages and the German Democratic Republic
Finally, the former GDR and unification pose some interesting questions concerning 
social cleavages and political parties. German unification ‘confronted two different 
electorates with a party system which, the PDS excepted, had developed in the context 
of only one of those electorates’ (Jeffery, 1999, p.117). In 1990 the German electorate 
swelled by around one-fifth. Four decades of state socialism had naturally impacted the 
GDR's party system (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.109ff.). There had not been a 
tradition of competitive elections; while parties other than the SED were represented in 
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the parliament, they were subservient to the ruling party (see Chapter One). In addition, 
voters had little or no experience of the Federal Republic's party system beyond the 
information and images they received via the media. At the time of the first all-German 
election in 1990 the East German electorate was therefore largely politically non-
aligned (while dealignment had been occurring in the West), and consequently was 
highly responsive to short-term influences, such as key campaign issues as well as 
focused campaigns and individual candidates (Jeffery, 1999, p.112).
Historically, the territory of what would become the GDR had been the location of the 
greatest support for the SPD and KPD. In 1928 the Weimar era left-wing parties, 
including the KPD, achieved 49% of the eastern vote compared to 35% in the West; by 
1933 combined voter share of the SPD and KPD was ca. 38% (East) compared to ca. 
25% (West) (Mochmann, 2003, p.58). However, the SPD was not able to revive this 
support in the 1990 election. In fact, the SPD and PDS performed weakly in industrial 
areas where one might expect a strong left vote, while the CDU and the bloc of eastern 
conservative parties attracted the greatest support in these regions. The CDU’s strong 
commitment to unification, which stood in contrast to the more ambivalent approach 
adopted by the SPD, was the greatest defining factor in these electoral outcomes. 
However, to fully understand the attitudes towards the capital-labour cleavage in the 
post-unification era, it is nonetheless useful to consider the distinct social base that had 
developed in the GDR, as well as its effect on social cleavages and their expression. 
First, in terms of the religious cleavage, the East had become far more secularised 
than the West. A clear majority of eastern voters (67%) identified themselves as having 
no religious affiliation, compared to just 19% in the West (Jeffery, 1999, p.113). Both 
the Protestant and Catholic denominations had markedly declined in the East: whereas 
approximately 80% of the population were Protestant in 1950, the proportion in 1989 
had fallen to around 30%. Catholics accounted for 11% of the population in the 1950s 
and just 6% by 1989. There had also been a strict separation of Church and state and 
the Church was not authorised to teach religion in the GDR’s schools. However, the 
Protestant Church played a prominent role in the protests that sprang up in 1989, and 
some of the citizens’ groups and organisations that shaped the demonstrations became 
associated with or absorbed by the CDU. Therefore, even though the Christian vote 
was numerically less significant than its counterpart in the western state, there was 
clearly strong alignment to the CDU. Nevertheless, eastern voters were largely secular 
and therefore unlikely to make electoral decisions along religious lines (ibid.).
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The class cleavage in the former GDR has been described as ‘disrupted’ (Mochmann,
2002, p.59), while Arzheimer and Schoen (2007, p.4) observe that the bond between 
workers and left-wing parties was destroyed during the four decades of the GDR’s 
existence. The class cleavage did persist but was less visible; far-reaching 
nationalisation and other socialist policies arguably minimised the tension, but the lack 
of competitive elections also prevented party-political expression of the cleavage 
(Nachtwey and Spier, 2005, p.129).
A further explanation for the weaker profile of the capital-labour cleavage was that the 
size of the working class was maximised, meaning that workers did not identify 
themselves as a distinct social group that distinguished and articulated its needs in 
relation to others (Mochmann, 2002, p.59). In fact, in the period around unification, the 
primary tension was not between capital and labour, but between labour and social 
hierarchy surrounding the SED itself (Nachtwey and Spier, 2005, p.129). The PDS 
would later exemplify this: despite its socialist manifesto, the party could hardly be 
described as the representative of the (eastern German) working class, since much of 
its support originated among the ranks of former functionaries and civil servants as well 
as — at least initially — those wishing to preserve separate statehood. On the other 
hand, by 1998 eastern workers tended to vote more in line with their western 
counterparts: 39% supported the SPD, while just 27% continued to support the CDU 
which, in terms of the class cleavage, suggests not only a degree of convergence with 
the West, but also signs of party alignment concerning this tension. 
Although there was no GDR equivalent to a Green Party, it is still possible to consider 
the role of the (post-)materialist dimension in eastern Germany following unification. 
Mochmann (2002, p.74) cites a series of studies  which applied the ‘Inglehart Index’  52 53
of political attitudes. In this index, issues such as maintaining law and order and 
combating rising prices are classified as materialist, while the focus on greater political 
influence and protecting freedom of speech are identified as non-materialist . The 54
surveys revealed that eastern German citizens prioritised a combination of both 
 European Commission Eurobarometer surveys 1990-1999 (Eurobarometer numbers 34.0, 52
35.0, 36, 37.0, 38.0, 39.0, 40, 42, 47.1 and 52.1), cited in Mochmann, 2002, p.77.
 The Inglehart Index, constructed in 1977, is used in Eurobarometer surveys on Value 53
Orientation. Respondents are asked to identify two priorities from the following: (1) Maintaining 
order in the nation; (2) giving the people more to say in important political decisions; (3) fighting 
rising prices; (4) protecting freedom of speech (Gesis Eurobarometer Data Service, 2010).
 These also reflect the policies associated with Bündnis ’90 (Alliance ’90), the umbrella group 54
that incorporated some of the citizens’ movements in the GDR — Bündnis ’90 eventually joined 
forces with the western Greens.
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aspects, although there was an increase in the number of eastern Germans who gave 
precedence to the post-materialist values during and shortly after unification. Given the 
unique context of unification, Mochmann (2002, p.76) considers it is hardly surprising 
that greater political influence and freedom of expression resonated with the eastern 
population. Yet the emphasis on these priorities declined as swathes of eastern 
industry declined while unemployment and prices rose (ibid.). In addition, the process 
of unification had weakened labour in the former GDR. Industry had been dismantled 
and the population, confronted with climbing unemployment, were reluctant to 
jeopardise increasingly scarce and insecure work. Despite the efforts of western trade 
unions to secure nationwide tariffs, wages remained lower in the East. In addition, 
these lower wages were in competition with an even cheaper labour market in the 
neighbouring eastern European states. As a result, the labour market in the eastern 
states was ‘prised loose’ (Anderson, 2009, p.11). Therefore, experiencing ‘unmet 
materialist demand’ such as economic security (for example regarding employment and 
the cost of living), citizens in the East increasingly prioritised materialist concerns 
(Mochmann, 2002, p.76).  
In addition to the transformation of the German party political system as a result of the 
enlarged and as yet unpredictable electorate, two party systems also took shape in the 
aftermath of unification. In the West, the failure of the PDS to establish a credible 
electoral base ensured the persistence of the four-party system (CDU, SPD, FDP and 
Green). Conversely, in the East, neither the post-materialist Greens nor the FDP, which 
went on to adopt a more market-liberal approach, would really thrive in the eastern 
states. Competitive politics was therefore dominated by three parties, namely the CDU, 
SPD and PDS. As such, the main parties in the East were orientated to the traditional 
left-right dimension of the labour-capital cleavage.
The consequence of deindustrialisation has not only been a numerical decrease in the 
number of blue-collar workers. The critiques outlined in this section have questioned 
the enduring salience of the class cleavage. The very definitions of socio-economic 
class are deemed problematic, as they no longer reflect the type of work, social 
mobility, educational attainment or individual interests that have resulted from 
economic development. Therefore, the next section re-examines these concepts of 
class and argues that while definitions of class need to account for modern patterns of 
employment, divisions along the lines of socio-economic class are clearly identifiable 
and, consequently, that class remains just as relevant today.
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3.3. Definitions of Social Class 
One of the challenges to social cleavage theory in relation to the class cleavage is that, 
in the modern post-industrial society, traditional classifications of class are outdated. 
Certain types of work have declined, while others have become widespread, for 
example as a result of an expanding service sector or advances in technology. A further 
criticism is that the terms are too broad. The term ‘white collar worker’, for example, 
has been used to refer to clerical workers, many of whom are part-time or temporary 
and have little in common with other white-collar workers such as academically trained 
employees (e.g., engineers and lawyers) in terms of pay, prospects or job security. The 
term has also been used to describe managers (including lower management), who, 
unlike some other professions within the white-collar category, tend to identify closely 
with company owners (Graf, 1977, p.191).  
In addition, there are also problems of misinterpretation. Both ‘middle class’ and 
‘working class’ can even be understood to mean ‘typical’: ‘middle class’ might suggest 
‘average’, while ‘working class’ could refer to the ‘normal’ activity of engaging in paid 
employment (Savage et al., 2010, p.120). Furthermore, there is a degree of 
ambivalence towards terms such as middle or working class, whether due to a 
reluctance to associate with a particular class or because of perceived irrelevance in a 
‘classless’ society (ibid., p.137). 
Therefore, it is helpful to refer to Evans (1999) and the further development of the 
definitions and classification first constructed by Goldthorpe and Erikson . The concept 55
underpinning this reclassification is not social status, but rather the character of 
working relationships within the modern employment market. The emphasis is 
therefore on terms of employment as well as the nature of the employment itself 
(Evans, 1999, p.10) and takes into consideration aspects of job autonomy, authority 
and security (Dalton, 1996, p.330). In light of the employment reforms in Germany, the 
emergence of the ‘precariat’ also demands particular attention.
The classification includes familiar terms such as petty bourgeoisie to denote those 
who are either owners of small enterprises or who are self-employed. However, a clear 
 See Robert Erikson and John H. Goldthorpe: ‘The Constant Flux’ (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).55
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distinction must be drawn here between the genuine self-employment of small-scale 
entrepreneurs and the pseudo-self-employment  of what can be described as the 56
precariat, which is addressed later in this chapter. The next group in the schema is the 
service class — also known as the ‘salariat' — consisting of professionals and 
managers in organisations (Evans, 1999, p.9), often in large corporations and public 
administration (Standing, 2011, p.7). These are followed by the routine non-manual 
working class, identified as clerical and white-collar workers (for example, the retail 
sector), and, finally, the manual working class, which incorporates skilled workers such 
as technicians, as well as semi-skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers (Evans, 1999, 
p.9).  
Closer examination of the service and working classes highlight the contrasts in 
conditions of employment. For instance, an employee in the service class has a degree 
of authority (for instance regarding their workload or perhaps supervision of a small 
team) and provides the employer with their specialist knowledge or skill in exchange for 
a salary. Their terms of employment also include agreed elements of occupational 
security, such as contractual rights, company pension and other benefits, as well as 
career progression prospects that include training and incremental salary increases 
(ibid., p.10). By contrast, contracts in the working class occupations tend to offer less in 
the way of long-term benefits and involve wages paid in exchange for manual or non-
manual effort, rather than for knowledge or expertise. Payment may also be 
determined on the basis of time work or piecework, rather than a fixed salary for 
contractual hours (ibid.). In terms of regulation and discipline, too, a distinction is drawn 
between service class employment and working class employment. Whereas the 
former is characterised by a 'carrot' approach of bonuses, promotion and other 
incentives, the latter relies on the 'stick' of strict regulation and short-term or fixed 
contracts (ibid.). 
Regarding the impact of these contrasting conditions of employment on political 
preferences, the comparatively favourable employment conditions of the service class 
provide an incentive to preserve privilege and certainty. Therefore, Evans describes 
members of the service class as quite a conservative group, keen to maintain a 
 On its website, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 56
Conditions (Eurofound) cites a definition of pseudo or bogus self-employment 
(Scheinselbstständigkeit) as ‘business activities that do not include any managerial or 
proprietary tasks and which possess the attributes of an employment relationship but without 
entitlement to the corresponding labour law protections’ European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2012).
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business-friendly environment (ibid., p.11). It can therefore be expected that there is a 
less significant role for trade union activity and instead greater emphasis on specific 
issues and interests. In other words, a member of this group vote could consider the 
business interests of the employing organisation to be a prerequisite for his or her own 
security, and therefore votes in accordance with this individualistic (rather than class-
based) motivation (see Section 2.2 above). Conversely, the employment conditions 
imposed on the working class may be linked to a preference for redistributive policies 
that serve as a safety net, especially in light of the lack of job security, prospects or 
enterprise benefits (ibid.). To summarise, the important point of this classification is that 
political preference within both the service class and working class is based on the 
specific nature of the employment relationship, rather than on actual income or social 
status. 
Since the original construction of this schema, further differentiation has been made, 
notably concerning the service class and the impact on values within that group. First, 
the service class is divided into two sub-groups: the administrative-managerial group 
and the expert-professional group (Müller, 1999, p.6), or ‘proficians' (Standing, 2011, p.
7). The role of administrator or manager implies an additional element of responsibility, 
meaning that employees in these positions play a role in upholding and implementing 
the structure of authority within the company or organisation. As a result, administrators 
and managers within the service class are likely to identify strongly with their employer 
(Müller, 1999, p.6). 
On the other hand, even though the expert-professional group may also implement 
some degree of delegated authority, it also identifies with the standards and practices 
of the respective profession (ibid., p.7). Furthermore, membership of a professional 
body and subsequent obligation to its regulations and codes of conduct gives 
prominence to professional competence and autonomy. Consequently, the loyalty of an 
expert-professional lies not only with the company or organisation, but also with the 
profession itself (ibid.). Yet another division among the expert-professional group has 
thus been made, which distinguishes between technical experts on one hand and 
those delivering social-cultural services on the other. This latter group includes 
employees in the social and caring professions, medical services and education, as 
well as culture and the arts (ibid). Employees in this group not only have obligations 
towards the employing organisation and to their professional body and standards; they 
also have close contact with their respective clients, such as patients or learners, and 
are concerned with meeting their health or educational needs. As a result, this group's 
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identification with the company or organisation becomes still further diluted (ibid.). 
Despite the relatively advantageous terms of the employment contract, the nature of 
the role could lead expert-professionals providing social or cultural services to hold 
values and political preferences that take into account the interests of their client group 
and therefore contrast with the more conservative elements within the service class. In 
fact, Müller (2011, p.8) expects that the egalitarianism arising from empathy for the 
client group would strengthen social or cultural service class employees' identification 
with the SPD, albeit for different reasons to those of non-manual or manual workers. 
One of the consequences of the employment market and welfare reforms introduced in 
Germany has been a growing number of people in non-standard — or precarious — 
employment conditions (Dörre, 2014, p.19). Precarious work has many faces. It can 
include, for example, part-time employment, which is commonly defined as thirty or 
fewer hours per week (Standing, 2011, p.15). The reforms saw an increase in part-time 
employment, especially in the form of mini-jobs (also known as ‘€400 jobs’), which fell 
below the threshold for tax or social security contributions, either on the part of the 
employee or employer. While working part time can provide a useful route to a return to 
work, it is also common among employees (especially women) who have stepped 
away from their previous career path, and can therefore result in reduced earnings over 
a longer period. Furthermore, part-time workers often find themselves doing extra 
hours, sometimes for no pay (Dörre, 2014, p.15). Part-time employment therefore 
carries a greater risk of (self-)exploitation; moreover, workers may find they do not 
qualify for full enterprise benefits, and have the added pressure of organising different 
aspects of their lives around hours that might include shifts (Standing, 2011, p.15). 
Also, some part-time patterns involve a shorter working day but are still spread across 
a five-day week, meaning less pay, but still the same costs (e.g., travel) as those for 
full-time employees. A final important point is that workers re-entering employment 
through, for example, mini-jobs are no longer included in unemployment figures, even 
though they may be heavily underemployed in their part-time job and still rely on Hartz 
IV benefits to survive.
Temporary work, including work found through an agency, can also be considered 
precarious. Even though some people undoubtedly thrive on the challenge of short-
term project-based work, temporary workers are easily exploited (Standing, 2011, p.
15). First, it is often the case that workers are paid at a lower rate than their 
counterparts with permanent contracts, despite doing similar or identical work and 
despite the insecurity inherent in temporary work. Also, employers can avoid paying 
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higher wages based on experience and an incremental pay scale (see above for a 
description of service class employment). Furthermore, career opportunities are 
reduced, since there is barely any opportunity to follow a career path within a single 
company. Once again, although temporary work can offer the chance of taking the first 
steps onto a career ladder — for example a newly qualified worker might take 
temporary employment to gain practical experience and improve their chance of finding 
permanent work — this type of work is often associated with a downward or at least 
sideways career move, particularly following a period of unemployment (ibid.). While 
policy makers and job centre staff exert pressure on unemployed people to accept 
temporary work, this pattern of employment, like part-time work, often results in 
reduced income over the longer term and offers few real prospects for social mobility 
(ibid.), as it is all but impossible to plan for long-term commitments, such as starting a 
family (Dörre, 2014, p.25) . Furthermore, there are implications for the hiring company’s 
regular staff, too, as greater flexibility in employment terms for temporary workers 
heightens the fear that permanent jobs may be cut. As a result, staff may offer less 
resistance to wage freezes and reduced benefits (ibid., p.22). When replicated across 
whole industries and sectors of the economy, this in turn clears the way for downward 
pressure on wages and the withdrawal of employment rights.
People working on a self-employed or freelance basis are also at risk of a precarious 
existence. An important criterion in this respect is whether the person is an 
independent contractor or a dependent contractor. The former has established a client 
base, determines terms and conditions and has autonomy over their work. The latter 
depends on an intermediary (an agency or coordinator within a company, for example) 
who also determines price and working methods (Standing, 2011, p.16). In other 
words, the worker is a 'concealed employee' and (depending on definitions within the 
employment law of the respective country) is engaged in pseudo self-employment. This 
type of work is made even more precarious in view of the limited eligibility for 
unemployment and other benefits. Other features of precarious work include 
internships, 'zero-hours' contracts and unpaid leave/lay-offs, for example during quiet 
periods for the business or sector. However, well-paid, well-qualified positions have 
also been subjected to ‘rationalisation’, since white-collar employees too are 
meanwhile forced to take jobs that offer no social security and low pay (Seppmann, 
2006).     
Given the diversity and growing reach of precarious work, it is necessary to consider 
this type of employment in the context of class. The actual work carried out in 
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precarious circumstances is extremely broad, with roles that could be included within 
the service class professions (such as hourly paid teachers) as well as among the 
routine non-manual or manual working class (for instance care workers) (ibid.). Yet, 
once again looking deeper than status or income, it quickly becomes apparent that 
precarious employment does not fit comfortably into either the service or working class 
categories in some of the key areas described above, including professional identity, 
the relationship with the employing organisation and occupational prospects.  
First, people in precarious employment are unlikely to have a relationship of trust and 
loyalty with the employing organisation. The often transient nature of the work 
precludes opportunities to exercise the delegated authority associated with the service 
class, and does not provide even the modest employment security given to the routine 
non-manual and manual working class in exchange for their subordination. In fact, due 
to outsourcing and intermediaries such as temping and placement agencies, it is even 
possible that the worker is unaware for whom he or she is really working (Standing,
2011, p.6). Meanwhile, those who do go on to develop longer-term relationships with 
an employing organisation are in jeopardy of becoming stuck in pseudo self-
employment and therefore missing out on the enterprise and statutory benefits granted 
to their service or working class colleagues. Furthermore, employees in the service and 
working class have clearly defined contracts and job titles. In contrast, occupational 
identity within precarious employment is far less specific, since this type of activity 
depends on flexibility and adaptation of skills (ibid., p.9). While this might suit some 
workers who value independence and variety (ibid., p.15), it does carry negative 
implications for long-term career progression and the support provided by belonging to 
an occupational community. Indeed, there is also the danger that workers in precarious 
employment face resentment (for example on the part of employees in more stable 
employment) for their perceived complicity in the downward pressure on wages and 
rights in the drive to increase employment market flexibility (Dörre, 2014, p.31). In turn, 
this can hinder the formation of a sense of solidarity among workers who are 
essentially performing similar tasks.  
The three main occupational groups outlined in this section — service class, routine 
non-manual working class and manual working class — highlight the often stark 
contrasts surrounding the autonomy, authority and security of employment that 
characterise each category. Subsequent refinements also take into account values and 
professional identification. In addition, the risks that characterise precarious 
employment extend much further than income or occupational status. Therefore, since 
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the schema is constructed to reflect employment conditions, there is a strong argument 
that rather than constitute a sub-section within these classes, ‘the precariat’ can 
arguably be understood as a further differentiation within this model of class structure 
(Standing, 2011, p.8). Based on the classifications presented here, the next section 
goes on to examine the importance of class voting in relation to the SPD and the PDS/
Left Party.
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3.4 Attitudes to Redistribution and Welfare
As far back as the late 1950s, the Social Democrats took the step of distancing 
themselves from their (at least nominal) socialist reference points and orientation. As a 
result, principles and core issues such as nationalisation and the property question 
(Eigentumsfrage), perceived as a hindrance to economic competition and maximum 
electoral appeal, were removed from centre stage. Focus was instead placed on 
provision of a safety net within the social market economy (Green et al., 2008, p.78). 
Thus, the SPD was able to extend its appeal beyond its traditional working class basis 
and potentially attract votes from different sections of the electorate. In a nutshell, 
‘electoral goals were overcoming ideological ones’ (ibid.). Now, the focus turns to 
explore the qualitative change in the Social Democrats’ approach to social welfare and 
social justice in the context of the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms.
The economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s and the resulting stagnation in 
growth and wages were accompanied by increasing unemployment, which by the 
1990s reached a post-war high. In the case of Germany, federal structure (with the 
Länder responsible for social assistance) the ‘hands off’ approach of Tarifautonomie 
and the minimal provision for the very poorest (see Section One) meant that the state 
was poorly equipped structurally to tackle its ‘discovery of poverty’ (Bowyer & Vail, 
2011, p.685). Furthermore, Germany’s unification in 1990 sharply intensified already 
growing problems of inequality and unemployment. Despite significant transfer 
payments to the eastern Länder, there was a pronounced disparity in terms of the 
economy, living standards and unemployment when compared to the western states. In 
addition, as a result of the funding allocated to the restructuring of the eastern region, 
the poorest western Länder such as Bremen and Saarland found that they had to 
manage with a reduced share of federal state subsidies. Furthermore, the imbalance 
highlighted the inability of the existing employment institutions and instruments to offer 
realistic hope of recovery. By the time the SPD-Green coalition entered government in 
1998, it was faced with long-term unemployment at record levels, with an average of 
11% nationwide, with the figure far higher in the eastern states (17.8%) 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2012). 
The new finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, took a distinctly expansionist and 
redistributionist approach to the economy. To reverse the deflationary path caused by 
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the Stability Pact and to stimulate domestic consumption (Anderson, 2009, p.5), fiscal 
policy centred on tax reduction for lower income groups, while maintaining the existing 
rate for middle and higher incomes. The objective of boosting consumer demand, 
particularly among these low-income groups, was to create economic growth and 
increase greater social justice (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.138). In terms of the 
labour market, measures were taken to begin the re-regulation of employment, 
especially with regard to part-time work and pseudo self-employment, while 
amendments to the Works Councils (Betriebsräte) aimed to enhance employee rights 
within the workplace (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.139). However, following 
Lafontaine’s resignation (see Chapter One), the SPD-Green federal government 
embarked upon an approach that although certainly interventionist, was based on the 
premise that transformation of the employment market and welfare held the key to 
reducing the stubbornly high jobless rate. 
The essence of the Hartz reforms was the flexibility of the employment market. The 
bleak message presented by the government was that Germany’s ‘inflexible’ job market 
would push up the cost of labour, leaving corporations no choice but to move their 
production and investment to more business-friendly locations with lower costs. 
Furthermore, this flight of investment would soon be followed by the departure of 
valuable and already scarce jobs (Butterwegge, 2005a, p.2). 
In flexible employment markets, employee rights and job protection are seen as 
‘barriers’ to greater employment. Indeed, when setting out his government’s reforms, 
Chancellor Schröder (2003) identified non-wage labour costs as an ‘impediment to 
creating new jobs’. It was not only employment in the private sector that was under 
pressure to become more flexible; jobs in the public sector, too, were affected, 
especially as outsourcing became increasingly common.
First and foremost, ‘flexibility’ refers to contracts and the terms of employment. It is 
argued that these should involve minimum financial cost and effort on the part of the 
company if it needs to change (and especially reduce) the size of its workforce to 
reflect demand at any given time. As such, workers' employment, security and rights 
are more restricted (Standing, 2011, p.6). The second aspect is job flexibility, which 
includes the ability of companies and organisations to alter the structure and even 
location of jobs, for example by deploying workers in targeted areas of the firm at short 
notice, again with little in the way of restrictions or cost. Linked to this is skills flexibility, 
which enables employers to hire the specific skills needed for a defined period. Finally, 
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wage flexibility allows companies and organisations to quickly adjust (and, once again, 
especially to reduce) the price of labour in response to demand and the economic 
situation (ibid.).
The dismantling of these ‘obstacles’ effectively places the resulting precariousness on 
the shoulders of employees and, therefore, their dependents. However, insecurity is 
portrayed as a necessary risk, based on the rationale that businesses are more likely to 
create jobs in the peace of mind that adapting the size of workforce according to 
demand will require minimal fuss or expense (Standing, 2011, p.1). Logically, therefore, 
the same line of reasoning implies that disappointing economic performance or failure 
to bring down unemployment rates can be then attributed to insufficient flexibility within 
the employment market or to a sluggish pace of reform.
A key objective of the Ich-AG self-employment scheme was to steer jobless people 
away from the shadow economy — it also removed them from the status of 
unemployment. However, the stumbling block was a lack of sustainability, as the 
scheme produced a number of bankruptcies once the full monthly subsidies had 
expired, and, moreover, contributed to the problem of pseudo self-employment 
(Scheinselbstständigkeit) associated with the precariat (Butterwegge, 2005b, p.9). 
What is more, although the growth of low-paid, part-time work, mini-jobs and 
(sometimes bogus) self-employment eased unemployment figures, these modes of 
employment were usually liable for substantially reduced social security contributions 
or were even exempt altogether, both of which of course resulted in a drop in the 
amount of contributions-based revenue flowing into the social state (Green et al., 2008, 
p.120).  
The Grundsicherung (basic security benefit) introduced in the Hartz reform package 
was not only aimed at people who were unemployed; it also applied to individuals who 
were in work, but unable to get by on their low wages. Indeed, driving down the cost of 
labour was another objective of the reforms, and among the 'Aufstocker' — the working 
poor in receipt of this top-up benefit — were many people who were in fact in regular 
full-time employment (Dörre, 2014, p.31). In addition, as the ‘mini-jobs’ were too low 
paid to attract tax or social contributions from the employee or employer, the Aufstocker 
payments essentially amounted to a state subsidy for low wages (ibid.). In 2005, 
Chancellor Schröder even went so far as to proudly declare to the World Economic 
Forum in Davos that Germany had ‘built up one of the best low-wage sectors in 
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Europe’ and praised the system in which job seekers would accept any type of 
reasonable work or else face sanctions (Bury et.al., 2006, p.19).
In the past, to achieve the goal of economic efficiency and social justice, the Social 
Democrats had attempted to maximise competition in the commodity, services and 
capital markets while strengthening the rights of workers in the labour market. The 
emphasis had therefore been on the de-commodification of labour (Nachtwey, 2013, p.
237); in other words, that exit from the labour market (for example through 
unemployment) should incur minimal loss of income for an individual. But the pursuit of 
a flexible employment market — the priority of the SPD-Green coalition — is also 
concerned with the supply of labour. As a result, criticism is focused on the established 
system of welfare benefits on the grounds that it is too generous and that it therefore 
represents a disincentive to work, since 'work doesn't pay' (Butterwegge, 2005a, p.2). 
Consequently, the coalition’s stance was that the labour market ‘had to be treated more 
thoroughly as a market like all others’. For the SPD, this constituted a significant 
departure from the de-commodified labour market of traditional social democracy 
(Nachtwey, 2013, p.242). 
Schröder announced that the government would ‘be cutting state benefits, promoting 
individual responsibility, and demanding that every individual make greater efforts’. In 
other words, another characteristic of the ‘activating’ approach to welfare and the 
employment market was, in addition to the reduction in unemployment benefits and the 
far more stringent eligibility criteria, that the ‘rights previously taken for granted’ by the 
individual claimant would be contingent on fulfilling a range of responsibilities (Bowyer 
and Vail, 2011, p.688). For example, claimants were obliged to participate in training 
courses and other employability measures, or else be subject to benefits sanctions. 
This even led to discussion centring on whether aspects of the Hartz measures were 
even unconstitutional, particularly in light of Article 1 of the German Basic Law (human 
dignity) as well as Article 12 (occupational freedom) .57
The Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms therefore indicate that the SPD underwent a 
transformation in its concept of social justice. Nachtwey (2013, p.244) refers to a shift 
from prioritising the ‘redistribution of market-generated primary wealth’ and instead 
 Article 1 [Human dignity – Human rights – Legally binding force of basic rights] (1) ‘Human 57
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.’ Article 
12 [Occupational freedom] (1) ‘All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their 
occupation or profession, their place of work and their place of training. The practice of an 
occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2012).
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towards levelling entry to the market. As explained in Section 3.2, the productivist 
approach had focused on redistribution in the form of higher wages, social spending 
and expanded public services, which would in turn generate the ‘productive side-effect’ 
of stimulating economic demand. In this sense, the SPD’s traditional redistributive 
model of welfare can be depicted as the ‘vertical’ tension between capital and labour. 
Conversely, the ‘supply-side egalitarianism’ that characterised SPD welfare policy from 
the late 1990s strove for fair access to a ‘horizontal’ market. Thus, the goal of equality 
of outcome was superseded by that of equality of participation (ibid.).     
Although the SPD-Green coalition anticipated that the outcome of its institutional 
reforms combined with the ‘activating’ effect of job market re-commodification would be 
a significant decline in the unemployment rate, the reality was that unemployment rose 
to its highest post-war level by 2005 (5.29 million people). Economic growth stalled as 
austerity bit, while wages stagnated. Between 2003 and 2007, corporate profits rose by 
37%, compared to a 4% increase in wages. By 2007, wages for the lowest paid quarter 
had actually dropped by 14% since 1995 (Anderson, 2009, p.21). Related to this was a 
further enduring outcome of the employment market reforms, namely the problem of 
poverty despite work, also fuelled by the growing number of people in precarious 
employment conditions.
All in all, the German workforce were confronted with the insecurity of the ‘flexible’ 
employment market and the ever-present threat of unemployment. Furthermore, the 
government had wasted no opportunity to emphasise the necessity of its labour and 
welfare reforms if Standort Germany were to remain competitive in the global economy. 
Therefore, following the reasoning set out by Kitschelt in Section Two, it could be 
anticipated that employees, motivated by anxiety to protect their increasingly 
vulnerable jobs, would prioritise the economic wellbeing of the employer over the 
interests of their socio-economic class, and specifically favour policies offering less 
redistribution and less public sector provision. But was this really the case? 
3.4.1. Perceptions of the Welfare State
Research into perceptions of the welfare state has revealed strikingly similar attitudes 
in the eastern and western regions of Germany (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007). In 1994, 
Germans were asked whether or not they concurred with the following statement on 
the scope of the state: 
 162
‘The state must ensure that people still have a decent living even if they are 
sick, destitute, unemployed or old’. (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.134)
A considerable 89% of westerners and over 91% of easterners agreed that the state 
should act upon these responsibilities. Ten years later, following the implementation of 
the Hartz reforms and rising unemployment, overall support for the statement remained 
quite resilient (ca. 87%) in both regions. In the western states, a solid 89% of workers 
and 87% of unemployed people continued to hold this view, while support was even 
stronger among eastern workers (91%) and the unemployed (96%). The results 
therefore show that although there has been a slight decline, the overwhelming 
majority of the German population endorsed state provision of a decent livelihood for 
the sick, destitute, jobless and elderly (ibid.). A second statement concerned the extent 
of state intervention:
‘The state must ensure that everybody has work and that prices remain 
stable, even if that means restricting the freedom of employers’. (Nachtwey 
and Spier, 2007, p.134)
This concept of state activity also met with solid support: In 1994, 69.8% of the general 
population in the West and 84.9% in the East agreed with this position, and ten years 
later, despite an overall decrease, the clear majority continued to identify with an 
interventionist approach (over 64% and 73% respectively). Once again, particularly 
strong support was found among workers in both the West and East (74% and 74.5%) 
and among the unemployed (71.7% and 92%) (ibid.).
Table 3.1 Attitudes towards the welfare state 1994-2004 
(Based on Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.134)
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The strength of support for both the scope and activity of the welfare state 
demonstrates the existence of ongoing concerns about social security and therefore 
the fulfilment of basic needs. In addition, the particularly strong endorsement of state 
welfare provision among workers and among the unemployed across both regions of 
Germany highlight the influence of socio-economic class on attitudes towards 
redistribution. 
These findings are particularly relevant because despite the economic challenges of 
deindustrialisation and unemployment, the attitudes towards the welfare state confirm 
continuing and robust support for redistributive policies. This is especially the case 
among workers, who, it has been suggested, would be the group most anxious to 
create the right business-friendly conditions for the protection of their job. Moreover, 
even though the Hartz reforms resulted in an increase in the number of working poor 
forced to top up their low income with benefits, Agenda 2010 had been driven by 
strident rhetoric that stressed the need to make work ‘pay’. The rhetoric also 
emphasised the need to end the ‘German sickness’ of relying on other people to ‘pick 
up the tab’ for the welfare state and the cost of regulated employment conditions . 58
Dörre argues that recipients of Hartz IV, subjected to bureaucratic scrutiny of their 
private sphere and extreme economic hardship, effectively became separated from the 
rest of society, thus earning ‘collective disapproval’ (Dörre, 2014, p.44) . 59
The employment market reforms and their consequences fuelled concerns about the 
systematic dismantling of Germany's social welfare system, as well as fears regarding 
the prospect of individual social decline (sozialer Abstieg): ‘Not only has social 
inequality increased, social uncertainty has also become widespread’ (Seppmann,
2006). Given the enduring demand for welfare and the expectations of the state to 
provide this security, Wiesendahl (2004, p.4) attributes public disquiet about Agenda 
2010 not only to scepticism regarding its effectiveness, but also to concerns that the 
reforms would in fact worsen social injustice. The continued solidarity with the sick, 
elderly, destitute and unemployed, together with the endorsement of prioritising work 
for all and general price stability showed that these anxieties concerned society as a 
whole, and were therefore not only based on individual needs and interests. 
Wiesendahl (ibid.) therefore regards such attitudes towards the welfare state as 
 Economist Thomas Straubhaar in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 August 2012, cited in 58
Dörre, 2014, p.7.
 Dörre (2014, p.44) also argues that the status of ‘Hartz IV recipient’ fuels discrimination, since 59
joblessness and precarious employment have become deemed ‘discreditable’.
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evidence that citizens ‘want to live in a country that values social security and not in a 
country that rewards personal risk provision’. As such, the reforms placed the issue of 
poverty at centre stage in political debate (Bowyer and Vail, 2011, p.689). The 
implications for the relationship between socio-economic class and party political voting 
are now explored in the next section, which concentrates on class-based electoral 
support for the SPD and the PDS/Left Party.
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3.5. Class Voting: The SPD and the PDS in Eastern and 
Western Germany
This chapter begins to consider the significance of class voting and public attitudes 
towards the welfare state in relation to electoral outcomes. The focus is concentrated 
on two parties: the SPD and the PDS/Left Party since the aim is to establish the extent 
of change in class-based electoral support. The Bundestag election results for both 
parties are broken down to reflect voting patterns by occupational group, including the 
unemployed, over time.
The results are shown separately for the eastern and western states. This is 
particularly important in the case of the Left Party, given the East-West disparity in 
electoral support for its predecessor, the PDS. The significance of class voting is also 
revealed by data depicting the tendency of workers in the eastern and western states 
to vote for either party. It is here that a striking relationship emerges between the 
demise of workers’ support for the SPD and the corresponding growth in working class 
support for the Left Party.    
Table 3.2: Bundestag results (percentage share of second vote) for the SPD and PDS/Left 
Party   
1 Western federal states including West Berlin.  
2 Eastern federal states including East Berlin  (election.de)  
The Bundestag election results shown above in Table 3.2 provide a general impression 
of support for the SPD and the PDS/Left Party, broken down into the western and 
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eastern regions and for Germany as a whole. Focusing on the eastern states first, it is 
clear that the SPD’s highest level of support in the region steadily climbed to reach a 
peak (39.7%) in 2002. However, the 2002 election took place against a set of 
circumstances that bolstered the popularity of the SPD in the eastern Länder . 60
Following 2002, though, there was a clear downward trajectory in the SPD vote, with 
support collapsing to below 20% in 2009. The PDS/Left Party on the other hand saw a 
steady increase in its share of the vote, marred only by the significant drop to 16.9% in 
2002 (again, the contributory factors are discussed in Chapter One). By 2005, in the 
first general election following the introduction of the Hartz reforms, the PDS/Left Party 
vote not only recovered from this slump but also exceeded all previous results; in 2009 
the Left Party became the second largest party in the eastern states by a comfortable 
measure. 
Electoral support for the SPD in the western states echoes the pattern nationwide. The 
results show that support for the SPD peaked in 1998 (when the SPD ended the 
sixteen-year run of CDU-led government and entered into coalition with the Greens). 
Yet again, it was in 2005 that voter share declined. Up until that year, voter share for 
the PDS had been negligible in the western states and across the entire country, which 
was a significant weakness for the party, given that western voters accounted for the 
majority of the electorate nationwide. But in 2005 the share of the vote increased to just 
under 5% in the western states and nationally to 8.7%. 
Looking at the overall Bundestag election results, the relationship between the voter 
share of these two parties begins to emerge. In 2005 the SPD suffered a substantial 
decline in support in both regions, while the PDS/Left Party share significantly 
increased. Furthermore, PDS success (measured in terms of clearing the five per cent 
electoral threshold) had until that point been limited to the East. But by 2005, in 
partnership with the newly emerged WASG, it had become a force in the western 
states, too, subsequently gaining seats in western regional parliaments (e.g., Bremen 
2007 and others in 2008) and further strengthening the nationwide vote in 2009.
However, these very general results do not yet establish any causal relationship to 
class voting specifically. To do this, the results need to be broken down further to reflect 
voting patterns by occupational group. Elff and Rossteutscher (2011) analyse 
Bundestag election support for the SPD and PDS/Left Party in eastern and western 
 These included the huge emergency and clean-up operation as a result of the flooding 60
of extensive areas in the East.
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Germany. Figure 3.6 below presents the voting patterns for five occupational classes 
according to the schema outlined above in Section 3.4: manual workers, non-manual 
workers, lower service class, upper service class and the self-employed.
Figure 3.6: The development of support for SPD and for PDS/Linke broken down by class 
in Bundestag elections 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009  
(Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.122)
The service class
The service class constituted an important source of votes for the SPD. In the eastern 
states, support among the lower service class grew steadily up to 2002, but then fell 
away sharply, even dropping below the level of support for the Left Party by 2009. The 
picture for the upper service class was more erratic, but it is notable that only among 
this occupational group did the SPD manage to buck the downward trend and even 
recover its support; just over 20% of the upper service class voted for the SPD in 2005 
but this figure rose to approximately 40% in 2009. In the western states, the pattern 
was similar for both lower and upper service classes; since 1998 SPD support ebbed 
away among these groups. 
For the PDS/Left Party, a rather differentiated picture emerges of support from the 
service classes. In 1994, both lower and upper groups constituted the greatest source 
of votes for the PDS. Although support had fallen among the lower service class by the 
next election, it increased sharply among the upper service class. So far then, support 
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from these occupational groups conforms to the classification of the PDS as a party of 
eastern interests, and in particular those of (former) administrators and officials 
employed in the GDR. Following a drop in support in 2002, which, as noted above, was 
a particularly disastrous year for the party across the board, voter share among the 
lower service class did make up some ground and continued to grow. However, the 
party did not fare as well among the upper service class; indeed, this occupational 
group represented the most substantial loss of support suffered by the PDS/Left Party 
in 2009. Overall, service class voter share failed to recover to the levels recorded in the 
early to mid-1990s. In the western states, the trend was similar across the two service 
class groups. After receiving only minimal support throughout the 1990s and in 2002, 
the party saw its share increase in both 2005 and 2009, particularly among the upper 
service class.     
The self-employed
Throughout the 1990s, SPD support among the self-employed was particularly weak in 
the eastern states and represented by far the smallest source of votes for the Social 
Democrats. Even in the 2002 election, when the SPD recorded its best performance 
among all occupational groups in the region, voter share remained decidedly modest. 
Furthermore, it slipped away again in 2005, and in 2009 SPD support among self-
employed voters (replicating the pattern of the lower service class) was weaker than 
that of the Left Party. In the western states, although the self-employed accounted for a 
greater share of the SPD vote overall, support remained quite flat and tailed off, albeit 
only slightly from 2005 onwards.
From the 1990s through to 2002, the PDS fared steadily worse among the self-
employed in the eastern states. Even the overall recovery in 2005 was unable to boost 
the party’s voter share among this occupational group to above 20% and the support 
received in the early 1990s. Furthermore, this modest level of support then declined 
even more in 2009. Together with the upper service class, the self-employed therefore 
represent the Left Party’s weakest source of electoral support. In the western states, 
while the minimal support during the PDS era is barely surprising, the Left Party too 
failed to attract a substantially greater share of votes from the self-employed and its 
modest increase in 2005 had even dropped away by 2009.
The routine non-manual working class
In the eastern states, after its postwar merger with the KPD and after forty years of the 
GDR, the SPD had to work hard to re-establish itself as a workers’ party. It embarked 
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on this process of renewal as the extent of the social and economic realities of 
unification were materialising (Nachtwey and Spier, 2005, p.129). Despite the absence 
of a traditional alignment to the SPD, the routine manual working class became a key 
voter group (around 50%) for the Social Democrats. However, repeating the pattern 
that emerged across all occupational groups, support fell in 2005, returning to a level 
comparable to that of 1994. By 2009 the SPD’s share of the non-manual working class 
vote had fallen by more than half. In the western states, support among this 
occupational group was far more established, and was even further strengthened 
during the 1990s. Support then rose to well over 50% (the largest share among all 
occupational groups) in the year that the SPD formed the federal government with the 
Greens, but then declined steadily, with a marked decrease to just over 20% by 2009. 
Thus in both regions of Germany, the SPD saw its support from this important group 
halve over a period of fifteen years. 
PDS support from eastern routine non-manual workers in the 1990s was modest, 
especially when compared to that of the upper service class. This contrast can be 
regarded as a symptom of the ‘disrupted’ class cleavage in the GDR (see Section 3.2). 
Even by 2005, voter share among this group had barely risen above levels in the initial 
post-unification period. It was not until 2009 that Left Party votes from routine non-
manual workers exceeded votes for the SPD. In the western states, the pattern closely 
resembles that of the lower service class, with a minimal share of the vote until 2005. 
From this point, the party’s support among routine non-manual workers climbed 
steadily. However, even though the voter share does not approach that of the SPD in 
the western states, the key point is that in both regions, support noticeably falls away 
from the SPD as it increases for the PDS/Left Party.     
The manual working class
In the eastern states, the SPD managed to strengthen voter share among the manual 
working class in the 1990s and retain its support at around 50% until 2002. The 2005 
election produced a collapse in this group’s vote for the Social Democrats, with the 
share (just under 30%) already at a comparable level to that of the PDS/Left Party. 
Subsequently, in 2009, the SPD managed to attract less than 20% of manual working 
class voters. The pattern in the western states is similar to that of the routine non-
manual working class, although the overall decline over the fifteen-year period is less 
severe than for the latter occupational group.
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PDS support among eastern manual workers was characterised by marked 
fluctuations. Voter share remained below 20% throughout the 1990s, reaching a low in 
2002. However, the 2005 election was once again the turning point; PDS support 
soared among eastern manual workers, first matching and then exceeding the voter 
share of the SPD. In the western states, the trajectory is similar to that recorded for the 
routine non-manual working class, but with a stronger performance in the 2005 election 
and continued growth in 2009. Most significantly, there is once again evidence of an 
inverse relationship between manual worker support for the SPD and Left Party. 
The unemployed
In addition to these occupational groups, it is also naturally important to consider the 
voting patterns of unemployed electorate. In the prewar era, the SPD had not formed a 
particularly strong relationship to the unemployed; rather, it was the communist KPD 
that counted this group among its key support, along with the precariously employed of 
the time, such as casual labour and migrant workers (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.
130). In the postwar Federal Republic, however, during a period of low unemployment 
(and no realistic political challenge from the socialist left), the SPD succeeded in 
attracting the support of jobless voters; the Social Democrats averaged just under 50% 
of voter share among this group up until 1998. For the eastern states, post-unification 
dismantling of industry and jobs, along with the substantial westward migration, 
resulted in massive job losses. Although the SPD did not have a firmly established 
voter base in the eastern states, it nevertheless began to win the votes of the 
unemployed. However, Table 3.3 below shows that during the period of SPD-Green 
government (1998-2005) the Social Democrats lost substantial electoral support 
among unemployed voters in both regions, particularly in the East, where voter share 
fell to just over a quarter. 
Meanwhile, the PDS, with a voter share of only 2% (albeit higher than its average of 
just over 1%), clearly failed to make any significant inroads among the growing 
proportion of unemployed voters in the western states. Even in the eastern states, 
where support among the unemployed was stronger and the PDS far more established, 
the share was actually lower than average (for example, 21.6% of the total vote, 
compared to 17% of the unemployed vote). Yet as the SPD formed the federal 
government in 1998 and began rapidly losing popularity among jobless voters, the 
overall share of the vote for the PDS rose from 1.1% to 4.9% in the West and from 
16.9% to 25.3% in the East in 2005. Unemployed voters accounted for a greater share 
of the labour force, too, increasing from 9.0% to 11.0% in the western states and from 
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15.7% to the very substantial figure of 20.6% in the eastern states in the eleven-year 
period to 2005. During this time, the Left's share of the vote among jobless voters had 
grown from 2% to 14% in the West and from 16% to 42% in the East. It is therefore 
clear beyond a doubt that unemployed voters became a key source of support for the 
PDS/Left Party in both regions.
Table 3.3 Voting behaviour of the unemployed 1980–2005 (from 1990 West/East)
(Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.132) 
To sum up, the figures show that by 2009 SPD support from the manual working class 
had shrunk to around one-third of that group’s total share of the vote. While it should 
not be overlooked that the working class (particularly manual workers) still remained 
the most significant voter base for the SPD, by 2005 onwards, workers in the West 
displayed only a marginally greater propensity to support the SPD than did any other 
class.
In the eastern states, between 2005 and 2009, the share of manual and routine non-
manual working class votes for the PDS rose to exceed that of the votes for the SPD. 
As such, Elff and Rossteutscher identify evidence of class realignment of the PDS vote 
in the eastern states as the party, having lost the post-unification support of the upper 
service, increasingly become a party of working class people (i.e., within the routine 
manual and non-manual occupational groups), and the unemployed. In western 
Germany, the dwindling of these groups’ support for the Social Democrats was 
countered by a significantly greater share of votes for the Left Party. Here it is also 
necessary not to underestimate the significance of the western vote, which is 
numerically far larger than that in the eastern states; indeed, as Chapter One has 
discussed, it is one of the reasons why the PDS prioritised and persisted with the 
strategy of establishing a voter base in the West. 
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The voting patterns illustrated above clearly point to the electoral significance of socio-
economic class. What is more, the salience of class-based voting becomes even more 
pronounced when we consider the extent to which workers are more likely than the 
electorate as a whole to vote for the SPD and the PDS/Left Party. This question is 
addressed in Figure 3.7 below (Nachtwey and Spier, 2005, p.128), which maps working 
class voting patterns for the SPD in the western and eastern states (1977-2005 and 
1990-2005 respectively) and for the PDS in the eastern states (1990-2005) . This 61
time, the results are not based on Bundestag election results, but on surveys of voting 
intentions carried out every two years. Although it is therefore more difficult to ascertain 
whether these intentions translated into actual votes, the benefit of biannual test of 
opinions is that it can minimise the potentially distorting influence of national election 
campaigns and the preoccupation with potential government coalitions.  
The graph depicts the increased likelihood of the SPD and the PDS to gain the vote of 
blue-collar workers than of the population in general. If the figure is zero, this means 
that workers are no more or no less likely than the rest of the electorate to support the 
respective party. A value greater than zero indicates a greater propensity to vote for 
either the SPD or PDS, while a negative value means that the blue-collar voter is less 
likely than the general voting population to support either party (ibid.).  
The SPD
The graph depicts the very clear overall trend of diminishing working class support for 
the Social Democrats. In pre-unification West Germany the gradual decline had already 
begun towards the end of the SPD-FDP government (early 1980s). However, the 
inclination of working class voters to support the SPD reduced even further following 
unification and was not restored until the mid-late 1990s, during the waning popularity 
of the CDU-led government. Once in power, though, the SPD lost substantial working 
class support, so that by 2003 working class voters in the West became only slightly 
more inclined than the general population to support the party. In post-unification 
eastern Germany, historical factors (see Section 3.2) meant that the SPD had always 
struggled that bit harder to win working class votes, as shown in the values for the early 
1990s. By 1991, the likelihood of greater electoral support from workers than from 
other voters was only minimal, most probably still a reflection of the SPD’s ambivalent 
 Voting patterns are presented for blue-collar workers; there is no differentiation between 61
routine non-manual workers and manual workers. Figures are not presented for the PDS in the 
western states, as the party’s share of the vote in western Germany was so small until 2005. As 
the merger to form the Left Party took place in 2007, i.e., outside the range of this data, the 
party is still referred to as the PDS, its name at the time.
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approach to unification. It was towards the end of the 1990s that eastern workers 
became increasingly inclined to vote for the SPD, only for this support, still lower in the 
eastern states than in the West, to fall away during the SPD-Green coalition. As such, 
the year 2003, which is when the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms were passed, 
marked something of a watershed for the SPD, in that blue-collar voters in the East 
actually became less likely than the overall electorate in that region to vote for the SPD.
Figure 3.7: Workers' relative support for SPD and PDS, 1977-2005 (from 1990 West/East) 
(Nachtwey and Spier, 2005, p.128) 
The PDS/Left Party
The contrast between PDS and SPD support is immediately striking. Initially, the party 
clearly lacked the support of blue-collar workers in the former GDR; indeed, the 
negative values shown for the 1990s and up to 2003 confirm that working class voters 
were less likely than the rest of the electorate to vote for the PDS. The historical factors 
explained in Section 3.2 as well as the growing inclination of workers to support the 
SPD account for this pattern, although the relationship between the PDS and the 
working class did improve around the turn of the century, with workers only marginally 
less likely than average to vote for the party. Once again, 2003 marks the turning point, 
as eastern blue-collar workers became more inclined to support the PDS than the SPD, 
with PDS support continuing to climb in 2005. An additional factor to consider at this 
point is age. Bowyer and Vail (2011, p,691ff.) observe that the PDS/Left Party attracted 
a disproportionately older voter base in this region and attribute this to the fact that 
much of the older eastern population was socialised in the former GDR. Conversely, it 
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is among the younger electorate that the PDS/Left Party finds its support in the western 
states. These voters are therefore of working age, even if they do not actively 
participate in the labour market. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 above illustrate that support for the 
PDS/Left grew among working class and unemployed voters in particular and therefore 
substantiate the conclusion of Bowyer and Vail (2011, p.699) that ‘social class seems to 
be a stronger determinant of Left Party support in the West than in the East’. 
Conclusion
A degree of dealignment has taken place between the Social Democrats and the 
traditional working class. However, the cause of this dealignment is not the diminished 
relevance of the class cleavage; in fact, a new variant of the tension between capital 
and labour has materialised (Nachtwey & Spier, 2005, p.135), also fuelled by the 
emergence of new industries, increasingly deregulated patterns of employment and, as 
a result, the growth of the precariat. Growing numbers of people have found 
themselves facing social and financial insecurity, for example as a result of precarious 
work, pseudo self-employment and under-employment, as well as downward pressure 
on wages. Furthermore, redefining class according to modern types and patterns of 
employment demonstrates that although changes in its character have taken place, 
class itself nonetheless remains important. 
The demand and support for state welfare measures such as healthcare provision, a 
social safety net and secure, liveable pensions, have remained robust across much of 
the population, and especially among workers and the unemployed. This contradicts 
the expectation that anxiety over job security generates preference for policies that 
favour business interests over redistribution and workers’ rights. The 'Welfare Wende' 
of the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms encountered opposition from those eager to 
conserve the fundamentals of social democracy, such as a principled commitment to 
social ownership of industry and services, and a redistributive welfare system to 
promote social equality. The resulting opposition and protest to the reforms were 
expressions of the deep ‘symbolic wounds’ the reforms tore open.
In the absence of a party that unequivocally represents the preferences of a particular 
class, it is not the cleavage itself, but the expression of class-based divisions in society 
that becomes less pronounced. Consequently, a gap opened up on the demand side of 
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Germany’s party system for a party with a clearly pro-welfare programme and that 
articulated concerns about social justice (Kitschelt 2004). As such, Bowyer and Vail 
(2011, p.686) consider that support for the Left Party is based not just on established 
ideological extremism, or a bleak view of the economy in general, but on convictions 
concerning economic equality and what the government should do to alleviate it.
The Case Study of the Left Party in Bremen will therefore concentrate on the following 
themes to determine the extent that the class cleavage explains the electoral 
breakthrough of the party:
A clearly defined and articulated class cleavage: As a result of deindustrialisation, there 
is a growing low-paid service sector accompanied by a rise in precarious work. 
Consequently, the problem of poverty despite work intensifies. Such developments 
support this chapter’s argument that there are clear divisions in social-economic class, 
defined according to conditions of employment. Furthermore, opposition to the Agenda 
2010 and Hartz reforms is mobilised around the capital-labour cleavage. 
Class-based electoral support for Left Party: Traditionally there has been strong class-
based support for the SPD. However, following the implementation of Agenda 2010 and 
Hartz reforms, a degree of dealignment from the SPD has taken place along class 
lines. It is expected that this dealignment is particularly noticeable in working-class 
neighbourhoods where SPD is traditionally high. Conversely, it is anticipated that a 
partial realignment towards the Left Party has occurred, with particularly strong 
evidence of this trend found in working-class SPD strongholds.
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Chapter 4: 
Bremen Case Study
Introduction
This research is concerned with identifying the relative strengths of two explanatory 
frameworks, Cartel Theory and Social Cleavage Theory, in accounting for the success 
of the Left Party in Germany’s western states. Chapter One’s historical account of the 
PDS/Left Party in Germany’s western states has outlined the strategy of establishing a 
voter base in the western states and also outlined the party’s three key policy areas of 
social justice, eastern interests and peace. It has also explained the significance of the 
Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms that led to the creation of the Left Party. Chapters Two 
and Three have introduced the two theoretical approaches of Cartel Theory and Social 
Cleavage Theory and placed both in the context of the German party political system. 
The task of the current chapter is to bring together these themes and put the 
explanatory frameworks to the test in a case study of the Left Party in the city-state of 
Bremen. Initial conclusions are drawn about the ability of these theories to explain the 
eventual success of the Left Party there. 
To set the scene, Section 4.1 begins with a contextual portrayal of Bremen’s structural, 
economic and political character. Long before the socio-economic and political 
consequences of the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms took effect, budgetary crisis, 
poverty and unemployment had already become established problems in this staunchly 
Social-Democratic city-state. In fact, it is the combination of persistent socio-economic 
challenge and uninterrupted SPD governance that provides such an interesting context 
for the research: given the long-term nature of Bremen’s financial and social problems 
and the Social-Democratic political tradition, what were the transformations that took 
place to facilitate the Left Party’s breakthrough success in 2007? 
Against this background, Section 4.2 then turns its attention to the performance of the 
Left Party itself. Throughout the legislative periods 1999 to 2007, the SPD governed in 
coalition with the CDU and oversaw the major restructuring of Bremen’s economy and 
industry, as well as the Hartz reforms introduced by the SPD-Green federal 
government in 2004. The section is structured into two parts, starting with the PDS and 
the Bürgerschaft elections in 1999 and 2003, in other words before the party formed 
the alliance with the WASG. Despite Bremen’s social and economic difficulties and the 
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hopes of the national leadership, the PDS remained unable to make any convincing 
impact in the state’s regional elections. Local issues and political constellations specific 
to Bremen, as well as the general challenges facing the PDS in the western states, all 
contributed to this underwhelming performance. The second part turns to the 2007 
election. By now, considerable change had taken place at a national level, not least in 
the implementation of the Hartz employment and welfare measures. The Left Party had 
also already gained seats in the Bundestag, although it had yet to enter a single 
western parliament. This section identifies the major election issues of 2007 and 
identifies the Left Party’s main campaign focus and objectives. The final part sets out 
the election results for the three centre-left parties, ahead of further analysis in Section 
4.3.
Section 4.3 analyses the theoretical frameworks in context, beginning with Cartel 
Theory (4.3.1). The key areas identified in Chapter Two — a narrowed policy supply 
and an internal organisation characterised by a parliamentary focus and ascendant 
party in central office — form the basis of the Cartel Theory analysis. Beginning with a 
closer examination of the policy scope offered at the time of the 2007 election, the 
chapter looks within the Left Party itself to discover whether evidence exists of efforts 
to consciously modify policy supply in order to gain power. Focusing on organisational 
traits, the study considers whether indicators such as efforts to influence candidate 
selection and campaign focus support Cartel Theory’s prediction of a power shift from 
the party basis towards the party leadership.
Section 4.3.2 places Social Cleavage Theory in the context of Bremen. It explores 
evidence that could support the themes identified in Chapter Three: a clearly defined 
and expressed class cleavage and evidence of class-based electoral support for the 
Left Party. As a collective identity is required for the expression of a social cleavage, 
the section begins with an account of the protests that sprang up as a consequence of 
the Hartz measures. The series of demonstrations, which came to be held on a regular 
basis on the Market Square (and in fact still take place today), provided a space for 
public protest for participants who were members of political parties, supporters/
members of social movements or simply individuals compelled to voice and share their 
dissent. The research examines the social and political character of these protests, in 
relation to the actors, the issues and the class-based language used to articulate the 
objections and demands. To determine the extent to which the Left Party’s success in 
Bremen could be explained in terms of class voting, the study then analyses the voting 
patterns in the 2007 Bürgerschaft election according to factors such as political 
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tradition and socio-economic class, and looks for evidence of class-based dealignment 
and realignment, particularly in SPD-voting, working-class districts. 
Methodology
A variety of resources useful for the investigation of both frameworks was readily 
available. Data obtained from Bremen’s State Statistics Office (Statistisches 
Landesamt) provided extensive information (tables and maps) on structural voting 
patterns, for example according to age, employment status and occupation, as well as 
statistics relating to income and employment, including at the most local level. The data 
was used to identify patterns in Left Party electoral support and subsequently to 
support the analysis of class-based voting patterns. Analysis of the election data 
pointed to a marked increase in Left Party support among the unemployed, workers 
and trade union members. Meanwhile, data relating to the political character of 
individual districts revealed that the support was concentrated in SPD strongholds, but 
also in certain Green strongholds.     
Bremen also has an Archive of Social Movements, which proved a useful starting point 
from which to build a picture of the groups that organised the first Monday 
demonstrations against Hartz IV. For every year that the protests have been held, the 
Initiative Bremer Montagsdemo group has published an online ‘annual’ containing 
collected press cuttings, photographs and flyers and transcripts of speeches by 
demonstrators. This documentation proved an invaluable resource for understanding 
the changes and developments in the framing and mobilisation of protest. It emerged 
that the Hartz demonstrations were indeed framed in class terms, but also that it was 
not until later, and in particular the growing influence of the WASG and trade unions, 
that Bremen’s Monday demonstrations were cast in clearly leftist class-based terms. 
Furthermore, this data also revealed several examples of the challenges confronting 
the PDS in the western states, including perceived ‘easternness’, weak ties to extra-
parliamentary movements and the perennial tension between office-seeking and 
opposition. 
A key aspect of Cartel Theory explored in the study related to leadership and 
organisation. Resources relating to these themes appeared more difficult to come by, 
as they would require an ‘insider’s view’ of the Left Party. However, a search of social 
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movements’ websites led to an online discussion forum, ‘OFFO’ . Established by 62
WASG members prior to the merger with the PDS, OFFO featured in-depth discussion 
topics relating not only to political issues in Bremen, but also the WASG-PDS 
cooperation and, later, the practices and policies of the Bremen Left Party. Non-
members, including local activists critical of the Left Party’s perceived 
parliamentarianism and reformist approach also contributed to the forum. Most 
interestingly for the research, discussions focused on transformations within the party, 
for example concerning leadership, democracy and party orientation; debates also 
addressed policy and the relationship to the SPD. Through the contributions, some 
supportive, others highly critical of the new alliance, it was possible to gain valuable 
insights into themes identified in Cartel Theory. Signs of an increasingly parliamentary 
focus emerged, as did indications of central party intervention in the election campaign 
and possible restriction of the policy offer. 
Therefore, qualitative analysis of the election data and the wealth of locally-based 
resources enabled inferences to be made about both Cartel Theory and Social 
Cleavage Theory. Consequently, the aim of the original, empirical aspect of the study 
was to obtain and qualitatively analyse supplementary evidence for its ability to support 
the key themes of each explanatory framework. 
There were two main considerations that determined sample selection and the 
research design. First, a central aspect of the thesis concerns the electoral 
breakthrough of the Left Party, which in the case of Bremen was 2007. Secondly, while 
aspects of the Cartel Theory framework require evidence from party members (e.g. 
relating to leadership and organisation), other aspects of the investigation would benefit 
from evidence from ordinary voters, since members would not account for the party’s 
breakthrough. Therefore, how would it be possible to obtain responses from both 
members and non-members who, in addition, were able to recall the reason for their 
voting decision in 2007?  
To fulfil these very specific criteria, a snowball sample approach was used. Initial 
contact was made with the Left Party in Bremen, as well as with social movements and 
organisations known to share policy interests/positions with the party, such as the 
Bremen Peace Forum, local trade union branches and the Chamber of Labour. In each 
 ‘Offene linke bremer Diskussionsforum’. In December 2007, after a series of conflicts with the 62
forum, the Left Party removed the OFFO link from its website. See ‘Offener Brief an den 
Landesvorstand der Partei DIE LINKE’ (Antikapitalistische Linke, 2008). Sadly, the number of 
users gradually declined after the merger; today the OFFO forum has closed.
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case, the contact person was made aware of the aims of the research and invited to 
distribute an online self-administered questionnaire (‘Questionnaire 1’ ). The contact 63
person at the Left Party agreed to place a link to the questionnaire on the party’s social 
media page. Contact persons from the social movements and groups were unable to 
publish a link on the website, as they were obliged to maintain party neutrality, even 
when the organisation had campaigned alongside the Left Party on specific issues. 
However, it was possible to distribute the link to associates in an ‘unofficial’ capacity.
Questionnaire 1 consisted of a series of closed questions, with the option of entering 
additional comments, and was designed to elicit responses relating to both Social 
Cleavage Theory, and aspects of Cartel Theory (principally policy competition, office-
seeking and opposition). Questions were worded carefully to avoid reference to the 
theories, or use of contentious/ill-defined terms, such as ‘working class’ (see Appendix 
1).  
However, questions requiring the response of members only, for instance those relating 
to leadership and organisation aspects of Cartel Theory, had yet to be addressed. 
Therefore, a second set of questions was compiled with the goal of gathering more 
focused and in-depth evidence in a structured interview. The aims and scope were 
explained to the (different) contact person at the party office, with the request for three 
to five remote interviews , ideally to include the grassroots party membership. A list of 64
themes and anticipated questions was forwarded to the contact person. At this point 
there was a palpable reluctance to consent to the interviews; instead the contact 
person offered to distribute the interview questions as a written, self-administered 
questionnaire to be returned by email. This approach was not ideal, as the questions 
were designed to elicit detailed information, and it was unrealistic to expect a 
respondent to spend time writing lengthy, in-depth answers to each question; 
furthermore, this method precluded clarification and follow-up questions. Nevertheless, 
it was agreed to gather the evidence in this manner and to distribute Questionnaire 2 . 65
This time, the questionnaire consisted of a series of open questions relating to Cartel 
Theory. The questions were designed to be answered by any type of member and as 
before avoided use of theoretical terminology (see Appendix 2).  
 See Appendix 1 for the English-language version of Questionnaire 1. The language of the 63
distributed questionnaire and the responses was German.
 Both telephone and Skype were offered.64
 See Appendix 2 for the English-language version of Questionnaire 2. The language of the 65
distributed questionnaire and the responses was German.
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The number of responses received for Questionnaire 1 was twenty-three. Although 
clearly not statistically significant, the data yielded some very useful evidence, 
particularly as respondents made frequent use of the comments fields to give more 
detailed answers and explanations. Questionnaire 2 received only one response with 
sufficiently elaborated answers. An inherent disadvantage of self-administered 
questionnaires is the potential for misunderstandings and dwindling interest/patience. 
Indeed, this may have contributed to Questionnaire 2’s weak response rate. 
Nevertheless, the respondent to the second questionnaire actually provided several 
insights into key aspects of the study, including the relationship to social democracy, 
core policy themes and parliamentary focus. 
Therefore, despite the low volume of responses, the qualitative data obtained through 
the questionnaire and accompanying anecdotal evidence provided some important 
insights to supplement the findings from the existing data and the conclusions of the 
study.
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4.1. Bremen: Structural, Economic and Political 
Background
Bremen is a city-state (Stadtstaat) consisting of two municipalities, Bremen (City) and 
Bremerhaven . Its status as a city-state carries both benefits and drawbacks. On the 66
positive side, as a state in its own right, its autonomy over spending and decision-
making is far greater than that of a city within a larger federal state (Flächenland or 
‘area state’). Also, without the additional layer of administration between itself and the 
federal government, the city-state is able to more rapidly access and implement federal 
programmes and funding (Plöger, 2008, p.9). However, even though the states are 
responsible for competences such as education, law enforcement, they do not possess 
their own tax-raising powers , which means that although the federal states, including 67
the three city-states, ‘bear full responsibility for their expenditure, they are unable to 
raise taxes to cover any shortfalls in expenditure (or excess expenditure), which in 
times of slow economic growth therefore tend to be covered by borrowing’ (Green et 
al., 2008, p.61). As we will see, precisely this problem has had particularly severe 
consequences for Bremen. Moreover, the city-state is also responsible for fulfilling 
functions and services whose scope extends beyond the geographical limits and 
interests of the city itself (Plöger, 2008, p.4). For instance, Bremen's infrastructure, 
public services, higher education (all of which are competences devolved to the 
Länder) and its port are significant not only for the city-state, but also to the 
surrounding region, further afield across the country and even internationally.
On top of these significant financial responsibilities, the city-state faces a further yet 
related challenge in the form of suburbanisation (ibid., p.2). The relocation of wealthier 
households to greener, quieter, more desirable outskirts of the city and even beyond 
has led also to the relocation of financial resources away from the central city, since 
income tax is based on the municipality of residence — the ‘Steuerzerlegung nach dem 
Wohnortsprinzip’ (Spehr, 2007, p.132). For Bremen, higher earners moving away from 
the centre into the surrounding area, chiefly to the state of Lower Saxony, therefore 
represents a direct loss of income (ibid., p.4). Even so, Bremen is still obliged to 
finance and carry out its functions both as a city and as a state. This is a challenge that 
 To avoid confusion, the city-state of Bremen is referred to as Bremen; the city of Bremen is 66
referred to as Bremen City.
 Taxes are raised at federal level then distributed in varying proportions across the federation, 67
the states and municipalities (Green et al., 2008, p.61).
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has to some degree also affected Germany's two other city-states but Bremen, the 
smallest of the three, has neither Berlin’s capital city status, nor Hamburg’s reputation 
as a ‘global’ city (Spehr, 2007, p.131). Ever since the tax ruling came into effect in the 
1970s (ibid., p.132), there has been a continuous and stark disparity in the relationship 
between Bremen's revenue and its expenditure obligations. Consequently, the city-
state has experienced a serious and enduring budget problem, which was then 
exacerbated by a further restructuring of federal finances following unification (ibid). 
The Länderfinanzausgleich (fiscal equalisation programme) has meant that while the 
eastern federal states (plus Berlin) receive a greater share of payments to assist with 
infrastructure development, the poorest western states, including Bremen, actually 
receive less funding (Green et al., 2008, p.72).   
4.1.1. Democratic Institutions and Political Parties
Bremen’s Landtag, or federal state parliament, is known as the Bürgerschaft. Electoral 
law treats the state as two distinct electoral areas, Bremen City and Bremerhaven. 
Thus, while a party has to achieve at least five per cent of voter share in order to enter 
the Bürgerschaft as a parliamentary group, it is only necessary to do so in either 
municipal area . In other words, a party could gain five per cent of the vote in 68
Bremerhaven but only three per cent in Bremen City and still be represented in 
parliament. This clause has proven highly significant in Bremerhaven, where electoral 
participation is generally lower than that of Bremen City, and has contributed to fringe 
parties gaining representation in this area of the state (Probst, 1999, p.6). The lower 
voting turnout has been attributed to a sense of being treated as Bremen's 'poor 
relation', as well as scepticism regarding the main parties' interest in or commitment to 
tackling Bremerhaven's particularly acute social and economic problems (ibid., p.7). 
Politically, Bremen is dominated by the SPD. It is the only western state in which the 
Social Democrats have remained in power without interruption since 1946; during that 
time the party has managed to gain an absolute majority five times (Infratest dimap, 
2007, p.18), which is quite an achievement in an electoral system based on 
proportional representation. Bremen is sometimes referred to in terms of its ‘mini-
electorate’ (Probst, 2007, p.4). This characterisation alludes not only to Bremen’s 
status as Germany’s smallest federal state, but also to the fact that it is a type of 
‘laboratory for new developments in the party system’ (ibid.). One reason for this is the 
favourable environment for small parties. It was in Bremen that the Greens first gained 
 See Bremen Verwaltung online: Wahlen im Land Bremen: ‘Sperrklausel’. 68
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representation in a regional parliament — a trajectory the PDS hoped to emulate in the 
West (Broughton, 2000, p.57). In addition, small right-wing parties such as the DVU 
and locally focused parties/alliances including Arbeit für Bremen (Jobs for Bremen) and 
Bürger in Wut (Enraged Citizens) have also managed to send deputies to the regional 
parliament. Secondly, Bremen’s governing SPD has experimented with various 
coalition configurations, including the Grand Coalition with the CDU, the ‘traffic light’ 
coalition (SPD/FDP/Green) and the Red-Green coalition (Spehr, 2007, p.131). 
Throughout the legislative periods 1999 to 2007, the SPD governed in coalition with the 
CDU and presided over the major restructuring of Bremen’s economy and industry 
described below. The coalition also oversaw the implementation of the Hartz reforms 
introduced by the SPD-Green federal government in 2004. In the aftermath of the 2007 
regional election and the Left Party’s entry to Bremen’s parliament, the SPD once again 
switched its coalition partner and entered into government with the Greens.
4.1.2. Bremen’s ‘Restructuring’ 
Bremen’s port has traditionally dominated the state’s industry and plays a vital role in 
the Germany’s export-orientated economy (Plöger, 2008, p.1). However, from the mid 
1970s, shipbuilding in general experienced a decline that would eventually result in the 
loss of two major shipbuilding companies in Bremen (AG Weser in 1984 and later 
Bremer Vulkan AG). As a result, Bremen became one of the regions with the highest 
levels of unemployment in western Germany (Probst, 2007, p.22). 
As a consequence, Bremen’s harbour industry underwent significant structural change. 
The orientation shifted to modern logistics and transport, which were more attractive in 
terms of added value than the old labour-intensive shipbuilding industry. Yet the 
outcome of this shift was an increase in unemployment and impoverishment, as well as 
a resulting shortfall in income: ‘This successful economic function has not been 
reflected locally, either in terms of increased tax revenue or in more jobs (…); it is a 
case of “jobless growth”’ (Spehr, 2007, p.132). As jobs in Bremen's traditional economy 
vanished forever, a large number of low-skilled workers, many of them with a migrant 
background, found themselves ‘being threatened with permanent exclusion from the 
formal labour market’ (Plöger, 2008, p.11).
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By the late 1980s, Bremen was suffering a growing budget crisis, prompting the SPD-
led government to make a claim at the Constitutional Court for compensation to take 
into account the city-state's fulfilment of the higher (in other words federal state) 
functions outlined above (ibid., p.5). In 1991, the state won compensation of €8.5 
billion, which included financial assistance from other states, spread across two five-
year periods, in instalments of between €500 and €900 million (Spehr, 2007, p.129). 
However, the federal government linked financial assistance to stringent budgetary 
measures. The primary objective of the package was debt reduction, although it was 
agreed that savings on servicing debt could be used for investment (Plöger, 2008, p.5). 
Bremen’s President Henning Scherf (SPD) accepted the terms and described the SPD-
CDU government as ‘the restructuring coalition' (Thomsen, 1999). However, the 
reverse side of the coin was that Bremen's per capita debt soared, becoming the 
highest in any of Germany's states (ibid.). The coalition used the funds for ongoing 
expenditure commitments and interest payments, but part of the agreement was to 
freeze public spending in areas such as social services, jobs and education; by 2004, 
the level of public expenditure was nominally comparable to that of the previous 
decade. Not only did this amount to a significant reduction in public spending, it also 
resulted in a cut in the number of public sector employees (ibid.). 
Following on from earlier measures introduced in the late 1980s to enhance the city's 
status as a centre for science and technology, Bremen's government embarked on a 
series of projects (Plöger, 2008, p.3). These were designed to develop new industry 
and business parks, to improve transport to the harbour and airport, to promote tourism 
both in the city centre and with the constriction of new projects, as well as to prioritise 
research and development, focusing on existing industries and new research institutes 
(ibid., p.5). Even Bremen University's academic focus was restructured, moving away 
from the social sciences and towards technology and the natural sciences (ibid., p.4). 
While public spending froze, expenditure for ‘restructuring investments’ doubled (Spehr,
2007, p.129). However, the results were mixed, and some of the high-profile 
investments turned out to be financial flops, such as the Space Park, the Musical 
Theatre and the private International University (ibid.). Although the restructuring 
programme prioritised growth in the high-tech, high-skill sectors, it also envisaged job 
creation in the low-pay sector, for example retail and catering jobs at the Space Park, 
an ultimately ruinous venture that was supposed to rejuvenate the socially deprived 
neighbourhood of Gröpelingen (Plöger, 2008, p.9). 
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The government promised that the finance package would stimulate job creation and, 
very importantly, jobs paying enough to become liable for social security contributions. 
But by the 1999 state election, the number of jobs qualifying for social security 
contributions had actually fallen by approximately 8,000 (Thomsen 1999). In the 
meantime, unemployment stood at 15.6%, a rate comparable with that in some eastern 
states (Probst, 1999, p.2). As a consequence, the proportion of Bremen's residents 
receiving social welfare payments also increased and was among the highest 
nationally in relation to the population. A further knock-on effect was that as 
unemployment rose, so did the problem of people chasing jobs for which they were 
over-qualified, thus creating even greater barriers to employment for those with few or 
no qualifications or skills (Plöger, 2008, p.9). Debt and a shortfall in income went hand 
in hand with a series of privatisation measures. Substantial sections of Bremen’s 
housing and infrastructure, including the Stadtwerke public utilities company, waste 
disposal and water, had been sold off, often at bargain prices (Thomsen 1999). All in 
all, the coalition ‘practised redistribution from bottom to top in enormous 
proportions’ (Spehr, 2007, p.129).
Even more ambitious measures were proposed under the SPD. One such concept was 
a reform of ‘task fulfilment’. The plans were submitted on behalf of a state steering 
group and envisaged the functions of the state being reduced to the very barest legal 
minimum, namely law enforcement, justice and financial administration (Eisermann and 
Spehr, 2007). This so-called ‘night watchman’ state would act as a manager/
coordinator of the public services ‘market’ and contract out all other services to private 
enterprises or to the non-profit sector (Disput, 2003) . A further proposal envisaged the 69
creation of a special economic zone (Eisermann and Spehr, 2007). Under this scheme, 
Bremen would have once again become a ‘test laboratory’ (Rupp, 2003); this time for a 
programme of deregulation and tax incentives designed to attract businesses with low 
costs and to stimulate the creation of (cheap) jobs. Had it been approved, the plan 
would have swept aside employment rights and the nationally established 
Tarifautonomie (collective bargaining) in a bid to dismantle legal protection, which was 
now renamed ‘bureaucracy’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2010). 
In 2002, the Bremen Chamber of Labour (Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen - ANK) 
published its first 'Poverty Report'. The ANK took as its point of reference a report 
published by the federal government a year earlier, which examined poverty and wealth 
 This ‘Neuordnung der Aufgabenwahrnehmung’ would be based on a similar model to that of 69
the ‘no-frills’ council or so-called ‘Easy Council’. 
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across the whole of Germany. The ANK was disappointed that Bremen’s government 
had refused to publish a similar report of i ts own (Jakubowski and 
Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen, 2002, p.9), so in the absence of an official report, the 
task fell to the ANK. The report identified unemployment as a key cause of poverty. Not 
only was joblessness stubbornly high, but the number of long-term unemployed was 
also increasing. What is more, the responsibility for implementing social welfare 
support (Sozialhilfe), was placing the local municipality mounting financial pressure 
(ibid., p.16). The report’s key finding was that any realistic chance of solving poverty 
was its recognition as a social problem within society — not a purely economic one 
(ibid., p.13). The following year, the ANK published another report, this time with the 
spotlight on the growing problem of in-work poverty . This time, the report identified a 70
growing awareness of poverty in Bremen. 
(B)eyond the 'official politics' there is another level of politics that is 
concerned about and with the poverty situation in our city, and which wants 
to know more and do more about it (and) to tackle it not just as an 
individual problem but as a social problem. (Jakubowski and 
Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen, 2003, p.7)
 In subsequent years leading up to the 2007 election, the ANK’s reports examined (inter alia) 70
poverty and health (2004), poverty and education (2005), the working poor (2006) and the 
social division of the city (2007). 
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4.2 The 2007 Bürgerschaft Election in Bremen
The 2007 Bürgerschaft election marked the turning point for the Left Party. But prior to 
this breakthrough, despite Bremen’s economic and social challenges, the PDS had 
repeatedly demonstrated its inability to mobilise opposition to the policies and 
programmes of the SPD-led government. This section traces the PDS/Left Party’s 
arduous path to the Bürgerschaft, beginning with the 1999 and 2003 elections. These 
earlier elections highlight the challenges facing the PDS in the western states (see 
Chapter One); furthermore, it is possible to discern early patterns in campaigning and 
voter share that would later become significant for the Left Party.   
4.2.1. The PDS and the Bürgerschaft Elections 1999-2003
Table 4.1. Election results for the PDS in Bremen Bürgerschaft elections 1995, 1999, 2003 
Source: Probst et al. 2008, page 3.
The 1999 Election
The 1999 Bürgerschaft election was the first major test of the Grand Coalition 
government and its restructuring programme. At federal level, the first ever SPD-Green 
government had come to power just the previous year,  which might have raised 71
expectations for a similar coalition in Bremen. However, Bremen's ruling SPD instead 
signalled its preference for continuing the partnership with the Christian Democrats for 
a second term (Broughton, 2000, p.56). One effect of this strategy and the subsequent 
dominance of the two largest parties was that smaller parties, including the PDS, were 
squeezed out and struggled to make a strong impression during the campaign.
 Broughton (2000, p.51) also observes that the 1999 regional elections in several federal 71
states were the first opportunity to assess the ‘fallout’ from the Third Way/Neue Mitte.
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Nonetheless, undeterred by the disappointing outcome of the previous election in 
1995 , the PDS entered the Bürgerschaft election campaign with a degree of 72
optimism. According to the Secretary of the Bremen Landesverband (regional 
association), writing in an article for party members’ magazine Disput, the PDS had 
been bolstered by an increase in its modest membership (from 30 to 150), some of 
whom enjoyed valuable connections to Bremen's social movements (Thomsen, 1999). 
On the other hand, he also acknowledged that it had been difficult to develop a strong 
profile on local themes during the past legislative period, despite Bremen's economic 
and social plight (ibid.). The article explained that in light of SPD and CDU public 
statements in favour of extending their coalition it was unlikely there would be a great 
tactical push among voters to bring about an alternative Red-Green coalition. The 
article also took the Greens to task on the grounds that during the traffic-light coalition 
they had supported privatisation, had not provided effective opposition from the left, 
and now appeared to be focused on ‘seeking the favour of an increasingly right-wing 
SPD’ (ibid.). 
With no new Red-Green coalition on the cards, the PDS targeted Green strongholds, 
and especially voters disillusioned with the Greens’ performance in national 
government (Probst, 1999, p.6). Despite its short time in office, the Red-Green federal 
government had disappointed particularly Green voters, who were dismayed at the 
(seemingly indefinite) postponement of the nuclear energy phase-out, the failed 
introduction of dual citizenship rights and, in particular, the stance on German military 
involvement in Kosovo. The PDS therefore planned to present itself as the genuine 
party of opposition and peace, and had already initiated anti-war protests through 
Bremen City and posted anti-war placards in traditionally Green-voting districts such as 
Östliche Vorstadt and Walle. In addition, the campaign hoped to appeal to political 
activists in the inner city, socially marginalised people in the suburbs, migrants (the 
party produced special materials on education and migrants' rights), as well as young 
and first-time voters. The party's weak organisation and resources, however, meant it 
relied on outside help from PDS groups in other states to produce and distribute the 
campaign materials (ibid.). 
Despite the cautious optimism that the PDS may finally live up to expectations in the 
'stronghold' of Bremen, the election results were again disappointing and the party still 
failed by some stretch to achieve five per cent in either Bremen City (3.1%) or 
Bremerhaven (1.6%) and was unable to gain a single seat the Bürgerschaft. However, 
 The PDS achieved just 2.37% of the vote in 1995.72
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while the party was unable to enter the state parliament, it did manage to gain some 
additional seats on local councils (Beiräte). The party had in fact won representation at 
this most local level of democracy in a number of neighbourhoods as early as 1995, 
with eight seats by 1999.
The PDS gained its local council seats in areas that were by no means characterised 
by socio-economic difficulties. Östliche Vorstadt, the district which consistently 
produced the strongest PDS vote, both in Beirat and parliamentary elections (and later 
for the Left Party, too) was a traditionally left-leaning Green stronghold, a middle class 
inner-city area popular with academics and artists. In fact, both Östliche Vorstadt and 
Mitte, also a key location of PDS/Left Party support, were ranked among the top fifty 
per cent of Bremen’s high-income districts . Of the districts with PDS Beirat seats in 73
1995, only Walle and Vahr were ranked in the lowest quarter of the income table 
(Muscheid and  Strüßmann, 2011, p.7).
The 2003 Election
In the run-up to the 2003 Bürgerschaft election, Bremen’s SPD and CDU once again 
stated their intention to continue the Grand Coalition. Despite the increasing 
unpopularity of the SPD-led national government, it appeared that for Bremen’s voters 
it was regional rather than national issues that prevailed, since approximately two-
thirds of voters considered Bremen’s politics more important than what was happening 
at federal level (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2003, p.1).
In spite of the persistent unemployment and social problems, PDS hopes for the 
election were decidedly cautious. The PDS feared that, unlike the SPD, its 
Bürgerschaft campaign would be hampered by the challenges facing the party at 
national level (Disput, 2003). In the previous year’s General Election, the PDS had 
failed to achieve the five per cent required to form a parliamentary group; the PDS was 
therefore excluded from certain privileges and struggled to maintain its profile as a 
national party (see Chapter One). 
Furthermore, the party had recently experienced a particularly bruising congress at 
Gera, where factional feuds had cast doubt over the future of the party’s ability to be 
anything but an eastern regional party. Conflict over the new party programme 
prompted the exit of several members from the Bremen party. This not only further 
weakened the party organisation (Spehr, 2007, p.134), but also resulted in the loss of 
 Based on the number of residents liable for tax on incomes of over €125,000 per annum.73
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invaluable contacts with local social groups, including self-help organisations for the 
unemployed, especially in the poor districts in the west of the city. Precisely these types 
of neighbourhood later became strongholds for the WASG. As such, by 2003 it was 
evident that the PDS actually had a variety of promising sources of support in Bremen, 
but also failed to mobilise this potential (ibid.).  
In the 2003 election, the SPD was able to strengthen its position as the largest party 
(see Table 4.1 above). However, given the lack of confidence in the governing parties’ 
competence to effectively tackle the most pressing problems, especially 
unemployment, the success of the SPD was widely attributed primarily to more 
personal factors, namely the continued popularity of its incumbent lead candidate 
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2003, p.2). The continued electoral success of the existing 
coalition left little room for the smaller parties, although both the right-wing law-and-
order Schill Party and right-wing nationalist DVU outperformed the PDS, with the DVU 
once again securing a seat in Bremerhaven (Infratest dimap, 2003, p.18). The DVU lost 
votes in Bremen City but increased its share in Bremerhaven, a result that highlighted 
not only the cleft between the two municipalities, but also the persistent weakness of 
the PDS, despite campaigning on these very issues, to attract voters in an area 
particularly severely affected by unemployment and social problems. 
To sum up, from the mid 1990s, the city-state of Bremen had been suffering the 
consequences of industrial decline. The transition to a high-tech, service-based sector 
was a traumatic one not only for the state’s economy in general, but also for the many 
workers now facing long-term unemployment. The ‘restructuring’ programme was 
based on cuts and privatisation on the one hand, and expensive ‘prestige’ projects on 
the other, while politically, the SPD’s commitment to continued cooperation with the 
CDU meant that there was little prospect of bringing about a substantial shift in policy 
or political direction. What is more, the SPD and Greens managed to increase their 
voter share, meaning that the 2003 election produced an arithmetical shift to the left on 
the political spectrum. According to Spehr (2007, p.127), this overall leftward trend 
would normally produce a move to the left in voter preferences among the centre-left 
parties themselves; in other words, the expectation would be for the PDS (i.e., a party 
to the left of the SPD) to profit from the electorate’s inclination towards a more left-wing 
balance. The fact that the PDS actually lost ground compared to its 1999 result 
highlighted the problems within the party itself (ibid., p.128). With centre-left voters 
broadly united behind the SPD, the PDS again failed to successfully challenge the 
Social Democrats from the left and mobilise voters dissatisfied with the austerity 
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programme. The Bürgerschaft election results ‘showed once again that (the PDS) was 
unable to attract new voter groups’ (Probst et al., 2008, p.3).
4.2.2. The 2007 Bürgerschaft election
The mood in Bremen ahead of the 2007 Bürgerschaft election was generally a 
pessimistic one, and yet again it was the economic and jobs situation that were cause 
for concern. The Tageszeitung (‘Taz') newspaper reported that while jobs were certainly 
scarce in the eastern states, Bremen too was especially hard-hit by unemployment: the 
official jobless rate at that time stood at over 13%, and over 19% in Bremerhaven. 
Furthermore, those still holding onto their jobs were under increasing pressure, either 
facing redundancy or the expectation they should work longer hours for the same pay. 
Protests against the Hartz reforms had also taken place in Bremen (Tageszeitung, 
2004). The city-state still relied on subsidies from the federal government, despite the 
coalition’s target of balancing Bremen’s books by 2004, by the expiry of the subsidies 
fought for and won in the Constitutional Court. But the coalition failed to achieve this 
objective, even though it had implemented various cuts designed to save money. In 
fact, in 2006, it became necessary for Bremen to submit another claim to Karlsruhe in 
order to obtain further subsidies, while the deficit had risen to nearly 14 billion euro 
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.58) Although some investments in tourism, the port and 
aerospace were broadly deemed a success, 76% of the Bremen electorate believed 
that the Senat (cabinet) had spent public money in an irresponsible manner (ibid., p.
78). Most commonly criticised were the prestige projects, including the Space Park 
development, an undertaking which had met with objections not only from the 
opposition Greens, but also from businesses fearing that the already limited consumer 
spending power would be diverted away from the struggling centre (Probst, 2007, p.
24). 
Key Themes and Voter Priorities
Voter confidence in the SPD and Greens to improve the situation in socially and 
economically deprived areas stood at 40% and 10% respectively (Infratest dimap, 
2007, p.81). The Left Party (4%) criticised the track record of existing policy, claiming 
that it had failed to address the growing polarisation of Bremen’s districts (DIE LINKE 
Bremen, 2007, p.8). While the wealth of some already well-appointed neighbourhoods 
had doubtless benefited from the growth within high-tech industries (such as 
aerospace), other areas, especially traditionally workers’ districts, had instead become 
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workless neighbourhoods. On the one hand, Bremen had the highest proportion of 
millionaires in Germany in relation to its size; on the other hand it also had the highest 
proportion of welfare recipients (Probst, 2007, p.23). As one participant in this research 
observed: ‘Bremen is [Germany’s] most poverty-rich federal state’.
Ahead of the election , Bremen’s voters identified two important themes in the 74
election, namely social justice (31%) and economic policy (30%). Employment policy 
was ranked third in the list of priorities, with 22% (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.47). 
However, Left Party, SPD and Green voters attached differing degrees of importance to 
these and other issues . Although voters of all three parties prioritised social justice, 75
the issue proved by far the most significant for Left Party voters (69%), followed by 
Green (39%) and then SPD voters (36%). Left Party voters also placed employment 
policy above economic policy (33% and 16% respectively) (ibid.). 
As seen in the 2003 election, the SPD appeared to benefit from the tradition of social-
democratic support in Bremen, as well as from the popularity of its lead candidate. 
These trends looked set to continue in 2007; SPD supporters cited party loyalty as their 
primary reason for voting (34%), slightly ahead of party competence (32%) and appeal 
of the leading candidate (31%). Conversely, Green and especially Left Party voters 
attached far greater importance to competence (72% and 80% respectively) and were 
less likely to be persuaded by the merits of the leading candidate. Indeed, for Left Party 
voters, this was the least important motivating factor (just 7%) (ibid., p.45) which 
perhaps reflected the fact that the lead candidate, Peter Erlanson, had a recognition 
rate of only 16% among the Bremen electorate (ibid., p.86). Only a minority of Left 
Party voters (9%) cited party loyalty as a key influence on their choice, but it is 
important to bear in mind that, at the point of the election, the Left Party had yet to be 
formally created through the merger of the small, extra-parliamentary PDS and the still 
relatively new WASG . As such, there had been little opportunity to build party loyalty, 76
either among members or voters. Despite the state of transition within the party, around 
a third of voters (34%) believed it would bring a ‘breath of fresh air’ to Bremen’s politics, 
while 37% thought it was simply about time that the Left Party entered parliament (ibid., 
 Pre-election surveys published in ‘Wahlreport: Bürgerschaft Bremen 13. Mai 2007’ (Infratest 74
dimap, 2007). 
 Of the Green voters, 62% saw themselves as ‘winners’ rather than ‘losers’ in light of socio-75
economic developments in Bremen (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.75). 
 The merger had been agreed just two months earlier on 27 March, and the formal creation of 76
the Left Party took place on 16 June, shortly after the Bremen election. However, all official 
election results already referred to the party as ‘DIE LINKE’ (Left Party).
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p.85). Finally, a third of voters felt that social problems had become noticeably worse in 
recent years (ibid., p.78). Furthermore, in light of the recent exposure of systemic and 
tragic failures in social care and yet another rock-bottom ranking for education in 
Germany’s states, these too were also prominent themes in the election (Spehr, 2007, 
p.131). 
The Left Party Campaign 
The Left Party’s stated electoral goal was to gain at least 7% of the vote (Hanau, 2007) 
and to enter the Bürgerschaft as a parliamentary group for the first time (DIE LINKE 
Bremen, 2007, p.16). At last, it seemed that after the disappointments of the past, there 
was real potential for the Left in Bremen. The campaign built on the successes of the 
2005 General Election and reiterated the promise to provide a counterbalance to the 
neo-liberalism of the established parties and to cuts in public services (ibid., p.7). 
Clearly orientated to social issues, the party claimed to articulate Bremen’s demand for 
social solidarity, highlighting what it saw as the SPD-CDU coalition’s ‘politically-
motivated’ and ‘ruinous’ package of public spending cuts (ibid., p.9). In particular, the 
party aimed to attract disillusioned SPD voters and trade unionists (especially given 
that the WASG emerged from precisely these groups), former Green voters, as well as 
the growing ranks of non-voters (Probst, 2007, p.46). Although the PDS had had rather 
weak connections to the trade union movement, the alliance with the WASG meant that 
the Left’s electorate now potentially included a sizeable share of organised labour. The 
leading Left Party candidate Peter Erlanson had been an activist in the anti-nuclear 
movement and the peace movement before becoming involved in trade union politics. 
However, despite his activism, he had little formal party political experience and did not 
initially enjoy the backing of the national leadership (Henning, 2007) . Nevertheless, 77
the candidates received significant support from leading Left Party figures, including 
Gysi and Lafontaine, both of whom travelled to Bremen to speak at rallies. Their public 
endorsement also underlined the strategic importance of Bremen’s state election: it 
was the Left Party’s most promising opportunity to enter its first western regional 
parliament and was also intended to function as a springboard for the Left in other 
western parliaments (ibid.).
The Left Party’s eleven-point ‘action plan’ campaign included inter alia the demand to 
halt privatisation of Bremen’s public services (DIE LINKE Bremen, 2007, p.14), an end 
to compulsory one-euro jobs, the abolition of the three-tier school system (ibid., p.12) 
and the call for the introduction of a subsidised monthly travel ticket (ibid., p.13). What 
 The leadership’s position regarding Erlanson is discussed later on in this chapter (4.3.1).77
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is more, although Bremen’s state elections historically tended to focus on regional 
rather than national, issues, the programme pointedly criticised the Red-Green federal 
government, particularly over the employment market reforms and their impact in 
Bremen. Calling for the abolition of Hartz IV, the programme set out a range of interim 
measures, for example, demanding an end to the eviction of Hartz recipients and their 
enforced relocation to cheaper accommodation (ibid., p.19). The election manifesto 
also proposed a minimum wage for Bremen’s public sector jobs, in addition to a 
statutory national minimum wage (ibid.). Acknowledging its structural weakness in 
Bremerhaven, the party also addressed the municipality’s specific economic and social 
problems in a dedicated section of the programme (ibid., p.61). 
The Results of the 2007 Election
The results of the 2007 election are set out in Table 4.2. Official figures for Bremen 
show the overall electoral outcome, as well as those for Bremen City and 
Bremerhaven, and compare the results with those of 2003.
The tables show that although the SPD achieved its aim of remaining the largest party 
in Bremen, it lost a sizeable amount of support (-5.6) in relation to its outcome in the 
previous Bürgerschaft election in 2003, with the most noticeable decline in Bremen City 
(-6.2%). The Greens managed to increase their share of the vote by over 3% in both 
municipalities but support remained markedly stronger in Bremen City (17.4% 
compared to 12% in Bremerhaven). Finally, the Left Party made substantial gains in 
Bremen City, where it received over four times as many votes as it had in 2003, and in 
Bremerhaven, where the party achieved a six-fold increase in its vote. This was a 
welcome development for the Left Party, as the organisationally weak PDS had always 
struggled in the municipality . Overall, the Left Party accounted for 8.7% (an increase 78
of 6.9%) of the vote in Bremen and 6.9% (an increase of 5.8%) in Bremerhaven. The 
party thus exceeded its stated electoral goal of gaining at least 7% and, most 
importantly, was able to enter the Bürgerschaft with seven seats as a full Fraktion, the 
first time it had done so in a western federal state. 
 Because of its weak resources the PDS had in the past even declined to field candidates in 78
some local council elections in Bremerhaven. 
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Table 4.2. Official results for the 2007 Bürgerschaft election: 
(a) Bremen, (b) Bremen City and (c) Bremerhaven
Note: Percentage point differences were calculated with unrounded values and may 
therefore differ slightly to the results published by the Bremen Returning Officer. 
(Infratest dimap 2007, p.7)
The 2007 result was also important in terms of the overall political balance. Since the 
emergence of the Greens and especially until the end of the 1980s, Bremen’s politics 
had been weighted to the centre-left. In 1987, the SPD and Greens had a combined 
lead of more than 27% over the centre-right CDU and FDP (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.
21). The SPD suffered substantial losses in the 1990s for which the Greens were 
unable to compensate, despite a consistently strong performance. Now, in the 2007 
Bürgerschaft election, despite a poor result for the centre-right (less than 32% — the 
worst combined share since the 1960s), the SPD-Green bloc was yet again eroded as 
a result of the fall in support for the SPD and, for the first time, the strong performance 
of the Left Party. On the other hand, the arrival of the Left Party parliamentary group in 
the Bürgerschaft in fact marked a further shift in favour of the centre-left in Bremen 
(ibid., p.22). 
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4.3. The Theoretical Frameworks in Context: 
Analysing the Left Party’s Electoral Performance in 
Bremen
So far, the chapter has set out Bremen’s economic, social and political context as well 
as a general account of the main issues and outcomes of three regional elections, from 
the perspective of the PDS and Left Party. Having also recalled the key concepts of 
Cartel Theory and Social Cleavage Theory set out in Chapters Two and Three, the next 
task of this case study is to begin to draw together these various strands and discuss 
the Left Party’s success in Bremen in terms of the theoretical frameworks. 
4.3.1. Cartel Theory
Chapter Two has identified policy competition and party organisation as the main 
themes for further investigation in the Case Study. This section now explores both 
themes and considers their relevance for the Left Party in Bremen.
The Restricted Policy Space in Bremen
The Agenda 2010 reform of the German employment market and welfare provision, 
seen from the perspective of Cartel Theory, can be regarded as willingness on the part 
of the SPD in particular to break with its core constituency, the working class. These 
measures, which cut public spending, privatised public goods and adopted market-led 
policies and narrative, effectively narrowed the ideological scope within the party 
system. Given the broad consensus among Bremen’s established parliamentary 
parties, difference was limited to mere degrees of austerity, rather than opposition.  
Furthermore, the policy of privatisation also highlighted a disposition to place public 
services and future decision-making outside democratic control. The sale of services 
would necessitate binding commercial contracts (a costly process in itself), which 
cannot simply be reversed by an incoming government with an election manifesto 
commitment to public sector services. Even if at all feasible, the early termination of 
such contracts to return the service to public ownership would involve costly legal 
procedures and payments to compensate the commercial damage suffered by the 
company or organisation; given the context of fiscal restraint and austerity, this would 
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not be regarded as the best use of public money. Similarly, the mooted ‘commissioning 
authority’ model and special economic zone would have involved exempting private 
companies and organisations from regulations and/or legislation based on agreements 
reached between governments and social partners. Once established, tax incentives, 
like commercial contracts, would be difficult to remove, again incurring massive legal 
costs. What is more, the tax incentives designed to promote business in Bremen would 
have actually reduced state income, thereby forcing future governments to provide 
even fewer public goods. In short, Bremen’s SPD-led programme of privatisation 
effectively restricted the scope for government to fulfil a commitment to maintaining 
public services, social housing and utilities and as such represented a restriction of the 
policy supply curve. 
Furthermore, Bremen’s SPD Bürgermeister (Mayor) Henning Scherf clearly utilised 
what Blyth and Katz described as the rhetoric of no alternative in his defence of 
Agenda 2010 and the dismantling of employment protection. Stating that what mattered 
above all else was getting people back into work, Scherf referred to contractual 
employee protection as a ‘barrier’ to jobs. Moreover, the greater the ‘risk’ to businesses 
in an employment contract (in other words the greater the employee protection), the 
less effective any government employment policy would be. Scherf even went so far as 
to state that the deregulation of the employment market would actually contribute to the 
‘emancipating experience of standing on one’s own two feet’ (Rundfunk Berlin-
Brandenburg, 2003).
Pragmatism and Office-Seeking Goals?
Chapter One has shown that the PDS/Left could not be assumed to always favour 
principled opposition over participation in a coalition, even one that was intent on 
implementing cuts and privatisation. Examples from the eastern federal states have 
illustrated that for the PDS, becoming ‘electable’ as a junior partner in an SPD-led 
coalition government was not only realistic, but also palatable. Where the PDS had 
become a junior partner in Red-Red coalitions in the eastern states, the fulfilment of the 
responsibilities devolved to the Länder meant that the party had jointly introduced and 
implemented various cuts in social services, including those arising from Agenda 2010, 
while regional social services departments were responsible for processing welfare 
claims. The PDS was therefore directly complicit in implementing Hartz IV, meaning 
that ‘in other words its regional programme (was) pretty similar to what it (was) now 
opposing on a national level in the shape of Hartz IV’ (Becker, 2004). 
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For the PDS, the issue of ownership was at the heart of influence and relative strength 
in society (see Chapter One). Yet as the party’s involvement in regional and local 
government in the eastern states grew (potentially in Bremen, too), debates arose 
within the party that appeared to cast doubt on the centrality of social ownership. For 
instance, the Berlin regional party questioned which policy choice would most severely 
compromise the competence of debt-ridden municipalities: the privatisation of social 
housing stock or debt servicing using the fiscal resources raised by such sell-offs 
(Klein, 2007, p.195). A pragmatic approach was encouraged that weighed up the 
relative benefits and disadvantages to privatisation of housing stock or non-medical 
hospital services on the one hand, versus budget cuts for essential services, with 
serious social consequences on the other (ibid.). Given the severity of Bremen’s 
budgetary constraints, a future Left Party parliamentary group (let alone a coalition) 
would not be able to shrink from similar questions.     
While the PDS had, for better or for worse, gained experience of government office in 
the eastern states, the dilemma of governmental responsibility had not been an urgent 
concern for the socialists in Bremen before 2007. But the initial cooperation between 
the PDS and the WASG had quickly developed into a new Left alliance that had 
already performed strongly in the 2005 General Election (particularly in Bremen) and 
now had a genuine prospect of entering Bremen’s parliament; this of course gave new 
relevance to the issue of whether a new Left Party group might – at least one day – 
share responsibility with an SPD government. 
Support for a pragmatic approach to coalition participation did indeed exist within the 
party. One participant in this research argued that the Left Party should ‘utilise the 
balance of power and resolve to maintain sufficient strength’ to deal with the SPD. For 
another, the decision was to be based on the potential for genuine policy maximisation 
potential; cooperation should be considered, but ‘only if [the Left Party’s] interests are 
upheld’. 
On the other hand, there was little public support for an SPD-Left Party partnership in 
Bremen; just two per cent favoured a Red-Red coalition in 2007 (Neu, 2007b, p.27). 
Opposition was also clearly evident within the party itself. For instance, one research 
participant expressed concern about the consequences of cooperation not only for the 
Left Party, but also for the people whose interests it claimed to represent:  
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The Left Party would then become superfluous. Until now, the Left has 
been the sole opposition to neoliberal developments. In a coalition with the 
SPD, all that would be over. [They would practise] Realpolitik, contrary to 
the interests of unemployed, disadvantaged and vulnerable people.
Another participant, a local activist who sympathised with the Left Party, stated that the 
divide between the SPD and Left Party ran far deeper than differences over specific 
policies:  
The SPD has become a party that carries and maintains the system. The 
‘Agenda 2010’ legislation (Hartz I-IV), the expansion of temporary 
employment contracts, the rejection of minimum wages and the military 
intervention in Yugoslavia etc., are all diametrically opposed to the Left 
Party programme. Without fundamental transformation, not only in terms of 
the manifesto but also in terms of mindset, a coalition isn’t feasible.
The election programme set out the Left Party’s position on coalition participation, 
stating that the Left Party: 
(W)ill not participate in any government that cuts social services, privatises 
public goods or further curtails the rights of wage-dependent workers, the 
precariously employed, the unemployed, pensioners or immigrants. As the 
Bremen SPD is set to continue its policy of social services cuts (…) we 
shall therefore enter the Bremen Bürgerschaft strictly as a party of 
opposition. (DIE LINKE Bremen, 2007, p.16)
The statement thus committed the party to an oppositional role in the Bürgerschaft so 
long as the SPD remained committed to austerity and cuts, and in so doing might have 
reassured members and voters anxious about the price to pay for government 
responsibility. Furthermore, while the statement did not explicitly rule out Left Party 
toleration of a minority government (whereby the Left would still remain in opposition 
but support key government legislation), the historical resilience of Bremen’s SPD and 
the sustained popularity of the Greens rendered the arithmetical need for such an 
agreement unlikely. However, even though the Left Party was on course to enter the 
Bürgerschaft in an opposition role, at least in 2007, there were still opportunities for the 
party to become established within the parliamentary ‘cartel’.
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Parliamentary Focus
The Left Party alliance had its roots on streets and squares, as people gathered to 
express their opposition to the Hartz reforms. In Bremen, this protest was 
overwhelmingly extra-parliamentary, bringing together an array of social groups and 
organisations, ranging from trade unions through to Bremen Peace Forum. As the PDS 
Bremen had failed to gain seats in the Bürgerschaft, the party could also technically be 
counted as part of this extra-parliamentary movement. At the same time, the party was 
represented on a number of local councils, even though these were not the exclusive 
reserve of political parties, and were concerned with issues at a very grassroots level. A 
Left Party (formerly PDS) councillor who participated in the research explained that 
there was ‘hardly any political controversy’, since the focus was on ‘practical, tangible 
matters that affect the residents in the neighbourhood (traffic lights, schools, social 
networks, aircraft noise, etc.).’ It can of course be argued that even if local issues fall 
outside the remit of a party manifesto, the framing of a problem and the approaches to 
its solution are rarely apolitical. Furthermore, while the Beirat provides an opportunity to 
become involved and established in local democracy, its non-partisan, collaborative 
atmosphere can also be seen as a ‘training ground’ for cooperation and collegiality 
among representatives. 
Conversely, the WASG membership included disaffected left-wing social democrats 
and therefore had historical and cultural ties to the SPD, even though relations 
between the two parties were naturally strained by the breakaway. Nonetheless, it 
would be erroneous to characterise the WASG as a straightforward social-democratic 
alliance. Indeed, Chapter One has described that some sections of the Left Party most 
emphatically opposed to government participation were former members of the WASG. 
The Left alliance therefore brought together a distinctly parliamentary-orientated PDS 
and a broad range of groups and organisations united under the WASG umbrella. 
Moreover, the WASG was originally founded as an initiative, rather than as a party, and 
encountered significant opposition within its members, some of whom had been long-
standing critics of, among other things, the parliamentary tradition of the PDS. One 
research participant summarised the changing orientation as follows:
  
The orientation of the party towards predominantly parliamentary activity 
was stronger in the PDS; the first years of the Linkspartei, on the other 
hand [were focused] more towards extra-parliamentary movements (anti-
Hartz demos, Occupy, etc.).
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Parliamentary Focus and Party Hierarchies
The Bremen Bürgerschaft vote was of course the party’s first and most promising 
prospect of entering a western parliament. But concern existed within the national 
leadership that much of the new Left Party in the western states was organisationally 
weak, and consisted of ‘leftist sectarians’ as well as members with little experience of 
party politics (Brandt et al., 2007). The WASG in particular was reported to be 
dominated by ‘fundamentalists’ (Seils, 2007). At one point, the Bremen WASG had 
even decided to field its own independent candidate, which would have involved 
standing against the Left alliance. Anxious not to risk Bremen quickly becoming an 
embarrassment that threatened to derail the party’s strategy of establishment in the 
western states, the central party in Berlin issued written instructions to the WASG 
members of the Bremen party, demanding that they resolve the political differences or 
else risk jeopardising the Bürgerschaft campaign (Gajevic, 2007). The central party 
then sought to exert its authority over the selection of the lead candidate. After the first 
centrally endorsed candidate withdrew his decision to stand, Berlin next threw its 
support behind the economist and Bundestag member Axel Troost (ibid.). Originally 
from Bremen, Troost would have lent the campaign an element of personality politics. 
In addition, he had won his Bundestag mandate via the list in the eastern state of 
Saxony-Anhalt, and therefore also enjoyed the support of the eastern party branch 
(Boecker, 2007). Nevertheless, the Bremen membership refused to accept any 
candidate imposed by the central party, and dismissed Troost as the national 
leadership’s ‘political commissar’ (Kaiser, 2007, p.4) . Instead, the grassroots 79
members opted for Peter Erlanson, a then relatively unknown hospital works council 
representative, as its lead candidate. According to the Junge Welt newspaper:  
Clearly, the PDS and WASG federal executive committees preferred to see 
their own representative — himself a member of the WASG executive 
committee — heading up the Bremen Landesliste. (…) Erlanson, with 
regard to the shameful role of the Berlin Left Party, spoke out against any 
form of government participation and for ‘genuine opposition. (ibid.) 
Following the party’s entry into the Bürgerschaft, further attempts were made to exert 
pressure on personnel, this time in the first meeting of the parliamentary group. Despite 
an earlier agreement that, as the lead candidate, Erlanson should head the Fraktion, 
 The article explains that originally, the agreement was that if the first, third and fifth places on 79
the party list were reserved for open list candidates, the WASG’s candidate, Erlanson, could be 
the lead candidate. Berlin’s decision to endorse Troost for the lead candidate position came at 
the last minute (Kaiser, 2007, p.4).  
 203
another newly elected member was suddenly proposed as an alternative and endorsed 
by the PDS group. Eventually, a compromise was reached that the seven-strong 
parliamentary group should have two lead speakers, one of whom was Erlanson 
(Brandt et al., 2007). 
A further example of intervention from the party in central office involved policies in the 
eleven-point action plan, the core of the campaign. Even though privatisation of 
Bremen’s services had become a campaigning focal point, the federal executive in 
Berlin tried to have this theme removed from the already agreed manifesto, ostensibly 
on the grounds of design adjustments. It was only due to resistance from WASG 
representatives that the party’s principled opposition to privatisation was eventually 
included in the leaflet (Meyer et al., 2007). However, the attempt prompted one party 
member to complain that the national (PDS) party apparatus had demonstrated a lack 
of respect for the WASG position and, despite having no accountability for the financial 
resources used, had tried to carry out a ‘sugar-coated’ election campaign’ (Jungclaus, 
2007). 
In addition to the above examples relating to the vertical hierarchy between the central, 
federal party and the regional party in Bremen, the decision-making capacity of 
grassroots members would also be challenged within the Bremen party’s own 
hierarchy. After the election, in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding the head of 
the parliamentary group, the PDS representative at an election plenary meeting 
announced that discussion would no longer involve ordinary members but instead be 
confined to the seven deputies (ibid.). Once again, here was evidence of withdrawing 
influence away from the party base and concentrating it into the hands of the 
leadership . Unsurprisingly, these decisions soured the relationship between the party 80
in office (the Landesvorstand) and the party on the ground. One member summed up 
the scepticism regarding future party cooperation and transparency:
Will the Bürgerschaft deputies take part in discussions in an open 
grassroots meeting? Will they take up grassroots members’ suggestions 
and ideas and put them forward in the Bürgerschaft, and create 
transparency and accountability for their actions? Or will they, like deputies 
from the other parties, only feel an obligation to their ‘conscience’ (and, 
realistically, to the party apparatus (…)? (ibid.)    
 
 See Appendix 3 for a description of the Bremen party structure.80
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Furthermore, the impact of the parliamentary focus was tangible at grassroots level. 
PDS strategy for party development in the western states had stressed the importance 
of political work that engaged with local social movements and issues. However, one 
member expressed frustration at how the prioritisation of entering the Bürgerschaft had 
transformed the concept of political work in the new party, as well as the nature of roles 
and tasks assigned to activists, commenting that ‘only the lead candidates matter — 
(while) the rest of the party can just get on with pasting and putting up posters’ (Meyer 
et al., 2007).
Parliamentary Focus: Narrowing the Policy Scope 
On the day of Bremen’s first Monday demonstration, Heidi Knake-Werner, the PDS 
Senator for Social Affairs in the Berlin regional government, dismissed demands to 'get 
rid of Hartz IV’ as 'non-political slogans’ (Knake-Werner, 2004). Instead, she argued 
that the truly political approach required PDS office holders to contribute to the efficient 
yet empathetic implementation of the measures contained in the Hartz legislation and 
to take 'corrective' action where necessary, for example in terms of assessing care for 
the elderly or determining what constituted 'reasonable' work for those returning to 
employment (ibid.). In this respect, the party’s role in implementing the Hartz package 
could be seen as a continuation of the practical support provided by local PDS 
branches to citizens in the post-unification period (see Chapter One). Although Knake-
Werner welcomed protest by those affected by Hartz, she felt her position as Senator 
precluded her participation. She also pointed out that the new reform was now a reality 
and, as such, the fight was already over (ibid.). Regarded from the perspective of 
Cartel Theory, comments about the inevitability of Hartz IV and cuts to public services 
can be interpreted as ‘signals’ that, despite the protests, the Left Party could be 
expected to adopt a critical stance but not to fundamentally oppose or obstruct these 
policies. Furthermore, distance from the protest might also be understood as 
symptomatic of office-holders’ growing orientation towards (anchoring in) the state 
institution of parliament.
In an interview with Junge Welt newspaper, the Left’s lead PDS candidate, Klaus-
Rainer Rupp, admitted that the party was under no illusions about its leverage in 
relation to the SPD (Rupp, 2007, cited in Berg, 2007a). He explained that the main task 
of the Left Party was to exert pressure on the other parties in the Bürgerschaft so that it 
would be impossible for them to ignore certain issues: ‘Were it not for (our) demands 
for a Social Ticket for public transport in Bremen and Bremerhaven, the SPD and 
Greens wouldn’t be suggesting something similar now’ (ibid.) Similarly, the SPD’s 
 205
recent decision to support a minimum wage was attributed to the impact of the Left 
Party, especially now that it had (re)gained a strong national profile (ibid.) . 81
Yet precisely these alleged indicators of Left Party influence prompted some of the 
strongest criticism within the party, especially among grassroots members and 
activists. Even though there was no realistic prospect of Left Party coalition 
participation following 2007, some members, chiefly ex-WASG, accused Rupp 
(formerly a member of both the SPD and DKP) of ‘democratic centralism’ and an over-
eagerness to turn a future Left Party parliamentary group into a coalition partner-in-
waiting (Meyer et.al., 2007). In fact, according to one participant in this study, the 
misplaced conviction that it was possible to ‘reform a gang of thieves’ (meaning the 
SPD) suggested the new Left alliance was in danger of losing its radical profile. 
A further consequence of the strategy of ‘lobbying’ from within the Bürgerschaft was 
that Left Party policy would be contingent on that of the SPD. In other words, rather 
than set out and fight for clear and ambitious policy alternatives, the Left would merely 
respond to the SPD ‘default’. The issue of the minimum wage illustrates this point.
Ahead of the 2007 Bürgerschaft election, the SPD’s lead candidate, Jens Börnsen, 
recognised the demand by public sector trade union Ver.di for a minimum wage of 
€7.50 per hour in Bremen (the Left Party had called for a rate of €8.00) (ibid.). As the 
national government had yet to agree in principle on a minimum wage, the step could 
be regarded as a bold, pro-worker step by Bremen’s SPD. However, seen from the 
perspective of Cartel Theory, the minimum wage issue provides a further illustration of 
how adoption of a popular policy can be regarded as a measure for neutralising a 
challenge to the established ‘cartel’ of parties. On the one hand, even though the Left 
Party called for a slightly higher rate, SPD support for the minimum wage actually 
narrowed the Left Party’s scope for mobilising around this issue (Meyer et.al..). In key 
low-income districts, where even €7.50 an hour would represent an increase in income 
for many people, the Left would face tougher competition to win over the poorest 
workers, since the differentiation was merely one of fifty cents, rather than clear-cut 
commitment or opposition to the minimum wage itself. 
One party member therefore argued that rather than indulge in a war of rhetoric over 
the fifty-cent difference between the two parties’ proposed minimum wage, the Left 
 This refers to the presence of the Left Party parliamentary group after the absence of a PDS 81
group 2002-2005.
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should seize the initiative, together with trade unions, and be out on the streets to 
demand a nationwide statutory living wage (Berg, 2007a). Although implementation of 
a national wage standard lay beyond the competence of the Bremen Bürgerschaft, the 
real crux of the matter here was whether the scope and ambition of Left Party’s 
demands should be restricted to only those objectives achievable in parliament: 
Should we forfeit the goal of a statutory minimum wage or the demand for a 
shorter working week (…) just because neither (of these) can be realised in 
the Bremen Bürgerschaft alone? (Ibid.) 
 
When asked about the impact of the parliamentary focus on policy, a party member 
who participated in this research stated that although social justice still remained the 
central policy focus, the political approaches to addressing the issue had become more 
‘social democratic’ in character. This led the member to identify:
A degree of despondency regarding more radical opposition; the possibility 
of a different society is still discussed, but preferably in terms of the distant 
future.
Summarising the Left Party’s contrasting and often-contradictory character, the same 
participant (a former PDS member) explained: ‘One section [of the party] believes it is 
able to exploit the weaknesses of the SPD in order to pull its strings. Another section, 
which is also the largest, consists of disappointed social democrats.’ But he also 
pointed out that from both perspectives ‘people simply want to be more left-wing, better 
social democrats.’ 
Summary
So far in this section, evidence did indeed emerge of attempts by the national 
leadership (party in central office) to exert influence on the candidate selection process 
within the Bremen party, even though the regional party, and especially the grassroots 
membership, displayed its resilience to such intervention. Similarly, against the wishes 
of the central party, the Bremen Left succeeded in stating in its election campaign 
literature its principled opposition (rather than a pragmatic approach) to privatisation of 
Bremen’s public services. Cartel Theory explains that such practices are symptomatic 
of a party prioritising the pursuit of parliamentary goals and politics. 
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The tensions regarding the (re)location of power, as well as surrounding the relative 
influence of the party leadership (party in central office), the future parliamentary group 
(party in public office) and the grassroots membership and activists (party on the 
ground) were reinforced by the political culture and tradition of the Left Party’s 
constituent parts: the eastern-rooted, parliamentary and, to a degree, office-seeking 
culture within the PDS, and the mainly western-based, extra-parliamentary and policy-
maximising WASG. 
Furthermore, policy objectives were defined in terms of parliamentary activity and 
therefore restricted to issues and demands that could be addressed within Bremen’s 
regional parliament. This too shifted the focus away from extra-parliamentary 
engagement and protest and towards the (potential) parliamentary party. In so doing, 
the Left Party risked becoming rather timid in its demands, since policy could become 
orientated to the Social Democratic ‘default’ instead of offering a clear alternative 
outside the narrow policy space offered by Bremen’s established parliamentary parties.
4.3.2. Social Cleavage Theory    
This section continues the study of the explanatory frameworks in the context of 
Bremen’s Left Party. The themes explored here relate to Social Cleavage Theory and 
look for evidence of a defined and articulated class cleavage, as well as class-based 
support for the Left Party.  
Framing the Anti-Hartz Protest
Lipset and Rokkan explained that one of the prerequisites for the emergence of a 
social cleavage is for a sense of collective identity to form around a social tension. 
Consequently, to understand the importance of the anti-Hartz demonstrations in 
relation to the success of the Left Party, it is necessary to identify both the actors and 
the language of the protest. The actors in the protest determine how dissent and 
demands are articulated or framed, while the language (or framing) of a protest 
contributes to the feeling of identity related to the issue (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.
125). In this section, the study is therefore looking for evidence of protest and demands 
framed in class terms. 
The application to hold the first demonstration was made on behalf of a group called 
the Bündnis Montagsaktion gegen Hartz IV (Monday Action Alliance Against Hartz IV). 
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Responsible for the protest’s organisation was the Bremen Social Plenum, formed out 
of the Bündnis gegen Sozialkahlschlag (Alliance against Austerity) (Sozialplenum 
Bremen, 2008). Convened in response to Agenda 2010 with the purpose of countering 
the restructuring policies of Bremen’s parliamentary parties, the Alliance comprised a 
diverse spectrum of groups and individuals based in trade unions, the peace 
movement, anti-globalisation groups, anti-fascist and anti-racism groups as well as 
political parties (including the PDS and the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany, MLPD). 
However, as media coverage grew, it became apparent that the political orientation of 
the anti-Hartz protest in Bremen was far from clear. An alternative demonstration was 
to be held by a group called Aufrechter Gang (AG)  whose leader, Mathias Henkel, 82
criticised the amount of public money wasted on the (by then) well-publicised 'prestige 
projects’, and that funding should instead have been spent on fighting unemployment 
and improving infrastructure and education (Initiative Bremer Montagsdemo, no date, 
p11ff.). Therefore, in this respect, AG clearly articulated some of the key issues uniting 
the Left in Bremen. On the other hand, Henkel also emphasised law and order and 
described AG as a 'political self-help group' whose aim was not only to campaign 
against Hartz IV and to oppose the governing coalition, but also to challenge 'Green 
and other ideologies' (ibid.). In short, alongside the broadly left-wing Alliance against 
Austerity, a small right-wing and socially authoritarian movement was also emerging in 
Bremen’s anti-Hartz protests. The Social Plenum (2004) issued a flyer, 'Don't give way 
to the right', urging the public not to support the AG demonstration and declaring 
opposition to the attempt of right-wing populists to exploit social protest. 
During the opening speech at the demonstration, MLPD member Wolfgang Lange 
disassociated the protest and the Monday demonstration movement as a whole from 
the AG rally and informed those gathered that anyone had the right to speak, so long 
as their speech was based on anti-fascist and anti-racist principles (Initiative Bremer 
Montagsdemo, p.15ff.). Many of the speakers who took to the microphone were not 
attached to any political party, indicating the strength and potential of wide mobilisation 
around this issue. Alongside the WASG and local social movements, the PDS was a 
visible and active participant; photographs taken at the demonstration show party 
banners and flags, as well as a PDS information stand on Bremen's Market Square. 
The PDS campaign materials carried the slogan ‘Hartz IV - das ist Armut per Gesetz - 
Weg damit!’ (Hartz IV is poverty by decree — let's get rid of it!) (ibid., p.17ff). 
 Aufrechter Gang: literally translates as ‘standing upright’ (relating to human evolution) or 82
‘walking tall’ (indicating pride).
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Several demonstrators remained and endeavoured to noisily disrupt the far smaller 
Aufrechter Gang rally that followed. In response, AG’s deputy chair, Norbert Kück, 
specifically accused the PDS of provoking a cacophony of whistles and shouts, as well 
as physically assaulting some of AG’s members. The PDS disruption was described as 
all the more ironic given that it represented a failed attempt to prevent a legitimate 
demonstration against unemployment and Hartz IV. Furthermore, recalling the earlier 
analogous reference to the citizens' protests in the GDR, Kück suggested that PDS 
efforts to disrupt the first Aufrechter Gang demonstration were to only be expected, 
since it was inevitable that the PDS, as the former state party of the GDR, would 
respond in such a hyper-sensitive manner to the Monday demonstrations. The PDS 
therefore stood accused of stifling free political speech, 'in the best tradition of the 
GDR’ .83
What is noticeable about these clashes is that in spite of the numerical disparity in the 
attendance of the two demonstrations, the Hartz IV protest in Bremen was not 
unequivocally framed in a leftist narrative. Although Aufrechter Gang was specific to 
Bremen, involvement of the right was also evident in demonstrations held in other 
cities. Udo Voigt, the chair of the extreme right-wing NPD, declared that it was the 
historical task of the 'national opposition' to wholeheartedly support the developing 
people's movement and to steer it towards a nationalist course of thought. Banners and 
placards with slogans such as ‘Hartz IV ist asozial / es dient nur dem Kapital' (‘Hartz IV 
is anti-social / it serves only capital’) and warning of ‘Zwangsarbeit und Hungerlohn-
Sklaverei’ (‘forced labour and starvation-wage slavery’) actually utilised concepts and 
terminology commonly associated with the left, such as anti-capitalism, anti-
globalisation and defence of the social state, whereby the latter was of course defined 
in strictly nationalist terms. However, it can also be argued that the right-wing/populist 
groups were also attempting to mobilise along class lines; support for the social state 
and critiques of capitalism and globalisation were not exclusively the property of the 
left. Furthermore, in Bremen – particularly in the municipality of Bremerhaven – working 
class areas supported not only the SPD but also small right-wing parties, such as the 
DVU or the locally-based Bürger in Wut (Enraged Citizens). As such, while the Hartz 
protests were expressed in class terms, it was not until February 2005, with the 
growing influence of the WASG — and therefore the trade unions — that the Bremen 
Monday Demonstration movement defined and documented its basic principles, which 
 Press release by Norbert Kück: ‘PDS in Bremen macht Front gegen Arbeitslose’, (Initiative 83
Bremer Montagsdemo, p.16ff).
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included a clear disassociation from the right, and cast the protest in plainly leftist, 
class-based terms. 
Key to this more pronounced framing of the protest was the fact that the demand was 
very much focused on soziale Gerechtigkeit - social justice. This was important in a 
number of ways. First, the protest articulated something positive. In other words, it 
moved beyond mere rejection and negative protest such as ‘get rid of Hartz IV’ (inviting 
criticism that the demonstrations amounted to little more than ‘non-political’ slogans) 
and instead articulated a demand for social justice. Second, the term ’social’ summed 
up the prevalent demand for social welfare; and ‘justice’ was a principle that, even if 
vaguely defined, had common appeal. Indeed, ‘social justice’ was sufficiently broad a 
term to allow the several groups forming the demonstration movement to unite behind it 
(Nachtwey and Spier, 2007, p.149). Furthermore, the growing expression of class 
interests and the positive demand for social welfare represented a counterbalance to 
the prevailing ‘rhetoric of no alternative’ and austerity. 
The PDS as Mobiliser of Protest?
The protest movement was by no means without internal disputes and rivalries. One of 
the WASG’s centred on the historical inability of the PDS to mobilise working class 
support in Bremen. This chapter has already described the PDS’s failure to establish a 
substantial voter base, even in working class districts. Instead, while fringe and right-
wing parties managed to attract votes in the poorest areas of Bremerhaven, the PDS 
had taken the strategic decision to target middle-class Green-voting areas and the anti-
military protest vote. Even in the midst of Bremen’s restructuring and austerity 
programme, the PDS had been unable to challenge the SPD. We also know that the 
PDS in Bremen was, of course, burdened by the party’s perceived ‘easternness’ (also 
instrumentalised by the AG) and the performance of SPD-PDS coalitions in the eastern 
states. In addition, there was a degree of mistrust surrounding suspected office-
seeking goals. Yet even on top of these obstacles, which affected the western 
organisation as a whole, the conduct of the PDS Bremen did little to overcome this 
ambivalence. 
Even though Bremen had a lively and diverse left scene, as evidenced by the groups 
that participated in the anti-Hartz demonstrations, the Bremen PDS appeared to be 
rather aloof from these social movements. One example occurred during the 2007 
election campaign, when a broad alliance of citizens’ groups in Bremen supported a 
day of action called by people who were employed in so-called ‘one-euro’ jobs and/or 
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were facing layoffs. The PDS had campaigned strongly against the employment market 
reforms, but rather than throw its weight behind the initiative, the party held its own 
meeting on social policy, which coincided with the event (Meyer et.al., 2007). Whether 
or not the PDS was unaware of the groups’ day of action, the clash reinforced the 
impression of a party seemingly out of touch with the people whose interests it claimed 
to represent. Later, with the growing prospect of formal PDS/WASG cooperation, some 
elements of the WASG favoured a broad electoral alliance for Bremen rather than a full 
merger with the PDS, believing this informal approach – rather than cooperation with 
the PDS – could have genuinely mobilised Bremen’s grassroots protest groups and 
addressed local issues (ibid.). Furthermore, the PDS’s perceived lack of anchoring and 
support in local social movements threatened to undermine the Left Party’s credibility 
and with it, the new party’s capacity for sustainably mobilising and articulating 
Bremen’s class interests in leftist terms. In fact it was this view that resulted in the initial 
decision by the WASG to stand an alternative list of candidates in the Bürgerschaft 
election; as we have seen, the resolution was of course swiftly overturned with the 
intervention of the PDS-WASG national leadership. 
To sum up, implementation of the Hartz reforms intensified existing socio-economic 
tensions, leading to a series of protests in Bremen. Along with various citizens’ and 
social movements, the future Left Party mobilised and articulated the growing 
opposition to the government attack on welfare and workers’ rights. Together, they 
framed the continuing demand for social justice in terms of class and from a left-wing 
perspective. As such, there is evidence of class-based expression of, and mobilisation 
around, the capital-labour cleavage.
Therefore, the next task is to identify the extent to which the Left Party alliance in 
Bremen was able to utilise this mobilisation of the protest movement to gain 
parliamentary representation in the 2007 Bürgerschaft election. The Left Party’s strong 
result in the Bürgerschaft election exceeded the party’s own goal of ‘7% plus X’. Yet it 
is still possible that these electoral choices might have been made according to factors 
other than class. In other words, a strong link between class and any party has not yet 
been established. What is more, the increased vote for the Left Party could be 
attributed to a variety of factors, rather than to class alone. To establish any connection 
of the Left Party vote to the class cleavage specifically, it is necessary to analyse the 
result in more detail.
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Voting Patterns84
Gender: The Left Party was slightly more popular with male rather than female voters. 
In particular, it was voters aged between 35 and 59 who were the strongest source of 
support for the Left Party; indeed, 15% (an increase of 13%) of men in the 45-59 age 
group, voted for the party (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.51). Prior to the election, a study by 
the Chamber of Labour revealed that some 40% of participants aged between 46 and 
55 years old — in other words, respondents in the age group that proved most 
supportive of the Left Party – were certain that the politics currently on offer would be 
unable to solve Bremen’s existing and future problems (Probst, 2007, p. 26). 
Educational attainment among voters revealed some contrasts between the three left-
of-centre parties. Unlike the SPD, whose greatest share of voters (51%) had a low level 
of educational attainment or the Greens, for whom over a quarter (28%) of Bremen’s 
most educated electorate voted, the Left Party did not demonstrate a striking pattern of 
support in terms of educational attainment. While the largest proportion of the vote 
came from the highly educated (9%) this figure was only slightly greater than that for 
Left Party voters with only basic education (8%) which in turn was only one percent 
more than the figure for voters with medium educational attainment. In terms of 
increase, too, the distribution was quite even (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.53). 
Population density: A more detailed picture of the PDS/Left Party vote begins to 
emerge in relation to locations of support. Unlike the Greens, whose support lies quite 
clearly in urban areas (22.4%), the SPD and Left Party have more evenly distributed 
support. However, the Left Party made its greatest gains in high-density areas, which is 
where the party finds its largest source of support (9.8%), the party finds its largest 
source of votes); it was also in these urban districts that the SPD lost its greatest voter 
share (-7.2%) in relation to population density (ibid., p.38). 
Unemployment rate: Although the SPD continued to receive support in areas with a 
high proportion of people out of work, and even managed to stave off particularly 
severe losses, the Left Party made its largest gains (+ 7.8%) in these areas suffering 
from high unemployment rates; indeed, such areas formed the major source of 
electoral support for the Left. The Greens, however, were quite clearly more popular in 
areas where unemployment rates were low (ibid., p.104).
 All election result data in this section is based on the official figures provided by the 84
Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, and published by Infratest dimap (2007). Tables containing 
data relating to gender, age and educational attainment are shown in Appendix 4.  
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So far, we have seen that, focusing first on voter profile, there was no striking gender 
pattern to the Left vote (unlike that of the Green vote), but on the whole the party did 
prove slightly more popular with men than with women. In terms of age, both men and 
women aged between 35 and 59 (especially those over the age of 45) constituted the 
largest source of support for the Left. Neither did a distinct pattern emerge regarding 
educational attainment; voters with a basic level of education were only slightly more 
likely to favour the Left than better-educated voters. Again, this is in contrast to the 
other two left-of-centre parties. But a clearer trend is discernible in relation to socio-
economic characteristics of neighbourhoods, as the Left Party performed best in highly 
populated urban areas with high or medium levels of unemployment and in 
neighbourhoods (with a high proportion of foreign residents). The full relevance of 
population density and in particular unemployment becomes clear in the more detailed 
analysis of class voting and Bremen’s neighbourhoods later in this section.
Shifts in Support for the Centre-Left Parties
An Infratest dimap study (2007), based on representative surveys carried out before 
the election, statistics from previous elections and exit polls, estimated the voter gains 
and losses among the respective political parties. The study also took into account 
non-voters, so-called generational change (i.e., first time voters as well as the 
deceased) and voters who had either moved to Bremen or moved away. In total, the 
electorate grew slightly compared to that of 2003, although voter turnout (57.6%) 
actually fell by 3.7%. The tables below set out the estimated gains and losses, both 
from/to other political parties and from/to voter groups, for the SPD and Left Party 
respectively. 
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Table 4.3. Gains and losses: SPD and Left Party 
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.33ff.) 
Focusing on the overall balance, it becomes clear at first glance that the SPD lost 
voters to each of the political parties that were elected to the Bürgerschaft as a 
parliamentary group. The greatest aggregate loss of support was to the Left Party 
(-6,000), followed by the Greens (-5,000). However, an even greater number (-7,000) of 
former SPD supporters joined the ranks of the non-voters, and modest gains among 
voters new to Bremen were nowhere near enough to compensate for the loss in SPD 
support. The Left Party, on the other hand, in addition to the 6,000 voters gained from 
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the Social Democrats, also managed to attract 3,000 former Green voters in 2007 
(even though the Greens performed well in the election). Although some former PDS 
supporters withheld their participation in the election altogether, the Left Party 
succeeded in achieving a positive balance regarding non-voters; indeed, it was the only 
party elected to the Bürgerschaft to do so (the Greens’ balance was zero, while the 
SPD, CDU and FDP all lost out to non-voters). When considering the impact of 
generational change, it is notable that only the Greens and Left Party made overall 
gains (2,000 and 1,000 respectively). Both parties therefore demonstrated an ability to 
attract first-time voters.
Secondly, given the importance of dealignment in the Social Cleavage Theory, it is also 
necessary to identify areas in which the Left Party might be expected to perform well 
(or otherwise) in the 2007 Bürgerschaft election. Therefore, the next table (4.4) 
describes the political structure of the Bremen’s districts. The political structure relates 
to the performance of each of the three left-of-centre parties in districts in which 
support for, respectively, the SPD, Greens and PDS is historically considered strong, 
medium or weak, based on previous electoral outcomes. The data also includes the 
percentage increase or decrease of the 2007 result in relation to the previous 
Bürgerschaft election in 2003 for the SPD and Greens. It should be noted, though, that 
the strength of the PDS is based on the party’s performance in the General Election 
Bundestag (BTW) in 2005 election, rather than on the Bürgerschaft election outcome. 
By 2005, the PDS was already cooperating with the newly formed WASG and 
performed well in that year’s general election. Given the historical weakness of the 
PDS, the comparison with the Bundestag election result thus provides a more realistic 
prediction of the Left Party’s locations of support. The number of districts in each 
category is indicated in parentheses.
 216
Table 4.4. Political structure of local districts: relative strength of SPD, 
Greens and Left Party 
SPD vote: Strong: 46% or more; weak: under 38% (2003 Bürgerschaft election)   
Green vote: Strong: 13% or more; weak: under 7.5% (2003 Bürgerschaft election)
PDS vote: Strong: 9.0% or more; weak: under 6.5% (2005 Bundestag election)   
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.105) 
Table 4.4 clearly shows the extent of the SPD’s overall decline in voter share compared 
to its performance in the 2003 election. Significantly, the greatest decrease occurred in 
neighbourhoods where the Social Democrats had traditionally performed strongly 
(-5.6%). Conversely, the Left Party’s largest gains (7.4%) were achieved in these SPD 
strongholds, as well as in neighbourhoods with historically moderate Social Democrat 
support. Where support for the SPD was already weak, the Left Party too  made more 
modest gains. As such, there is already a positive correlation between SPD and Left 
Party locations of support. The Greens also made inroads in traditionally strong SPD 
neighbourhoods, but to a lesser extent than managed by the Left Party (3.0, the party’s 
smallest gain from the SPD). Meanwhile, in Green strongholds, the greater the losses 
were for the SPD, the greater the gains were for the Left Party. In fact, it was in 
traditionally strong Green neighbourhoods that the SPD suffered its worst decline in 
voter share in all the neighbourhoods listed in the table (-8.7). Conversely, the Left 
Party vote was not only strongest (10%) in staunchly Green districts, but the increase 
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also equalled that achieved in the Social Democratic areas (7.4%). In districts where 
the PDS (in cooperation with the WASG) had performed strongly in the 2005 
Bundestag election, the SPD suffered its second worst decline (-8.4), thereby mirroring 
the most substantial gain in voter share made by the Left Party (+8.7). 
All in all, the Left Party performed well in districts with strong Social Democratic 
support, both in terms of voter share and increase on the previous Bürgerschaft 
election. However, the party’s performance in Green strongholds was just as 
convincing, suggesting not one but two important concentrations of Left Party support 
in Bremen. Furthermore, the party was able to build on the support already gained by 
the PDS-WASG alliance in the General Election 2005. 
We have already seen that the Left Party was able to attract voters who had previously 
supported extra-parliamentary parties. The WASG in particular had succeeded in 
attracting a broad leftist following, ranging from disenchanted Social Democrats 
through to left-wing voters and activists who had previously rejected the PDS. 
However, Bremen had also been fertile ground for small protest parties. Some, such as 
the Schill Party, Arbeit für Bremen, Bremen muss Leben or Bürger in Wut, were either 
short-lived and/or specific to Bremen. Bremerhaven in particular was also a relative 
stronghold for the far-right DVU; in the 2007 Bürgerschaft election, one DVU deputy 
was elected from the municipality, while overall the party missed out on becoming a 
Fraktion by less than one percentage point. Given this potential for protest voting and 
support for parties outside the mainstream, including on the far right, it is also useful to 
consider how the Left Party fared in the context of DVU votes as well as in relation to 
voter turnout, since low participation frequently benefits fringe parties on the right.
Focusing first on Left Party performance in relation to the strength of the DVU, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the party achieved its best result (9.0%) in areas with only 
weak support for the far-right party. (The opposite is true of the other centre-left 
parties.) The actual strength of DVU support does not appear to have had a particularly 
great impact on the Left vote, as there is only about a two per cent difference 
separating the best and the weakest results for the party. Meanwhile, the comparison 
of the 2007 and 2003 elections shows that the Left Party was also able to make some 
inroads into areas of DVU support. However, given that DVU support is often higher in 
working class areas, it could also be argued that the Left Party failed to win over its 
potential core voters in these districts. The overall results have already shown that 
overall Left Party support in Bremerhaven lagged behind that in Bremen City.
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Table 4.5. Left Party performance in relation to DVU strength and voter participation 
DVU: Strong: 3% and more; weak: under 1%  (2003 Bürgerschaft election)            
Participation: High: 69.5% and more; low: under 57%  (2003 Bürgerschaft election)
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.105) 
Secondly, the Left Party’s best results were achieved in wards with a high participation 
rate. Yet in terms of the Left Party’s ability to improve its voter share compared to the 
previous Bürgerschaft election, there was a noticeably more positive development in 
districts with either a medium or low turnout. However, as the participation rates relate 
to the 2003 election, the Left Party’s increased support in 2007 is most likely explained 
by the party’s ability to attract non-voters (see Table 4.3b above).
The following tables narrow down the focus to take a look at specific districts in order to 
establish a more accurate picture of Left Party support. For each of the left-of-centre 
parties, data is shown first for the six strongest wards overall and subsequently 
according to the most positive change for each respective party.
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Table 4.6. Top six districts by voter share: (a) SPD, (b) Greens, (c) Left Party
(Tables a, b, c: Infratest dimap, 2007, p.109ff.)
Gröpelingen, a neighbourhood severely impacted by the decline and eventual closure 
of the AG Weser shipyard and, later, also the location of a costly and unsuccessful 
regeneration programme, was the sole ward where the SPD achieved an overall 
majority of the vote. However, the party still lost voter share (-3.2%) in this traditionally 
staunch social democratic area. Furthermore, in Gröpelingen the Left Party performed 
more strongly than the Greens, achieving a substantial 10% of the vote.  
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A striking feature of the tables is the difference between the respective locations of 
support for the SPD and Greens. This suggests that the two parties have developed 
quite distinct core electorates located in separate districts in Bremen. The 
characteristics of the districts in Table 4.6a confirm the finding that SPD support tends 
to be concentrated in low or medium density areas, as well as in areas of high 
unemployment. Similarly, Table 4.6b underlines the Greens’ strength in urban areas (in 
particular Östliche Vorstadt, Mitte and Neustadt).
Conversely, the Left Party’s strongest districts comprised both SPD and Green 
strongholds. The top three districts correspond with those of the Greens, while only 
Gröpelingen and Walle are common to both the Left and the SPD. These results 
therefore confirm that the Left Party has the ability to perform well not only in 
traditionally Social Democratic areas strength, but also in urban Green districts. 
Looking at the districts in terms of the greatest positive development for the three 
parties in question (Table 4.7 below), two features stand out immediately. First, the 
SPD managed to grow its voter share in just a single ward, and even then by a 
decidedly modest 0.6%. Secondly, of the wards producing the best (or rather the ‘least 
worst’) developments for the SPD, the majority were located in Bremerhaven. Although 
the Left did increase its share of the vote in Bremerhaven, the SPD lost less support in 
the municipality than it did elsewhere, meaning that the Left’s most substantial 
increases, both in terms of overall votes and percentage increase, remained firmly 
concentrated in Bremen City. A contributory factor to the weaker performance in 
Bremerhaven could be the earlier decision of the PDS, struggling with limited resources 
and personnel, had taken the decision not to stand candidates in Bremerhaven, 
thereby restricting the party’s opportunity to nurture a core voter base in the 
municipality.
In the two Bremen City districts, Vahr (-0.9%) and Osterholtz (-2.3%), the Social 
Democrats have traditionally enjoyed solid support in these economically poor areas. 
Pre-election surveys had found that despite the challenges of government and the fact 
that it was no longer overwhelmingly regarded as the party of the ‘ordinary 
person’ (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.82) the SPD was still able to depend on some 
considerable goodwill from voters; slightly more than half of the electorate believed that 
it was the party that strengthened social justice (compared to the Greens 10% and Left 
Party 7%) (ibid.). Furthermore, specific factors such as investment in and complete 
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redevelopment of the run-down ‘problem’ estate in Osterholtz-Tenever  may also have 85
curbed further losses for the SPD.
However, the election results show that despite this goodwill towards the SPD, the Left 
Party managed to attract voters in areas important for the social democrats. The SPD 
suffered losses in its stronghold of Gröpelingen, where the Left improved its share to 
10.4%, an increase of some 8.0% that clearly ate into SPD support. In Walle, too, 
similarly an SPD district, the Left Party was able to increase its share, largely at the 
expense of the social democrats. Although the Greens shared none of the wards with 
the most positive development for the SPD, they did increase their share of the vote in 
these areas, as did the Left Party. The Greens increased their vote in the central wards 
of Östliche Vorstadt and Mitte, both established Green strongholds, but the greatest 
increase was actually in the more rural, CDU heartland of Blockland. 
Table 4.7: Top six districts by positive change: (a) SPD, (b) Greens, (c) Left Party
 
 The high-rise 1970s development of Tenever was blighted by many of the social problems 85
common to such developments (isolation, ‘ghettoisation’, vandalism), and suffered from high 
unemployment and poverty (including child poverty). The volume of Hartz IV recipients was one 
of the highest in Bremen. The Soziale Stadt and Stadtumbau (social city and urban 
redevelopment) investment and rebuilding programmes were largely focused on the area 
(Farwick et.al., 2007, p.33).
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(Tables a, b,c: Infratest dimap, 2007, p.116ff.)
The most positive developments for the Left Party were in Östliche Vorstadt and 
Neustadt. If Mitte is also taken into account it becomes clear that in each of these 
strong districts for the Left Party, the SPD suffered some of its most severe losses; in 
fact, Östliche Vorstadt accounted for the greatest decrease in SPD voter share in the 
2007 election.  Once again, this is in line with the trend identified in Table 4.4, which 
showed the party tended to gain support in areas where the SPD was traditionally 
either (moderately) strong, as well as in Green strongholds. These same 
neighbourhoods were also the source of the strongest PDS support from 1995 through 
to the Bundestag election of 2005. 
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So far, we have seen that the SPD suffered substantial losses in voter share in several 
but not all of its core districts. Secondly, as expected, the Left was able to develop its 
existing modest voter base in Green strongholds that were also characterised by 
moderate SPD support. However, it is also striking that the strong performance of the 
Left in these Green appeared to be at the considerable expense of the Social 
Democrats, whose voter share in Östliche Vorstadt shrank by approximately one third. 
Now, having identified the pattern of gains and losses in relation to location and 
traditional party strongholds, we need to turn to the question of class voting in Bremen 
and whether the 2007 election provided evidence of class-based voting for the Left 
Party.     
Voting Patterns: Socio-Economic Factors
To gain an insight into how socio-economic class relates to the Left vote in Bremen, 
Table 4.8 below identifies electoral behaviour according to occupational status. 
Focusing first on the other centre-left parties, it is clear that the Social Democrats still 
received the majority of their support from workers. Indeed, while the party lost voter 
share across all the occupational groups, it managed to minimise losses among this 
core group (-2%). Furthermore, manual workers who were also trade union members 
continued to provide strong support for the SPD, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2003 
(-7%). But the Social Democrats suffered the most substantial fall in voter share among 
the unemployed members of the electorate. Whereas in 2003 SPD support stood at 
over 40%, in 2007 this fell to 32%, just behind the figure for civil servants. Unemployed 
voters also turned away from the Greens, too (-9%), representing the only loss for the 
party, who otherwise managed to grow its voter share in all other occupational groups, 
including a slight increase in support from workers (+1%). The largest growth in Green 
support came from the self-employed, while apprentices constituted the main source of 
support. However, the Greens’ weaker support among unemployed voters is perhaps 
not entirely unexpected; the party tended to fair less well in areas of high 
unemployment and even though in opposition in Bremen at the time was part of the 
national government coalition, together with the SPD, responsible for introducing 
Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV.  
Turning now to the Left Party, it is striking that unemployed voters account for not only 
the largest source of support (20%) but also the greatest increase in voter share 
(+16%). Furthermore, workers represent both the Left’s second largest group of voters 
(12%) and the second largest percentage increase (+11%). In both occupational 
groups, the Left clearly outperformed the Greens, and its 20% share of the unemployed 
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vote meant that the party was second only to the SPD (i.e. also stronger than the 
CDU). Among the remaining occupational groups listed, the Left increased its voter 
share by an average of just under 6%. 
Table 4.8: Voter share and relative increase/decrease (2007-2003): occupational group 
and trade union membership
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.53) 
While the pre-election survey found that the majority regarded the Left not as a 
problem solver but rather as a party that ‘tells it like it is’ (Infratest dimap, 2007, p.85) 
just under half (47%) of Bremen voters, including those who voted for parties other 
than the Left, agreed that the party was actively engaged on behalf of the socially 
disadvantaged (ibid.) Participants in this research echoed this finding. Some of the 
participants were unemployed; two thirds were employees who earned an annual 
income of less than €27K. They too made a strong association between the Left Party 
and the representation of the interests of workers and unemployed people, describing 
this as an ‘influential’ or even ‘decisive’ factor in their voting decision. Just under half 
the research participants specifically cited the SPD’s ‘betrayal of working and 
unemployed people’ as their reason to support the Left Party. 
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The PDS had always struggled to establish ties with organised labour, so a further 
important development for the Left Party was its increased popularity among trade 
union members. Overall, 13% of trade union members voted for the Left Party, an 
increase of 10% compared to the previous Bürgerschaft election. This result is even 
stronger, both in terms of voter share and percentage increase, among trade union 
members who are employed as workers: 17% of workers organised in trade unions 
supported the Left (compared to 7% of workers who were not members of a trade 
union), thus representing an increase of 15% on the 2003 result for the same group 
(and compared to an increase of 6% among non-members). Furthermore, of the 
participants in the research who had voted for the Left in 2007, the majority (70%) were 
also members of a trade union. The SPD, on the other hand, suffered losses among 
organised labour, particularly among workers. Although general disillusionment with the 
SPD would certainly seem to account for the Social Democrats’ weaker performance, 
the fact that the Left Party was able to strengthen its voter share among trade union 
members (the Greens managed only a slight increase) strongly points to the influence 
of the WASG and its associations with – and indeed origins in – organised labour.
The detailed Bürgerschaft results have so far presented a picture of diminishing SPD 
support among workers, the unemployed and trade union members, which in turn has 
been reinforced in the anecdotal evidence from the Left Party sympathisers who 
contributed to this research. Elff & Rossteutscher demonstrated the declining ability of 
the SPD to attract the votes of workers in the western states from 2005 onwards (see 
Chapter Three). The data from Bremen does not fully conform to these findings, since it 
shows that in 2007 workers still voted for the SPD far more than for any other party 
(SPD: 45%; Left Party: 12%). Moreover, the SPD continued to attract the greatest 
overall share of the vote from trade union members (SPD: 47%; Left Party: 17%). Here, 
it is probably important not to underestimate either the residual goodwill towards 
Bremen’s SPD or the Social Democrats’ historic strength of the party in Bremen. A 
further important contributory factor is of course the historical weakness of the PDS, 
both in Bremen and the western states in general. 
On the other hand, among unemployed voters, the gap was far narrower (SPD: 32%; 
Left Party: 20%). This suggests that although workers still voted primarily for the SPD, 
a degree of class-based dealignment was taking place. Naturally, it does not 
necessarily follow that a realignment of class voting occurred in favour of the Left Party. 
However, evidence so far does point to the existence of a link between class and the 
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Left Party vote, and this becomes clearer when the locations of support are taken into 
account. The following example of two Bremen City districts further illustrates this point.
The election data has shown that the district of Gröpelingen was a staunchly SPD area 
and remained the sole district in which the party maintained an overall majority (50.6%) 
in 2007. Yet here, too, the Social Democrats lost voter share (-3%). The district is one 
of the poorest in Bremen City: in 2007, the average personal income was just €18,000 
(Muscheid and Strüßmann, 2011, p.11), and over half the residents had an annual 
income of €15,000 or less (ibid., p.9). Unemployment was also a problem, with 22.4% 
of residents out of work (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, 2007, p.144). Of these, 
27.2% were classified as belonging to the ‘workers’ occupational group, and 42.5% 
were long-term unemployed (ibid.). In the Bürgerschaft election, the Left Party was able 
to record one of its best results in Gröpelingen, both in terms of overall share (10.4%) 
and increase in relation to the PDS result in the previous Bürgerschaft (8%). 
Conversely, the Greens did not make substantial gains and, with an overall result of 
9.0%, actually finished behind the Left Party. 
Looking at this district in greater detail, the neighbourhood (Ortsteil) of Lindenhof, 
which is classified as a working-class residential area (Farwick et. al., 2007, p.68), 
demonstrates the same pattern at a more grassroots level. Here, although the Social 
Democrats managed to retain their overall majority, the Left Party vote significantly 
increased (to 11.5%) in this SPD stronghold (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, 2007, 
p.228). Again, the area is characterised by low personal annual incomes (€17.8K) 
(Muscheid and Strüßmann, 2011, p.11) and high unemployment; in July 2007 the 
jobless figure for Lindenhof stood at 26.9% (Farwick et. al., 2007, p.88). Notably, Left 
Party voter share in Lindenhof first exceeded that of the Greens (whose performance 
tends to be weaker in areas of high unemployment) in the general election of 2005, 
when the PDS first cooperated with the WASG (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, 
2007, p.225). The party went on to strengthen this result in 2007, whereas the Green 
vote further declined compared to that of 2005.  
However, the chapter has also already shown that the Left Party vote was far from 
confined to SPD-voting, working-class districts blighted by high unemployment. The 
district in which Left Party achieved its best election results, both in terms of voter 
share and increase, was Östliche Vorstadt. The Greens further consolidated their vote 
in 2007, and were once again the largest party; conversely, it was here that the SPD 
suffered its greatest loss of voter share in Bremen (see also Tables 4.6 and 4.7). In this 
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fashionable district, close to the centre of Bremen City and classified as a middle-class 
residential area (Farwick et. al., 2007, p.68), the average annual income was over 
€29K (€11K higher than in Gröpelingen) (Muscheid and Strüßmann, 2011, p.11), and 
unemployment stood at 16.1%, which although substantial, nevertheless reflected the 
average rate for Bremen. Workers accounted for 25.2% of the jobless figure, while 
41.3% were long-term unemployed (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, 2007, p.142). 
Looking again at the Ortsteil level, it was in the Steintor neighbourhood that the Left 
Party recorded by far its best result across the whole of Bremen, with just over 17%. Of 
the four areas that constitute Östliche Vorstadt, Steintor had the lowest average income 
(ca. €28K); at 15.7% the unemployment rate was marginally below the Bremen City 
average (15.9%) and around ten per cent lower than in Lindenhof (Farwick et. al., 
2007, p.88). Even here, in Östliche Vorstadt’s ‘weakest’ area, the Greens achieved 
their best result (41.5%), while the SPD actually lost voter share and finished only six 
per cent ahead of the Left Party (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, 2007, p.226). 
These examples of two contrasting districts and local neighbourhoods contained within 
them demonstrate two ‘typical’ locations of strong Left Party support. The first is a 
staunchly social-democratic working class area with low income and higher than 
average unemployment. The second is a middle-class residential Green stronghold 
with a higher annual income and a lower than average rate of unemployment. 
Furthermore, the latter had also delivered the strongest support for the PDS (notably 
Östliche Vorstadt and Mitte). Consequently, it is necessary to consider the existence of 
an additional explanation of the Left Party vote that does not strictly fit the class 
cleavage framework. 
An Alternative – or Additional – Explanation of Left Party Support
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in the mid-1990s the PDS settled on the 
strategy of campaigning specifically on the issue of peace and anti-militarism. The 
party targeted traditionally Green-voting districts such as Östliche Vorstadt and Mitte in 
the hope of attracting the support of voters who opposed the Red-Green federal 
government’s decision to involve the Bundeswehr in military action abroad. Anti-
militarism was of course also a key PDS policy at national level. Interestingly, while 
SPD ‘betrayal’ of workers and the unemployed was the reason most commonly cited by 
Left Party voters contributing to this research, the second most frequently identified 
explanation for voting Left was that it was ‘the only party against foreign engagement of 
the Bundeswehr’. Although foreign policy, like Hartz and the setting of a national 
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minimum wage, is a competence of federal government, rather than of the Länder, a 
feared ‘watering down of [Left Party] foreign policy’ was also cited among the 
participants as a reason for opposing a potential coalition with the SPD. Another 
contributor identified both peace and social justice as priority issues for Bremen, thus 
echoing the perception that both the Agenda 2010/Hartz measures and Germany’s 
international military intervention created an irreconcilable cleft between the SPD and 
the Left Party (see Cartel Theory above). 
Furthermore, the issue of antimilitarism has particular relevance for Bremen. A number 
of the state’s institutions and industries, including the port, are involved in the research, 
manufacture or export of weapons. Indeed, the Bremen Left Party has continued the 
initial efforts of the PDS and built strong relations with the Bremer Friedensforum 
(Bremen Peace Forum), itself an early member of the anti-Hartz demonstrations. It has 
cooperated with the organisation on a number of occasions, for example in the struggle 
to uphold the Zivilklausel  at Bremen University. 86
The (by western standards) relatively promising PDS vote and, subsequently, the 
strong performance of the Left Party in these districts therefore suggest that 
antimilitarism, both in terms of federal foreign policy but also in the regional context of 
Bremen, represents a further important source of electoral support for the Left. 
However, given the volume of employment resulting from these activities, this issue 
could potentially give rise to a conflict of interests for Bremen’s Left Party, particularly if 
it were to enter into a coalition required to make decisions about the future of the 
industry and a significant number of jobs. 
To sum up, the Left Party’s performance in these traditionally Green neighbourhoods 
strengthened the modest inroads already made by the PDS from the mid-1990s. 
Therefore, this source of electoral support, although extremely important for the party, 
did not actually represent a major shift in the Left vote in 2007. The question remains of 
the class cleavage and the extent to which this accounted for the party’s success. 
While the SPD lost the support of, above all, the unemployed, the Left Party 
significantly increased its share among jobless voters, as well as among manual 
workers. Workers organised in trade unions represented another voter group who 
turned away from the SPD. Again, the Left Party was able to grow its voter share 
 Literally ‘civil clause’, meaning an undertaking by academic/scientific institutes to abstain from 86
research and teaching for military purposes.
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among this section of the electorate. Given the political climate at the time, as the 
impact of the Hartz employment market and welfare reforms, high unemployment and 
rising poverty continued to bite, it might not have seemed surprising that the Left Party 
was able to make strong gains among these groups, but the disappointing experience 
of the PDS shows that a class-based dealignment from the SPD and a realignment to 
another party on the left of the Social Democrats could by no means be assumed. In 
other words, a series of specific circumstances were required to allow the new Left 
Party to successfully mobilise along the class cleavage. 
The magnitude of a social cleavage’s expression varies over time, depending on the 
particular given conditions and relationships and also, accordingly, favours either a 
consensual or more conflict-driven approach. It has been stated (see Chapter Three) 
that expression of the class cleavage occurs somewhere between the instrumental and 
ideological poles of the functional dimension; in other words, between negotiating 
concessions, especially in parliament, on the one hand, and principled opposition on 
the other. Factors such as the state of the economy, industrial sector, political 
conditions and the institutional context all play a role in determining the articulation of 
the class cleavage.
In Bremen, the prevailing conditions had long been economic austerity, privatisation, 
long-term unemployment and industrial transformation, all implemented by the social 
democrat-led government, which, despite dwindling support, continued to dominate the 
state’s politics. However, opposition to the recently introduced Hartz reforms resulted in 
the establishment of a collective identity that did not restrict its demand to merely 
modifying Hartz, but called for its abolition. Furthermore, the movement, which was 
overwhelmingly extra-parliamentary, also called for social justice and framed this 
demand in clear class terms. 
Social Cleavage Theory also identifies the need to express an emerging collective 
identity through some form of political organisation, most commonly a political party. 
Initially, this organisation was the gathering of the loose alliance of social groups and 
individuals at the Monday demonstrations. The PDS, though a regular participant in the 
protests and an opponent of the Agenda 2010, was not in a position to fulfil the role of 
the mobilising party, due to its perceived ‘easternness’, its weak ties to Bremen’s social 
movements and what one research participant termed its well-trodden ‘path of 
conformity’ towards the SPD. According to Social Cleavage Theory, if it is not possible 
for the mobilising movement to align to an existing party, then factors such as political 
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culture and institutions determine whether a new party may form to articulate the new 
or revived cleavage. The conditions were favourable in Bremen: the state’s electoral 
law had already facilitated the emergence of political newcomers, including locally 
based initiatives and there also existed a strong tradition of left-wing, extra-
parliamentary activism and social movements. The Greens had also made their 
electoral breakthrough here in the political ‘laboratory’ of Bremen. These conditions 
therefore allowed the newly-founded WASG to quickly become the key articulator of the 
demand for social justice. 
As seen earlier in the chapter, there were concerns, certainly among WASG members 
as well as among activists within social movements, that a more formal cooperation 
with the PDS risked too much emphasis on a parliamentary approach — in other 
words, a more ‘instrumental' articulation of the class cleavage. 
Nonetheless, as the analysis of the election shows, the Left Party, with its class-framed 
opposition to Hartz IV and demand for social justice, succeeded in attracting votes 
away from the SPD. A research participant criticised the SPD from a class perspective, 
observing that, ‘historically, at decisive moments, had always voted in favour of the 
ruling class’. Another contributor cited a commitment to socialism as the grounds for 
their voting decision: 
The Left Party is the only party that represents a break with neoliberal 
politics and, at least in its basic approach, is for a socialist society. 
While the anti-military issue and voters in traditionally Green inner city areas continued 
to be important sources of electoral support, it was workers, trade union members and, 
above all, the unemployed — the group most directly affected by Hartz IV — that 
accounted for the success of Bremen’s Left Party in 2007. 
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Chapter 5: 
Discussion, Conclusions and Outlook
The aim of this research has been to determine the extent to which Cartel Theory and 
Social Cleavage Theory (specifically the class cleavage) can explain the electoral 
success of the Left Party in Germany’s western states. The current chapter now 
reviews the key findings and then opens up the discussion to consider evidence from 
other western states. 
The starting point of the research was an analysis of the PDS/Left Party and its 
development in the western states. After an initial explanation of the PDS’s origins in 
the GDR’s party of state socialism, Chapter One gave an account of the party’s early 
efforts to establish an organisational and voter base in the western Länder. The 
chapter identified the fundamental challenges facing the PDS during the post-
unification period, including organisational weakness, the party’s perceived 
‘easternness’ and the inability to become a uniting force for the West German left. The 
same challenges continued to hinder the party’s endeavours right up until the alliance 
with the WASG and indeed influenced the negotiations between the two parties. 
Chapter One also explained the importance of the western states for the PDS. Given 
Germany’s federal structure, electoral system and demographic character, a solid and 
long-term voter base in the West, rather than one confined to the East, was essential 
for the party. Moreover, a nationwide voter base would lend credence to the PDS’s self-
identification as a socialist party for the whole of Germany. The party had to appeal to 
its eastern core but also attract activists and voters, especially in the West, who were 
critical of state socialism and the SED. The PDS campaigned on three key policy 
areas: the representation of eastern interests, socialism and antimilitarism. The chapter 
then outlined the catalyst for the alliance between the PDS and WASG, namely the 
introduction of the Hartz welfare and employment market reforms, and described the 
process of the cooperation and the circumstances leading to the eventual merger. 
From this starting point of the historical, strategic and ideological factors identified and 
explained in the chapter, it has also been possible to understand the debates 
surrounding the foundation of the Left Party. Furthermore, this foundation provided a 
context for the subsequent theoretical frameworks and the Case Study. 
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Chapters Two and Three introduced the theories explored in the research. Both 
chapters set out the basic elements and reviewed the key aspects relating to the 
respective theory. Chapter Two focused on Cartel Theory, first conceptualised by Katz 
and Mair to explain the changing relationship of parties and the state, and the 
implications for party democracy and representation. The chapter also outlined the 
main challenges to Cartel Theory (Kitschelt, Detterbeck), before considering later 
developments to the theory (Blyth and Katz) that explored Cartel Theory in the context 
of globalisation and the consequences for competition in the political ‘marketplace’. The 
chapter concluded by identifying aspects of the framework that could be applied to the 
Case Study of the Left Party in Bremen. These focused on leadership and 
representation within the party, as well as party competition.
Chapter Three approached Social Cleavage Theory in a similar manner. First was an 
explanation of Lipset and Rokkan’s model of social cleavage, followed by a definition of 
the capital-labour cleavage that this research has discussed in relation to the Left 
Party. The chapter then gave an outline of arguments citing economic change, social 
mobility and the emergence of a new, values-based dimension (post-materialism) as 
factors in the decline of the class cleavage. However, the continuing importance of the 
class cleavage was explained by means of class categorisations based on the 
character of working relationships within the modern employment market. The chapter 
then referred to data (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007) that demonstrated the continued 
demand for welfare and redistribution, despite the rhetoric and realities of the flexible 
labour market. Election results depicted voter support for the SPD and Left Party 
according to occupational group (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007) and changes in workers’ 
propensity to support either of the two parties (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011). Finally, 
key aspects of Social Cleavage Theory were identified for further study in the context of 
Bremen’s Left Party.
The Case Study brought together the earlier analysis of the PDS/Left Party and the 
theory chapters to test the explanatory frameworks in the city-state of Bremen. First, a 
contextual section introduced Bremen’s political and economic character as a region 
that was electorally dominated by the Social Democrats and suffering the 
consequences of industrial decline, including poverty fuelled by high unemployment 
and a growth in the low-pay sector. Next, the study outlined the strategic and electoral 
development of the regional PDS, thereby recalling the themes explored in Chapter 
One, such as the party’s organisational weakness and lack of local political ‘roots’. The 
final contextual part of the study concentrated on the 2007 Bürgerschaft election, 
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providing an overview of the campaign goals and political focus of the three left of 
centre parties, as well as the election results. The chapter then moved onto the 
analytical part of the study, focusing on the two theoretical frameworks in turn. For both 
frameworks, qualitative research was carried out by means of questionnaire to gain 
first-hand insights of Left Party supporters and members. 
First, the study considered the narrowing of the policy supply predicted in Cartel 
Theory. Evidence was sought in the ‘restructuring’ policies of the SPD-led government, 
the rhetoric associated with these policies, as well as in the response of Left Party. In 
particular, the study set out to discover indications of ‘signalling’ on the part of the SPD 
and Left Party that suggested a willingness to cooperate and further restrict policy in 
return for a (future) share in power. The second area of focus concerned the 
organisational character of the Left Party. Here, the study was looking for symptoms of 
prioritising office-seeking goals and signs of an ascendant party in central office, 
particularly in the context of the focus of campaigns and candidate selection, as well as 
in the relationship between the PDS and WASG. 
The analysis of Social Cleavage Theory began by considering whether there was 
evidence of a distinct and articulated class cleavage in Bremen. The anti-Hartz protests 
were a key source of insights regarding mobilisation of the class cleavage as well as its 
framing and articulation. Next, the more detailed breakdown of the 2007 election 
results identified patterns of Left Party support and in particular whether there was 
indeed a class element to the Left Party’s vote. The analysis focused on factors 
including voters’ occupational group, the political and economic character of the district 
and clues provided by the increase or decrease in support for the other left of centre 
parties. Finally, this section also considered whether factors other than the class 
cleavage accounted for the strong Left Party vote.                           
5.1. The Left Party Elsewhere in Western Germany: The 
Bremen Results in a Comparative Perspective
5.1.1. Cartel Theory
Chapter Two identified both internal and external aspects of Cartel Theory for further 
investigation in the Bremen Case Study. The first set of characteristics related to 
leadership and organisation, while the second set was concerned with competition 
between political parties. The Case Study revealed that certain aspects of Cartel 
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Theory were indeed evident in the Bremen’s Left Party leading up to the 2007 
Bürgerschaft election. This discussion now focuses on whether the characteristics 
identified were specific to Bremen and the circumstances that existed within the setting, 
or whether similar patterns could be found in other western federal states. As Bremen 
is a small city-state in which the Left Party was (at least by its western standards) 
relatively well established, the discussion pays particular attention to the ‘area state’ of 
Hessen, where the PDS had not previously participated in regional elections. Additional 
comparisons focus on the large area state of North Rhine-Westphalia and the city-state 
of Hamburg.
Organisation and Leadership
The Bremen campaign was orientated to the party’s anticipated entry into the 
Bürgerschaft, prompting concerns among some members that the parliamentary focus 
threatened to sideline the party’s grassroots engagement with social movements and 
extra-parliamentary activism. Moreover, the Case Study found that the national 
leadership had intervened (unsuccessfully) to prevent the campaign being headed by 
an inexperienced lead candidate who was critical of the PDS/Left Party participation in 
eastern regional governments, especially the track record of the Berlin coalition, and 
instead favoured an approach of principled opposition in Bremen. In place of the 
democratically selected Erlanson, a leadership-approved, higher profile candidate was 
to steer a more moderate, pro-coalition course in Bremen. In the federal state of 
Hessen, where the Left Party was contesting an election for the first time, the party’s 
candidate list for the early 2008 election consisted of unknown and inexperienced 
candidates (Schroeder 2008a,10’). The lead candidate Pit Metz stirred up some 
controversy by directly comparing the actions of armed guards on divided Germany’s 
east-west border and the military participation of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. In the 
resulting media storm, the national leadership intervened to remove the candidate and 
Metz was forced to stand down (ibid.). 
The leadership’s involvement in Bremen centred on social and economic policy, namely 
Erlanson’s criticism of the Red-Red coalition in Berlin and the decision to include a ‘no 
privatisation’ commitment in the party’s eleven-point plan, which would have ruled out 
any cooperation with an SPD-led government intent on continuing Bremen’s 
‘restructuring’. In Hessen, it was the reaction to Metz’s statement, which managed to 
touch on two controversies (German military engagement and the GDR) that made his 
position untenable and prompted the central party to intervene. However, Schroeder 
(ibid.) considers the inevitable removal of Metz to be the pathway for the national 
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leadership, and particularly Gysi and Lafontaine, to ensure that a more moderate and 
pragmatic course was steered in Hessen. As in Bremen, which had long been 
considered the trailblazer for the westward expansion of the PDS, great hopes had 
recently been pinned on the Hessen party. A resurgent and more left-leaning SPD was 
hoping to unseat the incumbent CDU-led government and form a new coalition with its 
preferred partner, the Greens. Although SPD leader Andrea Ypsilanti had ruled out any 
form of cooperation with the Left, preferring to rely on the pro-business FDP for support 
if necessary (DIE LINKE Hessen, 2008a), it was unclear whether the SPD and Greens 
would be able to muster sufficient voter share. The Left Party’s national leadership 
therefore took a keen interest in developments in Hessen and the potential ‘Wiesbaden 
Model’, in other words a western counterpart to the eastern ‘Magdeburg Model’ of PDS 
toleration of minority government. The regional party associations in both Bremen and 
Hessen were therefore under the spotlight in terms of their groundbreaking potential 
and thus attracted the direct (and sometimes unwelcome) involvement of the national 
leadership. In Lower Saxony, a DKP member standing on the Left Party’s open list was 
expelled for appearing to justify the existence of the Stasi as a necessary measure to 
defend against reactionary forces; later on in Bremen two members of the 
parliamentary group’s staff were sacked for unprofessional conduct, and a speaker 
resigned after just three days (Patton, 2008, p.17). Although these incidents could be 
regarded as unfortunate but individual incidents, they nevertheless demonstrate the 
leadership’s readiness to intervene lest such behaviour undermine the party’s 
parliamentary goals. Furthermore, Patton speculates that the controversies point to 
greater unruliness within the western associations that makes them more difficult to 
‘manage’ from above than their eastern counterparts (ibid.), thus underlining the 
contrasting political culture in the two regions.    
However, at least in the case of Hessen, the central party’s active role is also explained 
by the regional party’s organisational weakness. The party’s membership and support 
was concentrated in the south of the state and particularly in the metropolitan area of 
Frankfurt, leaving sizeable parts of Hessen with little in the way of a grassroots 
organisation, particularly in rural areas. Furthermore, there was a poorly developed 
activist base, which leads Schroeder (2008b) to conclude that the Hessen party was 
primarily rooted in trade unions, with few connections to new social movements (such 
as the peace movement). Echoing the earlier experience of the PDS in the West, the 
lack of personnel and resources necessitated greater dependence on ‘outside’ support, 
in this case the national leadership. Added to this was the overall political inexperience 
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of the candidates, which forced the Hessen campaign to rely heavily on the 
participation of well-known national Left Party figures. 
Following the election, when the party held a vote among the Hessen members on 
whether to support Ypsilanti’s election as Prime Minister and prop up a minority SPD-
Green government, less than half of the membership (which numbered approximately 
2,100) actually participated (Schroeder, 2008a,13’), thus reinforcing the claim that it 
was a passive, rather than an activist-based party. The lack of a solid grassroots 
activist movement within the party was also evident in relation to the policy on the 
separation of office and mandate. At the party’s founding congress in 2007, the 
decision had been taken to ensure the separation of the two functions. However, due to 
the organisational weakness of the party, the decision resulted in something of a power 
vacuum, with no-one available or willing to fulfil the vacated party officers’ positions 
once the parliamentary group was established. Consequently, the policy was 
abolished, thus allowing mandate holders to continue occupying officer positions 
(Schroeder, 2008a, 22’), a step which can be seen as further strengthening the 
influence of parliamentary rather than grassroots politics. 
Party Competition
The second and related aspect of Cartel Theory explored in the Case Study was 
political competition. Blythe and Katz used the analogy of economic oligopolies to 
explain parties’ restriction of policy output. Faced with tighter fiscal limitations, social 
democratic parties in particular sought new ways to become absolved of the 
responsibility for the supply of public goods while maximising ‘profit’ (security and 
resources) for the party. The rhetoric of ‘no alternative’, especially surrounding 
globalisation, provides the means of downsizing voter expectations and demands, 
while decision-making is placed outside the reach of political ‘interference’ or, looking at 
it another way, beyond democratic accountability. According to this theory, for social 
democratic parties, the shift in the provision of public goods from being a responsibility 
of the state to one of the market was interpreted as signalling to the centre-right parties 
their willingness to restrict output and cease competition.    
The Bremen case study has depicted a narrowed range of policies offered by the 
parties represented in the Bürgerschaft before 2007. The SPD-led government had 
implemented a range of far-reaching cuts and privatisation measures, and could rely on 
the broad support of the other parties in the legislature. There had also been additional 
proposals that would have seen the role of the state reduced to that of coordinator of 
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the public services ‘market’. The discourse surrounding the government programme 
emphasised the importance of ‘emancipating’ people from welfare and the need to do 
away with employment rights as ‘barriers’ and ‘risks’ to business. Furthermore, the 
privatisation of state assets and services resulted not only in the long-term loss of 
income, but also restricted the fiscal resources and the legal scope available to future 
governments, regardless of party commitment to, or voter demand for, public services. 
Although Bremen faced particularly tough economic and social problems, including 
those related to its status as a city-state, it was by no means the only western state 
facing budget challenges. Moreover, the Left Party’s first entry into some western 
parliaments coincided with or took place in the aftermath of the 2007/8 financial 
crash . A national cap on new borrowing (‘Schuldenbremse’ - literally a ‘debt brake’) 87
was adopted into Germany’s Basic Law constitution, prohibiting any new borrowing as 
of 2020. In preparation, all sixteen federal states are required to bring their deficits 
under control (maximum 0.35% of GDP) by 2016. It is two western states, Bremen and 
Saarland, that have experienced the greatest difficulty meeting these requirements and 
as a result are expected to make still further cuts (Spiegel Online, 2014). The Left Party 
pursued legal means to challenge the Schuldenbremse on the grounds that it 
compromised the independence of the Länder and the capacity of the state to act, but 
the challenge was unsuccessful (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2013; Neues Deutschland, 
2014). Consequently, both the cap itself as well as the efforts to bring debt within the 
permitted parameters place further legal restrictions on the ability of governments to 
invest in the economy, housing and education. Just as future governments are already 
obliged to implement the employment and welfare reforms, so too will they be required 
to abide by these constitutional requirements or, as they are described in Cartel Theory, 
‘binding quotas’.
Cartel Theory also regards a narrowing in the policy scope by individual parties as a 
possible signal of readiness to ‘join’ the established cartel. Analysis of the policy 
programme as well as and the attitude towards office-seeking goals and potential 
coalition-building are both useful in this respect. Chapter Four showed that in Bremen 
the Left Party’s Bürgerschaft campaign identified a consensus among the established 
parties, which had subjugated themselves to supposed fiscal constraints to such an 
extent that people would be ‘completely and utterly’ at the mercy of economic interests 
 Western federal state elections in which the Left Party entered the regional parliament for the 87
first time: Hessen and Lower Saxony: 27.01.08; Hamburg: 24.02.08; Saarland: 30.08.09; 
Schleswig-Holstein 27.09.09; North Rhine-Westphalia: 09.05.10. See Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen, 2014.      
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(DIE LINKE Bremen, 2007, p.9). The party’s key policy areas included the retention of 
public services and corporations, the return of already privatised areas to social 
ownership, as well as strengthened investment in public services, education and 
healthcare (ibid., p.9ff), funded by tax increases and the allocation of underspent 
resources (ibid., p.13). The Case Study also revealed that some Left Party members 
expressed concern that policy was too focused on the SPD and that the party had 
thereby squandered an opportunity to build a more convincing profile as an alternative 
to the prevailing neoliberal policies of the established parties, including the Social 
Democrats. On the other hand, the party did plainly state its rejection of cooperation 
with any government implementing cuts, privatisation or other measures that would 
worsen the circumstances of, for example, wage-dependent workers and those in 
precarious employment (ibid., p.14). As such, the Left Party was preparing to enter the 
Bürgerschaft strictly as a party of opposition. Although this approach would not have 
automatically ruled out a toleration agreement, it was unlikely that the SPD, even with 
its predicted losses in the election, would have had to rely on the informal support of 
the Left in order to prop up its preferred coalition with the Greens. To sum up, Chapter 
Four found that the Bremen Left Party set out redistributive policies that explicitly 
opposed privatisation and cuts, and favoured investment in and expansion of public 
services, welfare and publicly funded job creation. There was also a clear statement of 
the party’s oppositional role. But what is the evidence from other western states? 
The familiar themes of privatisation, poverty and working conditions dominated the Left 
Party’s 2010 regional election programme in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). By then 
the party was already represented in six western parliaments, so expectations were 
high for a similar success in Germany’s most populous state, where the previous 
regional election (2005) had precipitated the demise of the SPD-Green federal 
government. In its analysis of the financial crisis, the programme set out a critique of 
the historical and inherent crises of capitalism (DIE LINKE NRW, 2010, p.2) and 
strongly emphasised the democratisation of the economy (ibid., p.6). Of specific 
relevance for NRW was the policy of bringing the huge privatised energy companies 
such as E.ON and RWE into municipal ownership, as well as a state-wide ban on the 
production, processing or transportation of atomic energy and materials (ibid., p.6). 
Regarding the Hartz measures, the NRW Left Party demanded a higher statutory rate 
for claimants, as well as the abolition of sanctions (ibid., p.15). Further demands 
included an end to ‘mini-jobs’, a minimum wage of 10 euro (ibid., p.20), and the 
introduction of a shorter working week with the same pay (ibid., p.4). The Left Party 
also campaigned strongly on these issues in the federal state of Hessen. The Hessen 
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party’s organisational weakness necessitated a more general approach to the 
campaign, which focused on the Left’s key issue of social justice as well as regional 
themes such as the airport, the prevention of railway privatisation, an end to the sell-off 
of stakes in the already privatised Telekom and to return the Hessen-based company to 
state ownership (DIE LINKE Hessen 2008b, p.12). Describing privatisation as ‘theft 
from citizens’ (ibid., p.11), the party stated its intention to provide a parliamentary 
platform for the broader movement striving to overcome neoliberalism.
In the city-state of Hamburg, the campaign against privatisation centred on energy and 
hospitals. The party demanded an end to coal and atomic energy (DIE LINKE 
Hamburg, 2008, p.36) and insisted that healthcare was not a commodity to be placed 
in the hands of private interests (ibid., p.19). Education was another key theme and 
was directly linked to the problem of child poverty in Hamburg; the programme pointed 
out that despite the Hamburg’s significant wealth, one in five children was growing up 
in poverty, while educational opportunities were increasingly defined primarily by 
parental wealth (ibid., p.4). Like Bremen, Hamburg was also experiencing budget 
problems exacerbated by investment in so-called prestige projects, which the Left Party 
claimed was diverting money away from urgently needed social programmes. The 
party called for tax increases to fund a package of investment and social welfare 
measures (ibid., p.62). An additional similarity to the Bremen campaign was the 
concern about militarisation of the economy. As a port city, Hamburg was an economic 
centre for international weapons exports; it was also a location for national military 
planning and training (ibid., p.29ff). The Left Party set out a policy that would ban 
weapons passing through Hamburg’s port or airport, bring about the ‘demilitarisation of 
culture’ (prohibiting an overtly military focus for museums, events and even street 
names) and place a ban on school visits by military youth officers and recruiters (ibid., 
p.30ff). 
This next main question within Cartel Theory concerns the ‘signalling’ of willingness to 
modify policy in return for cooperation opportunities. In Bremen, the Left Party declared 
itself the party of solidarity, jobs and social justice that stood as a clear alternative to 
the policies of the established party. As the first regional association to enter an 
election, Bremen’s Left Party cited the success of the pre-merger Left alliance in the 
2005 Bundestag election as proof that it was already a counterbalance to neoliberalism 
and social austerity. Furthermore, the party plainly stated there would be no 
participation in a government that implemented cuts or privatised public sector goods, 
or further undermined the situation of workers, the unemployed, pensioners or 
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immigrants. Given the SPD’s stated intent to continue its ‘restructuring’, Bremen’s Left 
Party thereby committed itself to an oppositional role. The Left Party in Hamburg took a 
similar position in its programme, stating that it would oppose measures such as cuts 
and privatisation. However, the election outcome delivered the opportunity to remove 
the CDU government with the formation of an SPD-Green-Left (Red-Green-Red) 
coalition. Having rejected a coalition so unequivocally in its programme, the Left Party 
could not risk losing its credibility by then entering into such an alliance; it did, however, 
offer its informal support or toleration of a minority SPD-Green government (Hartwig, 
2008, p.7). Nonetheless, there were few signs that either the SPD or, in particular, the 
Greens, would have accepted a toleration model; furthermore, the Greens (who stand 
in Hamburg as the Green Alternative List - GAL) were already known to favour a 
coalition with the incumbent Christian Democrats (ibid.).
Conversely, there appeared to be greater clarity regarding potential coalitions or 
informal support in North Rhine-Westphalia. Here too, the Left Party rejected in its 
programme participation — either on a coalition or toleration basis — in any 
government committed to cuts and privatisation, and emphasised the party’s openness 
to extra-parliamentary movements and activism as a key requirement of any future 
Fraktion. Oskar Lafontaine lent support to the campaign and also ruled out a 
‘Magdeburg Model’ of toleration in NRW. He stated that the principal condition for any 
such cooperation would be no social cuts not only in NRW, but also in the Bundesrat 
(Stern, 2010a). Once again, given the policy intentions of the SPD, Lafontaine’s 
statement effectively committed the Left Party to its oppositional role. Among voters, 
rather than members, however, the approach to Left Party involvement or toleration in 
government was rather different; although only 33% of SPD voters and 40% of Green 
voters favoured serious consideration of such a model, among Left Party voters 
support rose to 94% (Neu, 2010, p.34). The leader and key candidate of the NRW 
Social Democrats, Hannelore Kraft, had already stated her refusal to turn her back on 
policies to which she was wholeheartedly committed (i.e. Agenda 2010) (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 2010). In so doing, Kraft in turn rejected any cooperation with the Left Party 
unless it relinquished its core policies and accepted Agenda 2010. The Greens, 
meanwhile, were not opposed to cooperation with the Left Party in principle, but 
dismissed the notion due to the incompatibility of the Left’s programme and campaign, 
with federal Chair Claudia Roth also ruling out Left Party toleration of a minority Red-
Green government (Stern, 2010a). Although the SPD and Greens did meet with the 
Left Party to discuss possible terms of the party’s support, talks broke off after one day, 
with Kraft citing the Left’s ‘GDR’ mentality and ‘understanding of democracy’ as the 
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factors rendering it neither ‘koalitionfähig nor regierungsfähig’ (Stern, 2010b). However, 
this explanation indicates the SPD’s resistance to engage with the Left Party over 
specific key policy areas such as Hartz, cuts and privatisation, while instead 
emphasising the GDR ‘stigma’ that the PDS had been unable to overcome in western 
states.  
In the examples discussed so far, the prospects of the Left Party entering into 
cooperation with the Social Democrats was decidedly slim; either because the balance 
of power rendered such cooperation superfluous (Bremen) or arithmetically impossible 
(Hamburg); or because of unequivocal rejection by both parties before and after the 
election (NRW). In Hessen, however, a far more complex picture emerged, which this 
discussion now considers in greater depth. 
As the SPD’s lead candidate in Hessen, Andrea Ypsilanti attempted to steer the Social 
Democrats on a more leftist course than that of the party at federal level. Nevertheless, 
the Left Party programme heavily criticised Ypsilanti on the grounds that her 
supposedly left-wing direction was mere electioneering, even though she had 
previously expressed reservations about some aspects of Agenda 2010 (DIE LINKE 
Hessen, 2008b, p.5). The manifesto made no distinction between the CDU, SPD, 
Greens or FDP, as the parties all ‘shared responsibility’ for falling wages, the lack of a 
minimum wage, an increase in precarious employment, cuts, privatisation and the 
dismantling of the welfare state (ibid., p.6). What is more, the four parties were all 
potential partners in various feasible coalition constellations, further underlining the 
compatibility of their policy offers. Yet despite placing clear ground between itself and 
the established parliamentary parties, the Left Party also stated its readiness to vote 
out the incumbent Prime Minister Koch (CDU), which would most likely require the Left 
to at least support the election of Ypsilanti as Prime Minister (ibid.). Despite the SPD’s 
rejection of any kind of cooperation with the Left Party, when the election result 
produced a majority neither for a CDU-FDP nor for an SPD-Green coalition, Ypsilanti 
then considered building a minority Red-Green government dependent on ad hoc 
support of the Left Party (Focus, 2015). 
The SPD produced a paper setting out a list of conditions to be fulfilled by the Left 
Party, including renunciation of the GDR, evidence that no deputies had had Stasi 
involvement, unconditional support of the budget for the entire legislative period and 
the commitment to work towards a balanced budget (Öfinger, 2008). The Left Party 
was also expected to guarantee its support for all key legislation for the five-year 
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duration of parliament, with no influence over personnel decisions. Furthermore, 
Hessen’s intelligence service would continue to keep the Left Party under observation 
for extremism. As such, the document represented ‘above all a rejection of any further 
Left Party demands’ (ibid.). However, the Left Party took steps to fulfil many of these 
conditions, including an agreement not to open its lists to DKP candidates (Schroeder, 
2008b, p.25). Although some sections of the Hessen Left Party were committed to 
principled opposition and were concerned that there would be too great a price to pay, 
the toleration model generally met with broad support among members (at least among 
those who participated) keen to bring about an end to the CDU-led government. Oskar 
Lafontaine commented that, ‘with a voter share of 5.1 per cent we obviously can’t 
determine one hundred per cent of policy’ but also that the Left’s election promises 
would be ‘nothing but smoke and mirrors’ if it did not positively contribute to a change 
of political direction (Neues Deutschland, 2008a); in other words support the election of 
Ypsilanti as Prime Minister. Lafontaine’s statement on the prospective toleration model 
in Hessen therefore differed somewhat to his outright rejection of a similar agreement 
later on in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
However, a newly elected SPD deputy declared her willingness to vote against 
Ypsilanti’s election as Hessen’s Prime Minister if the Left Party was in any way involved 
in cooperation. Cited as the chief reason was the party’s (or at least the PDS’s) GDR 
heritage. The response to Ypsilanti’s reconsideration of Left Party support was not so 
much based on specific policies as such, but on talk of broken promises, doubts 
(especially among the Greens) about the Politikfähigkeit of the Left and warnings about 
the party’s ‘easternness’. Other deputies followed suit, thereby dashing the opportunity 
to form a Red-Green alternative to the CDU-FDP coalition. Labelled a traitor for 
reversing her pre-election promise not to cooperate with the Left Party and no longer 
able to muster the votes required to become Prime Minister, Ypsilanti withdrew from the 
election, leaving Koch in power as Hessen’s acting PM. The question to answer here is 
why the SPD actively prevented the formation of a minority government with Left Party 
support and, in so doing, enabled the conservative government to continue in power. 
After all, given the track record of the Left Party (and previously the PDS) in eastern 
government coalitions, there appeared to be little evidence to suggest that the Left, 
once in a position of responsibility, would not act in a similarly compliant manner in 
Hessen. 
Cartel Theory offers an explanation. Katz and Mair argue that even a party in 
opposition continues to influence policy and because of policy convergence is assured 
 243
that the incoming government will continue to implement core elements of its policy. 
Back in 2005, alarmed by the SPD’s defeat in NRW, Chancellor Schröder took the 
unusual decision to dissolve parliament in preparation for an early General Election 
rather than concede any part of the Agenda 2010 and Hartz measures. When the 
election failed to produce the expected CDU-FDP majority, the SPD joined the 
‘opposition’ CDU in the Grand Coalition led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, in the 
knowledge that the CDU was also committed to the Agenda policies. Similarly, in the 
case of Hessen, the SPD demonstrated that regardless of voters’ preference for the 
centre-left parties opposing Koch (SPD, Greens and Left Party), the Social Democrats 
would not deviate from the policies of Agenda 2010. A telling statement in respect of 
the SPD’s decision to remain in opposition was a declaration by the party’s Seeheimer 
Kreis (Circle) group (Seeheimer Kreis, 2008), which described ‘the concept of Left and 
Right’ as ‘obsolete’ and fit only for theoretical debate. Influential in the decision to 
remain in opposition in Hessen, the Seeheimer Circle is a group within the SPD that 
according to its website rejects ‘clinging dogmatically’ to social-democratic traditions. 
The group regards globalisation as a potential source of wealth, views deficit spending 
as unsocial, and insists that the unemployed should make a ‘contribution’ in return for 
social welfare (Schuster, 2009). Furthermore, the Seeheimer Circle rejected 
‘ideological blinkers or utopian ideas’ on the grounds that they were incompatible with 
policy-making (ibid.). In choosing to allow the CDU to remain in power, the SPD’s 
‘message’, therefore, was that voter policy preference and periods out of governmental 
office were secondary to the priority of continuing the deregulation and restructuring of 
Germany’s employment market and welfare system. 
5.1.2. Social Cleavage Theory
The Case Study analysed election results as well as locations and patterns of support 
to test the influence of the class cleavage based in the Left Party vote in Bremen. Two 
main patterns of Left Party vote emerged. First, the party made its most significant 
gains from former SPD voters. This trend was also visible in terms of locations of 
support, as the party made important inroads into traditionally SPD-voting districts 
characterised by relatively high unemployment and low income. Regarding 
occupational group, the overwhelming support for the Left Party was found among the 
unemployed, workers and trade union members. As such, this trend confirms the 
existence of a strong class-based vote for the Left Party in Bremen. Furthermore, the 
political mood at the time was one of protest focused on the Hartz reforms of welfare 
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and employment. Alongside the various citizens’ and social movements, the PDS and 
especially WASG mobilised this protest and framed the continuing demand for social 
security and justice in class terms.  
The second pattern identified in Bremen was particularly strong Left Party support in 
Green-voting middle-class residential areas with average unemployment and slightly 
higher incomes. In fact, it was these districts that produced the best results for the 
party, as seen in the substantial voter share of around 17% in the Steintor 
neighbourhood in Östliche Vorstadt. Furthermore, whereas the party’s strength in 
working-class SPD strongholds was a new phenomenon in 2007, the inner-city ‘Green’ 
districts could be regarded as having been fledgling ‘strongholds’ for the PDS since 
1998, albeit on a very modest scale. 
Once again, the task now is to consider the extent to which these two patterns were 
specific to Bremen or whether they were replicated in other western states. The results 
from regional elections in the ‘area states’ (North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen and Lower 
Saxony) as well as the city-state of Hamburg are analysed for the same indicators.
In Hessen, the SPD managed to increase its voter share compared to that of 2003 
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2008, p.1). Naturally, this represented a contrast to the 
slump in the Social Democratic vote in Bremen, but it should be borne in mind that in 
Hessen the SPD was in opposition, whereas in Bremen the party had been in 
government since 1945 . Interestingly, the main source of the SPD gains in Hessen 88
was former CDU voters, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the incumbent CDU and in 
particular its polarising Prime Minister was a contributory factor in the upturn in the 
SPD’s fortunes (Infratest dimap, 2008a, p.9). This is further underlined when taking the 
voting behaviour of occupational groups into consideration: the CDU lost voter share 
across all groups, in other words, workers, salaried employees, civil servants, the self-
employed and the unemployed, while the SPD increased its share across all of these 
groups (Neu, 2008, p.36). What is more, although workers and the unemployed still 
constituted the SPD’s largest voter groups, they also accounted for the weakest growth 
in the party’s voter share. Consequently, the strongest growth for the SPD was found 
among salaried workers, civil servants and the self-employed (ibid., p.40). Therefore, it 
can be argued that despite the SPD’s ‘left turn’ and the goodwill towards Ypsilanti, the 
party actually underperformed among its traditional core electorate. 
 As the case study pointed out, in spite of the enduring goodwill towards the SPD in Bremen, 88
the party was also suffering from the burden of ‘double governmental responsibility’, i.e. at Land 
and at federal level.
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The Left Party did not participate in the 2003 election, so it is not possible to calculate 
percentage increase/decrease for 2008. However, the 2008 results revealed support 
for the party was chiefly concentrated in urban rather than rural areas, and mainly in 
SPD strongholds (Schroeder, 2008b, p.12). Although the SPD strengthened its profile 
as the party voters considered most competent to address the issue of social justice, it 
is likely that former CDU voters once again accounted for this increase; as the election 
neared, the Left Party, whose campaign focused heavily on social justice, doubled 
(from four per cent to eight) the share of voters who believed it was in the best position 
to solve the problem (Neu, 2008, p.66). Moreover, it was primarily former SPD voters 
who switched their support to the Left, followed by non-voters, Green voters and, 
uniquely, supporters of other parties not represented in parliament (ibid., p.38), which 
points to the Left’s ability to also mobilise protest votes. In terms of social groups, it 
was the unemployed (15.3%), workers (8.4%) and trade union members (9.2%) who 
constituted the largest source of Left Party support (Schroeder, 2008b, p.15). Also, 
given that the share of support for the Left Party among these groups outweighed the 
increase in support for the SPD, it is again reasonable to conclude that the decision of 
former CDU to switch to the SPD masked the inroads made by the Left Party into the 
Social Democrat voter share, particularly in relation to workers, the unemployed and 
union members, as well as over credibility regarding social justice.    
Another CDU-governed state, Lower Saxony, went to the polls on the same day as 
Hessen and saw the SPD not only lose ground, but also experience its worst ever 
result (Neu, 2008, p.23). Even though the Social Democrats did manage to gain a 
substantial number of former CDU voters, they lost even more to the Left Party, while 
other former Social Democrat voters chose not to participate in the election at all 
(Infratest dimap, 2008b, p.18). Among the occupational groups, it was primarily 
workers, trade union members and the unemployed who abandoned the SPD; 
conversely, the same groups accounted for the most significant share of the Left Party 
vote: just under a quarter of all unemployed voters, nearly ten per cent of workers and 
around twelve per cent of trade union members supported the party (Neu, 2008, p.83), 
which was standing for the first time in Lower Saxony. A study carried out in the Left 
Party’s strongest electoral districts showed that among voters who regarded 
themselves as ‘losers of modernisation’ (Kulick and Onken, 2008, p.8) as a result of the 
employment market and welfare reforms, over a third gave their support to the new Left 
Party. Furthermore, nearly all Left voters (90.7%) cited social justice as the main 
priority in the election, compared to 79.9% of SPD voters (ibid., p.13). In addition, 
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46.7% of Left Party voters subjectively saw themselves as belonging to the ‘lower 
classes’ (Unterschicht), whereas supporters of the four established parliamentary 
parties described themselves as ‘middle class’ (ibid.:10). Although Chapter Two 
highlighted some of the difficulties in classifications of socio-economic class, the 
study’s results nevertheless reveal some clear differences at least in terms of self-
perception on class lines between Left Party voters and the voters of the other parties.  
In North Rhine-Westphalia the WASG had already participated in a regional election 
(2005), when it stood separately from the PDS; Chapter One explained that the failure 
of both parties to clear the five per cent electoral threshold was a contributory factor to 
the merger decision. The 2010 election, when the Left Party first entered the NRW 
regional parliament, therefore permits an early comparison of the party’s votes over two 
elections by combining the 2005 results of the PDS and WASG. Traditionally an SPD 
heartland, NRW had been governed by a CDU-FDP coalition since the Social 
Democrats’ defeat at the previous election. In 2010, however, it was both major catch-
all parties that lost voter share (SPD: minus 2.6%), while the smaller parties (Greens, 
FDP and Left) improved their results; in relation to the combined PDS-WASG vote, the 
Left Party increased its share by 2.5% to achieve 5.6% (Infratest dimap, 2010, p.5), 
even though around 20,000 voters who had supported the former PDS or WASG 
stayed away from the 2010 election (Neu, 2010, p.14). In terms of occupational groups, 
the SPD lost voter share in all categories. However, the most pronounced losses were 
among civil servants and the self-employed, whereas support among workers and the 
unemployed fell only by around 1%, with workers still constituting the largest voter 
group (44.4%) (ibid.:25). Among trade union members, too, it was self-employed 
members rather than workers who turned away from the SPD (ibid.). One explanation 
for this result is that the CDU suffered some of its heaviest losses among workers and 
the unemployed, and that these voters switched their support to the SPD, thus 
compensating for and disguising Social Democrat losses among these groups (ibid.) 
and partial realignment to the Left Party.    
The Left Party was able to strengthen its appeal across all occupational groups, but the 
familiar pattern that had emerged both in the Bundestag election (Solty, 2007, p.21) 
and in subsequent regional elections was once again evident: in 2005 the strongest 
source of support for the PDS-WASG had been unemployed voters (9.3%), and in 
2010 this rose to 16.7%. Workers had voted for the PDS-WASG to a lesser degree, but 
still represented the second largest voter group in 2005 (4.5%); in 2010, however, 7.7% 
of workers voted for the Left Party (Neu, 2010, p.25). Taking trade union membership 
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into account, it was again workers who accounted for the greatest voter share in each 
election (4.9% and 9.0% respectively)(ibid.). Thus, the Left Party’s strongest results 
both in terms of overall voter share and increase were found among the same voter 
groups that had accounted for the PDS-WASG’s combined support in 2005. It is 
therefore possible to identify an early Left Party core electorate consisting of 
unemployed voters, workers and trade union members emerging in North Rhine-
Westphalia.       
The final state to consider is Hamburg, also governed by the CDU at the time of the 
2008 election. Once again, Left Party support was disproportionately high among the 
unemployed (19%) and workers (10%), with both occupational groups accounting for 
strong increases in the party’s voter share (Hartwig, 2008, p.6). Conforming to the 
voting patterns described above, the source of the party’s greatest gains was former 
SPD voters, followed by non-voters. Social justice was again cited by Left Party voters 
as their main policy concern, while of the former SPD and Green voters who switched 
to the Left, just under three quarters named social justice as their primary motivation for 
their decision (ibid.). The location of key Left Party support also repeated the pattern 
found in other western states: Left Party voters tended to reside in SPD-voting districts 
with a high proportion of welfare claimants, whether in the form of unemployment 
benefits or income support for low-paid workers (the ‘Aufstocker’ described in Chapter 
Three). The proportion of people living in poverty was also high in these areas (ibid., p.
3).  
Interestingly, the results of the Hamburg election also revealed a second key location 
and source of Left Party support. The party performed particularly strongly in inner city 
districts (8.3% compared to 6.7% for Hamburg overall). While the SPD’s electorate was 
fairly evenly distributed across the city-state, GAL (Green) support, too, was clearly 
concentrated in these inner city areas (Hartwig, 2008, p.4). Analysis carried out on 
behalf of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation determined the correlation between the 
parties in terms of the districts in which they attracted the greatest voter share. The 
study found that there was clearly a positive relationship between concentrations of 
Left Party support and those of the SPD (0.67) and, to a lesser extent, those of the 
GAL (0.38). Focusing on locations of SPD support, the greatest similarity was with the 
Left Party (0.67), while the relationship between SPD and Green support was just 0.07, 
indicating that there was little common ground between the geographical locations of 
the two parties’ electorates (ibid., p.5). The urban locations of GAL as well as Left Party 
support are characterised by a high proportion of people who have completed higher 
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education, many of whom work in relatively well-paid fields such as education, social 
work and the ‘creative economy’. These voters have been referred to as the ‘critical 
educational elites’ (kritische Bildungseliten). Although Left Party voters in Hamburg as a 
whole demonstrated neither a particularly high or low level of educational attainment, 
the party’s strong performance in these districts suggests that a high proportion were 
highly educated (ibid., p.9). Therefore, it is possible to recognise a parallel between the 
electorate of the Left Party in Hamburg and that in Bremen, where the party attracted 
voters not only in SPD strongholds consisting primarily of workers and characterised by 
high unemployment and poverty, but also Green-voting inner-city middle class 
residential areas.
To sum up, the Bremen Case Study found that the Left Party entered the regional 
parliament with two different categories of support. The first group consisted of 
unemployed voters and blue-collar workers. Trade union members, particularly blue-
collar workers, were a third key source of support. As the discussion of Hessen, Lower 
Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hamburg has shown, this was a pattern 
replicated across other western federal states. In the city-states of Bremen and 
Hamburg, voter share among these groups was located in residential areas outside of 
the inner city, while in the ‘area states’ (Flächenländer), support was concentrated in 
urban rather than rural areas. Another common characteristic is that the party was able 
to attract these social groups chiefly from the SPD, and also managed to mobilise non-
voters. Furthermore, the Case Study identified social justice as a key policy priority 
among Left Party voters.
The second key source of Left Party support was located in inner-city districts with a 
strong Green vote, less affected by unemployment and poverty, and characterised by 
higher incomes and educational attainment. This electorate appears to be particularly 
important in the two city-states. However, it is difficult to draw a direct comparison 
between Bremen and Hamburg on the one hand and Germany’s third city-state, Berlin 
on the other, given the PDS’s particularly strong performance in the east of the city 
since unification. One contrast between the two western city-states is that whereas the 
Left Party in Hamburg achieved its strongest vote in typically SPD-voting areas, in 
Bremen by far the best result for the party was achieved in the inner-city ‘Green’ 
districts, building on support that had slowly developed for the PDS. Yet it is important 
to bear in mind that the SPD lost heavily in these areas, while overall Bremen’s Greens 
proved less able than the Left to attract workers and particularly the unemployed (the 
sole loss for the Greens in Bremen). This suggests that even in the ‘Green’ districts, the 
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Left Party was still able to attract support from the unemployed, workers and trade 
union members, thus actually further emphasising the party’s ability to mobilise on 
class lines. 
Both Bremen and Hamburg were port cities with economies built around weapons 
development, manufacturing, export and, in the case of Hamburg, military planning and 
training. Opposition to this militarisation of the economy was likewise well-established 
in the two city-states, particularly in Bremen, where the Peace Forum has cooperated 
closely with both the PDS and Left Party. As Chapter One has explained, antimilitarism 
became a key Left Party policy area, and one which featured prominently in the 
Bremen and Hamburg election campaigns in particular. Left Party voters in the Bremen 
Case Study also cited the party’s commitment to antimilitarism as their primary 
motivation for supporting the party. Therefore, it can be concluded that as well as socio-
economic factors, antimilitarism was potentially an additional contributory factor to the 
party’s success in the ‘Green’ districts of the two city-states.     
5.2. Conclusions
Chapter Two identified various organisational traits that, according to Cartel Theory, 
develop within parties. The first feature is an ascendant party in central office. Given 
Germany’s federal structure, the party in central office is not limited to just the national 
level, but can also include the party executive within an individual federal state. The 
Case Study has described how the national leadership sought to influence local 
matters in Bremen by attempting to remove a democratically selected but 
inexperienced candidate who was committed to principled opposition, and instead 
impose a more ‘reliable’ and well-known pro-office-seeking candidate. Efforts were also 
made to remove the anti-privatisation policy from campaign materials. In Hessen, too, 
the national leadership intervened over the lead candidate. Even though the 
involvement was mainly prompted by controversy surrounding the candidate’s 
comments, rather than by policy modification (as was the case in Bremen), the net 
result was still the greater influence of the national leadership, which in turn led to a 
more pragmatic political direction in Hessen. Furthermore, the party’s lack of 
experienced personnel, including among the parliamentary candidates, combined with 
organisational weakness in parts of the state were all characteristics that again once 
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again paved the way for federal politicians and resources to play a more influential role 
in Hessen.
A further aspect of Cartel Theory identified in Chapter Two for investigation was an 
increased focus on parliamentary politics. The theory anticipates an increasingly top-
down approach to decision-making that favours the parliamentary group and potentially 
sidelines the influence of activists. In Bremen there was concern that preoccupation 
with parliamentary work would lead the Left Party to define itself in relation to the SPD; 
in other words, the Social Democrats would become the main point of reference, thus 
diminishing the Left Party’s own socialist identity and policies. Activists in Bremen also 
expressed frustration that their work was increasingly focused on supporting 
candidates, rather than on engagement in local issues. However, it is natural for a party 
with a realistic chance of gaining parliamentary seats to concentrate its resources to 
support the campaign, and for the Left Party the regional elections of 2007 onwards 
represented the first such opportunity; even in Bremen, the prospects of actually 
gaining seats in the Bürgerschaft had been decidedly remote for the PDS while in 
some other western states the PDS had not even contested previous elections. 
Consequently, it was inevitable that the focus and intensity of campaigning would 
reflect this genuine opportunity to enter parliament. Nonetheless, there was also 
evidence beyond election campaigns that the overall direction of the party might be 
shifting towards a dominance of parliamentary politics. In Bremen, for example, 
decision-making rights were removed from grassroots members. In Hessen, whereas 
no single wing of the party, whether pragmatic office-seekers, trade unionists or the 
opposition-focused ‘movement’, had gained overall dominance before the election, the 
party’s subsequent reversal of its ruling on the separation of office and mandate paved 
the way for the parliamentary group in Hessen to become the driving force in the party 
(Schroeder, 2008a).  
Cartel Theory also argues that parties’ prioritisation of parliamentary politics and 
anchoring in the institutions of the state results in the narrowing of policy. An additional 
consequence of the parliamentary focus was that in Bremen and in the other western 
states discussed in this chapter, the campaigns generally concentrated on policies 
achievable within the competence of the Bürgerschaft or Landtag. Although the 
campaign to abolish the Hartz measures was extremely prominent at national level and 
had of course driven the protests that had led to the creation of the Left Party, the 
scope of demands in regional campaigns was limited mainly to the abolition of 
sanctions on Hartz IV recipients, while calling for a raise in statutory payments. 
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Naturally, the abolition of Hartz could not be achieved in Bremen, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Hessen or indeed in any other individual state, but as the Bremen study 
has shown, the absence of more far-reaching demands failed to quell criticism that the 
Left Party, despite its declared opposition to Hartz and its intention to work with extra-
parliamentary groups such as trade unions and anti-globalisation campaigners, was 
consciously restricting its ambitions to the parliamentary context, also to facilitate 
cooperation with the SPD and Greens . 89
Trade union support was essential for the party’s breakthrough in each regional 
election. As discussed in the Bremen Case Study, the WASG played a key role in 
mobilising trade union members, since the PDS, chiefly for historical reasons, had 
failed to attract these voters. These factors — the party’s perceived ‘easternness’ and 
lack of a grassroots basis in the West — were just as problematic for the PDS in other 
western states, perhaps even more so than in Bremen, where the party had at least 
built up some modest support in the inner-city areas and at Beirat level. The groups 
from which the WASG would emerge, namely traditional Social Democrat voters and 
trade union members, had remained beyond the reach of the PDS. However, as the 
2005 election in North Rhine-Westphalia demonstrated, the WASG too lacked the 
individual organisational strength to mobilise the amount of support needed to gain 
parliamentary seats. The evidence from Bremen and from other Länder discussed here 
confirms that both parties were essential to the creation of a united and credible 
political force in the western states. The Bremen Left Party Bürgerschaft deputy and 
former PDS Chair Klaus-Rainer Rupp summed this up as follows: 
Were it not for a number of people who in 1989 decided against throwing 
socialism overboard and who instead decided to found the PDS — despite all 
the challenges — then there would have been no partner for the new Left — 
and therefore the Left Party would never have happened. Likewise, neither 
would it have happened without the WASG. (Neues Deutschland, 2008b). 
Having considered the various characteristics of Cartel Theory in context, the task is 
now to establish the extent to which this theory, or parts of it, explain the Left Party’s 
electoral success in 2007 onwards. Not all central party attempts to influence regional 
candidates and policy were successful, but leadership involvement in campaigns did in 
 Even though it was the SPD and Greens who introduced Hartz IV, both parties claimed to 89
support improved benefits. For example, the GAL (Greens) in Hamburg called for the statutory 
benefits to be ‘substantially’ increased and also for the introduction of a minimum wage, 
although in neither case was a value specified (Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen GAL Hamburg, 2008).
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general ensure that the regional organisations and their campaigns were ‘on message’. 
Policy goals were set within the parameters of the national party programme as well as 
within the competence of the respective legislature. Clearly stating the party’s 
parliamentary ambitions, the campaigns presented the Left Party as the parliamentary 
arm of the anti-Hartz, anti-privatisation movement for social justice, which was largely 
based in the trade unions.
Overall, there was an increased emphasis on the uniformity of campaigns, approved 
candidates and orientation towards parliamentary politics. This approach was intended 
to manage the presentation of the party and set the framework for policies, and 
indicates the influence of an ascendant central party on leadership and organisation. 
Yet as Chapter One and the Case Study have shown, neither the top-down 
management of the party nor the tension between parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary focus were anything new, and therefore did not represent a significant 
qualitative change at the time of the party’s electoral breakthrough. Elsewhere, the 
active involvement of the central party was explained at least in part as a necessity 
arising from the organisational weakness of the regional association. Furthermore, 
there was no clear evidence to suggest that the electoral choices of voters (as opposed 
to members) were determined by internal characteristics relating to leadership and 
organisation. Rather, it was policy, and the value of social justice, that were most 
frequently cited as the key reason for voting for the Left Party. 
In terms of party competition, the regional election campaign in Bremen and in the 
other western states examined here have shown that the Left Party offered a 
programme that was unmistakably redistributive in character. Some common ground 
did exist between Left Party policy and that of other parties, for example the 
introduction of a minimum wage demanded by both the Left and the SPD (for instance 
in Bremen and Hessen), or the call to improve the statutory rate and conditions for 
Hartz recipients. Furthermore, existing legal and fiscal restraints, together with the 
Left’s experience of government responsibility in eastern Länder both placed a 
question mark over the party’s capacity and credibility regarding the implementation of 
its programme. The evidence from Hessen also suggested a degree of willingness to 
compromise in order to bring about a more general Politikwechsel (change of political 
direction). But at least in their intentions, the Left Party’s core policies centred on tax-
funded investment and spending on public services rather than cuts and on the 
democratisation of the economy instead of privatisation. In this respect, the Left Party 
programme represented a set of alternatives that countered the prevailing politics 
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practised at regional level (notably in Bremen, where the SPD was established in 
government and driving the reforms) and offered by the mainstream parliamentary 
parties, a situation Solty (2007, p.21) sums up as follows:
For the time being, in the struggle against the neoliberal pensée unique, DIE 
LINKE is the sole occupant of a wide-open field.
As such, it is reasonable to conclude that policy convergence between the Left Party 
and other centre-left parties did not account for the Left’s success. What is more, it is 
possible that the presence of the WASG, many of whose members (for example in 
Bremen) were committed to principled opposition, could act as a counterbalance to any 
office-seeking tendencies on the part of the central party or from within the former PDS.  
To sum up, the leadership and organisational characteristics associated with Cartel 
Theory do not actually account for western electorates’ sudden support for the Left 
Party, while policies of redistribution and economic democracy were distinct from the 
prevailing policies of austerity, privatisation and the flexible employment market. 
Nevertheless, as Chapter One has explained, the merger of the PDS and WASG was 
itself characterised by a top-down approach, driven by a strong leadership with the 
formal support of the wider and more passive membership. The PDS in particular had 
some organisational strength, even though far less developed than in the eastern 
states, plus governmental experience in the eastern states and at national level. A 
parliamentary focus was also evident within the new party, as expressed in the regional 
campaigns and programmes discussed in the Case Study and in this chapter. 
Despite the strengthened organisation and parliamentary focus of the Left Party, a 
more pronounced qualitative change was the establishment of ties to organised labour. 
Close political links to trade unions had eluded the PDS, but were facilitated by the 
cooperation with the WASG and proved essential to the Left Party, as demonstrated by 
the consistently strong voter share among trade union members in all of the regional 
elections discussed in this research. Secondly, the WASG’s organisational and political 
origins played an important role in remedying a further weakness of the PDS in the 
western states, namely negative associations with the party’s easternness. Even so, 
the campaigns conducted by other political parties continued to instrumentalise the 
Left’s (PDS’s) eastern roots, notably in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen, whether 
in terms of the ‘GDR mentality’, the political unfitness of ‘the communists’ or the party’s 
SED heritage. Furthermore, while the PDS had struggled to establish itself as a 
socialist alternative to the left of the SPD, the familiar, social democratic, trade union 
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based roots of the WASG made the Left Party electable for disillusioned SPD voters, 
as evidenced by the volume of former SPD voters who switched to the Left Party in the 
regional elections. Yet the reverse side to this particular coin was the concern 
expressed by some members in Bremen that Left Party policy and strategy would 
inevitably become orientated towards the SPD ‘default’, leading the Left Party along the 
road to becoming a useful appendage (Anhängsel) of the Social Democrats.    
The research carried out in Bremen demonstrated the existence of persistent 
unemployment combined with an expanding low-paid sector and precariat, which in 
turn intensified the problem of poverty. Opposition to the Agenda 2010 and Hartz 
reforms was framed in class terms, thereby fulfilling the mobilisation criteria established 
in Social Cleavage Theory. In the broader context, too, the Left Party’s breakthrough in 
western parliaments coincided with an unusually high amount of industrial unrest and 
protest. Against a background of ongoing protest against welfare reform, massive job 
cuts by large companies such as Nokia and BMW, and public sector cuts resulting from 
the financial crisis, a wave of strikes erupted across Germany. In 2008 and 2009, 
railway workers, members of the heavy industry union IG Metall, Deutsche Telekom 
workers, teaching staff and students/pupils and social workers all took industrial action 
over conditions, pay and job losses (Focus, 2011). Therefore, it is plausible that the 
established parties’ approach of disassociation from and discrediting of the Left Party 
was motivated less by genuine doubts regarding Koalitionsfähigkeit (especially taking 
into account the performance of the party in the East), or alarm over allowing the 
‘former communists’ a glimpse of power in the western parliaments, and more out of 
concern that, given the Left Party’s strengthening ties to organised labour, cooperation 
even on an informal (toleration) basis could encourage and embolden trade unions and 
protesters to increase their demands. The example of Hessen illustrates this point 
particularly well: beyond the hysteria surrounding the PDS/SED heritage and despite 
the Left’s willingness to compromise, the SPD actually prioritised the continuation of 
cuts, privatisation and the Hartz reforms over the very real opportunity to remove an 
unpopular conservative government and form a centre-left coalition with the assistance 
of the Left Party. 
Elff and Rossteutscher’s analysis of shifts in SPD and Left Party voter share was based 
on classifications of socio-economic class along the lines identified in Chapter Three. 
The findings showed a decline in SPD support most notably among the non-manual 
and manual working class in western states, while support for the PDS/Left Party rose 
among the same occupational groups; Nachtwey and Spier identified a similar pattern 
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among unemployed voters (see Chapter Three). When it entered western regional 
parliaments, the Left Party succeeded in gaining the support of those who were either 
directly affected by the Hartz reforms or at risk of falling into dependency on benefits, 
namely the unemployed and workers. Organised labour, especially workers, formed the 
third major source of electoral support for the Left. While the SPD remained the most 
popular party overall among these voters, the evidence from Bremen as well as 
subsequent western elections indeed indicated a partial realignment towards the Left 
Party among workers and the unemployed, and particularly in working-class SPD 
strongholds. Neu therefore describes the Left Party as the mobiliser of the 
‘unemployed, workers and trade unionists (…); in a word, the party of the ‘Old Social 
Movements’ (Neu, 2008, p.5).     
However, the analysis has also highlighted the strong Left Party performance in Green-
voting middle-class, inner-city residential areas, particularly in the city-states of Bremen 
and Hamburg, where antimilitarism was an additional policy focus in the campaign. In 
Bremen, support in these areas had built up over time, providing the PDS with its 
strongest source of support. Therefore, the party’s strength in ‘Green’ districts is 
unlikely to be a mere anomaly. Yet neither does it necessarily contradict the findings of 
this research that class voting was the chief explanation of the Left Party’s success. 
First, since the Left’s strong result in 2007/8 represented a pronounced strengthening 
of the voter base that had already been gradually developing in these districts, it did not 
mark a clear qualitative change. Secondly, the new significant gains in the party’s 
support were found in SPD-voting, working class residential areas, where the party 
managed to attract voters from the Social Democrats. In the Green districts too, rather 
than the Greens, whose voter base did not reflect the pattern of the Left support ), it 90
was the SPD who lost voter share, allowing the Left Party to substantially improve its 
result, thus conforming to Elff and Rossteutscher’s expectation of partial realignment. 
Consequently, whether in the Social Democrats’ strongholds or in the middle-class 
Green districts, it was the ability to attract former SPD voters that allowed the Left Party 
to enter the Bürgerschaft and subsequently other western parliaments.    
The SPD’s first major change of political course was described as a transformation 
from ‘consciousness-evoking factor of the working classes and instrument for the (…) 
transition to socialism, to that of conciliator between classes and the representative of 
the interests of “all the people” within the existing socio-economic context’ (Graf,1977, 
 Solty (2007, p.21) concludes that the class base of the Greens is different to that of the Left 90
Party. 
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p.190). With the implementation of the Agenda 2010, the SPD took steps to radically 
transform the socio-economic context by shifting from the de-commodification of labour 
to the pursuit of a flexible, supply-side orientated employment market based on the 
assumption that the established system of welfare benefits represented a barrier to 
work. According to Mochmann (2002, p.54), for parties, a ‘loosening of ties actually 
more or less asks for an active individual political orientation and identification which is 
not based on tradition’. In other words, a party’s endeavour to disassociate from its 
core values and voter base is a two-way process that also requires a change in 
behaviour among voter groups, for example in terms of class-based voting. At the time 
of the SPD-Green reforms, the electorate was not fundamentally hostile to reform — in 
fact, one of the main criticisms levelled at the government during its first term in office 
had centred on Reformstau (reform bottlenecks) in fulfilling the election pledge to halve 
unemployment. But neither was it a matter of reform at any price. Chapter Three has 
argued that demand for redistributive welfare proved resilient among the German 
population in general and particularly among workers and the unemployed. Despite the 
near-ubiquitous mantra of ‘no alternative’ and periods of austerity, as seen in Bremen’s 
restructuring or, later on, as a result of the financial crash and introduction of the 
Schuldenbremse, it can therefore be concluded that these social groups were simply 
unwilling to abandon policies based on the state’s responsibility for the provision of a 
decent livelihood for the sick, destitute, jobless and elderly, prompting a partial 
realignment to a party offering policies based on redistribution and social justice. 
5.3. Outlook
Between 2007 and 2010 the Left Party entered parliaments in all but three western 
federal states . However, since then, in subsequent elections the party failed to regain 91
seats in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein. Although as a 
relatively new party it was not yet possible to speak of an established, regular 
electorate, the Left lost primarily to the SPD, but also to the newly emerged Pirate 
Party (which entered a series of western parliaments ) as well as to non-voters (Neu, 92
2012, p.10). In Bremen, the Fraktion was returned to the Bürgerschaft in 2011, but with 
five seats, rather than the seven gained in 2007. Bremen’s Left continued to attract its 
greatest voter share among the unemployed, workers and trade union members (Neu,
 The Left remains unrepresented in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate.91
 In the western states, the Pirates entered the parliaments of Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-92
Westphalia, Saarland. The party also gained representation in the city-state of Berlin (Piraten 
Partei, 2014).
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2011, p.9), but lost much of the support it had received from these groups in 2007 . 93
The party lost ten per cent of the unemployed vote, while gains among this group were 
made by the SPD (+5%), Greens (+7%) and the right-wing populist Enraged Citizens 
(+5%) (ibid.). 
A variety of factors contributed to the Left’s weaker performance in its attempt to be 
returned to the western regional parliaments; what is more, these also differed from 
state to state. Broadly speaking, however, they included conflicting political approaches 
within the parliamentary groups, disputes surrounding individual members and 
deputies, as well as the continuing organisational weakness of the regional 
organisation in relation to the parliamentary group. Furthermore, the political and 
strategic dilemma concerning the toleration of minority Red-Green coalitions also 
remained unresolved (Hoff and Kahrs, 2011, p.2). As such, whereas a class-based Left 
Party vote was identifiable in the western states where the party first entered 
parliament, it was difficult to single out a satisfactory explanation to account for the 
party’s subsequent losses. In addition, while the Pirate Party succeeded in attracting 
Left Party voters in some states, notably North Rhine-Westphalia, it failed to enter the 
Bremen Bürgerschaft . Here, it was once again a small, Bremen-specific group, the 94
right-wing populist Enraged Citizens, that attracted the support of unemployed voters, 
including those who voted Left in 2007. 
Since the 2011/12 elections the Pirate Party has all but disappeared from national 
politics. In the next round of regional elections beginning in 2015, it will therefore be 
interesting to re-examine the Left Party vote in western states to see whether the party 
has been able to recover its voter share among the unemployed, workers and 
organised labour. Analysis should aim to establish whether the initially strong support 
for the Left was merely interrupted by short-term, specific protest votes in 2011/12 (for 
example, as a result of the chaotic impression created by the parliamentary group, or 
the sudden but novelty appeal of the Pirate Party). Alternatively, given the NRW Left’s 
loss of some of previous PDS-WASG support to non-voters as early as 2010, a later 
study might discover that the strong Left Party vote was itself a short-lived expression 
of protest against the SPD. However, with the SPD currently in office at national level 
(as the junior partner in a Grand Coalition) and with cuts resulting from the 
Schuldenbremse still to fully bite, there could be a further spate of protests against the 
 Unemployed -10%; workers: -4%; blue-collar trade union members: -9% (Neu, 2011, p.9).93
 Elsewhere, such as in Schleswig-Holstein, the Pirates were also able to make significant 94
gains among middle class voters (Neu, 2012, p.10). 
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two main parties. Whether such protest could again be successfully framed in class 
terms by the Left Party, or whether it could be mobilised by the populist right remains to 
be seen. Therefore, to build a sustainable core electorate based on the class vote, the 
Left Party will need to be able to mobilise not only disillusioned SPD voters but also 
non-voters. 
Secondly, particularly in the case of the western city-states (Bremen and Hamburg), 
consideration should also be given to the Left Party vote in the urban ‘Green’ areas and 
whether these continue to provide key locations of support. In this respect, it would be 
useful to gain a deeper understanding of the role of class voting in such areas, and the 
significance of the Left’s key policy of antimilitarism. While this pattern of support has 
until now been concentrated in the city-states, a similar trend could also emerge in 
inner city districts in the western Flächenländer.      
These potential research avenues are not only interesting questions concerning the 
future development of the Left Party; they are also relevant for the further investigation 
of the theoretical frameworks considered in this thesis. Our understanding of Cartel 
Theory in relation to the Left Party would benefit from a longer term reflection on the 
party organisation and leadership practices, as well as policy offerings and position on 
toleration and/or coalitions. In addition, extended analysis of the Left Party’s role in 
class-based mobilisation and evidence of trends in class-based voting will contribute to 
any validation of (or indeed challenge to) Social Cleavage Theory as an explanation of 
the party’s breakthrough and subsequent electoral success in Germany’s western 
states. 
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Appendix 1
Bremen Case Study: Questionnaire 1*
(*Note: The language of the questionnaire and all responses was German)
Section A. This section focuses on the 2007 Bürgerschaft election.
Thinking about when you voted for the Left Party in the 2007 election:
1. How strongly do you associate the Left Party with voicing the interests of working people?
Extremely strongly
Very strongly
Moderately strongly
Not very strongly
Not at all strongly
2. Of the parties listed below, which do you most closely associate with ‘soziale Gerechtigkeit’? 
(social justice)
SPD
Greens
Left Party 
Why? [ ]
3. When you decided to vote, how influential was the Left Party’s representation of the interests 
of working people? 
Extremely influential 
Very influential 
Moderately influential 
Not very influential 
Not at all influential 
Why? [ ] 
4. When you decided to vote, how influential was the Left Party’s representation of the interests 
of unemployed people? 
Extremely influential 
Very influential 
Moderately influential 
Not very influential 
Not at all influential 
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5. How important was the impact of the Hartz employment and welfare reforms when you 
decided how to vote?
Extremely important 
Very important 
Moderately important 
Not very important  
Not at all important 
Please explain why.  [ ]
The Left Party formed from the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the 
Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG). The PDS had participated in 
previous elections in Bremen.
6. Comparing the Left Party and the PDS, was the Left Party politically closer to the SPD?
Yes, the Left Party was closer to the SPD  
No, the Left Party was not closer to the SPD 
No, the Left Party was further from the SPD  
In which way(s)?[  ]
7. To what extent would you have supported the Left Party entering into a coalition with the 
SPD? 
Strongly supported 
Moderately supported 
Neither supported nor opposed 
Moderately opposed 
Strongly opposed 
On what grounds? [  ] 
8. Which of these statements most closely reflects your main motivation for voting for the Left 
Party in 2007?
The SPD had ‘betrayed’ ordinary working people and the unemployed 
The new Left Party was more radical than the old PDS 
The Trade Unions were linked with the WASG 
The Left Party was a clearly anti-capitalist party 
The Left Party was the only party that opposed Bundeswehr intervention abroad 
The new Left Party was less extreme than the olds PDS 
Other [   ] 
Section B. Thinking now about your personal situation seven years ago, in 2007: 
9. Please select your age group as of 2007 
18 - 24 
25 - 34 
35 - 44 
45 - 59 
60 or above 
 262
10. What was your occupational group in 2007?
Self-employed 
Public sector employee 
Routine/manual worker 
Apprentice 
Retired 
Unemployed 
Other [    ] 
11. As best you can remember, what was your income group at that time?
€ 37,000 and more           
€ 33,381 up to € 36,999 
€ 30,000 up to € 33,380 
€ 27,000 up to € 29,999 
Under € 27,000 
Prefer not to say 
12. Are you…
Male 
Female 
Prefer not to say 
13. Were you a member of a trade union in 2007?
Yes 
No 
Don’t know / prefer not to say 
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Appendix 2
Bremen Case Study: Questionnaire 2
(Note: These questions were initially intended as a series of prompts to help guide an 
interview (the respondent would not be required to answer every question, and would 
be free to focus on a particular area in depth). However, for the reasons explained in 
the Introduction to the Case Study, the questions were instead distributed as a self-
administered questionnaire. The language of the questionnaire and all responses was 
German.)
 
1. Party activity
Can you please describe your role/activity in Die Linke? 
When did you join the party? 
Were you previously a member of the PDS, WASG or another party? 
What was your main reason for joining Die Linke? 
Do you hold (or have you held) an official post within the party, e.g. at local or Land level? 
Do you belong to a working group (AG) within the party? 
Are you a member of any other movement or organisation (e.g. trade union, social movement) 
in Bremen?
2. Policy 
What do you consider the main policy areas of the Left Party to be? How do these policies 
relate to Bremen specifically?
To what extent has there been a change in the focus of Left Party policy?
And when did you notice this change?
What do you think were the reasons for the change?
How was the decision made to implement this change in policy? (Who was involved in the 
decision?)
To what extent do you think that Bürgerschaft representation has influenced Left Party policy in 
Bremen?
To what extent has party policy on a particular issue been directly influenced by a separate 
social movement or evidence of strong public opinion? 
Are there any policies (relating to Bremen) you strongly feel the Left Party should - or shouldn’t - 
campaign on? 
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3. Influence within the party
In your own experience, what influence does the (grassroots membership) have within the 
party? Can you give examples?
In your opinion, what is the most influential organisation/structure within the party? Can you 
explain your answer?
Would you say that social media has strengthened or weakened party democracy / the influence 
of ordinary members in relation to the party leadership? In which ways?
How does that affect you?
4. Cooperation and parliamentary work
How closely does the Left Party cooperate with other political parties represented in the 
Bürgerschaft? In which matters/on which issues?
And at which level? (For example, leadership, Fraktion, basis)
With which extra-parliamentary groups does the Left Party cooperate in Bremen?
Again, at which level does this cooperation take place? (Informal, basis, parliamentary group, 
Beirat etc.)
To what extent has parliamentary representation influenced cooperation with other social 
movements and organisations?
What are the main advantages of parliamentary work? What about any drawbacks?
Thinking about the role of the party basis, would you say that activities have been orientated 
towards the interests of the parliamentary group (or candidates) or have they focused on extra-
parliamentary work with the social movements you have mentioned?
How do you feel about that? 
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Appendix 3
DIE LINKE Bremen: Party structure.
In accordance with §12 of its federal statute (DIE LINKE, 2014) (Bundessatzung), the 
Left Party is organised into sixteen Landesverbände (regional associations) at Land 
level, to reflect Germany’s federal structure (Bundessatzung der Partei Die Linke 
§12.1). The role of the individual regional association, which is also governed by its 
own constitution (Statut), is to develop regional policies within the framework of the 
(federal) party programme (Bundessatzung der Partei Die Linke §12.4). It is also 
responsible for further structuring the party into district associations known as 
Kreisverbände. Within Bremen, therefore, as well as the Landesverband Bremen, the 
party consists of four Kreisverbände, namely Links der Weser, Mitte-Ost, Nord West 
and Bremerhaven. All members, regardless of their position within the party (e.g., 
regular member, office holder, mandate holder) automatically belong to the 
Kreisverband for the area in which they are officially registered as a resident. The 
Kreisverband is competent for the political and organisational activities within its 
respective district, insofar as these do not fall under the responsibility of the regional 
association, and constitute the most local level of the party structure with its own 
financial management and budget. Article 7 of the Political Parties Act permits these 
district associations to organise subdivisional local branches (Ortsverbände) within 
their respective area (Bundessatzung der Partei Die Linke §13. 6-8); however, these 
are usually features of the larger ‘area states’, rather than of city states such as 
Bremen. 
The executive board (Landesvorstand) is described in Bremen’s regional statute 
(Landessatzung) (DIE LINKE Landesverband Bremen, 2007) as the highest level 
political and organisational committee within the regional party association 
(Landessatzung, §13 Aufgaben des Landesvorstands). Its many responsibilities include 
formulating and coordinating political campaigns and policy positions on current 
political issues, control of party finance as well as electoral campaigns and candidate 
selection. It consists of an executive committee (Geschäftsführender Vorstand) of two 
speakers (one male, one female), a deputy speaker and a treasurer; seven regular 
board members complete the executive committee. Furthermore, Bremen’s 
representatives of the Bundestag and European parliamentary groups and the leader 
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of the Bürgerschaft parliamentary group participate in an advisory role, as do the 
secretary of the regional association and a representative of the party’s youth 
organisation (Landessatzung, §13 Aufgaben des Landesvorstands, §14 
Zusammensetzung und Wahl des Landesvorstands). Each district association also 
consists of an executive (at least half of whom must be female), including a speaker 
and treasurer. The district is also required to hold a members’ general meeting, at 
which members of the Landesrat (regional committee), a body with a consulting and 
monitoring function within the party structure, are elected. An additional role of the 
district association is the selection of candidates for the district council (Beirat) 
elections (Landessatzung, §7 Kreisverbände). 
The most senior function overall within the Landesverband Bremen is the regional 
conference (Landesparteitag), responsible for political and organisational decisions. 
Conference is the body responsible for policy resolutions and content of election 
manifestoes. Furthermore, it adopts formal positions on the work of the parliamentary 
group in the Bürgerschaft and determines the party’s stance on governing coalition 
participation or toleration (Landessatzung, §10 Aufgaben des Landesparteitages). 
Conference also elects, inter alia, members of the party’s state executive and various 
committees, including the regional committee and the financial committee. 
There are also several electoral mandate holders within the Bremen party. In addition 
to one member of the Bundestag, in 2007 these included seven Bürgerschaft deputies, 
two Stadtverordnetenversammlung (city council) deputies in Bremerhaven and twenty-
two members in sixteen of the twenty-two district councils in Bremen City. Furthermore, 
the regional association integrates nineteen Arbeitsgruppen (working groups), which 
focus on specific policy areas (such as models of the basic citizens’ income, precarious 
employment, gender, health and social issues) and/or represent the different political 
tendencies within the party (including the anti-capitalist left, trade unions, emancipated 
left, democratic socialism). To gain recognition, the group must demonstrate 
membership in at least two (i.e., at least half) of the district associations in the case of 
Bremen) and a minimum of 5% of the overall regional membership. The groups must 
be continuously active and report to the executive committee (Landessatzung, §5 
Landesweite Innerparteiliche Zusammenschlüsse).
 267
Appendix 4
Bremen Bürgerschaft election 2007
Results by gender, age and educational attainment
Left Party support according to gender and age group 
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.50)
Voter share and relative increase/decrease (2007-2003) according to 
educational attainment
(Infratest dimap, 2007, p.53)
Share of vote 
2007 (%)
Difference ( in % 
points) to 2003
Women 7 5
18 - 24 7 4
25 - 34 7 5
35 - 44 8 5
45 - 59 10 8
60 + 4 4
Men 10 8
18 - 24 8 5
25 - 34 8 5
35 - 44 10 8
45 - 59 15 13
60 + 8 7
Educational attainment
SPD Greens Left Party
2007 
(%)
+/- 2003 2007 
(%)
+/- 2003 2007 
(%)
+/- 2003
Education
High 27 -9 28 + 5 9 + 6
Medium 38 -3 12 + 2 7 + 6
Low 51 -2 4 0 8 + 8
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